Liquidity Stress Testing in Asset Management

A Comprehensive Report compiled by Thierry Roncalli

December 2021

Abstract

This report is made up of four research papers, which have been written to perform liquidity stress testing programs, which comply with ESMA regulatory guidelines: **(1)** Roncalli, T., Karray-Meziou, F., Pan, F., and Regnault, M. (2021), Liquidity Stress Testing in Asset Management — Part 1. Modeling the Liability Liquidity Risk, *Amundi Working Paper*; **(2)** Roncalli, T., Cherief, A., Karray-Meziou, F., and Regnault, M. (2021), Liquidity Stress Testing in Asset Management — Part 2. Modeling the Asset Liquidity Risk, *Amundi Working Paper*; **(3)** Roncalli, T. (2021), Liquidity Stress Testing in Asset Management — Part 3. Managing the Asset-Liability Liquidity Risk, *Amundi Working Paper*; **(4)** Roncalli, T., and Cherief, A. (2021), Liquidity Stress Testing in Asset Management — Part 4. A Step-by-step Practical Guide, *Amundi Working Paper*.

Keywords: asset-liability management, liquidity, stress testing, asset risk, funding risk, redemption rate, transaction cost, market impact, redemption coverage ratio, liquidity management tool.

JEL classification: C02, G32.

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Liquidity Stress Testing in Asset Management Part 1. Modeling the Liability Liquidity Risk*

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Abstract

This article is part of a comprehensive research project on liquidity risk in asset management, which can be divided into three dimensions. The first dimension covers liability liquidity risk (or funding liquidity) modeling, the second dimension focuses on asset liquidity risk (or market liquidity) modeling, and the third dimension considers asset-liability liquidity risk management (or asset-liability matching). The purpose of this research is to propose a methodological and practical framework in order to perform liquidity stress testing programs, which comply with regulatory guidelines (ESMA, 2019) and are useful for fund managers. The review of the academic literature and professional research studies shows that there is a lack of standardized and analytical models. The aim of this research project is then to fill the gap with the goal to develop mathematical and statistical approaches, and provide appropriate answers.

In this first part that focuses on liability liquidity risk modeling, we propose several statistical models for estimating redemption shocks. The historical approach must be complemented by an analytical approach based on zero-inflated models if we want to understand the true parameters that influence the redemption shocks. Moreover, we must also distinguish aggregate population models and individual-based models if we want to develop behavioral approaches. Once these different statistical models are calibrated, the second big issue is the risk measure to assess normal and stressed redemption shocks. Finally, the last issue is to develop a factor model that can translate stress scenarios on market risk factors into stress scenarios on fund liabilities.

Keywords: liquidity, stress testing, liability, redemption rate, redemption frequency, redemption severity, zero-inflated beta model, copula.

JEL classification: C02, G32.

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1 Introduction

Liquidity stress testing in asset management is a complex topic because it is related to three dimensions — liquidity risk, asset management and stress testing, whose linkages have been little studied and are hard to capture. First, liquidity is certainly the risk that is the most difficult to model with the systemic risk. If we consider market, credit, operational and counterparty risks, there is a huge amount of academic literature on these topics in terms of models, statistical inference and analysis. In terms of liquidity risk, the number of practical studies and applied approaches is limited. Even though a great deal of research has been completed on this subject, much of it is overly focused on descriptive analyses of liquidity, or its impact on systemic risk, or policy rules for financial regulation. Moreover, this research generally focuses on the banking sector (Grillet-Aubert, 2018). For instance, the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) of the Basel III regulatory framework are of no help when measuring the liquidity risk in asset management. In fact, the concept of liquidity risk in asset management is not well defined. More generally, it is a recent subject and we must admit that the tools and models used in asset management are very much lagging those developed in the banking sector. This is why the culture of asset-liability management (ALM) is poor in investment management, both on the side of asset managers and asset owners. Therefore, if we add the third dimension, stress testing, we obtain an unknown and obscure topic, because the combination of liquidity risk and stress testing applied to asset management is a new and difficult task.

This is not the first time that the regulatory environment has sped up the development of a risk management framework. Previous occurrences include the case of market risk with the Amendment of the first Basel Accord (BCBS, 1996), credit risk with the second consultative paper on Basel II (BCBS, 2001), credit valuation adjustment with the publication of the Basel III Accord (BCBS, 2010), interest rate risk in the banking book with the IRRBB guidelines (BCBS, 2016), etc. However, the measurement of these risks had already benefited from the existence of analytical models developed by academics and professionals. One exception was operational risk, since banks started from a blank page when asked to measure it (BCBS, 1999). Asset managers now face a similar situation at this moment. Between 2015 and 2018, the US Securities and Exchange Commission established several rules governing liquidity management (SEC, 2015, 2016, 2018a,b). In particular, Rule 22e-4 requires investment funds to classify their positions in one of four liquidity buckets (highly liquid investments, moderately liquid investments, less liquid investments and illiquid investments), establish a liquid investment minimum, and develop policies and procedures on redemptions in kind. From September 2020, European asset managers must also comply with new guidelines on liquidity stress testing (LST) published by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA, 2019). These different regulations are rooted in the agenda proposed by the Financial Stability Board to monitor and manage systemic risk of non-bank non-insurer systemically important financial institutions (FSB, 2010). Even if the original works of the FSB were biased, the idea that the asset management industry can contribute to systemic risk has gained ground and is now widely accepted. Indeed, FSB (2015) confused systemic risk and systematic market risk (Roncalli and Weisang, 2015a). However, Roncalli and Weisang (2015b) showed that "*the liquidation channel is the main component of systemic risk to which the asset management industry contributes*". In this context, liquidity is the major risk posed by the asset management industry that regulators must control. But liquidity risk is not only a concern for regulators. It must also be a priority for asset managers. The crisis of money market funds in the fourth quarter of 2008 demonstrated the fragility of some fund managers (Schmidt *et al.*, 2016). Market liquidity deteriorated in March and April 2020, triggering a liquidity shock on some investment funds

and strategies. However, aside from the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and 2020 coronavirus pandemic, which have put all asset managers under pressure, the last ten years have demonstrated that liquidity is also an individual risk for fund managers. It was especially true during episodes of flash crash[1], where fund managers reacted differently. In a similar way, idiosyncratic liquidity events may affect asset managers at the individual level (Thompson, 2019). Following some high-profile fund suspensions in mid-2019, asset managers received requests from asset owners to describe their liquidity policies and conduct a liquidity review of their portfolios. Therefore, we notice that liquidity is increasingly becoming a priority for asset managers for three main reasons, because it is a reputational risk, they are challenged by asset owners and it can be a vulnerability factor for financial performance.

However, even though liquidity stress testing in asset management has become one of the hot topics in finance, it has attracted few academics and professionals, implying that the research on this subject is not as dynamic as one might expect. In fact, it is at the same stage as operational risk was in the early 2000s, when there was no academic research on this topic. And it is also at the stage of ALM banking risk, where the most significant contributions have come from professionals. Since liquidity stress testing in asset management is an asset-liability management exercise, modeling progress mainly comes from professionals, because the subject is so specific, requires business expertise and must be underpinned by industry-level data. This is obviously an enormous hurdle for academics, and this explains the lack of modeling and scientific approach that asset managers encounter when they want to develop a liquidity stress testing framework. Therefore, the objective of this research is twofold. First, the idea is to provide a mathematical and statistical formalization to professionals in order to go beyond expert qualitative judgement. Second, the aim is to assist academics in understanding this topic. This is important, because academic research generally boosts the development of analytical models, which are essential for implementing liquidity stress testing programs in asset management.

Liquidity stress testing in asset management involves so many dimensions that we have decided to split this research into three parts:

1. liability liquidity risk modeling;
2. asset liquidity risk modeling;
3. asset-liability liquidity risk management.

Indeed, managing liquidity risk consists of three steps. First, we have to model the liability liquidity of the investment fund, especially the redemption shocks. By construction, this step must incorporate client behavior. Second, we have to develop a liquidity model for assets. For that, we must specify a transaction cost model beyond the traditional bid-ask spread measure. In particular, the model must incorporate two dimensions: price impact and trading limits. These first two steps make the distinction between funding liquidity and market liquidity. As noticed by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), these two types of liquidity may be correlated. However, we suppose that they are independent at this level of analysis. While the first step gives the liquidity amount of the investment fund that can be required by the investors, the second step gives the liquidity amount of the investment fund that can be available in the market. Therefore, the third step corresponds to the asset-liability management in terms of liquidity, that is the matching process between required liquidity and available liquidity. This implies defining the part of the redemption shock that can be managed by asset liquidation and the associated liquidity costs. It also implies

[1] For instance, during the US stock market flash crash (May 6, 2010), the US Treasury flash crash (October 15, 2014), the US ETF flash crash (August 24, 2015), etc.

defining the liquidity tools that can be put in place in order to manage the non-covered part of the redemption shock or the liquidation shortfall. For instance, a liquidity buffer is an example of one of these tools, but this is not the only solution. Redemption gates, side pockets and redemptions in kind are alternative methods, but they are extreme solutions that may break the fiduciary duties and liquidity promises of asset managers. Swing pricing is also an important ALM tool, and is a challenging question when we consider the fair calibration of swing prices.

Figure 1: The sequential approach of liquidity stress testing



The three-stage process has many advantages in terms of modeling. First, it splits a complex question into three independent and more manageable problems. This is particularly the case of liability and asset modeling. Second, managing liquidity risk becomes a sequential process, where the starting point is clearly identified. As shown in Figure 1, we should begin with the liability risk. Indeed, if we observe no inflows or outflows, the process stops here. As such, the first stage determines the amount to sell in the market and it is measured with respect to the investor behavior. The liquidity risk has its roots in the severity of the redemption shock. Market liquidity is part of the second phase. Depending on the redemption size and the liquidity of the market, the fund manager will decide the best solution to adopt. And the sequential process will conclude with the action of the fund manager[2]. Finally, the third advantage concerns the feasibility of stress testing programs. In this approach, stress testing concerns the two independent dimensions. We can stress the liquidity on the liability side, or we can stress the liquidity on the asset side, or both, but the rule is simple.

In the sequential approach, the liability of the investment fund is the central node of the liquidity risk, and the vertex of the liquidity network. However, it is not so simple, because the three nodes can be interconnected (Figure 2). If market liquidity deteriorates sharply, investors may be incited to redeem in order to avoid a liquidity trap. In this case, funding liquidity is impacted by market liquidity, reinforcing the feedback loop between funding and market liquidity, which is described by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). But this is not the only loop. For instance, the choice of an ALM decision may also influence funding liquidity. If one asset manager decides to suspend redemptions, it may be a signal for the investors of the other asset managers if they continue to meet redemptions. Again, we may observe a feedback loop between funding liquidity and asset-liability management.

[2]Of course, the fund manager's action is not uniquely determined, because it depends on several parameters. This means that two fund managers can take two different decisions even if they face the same situation in terms of redemption and market liquidity.

Finally, it is also obvious that market liquidity is related to ALM decisions, because of many factors such as trading policies, the first-mover advantage and crowding effects (Roncalli and Weisang, 2015a). It follows that the liquidity risk given in Figure 1 is best described by the dense and fully connected network given in Figure 2. Nevertheless, developing a statistical model that takes into account the three reinforcing loops is not straightforward and certainly too complex for professional use. Therefore, it is more realistic to adjust and update the sequential models with second-round effects than to have an integrated dynamic model.

Figure 2: The network risk of liquidity



Liquidity is a long-standing issue and also an elusive concept. This is particularly true in asset management, where liquidity covers several interpretations. For example, some asset classes are considered as highly liquid whereas other asset classes are illiquid. In the first category, we generally find government bonds and large cap stocks. The last category includes real estate and private equities. However, categorizing liquidity of a security is not easy and there is no consensus. Let us consider for example Rule 22e-4(b) that is applied in the US. The proposed rule was based on the ability to convert the security to cash within a given period and distinguished six buckets: (a) convertible to cash within 1 business day, (b) convertible to cash within 2-3 business days, (c) convertible to cash within 4-7 calendar days, (d) convertible to cash within 8-15 calendar days, (e) convertible to cash within 16-30 calendar days (f) convertible to cash in more than one month. Finally, the adopted rule is the following:

1. highly liquid investments (convertible to cash within three business days);
2. moderately liquid investments (convertible to cash within four to seven calendar days);
3. less liquid investments (expected to be sold in more than seven calendar days);
4. illiquid investments (cannot be sold in seven calendar days or less without significant price impact).

Classifying a security into a bucket may be different from one fund manager to another. Moreover, the previous categories depend on the market conditions. Nevertheless, even if the current market liquidity is abundant, securities that can be categorized in the first bucket must also face episodes of liquidity shortage (Blanqué and Mortier, 2019a). A typical example concerns government bonds facing idiosyncratic risks. Blanqué and Mortier (2019a)

gave the case of Italian bonds in 2018 during the discussion on the budget deficit. However, most of the time, when we consider the liquidity of an asset class, we assume that it is static. Certainly, this way of thinking reflects the practice of portfolio management. Indeed, it is common to include a constant illiquidity premium when estimating the expected returns of illiquid assets. But investors should stick to their investments without rebalancing and trading if they want to capture this illiquidity premium. The split between liquid and illiquid investments does not help, because it is related to the absolute level of asset illiquidity, and not liquidity dynamics. However, the issue is more complex:

> "*[...] there is also broad belief among users of financial liquidity – traders, investors and central bankers – that the principal challenge is not the average level of financial liquidity... but its variability and uncertainty*" (Persaud, 2003).

This observation is important because it is related to the liquidity question from a regulatory point of view. The liquidity risk of private equities or real assets is not a big concern for regulators, because one knows that these asset classes are illiquid. Even if they become more illiquid at some point, this should not dramatically influence investors (asset managers and owners). Regulators and investors are more concerned by securities that are liquid under some market conditions and illiquid under other market conditions. At first sight, it is therefore a paradox that liquidity stress testing programs must mainly focus on highly or moderately liquid instruments than on illiquid instruments. In fact, liquidity does not like surprises and changes. This is why the liquidity issue is related to the cross-section of the expected illiquidity premium for illiquid assets, but to the time-series illiquidity variance for liquid assets.

This is all the more important that the liquidity risk must be measured and managed in a stress testing framework, which adds another layer of complexity. Indeed, stress scenarios are always difficult to interpret, and calibrating them is a balancing act, because they must correspond to extreme but also plausible events (Roncalli, 2020). This is why the historical method is the most used approach when performing stress testing. However, it is very poor and not flexible in terms of risk management. Parametric approaches must be preferred since stress periods are very heterogenous and outcomes are uncertain. Therefore, it makes more sense to estimate and use stressed liquidity parameters than directly estimate a stressed liquidity outcome. In this approach, the normal model is the baseline model on which we could apply scenario analysis on the different parameters that define the liquidity model. This is certainly the best way to proceed if we want to develop a factor-based liquidity stress testing program, which is an important issue for fund management. Otherwise, liquidity stress testing would be likely to remain a regulatory constraint or a pure exercise of risk measurement, but certainly not a risk management process supporting investment policies and fund management.

This paper is organized as follows. Section Two introduces the concept of redemption rates and defines the historical approach of liquidity stress testing. In Section Three, we consider parametric models that can be used to estimate redemption shocks. This implies making the distinction between the redemption event and the redemption amount. From a statistical point of view, this is equivalent to modeling the redemption frequency and the redemption severity. After having developed an aggregate population model, we consider an individual-based model. It can be considered as a first attempt to develop a behavioral model, which is the central theme of Section Four. We analyze the simple case where redemptions between investors are independent and then extend the model where redemptions are correlated to take into account spillover effects and contagion risk. Then, we develop factor-based models of liquidity stress testing in Section Five. Finally, Section Six offers some concluding remarks.

2 Understanding the liability side of liquidity risk

In order to assess the liquidity risk of an investment fund, we must model its '*funding*' liquidity. Therefore, managing the liquidity in asset management looks like a banking asset-liability management process (Roncalli, 2020). However, there is a major difference since banking ALM concerns both balance sheet and income statement. This is not the case of an investment fund, because we only focus on its balance sheet and the objective is to model the redemption flows.

2.1 Balance sheet of an investment fund

In order to define the liability risk, we first have to understand the balance sheet of a collective investment fund. A simplified illustration is given in Figure 3 for a mutual fund. The total (gross) assets $A(t)$ correspond to the market value of the investment portfolio. They include stocks, bonds and all financial instruments that are invested. On the liability side, we have two main balance sheet items. The first one corresponds to the debits $D(t)$, which are also called current or accrued liabilities. They are all the expenses incurred by the mutual fund. For instance, the current liabilities include money owed to lending banks, fees owed to the fund manager and the custodian, etc. The second liability item is the unit capital $C(t)$, which is owned by the investors. Each investor owns a number of units (or shares) and is referred to as a '*unitholder*'. This unit capital is equivalent to the equity concept of a financial institution. A unitholder is then also called a shareholder in reference to capital markets.

Figure 3: Balance sheet of mutual funds



2.1.1 Definition of net asset value

The total net assets (TNA) equal the total value of assets less the current or accrued liabilities:

$$\text{TNA}(t) = A(t) - D(t)$$

The net asset value (NAV) represents the share price or the unit price. It is equal to:

$$\text{NAV}(t) = \frac{\text{TNA}(t)}{N(t)} \tag{1}$$

where the total number $N(t)$ of shares or units in issue is the sum of all units owned by all unitholders. The previous accounting rules show that the capital is exactly equal to the

total net assets, which is also called the assets under management (AUM). The investment fund's capital is therefore an endogenous variable and depends on the performance of the total net assets:

$$\begin{aligned} C(t) &= N(t) \cdot \text{NAV}(t) \\ &= \text{TNA}(t) \end{aligned}$$

At time $t+1$, we assume that the portfolio's return is equal to $R(t+1)$. Since $D(t) \ll A(t)$, it follows that:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{TNA}(t+1) &= A(t+1) - D(t+1) \\ &= (1 + R(t+1)) A(t) - D(t+1) \\ &\approx (1 + R(t+1)) \cdot \text{TNA}(t) \end{aligned}$$

meaning that:

$$\text{NAV}(t+1) \approx (1 + R(t+1)) \cdot \text{NAV}(t)$$

The investment fund's capital is therefore time-varying. It increases when the performance of the asset is positive, and it decreases otherwise.

Remark 1 *In the sequel, we assume that the mutual fund is priced daily, meaning that the NAV of the mutual fund is calculated at the end of the market day. Therefore, the time t represents the current market day, whereas the time $t+1$ corresponds to the next market day.*

2.1.2 The effect of subscriptions and redemptions

Let us now introduce the impact of subscriptions and redemptions. In this case, new and current investors may purchase new mutual fund units, while existing investors may redeem all or part of their shares. Subscription and redemption orders must be known by the fund manager before $t+1$ in order to be executed. In this case, the number of units becomes:

$$N(t+1) = N(t) + N^+(t+1) - N^-(t+1)$$

where $N^+(t+1)$ is the number of units to be created and $N^-(t+1)$ is the number of units to be redeemed. At time $t+1$, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{NAV}(t+1) &= \frac{\text{TNA}(t+1)}{N(t+1)} \\ &= \frac{\text{TNA}(t+1)}{N(t) + N^+(t+1) - N^-(t+1)} \end{aligned}$$

We deduce that:

$$\text{TNA}(t+1) = N(t) \cdot \text{NAV}(t+1) + \mathcal{F}^+(t+1) - \mathcal{F}^-(t+1) \tag{2}$$

where $\mathcal{F}^+(t+1) = N^+(t+1) \cdot \text{NAV}(t+1)$ and $\mathcal{F}^-(t+1) = N^-(t+1) \cdot \text{NAV}(t+1)$ are the investment inflows and outflows. Again, we notice that the investment fund's capital is time-varying and depends on the fund flows.

From Equation (2), we deduce that:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{TNA}(t+1) &= N(t) \cdot \text{NAV}(t+1) + \mathcal{F}^+(t+1) - \mathcal{F}^-(t+1) \\ &\approx N(t) \cdot (1 + R(t+1)) \cdot \text{NAV}(t) + \mathcal{F}^+(t+1) - \mathcal{F}^-(t+1) \\ &= (1 + R(t+1)) \cdot \text{TNA}(t) + \mathcal{F}^+(t+1) - \mathcal{F}^-(t+1) \end{aligned}$$

The current net assets are approximatively equal to the previous net assets plus the performance value plus the net flow. We retrieve the famous formula of Sirri and Tufano (1998) when we want to estimate the net flow from the NAV and TNA of the fund:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{F}(t+1) &= \mathcal{F}^{+}(t+1) - \mathcal{F}^{-}(t+1) \\ &= \text{TNA}(t+1) - (1+R(t+1)) \cdot \text{TNA}(t) \\ &= \text{TNA}(t+1) - \left(\frac{\text{NAV}(t+1)}{\text{NAV}(t)}\right) \text{TNA}(t) \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

2.1.3 Liability risks

Since the capital is a residual, we face three liability risks. The first one deals with the accrued liabilities $D(t)$. Generally, the debits are a very small part of the liabilities. However, we can potentially face some situations where the debits are larger than the assets, implying that the net asset value becomes negative. In particular, this type of situation occurs when the fund is highly leveraged. The second risk concerns the inflows. If the investment fund has a big subscription, it may have some difficulties buying the financial instruments. For instance, this type of situation may occur when the fund must buy fixed-income securities in a bond bull market and it is difficult to find investors who are looking to sell bonds. The third liability risk is produced by the outflows. In this case, the fund manager must sell assets, which could be difficult in illiquid and stressed market conditions. The last two situations are produced when supply and demand dynamics are totally unbalanced (higher supply for buying assets or higher demand for selling assets). In this article, we focus on the third liability risk, which is also called redemption risk.

2.2 Measuring redemption risk

In order to assess an investment fund's redemption risk, we need an objective measurement system, which is well scaled. For instance, the outflows $\mathcal{F}^{-}(t)$ are not very interesting, because they depend on the investment fund's assets under management. In fact, they must be scaled in order to be a homogeneous measure that can be used to compare the redemption behavior across time, across funds and across investors.

2.2.1 Gross redemption rate

The (gross) redemption rate is defined as the ratio between the fund's redemption flows and total net assets:

$$\mathcal{R}(t) = \frac{\mathcal{F}^{-}(t)}{\text{TNA}(t)} \tag{4}$$

We verify the property that $\mathcal{R}(t) \in [0,1]$. For example, if we observe an outflow of \$100 mn for a fund of \$5 bn, we have $\mathcal{R}(t) = 100/5\,000 = 2\%$. In the case where the outflow is \$10 mn and the fund size is \$100 mn, the redemption rate is equal to 10%. The redemption is more severe for the small fund than for the large fund.

We notice that Equation (4) is used to calculate the ex-post redemption rate, meaning that the value of outflows is known. Therefore, Equation (4) corresponds to the definition of the redemption rate, but it can also be used to estimate or predict the redemption flows. Indeed, we have:

$$\hat{\mathcal{F}}^{-}(t+1) = \mathcal{R}(t+1) \cdot \text{TNA}(t) \tag{5}$$

In this case, $\mathcal{R}(t+1)$ is a random variable and is not known at the current time t. By assuming that redemption rates are stationary, the challenge is then to model the associated probability distribution $\mathbf{F}$.

2.2.2 Net redemption rate

The guidelines on the liquidity stress testing published by ESMA (2019) refer to both gross and net redemptions:

> "*LST should be adapted appropriately to each fund, including by adapting: [...] the assumptions regarding investor behaviour (gross and net redemptions)*" (ESMA, 2019, page 36).

Following this remark, we can also define the net flow rate by considering both inflows and outflows:

$$\mathcal{R}^{\pm}(t) = \frac{\mathcal{F}(t)}{\text{TNA}(t)} \tag{6}$$

This quantity is more complex than the previous one, because it cannot be used from an ex-ante point of view:

$$\hat{\mathcal{F}}(t+1) \neq \mathcal{R}^{\pm}(t+1) \cdot \text{TNA}(t)$$

The reason is that the outflows are bounded and cannot exceed the current assets under management. This is not the case for the inflows. For example, we consider a fund with a size of \$100 mn. By construction, we have[3] $\hat{\mathcal{F}}^{-}(t+1) \leq 100$, but we can imagine that $\hat{\mathcal{F}}^{+}(t+1) > 100$. The fund size can double or triple, in particular when the investment fund is young and small.

Nevertheless, the use of net flows is not foolish since the true liability risk of the fund is on the net flows. If the fund manager faces a large redemption, which is offset by a large subscription, there is no liquidity risk. The issue is that the use of net flows is difficult to justify in stress periods. In these cases, inflows generally disappear and the probability distribution of $\mathcal{R}^{\pm}(t)$ may not reflect the liability risk in a stress testing framework. For example, let us consider an asset class that has experienced a bull market over the last three years. Certainly, we will mainly observe positive net flows and a very small number of observations with negative net flows. We may think that these data are not relevant for building stress scenarios. More generally, if an asset manager uses net flow rates for stress testing purposes, only the observations during historical stress periods are relevant, meaning that the calibration is based on a small fraction of the dataset.

In fact, the use of net flows is motivated by other considerations. Indeed, the computation of $\mathcal{R}(t)$ requires us to know the outflows $\mathcal{F}^{-}(t)$ exactly. Moreover, as we will see later, $\mathcal{R}(t)$ must be computed for all the investor categories that are present in the fund (retail, private banking, institutional, etc.). This implies in-depth knowledge of the fund's balance sheet liability, meaning that the asset manager must have a database with all the flows of all the investors on a daily basis. From an industrial point of view, this is a big challenge in terms of IT systems between the asset manager and the custodian. This is why many asset managers don't have the disaggregated information on the liability flows. An alternative measure is to compute the net redemption rate, which corresponds to the negative part of the net flow rate:

$$\mathcal{R}^{-}(t) = \max\left(0, -\frac{\mathcal{F}(t)}{\text{TNA}(t)}\right)$$

It has the good mathematical property that $\mathcal{R}^{-}(t) \in [0,1]$. Indeed, we have:

$$\mathcal{R}^{-}(t) = \max\left(0, \frac{\mathcal{F}^{-}(t) - \mathcal{F}^{+}(t)}{\text{TNA}(t)}\right) \tag{7}$$

[3] In order to simplify the calculus, we do not take into account the daily performance of the fund.

and its maximum value is reached when $\mathcal{F}^{-}(t) = \text{TNA}(t)$ and $\mathcal{F}^{+}(t) = 0$. Moreover, we notice that the net redemption rate is equal to the gross redemption rate when there are no inflows:

$$\mathcal{R}^{-}(t) = \max\left(0, \frac{\mathcal{F}^{-}(t)}{\text{TNA}(t)}\right) = \mathcal{R}(t)$$

Otherwise, we have:

$$\mathcal{R}^{-}(t) < \mathcal{R}(t)$$

From a risk management point of view, it follows that redemption shocks based on net redemptions may be underestimated compared to redemption shocks based on gross redemptions. However, we will see later that the approximation $\mathcal{R}(t) \approx \mathcal{R}^{-}(t)$ may be empirically valid under some conditions.

2.2.3 Liability classification

The computation of redemption rates only makes sense if they are homogeneous, coherent and comparable. Let us assume that we compute the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}(t)$ at the level of the asset management company, and we have the historical data for the last ten years. By assuming that there are 260 market days per year, we have a sample of 2 600 redemption rates. We can compute the mean, the standard deviation, different quantiles, etc. Does it help with building a stress scenario for a mutual fund? Certainly not, because redemptions depend on the specific investor behavior at the fund level and not on the overall investor behavior at the asset manager level. For instance, we can assume that an investor does not have the same behavior if he is invested in an equity fund or a money market fund. We can also assume that the redemption behavior is not the same for a central bank, a retail investor, or a pension fund. Therefore, we must build categories that correspond to homogenous behaviors. Otherwise, we will obtain categories, whose behavior is non-stationary. But, without the stationarity property, risk measurement is impossible and stress testing is a hazardous exercise.

Therefore, liability categorization is an important step before computing redemption rates. For instance, ESMA (2019) considers four factors regarding investor behavior: investor category, investor concentration, investor location and investor strategy. Even though the last three factors are significant, the most important factor remains the investor type. For instance, AMF (2017, page 12) gives an example with the following investor types: large institutional (tier one), small institutional (tier two), investment (or mutual) fund, private banking network and retail investor. Other categories can be added: central bank, sovereign, corporate, third-party distributor, employee savings plan, wealth management, etc. Moreover, it is also important to classify funds into homogeneous buckets such as balanced funds, bond funds, equity funds, etc. An example of an investor/fund categorization matrix is given in Table 1.

Remark 2 *The granularity of the investor/fund classification is an important issue. It is important to have a very detailed classification at the level of the database in order to group categories together from a computational point of view. In order to calibrate stress scenarios, we must have a sufficient number of observations in each cell of the classification matrix. Let us for instance consider the case of central banks. We can suppose that their behavior is very different to the other investors. Therefore, it is important for an asset manager to be aware of the liabilities with respect to central banks. Nevertheless, there are few central banks in the world, meaning we may not have enough observations for calibrating some cells (e.g. central bank/equity or central bank/real asset), and we have to merge some cells (across investor and fund categories).*

Table 1: An example of two-dimensional categorization matrix

Investor category	Absolute return	Balanced	Bond	Commodity	Enhanced treasury	Equity	Money market	Real asset	Structured
Central bank									
Corporate									
Institutional									
Insurance									
Internal									
Pension fund									
Retail									
Sovereign									
Third-party distributor									
Wealth management									

2.2.4 The arithmetic of redemption rates

We consider a fund. We note $\text{TNA}_i(t)$ the assets under management of the investor i for this fund. By definition, we have:

$$\text{TNA}_i(t) = N_i(t) \cdot \text{NAV}(t)$$

where $\text{NAV}(t)$ is the net asset value of the fund and $N_i(t)$ is the number of units held by the investor i for the fund. The fund's assets under management are equal to:

$$\text{TNA}(t) = \sum_k \text{TNA}_{(k)}(t)$$

where $\text{TNA}_{(k)}(t) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{IC}_{(k)}} \text{TNA}_i(t)$, and $\mathcal{IC}_{(k)}$ is the k^{th} investor category. It follows that:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{TNA}(t) &= \sum_k \sum_{i \in \mathcal{IC}_{(k)}} \text{TNA}_i(t) \\
&= \sum_k \sum_{i \in \mathcal{IC}_{(k)}} N_i(t) \cdot \text{NAV}(t) \\
&= N(t) \cdot \text{NAV}(t)
\end{aligned}$$

where $N(t) = \sum_k \sum_{i \in \mathcal{IC}_{(k)}} N_i(t)$ is the total number of units in issue. We retrieve the definition of the assets under management (or total net assets) at the fund level. We can obtain a similar breakdown for the outflows[4]:

$$\mathcal{F}^-(t) = \sum_k \sum_{i \in \mathcal{IC}_{(k)}} \mathcal{F}_i^-(t) = \sum_k \mathcal{F}_{(k)}^-(t)$$

The redemption rate for the investor category $\mathcal{IC}_{(k)}$ is then equal to:

$$\mathcal{R}_{(k)}(t) = \frac{\mathcal{F}_{(k)}^-(t)}{\text{TNA}_{(k)}(t)} \tag{8}$$

[4] We have $\mathcal{F}_k^-(t) = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{IC}_{(k)}} \mathcal{F}_i^-(t)$.

We deduce that the relationship between the investor-based redemption rates and the fund-based redemption rate is:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{R}(t) &= \frac{\mathcal{F}^{-}(t)}{\text{TNA}(t)} \\ &= \frac{\sum_k \mathcal{F}^{-}_{(k)}(t)}{\text{TNA}(t)} \\ &= \frac{\sum_k \text{TNA}_{(k)}(t) \cdot \mathcal{R}_{(k)}(t)}{\text{TNA}(t)} \\ &= \sum_k \omega_{(k)}(t) \cdot \mathcal{R}_{(k)}(t) \end{aligned} \tag{9}$$

where $\omega_{(k)}(t)$ represents the weights of the investor category $\mathcal{IC}_{(k)}$ in the fund:

$$\omega_{(k)}(t) = \frac{\text{TNA}_{(k)}(t)}{\text{TNA}(t)}$$

Equation (9) is very important, because it shows that the redemption rate at the fund level is a weighted-average of the redemption rates of the different investor categories.

Let us now consider different funds. We note $\mathcal{R}_{(f,k)}(t)$ as the redemption rate of the investor category $\mathcal{IC}_{(k)}$ for the fund f at time t. By relating the fund f to its fund category $\mathcal{FC}_{(j)}$, we obtain a database of redemption rates by investor category $\mathcal{IC}_{(k)}$ and fund category $\mathcal{FC}_{(j)}$:

$$\mathcal{DB}_{(j,k)}(T) = \left\{\mathcal{R}_{(f,k)}(t) : f \in \mathcal{FC}_{(j)}, t \in T\right\}$$

$\mathcal{DB}_{(j,k)}(T)$ is then the sample of all redemption rates of the investor category $\mathcal{IC}_{(k)}$ for all the funds that fall into the fund category $\mathcal{FC}_{(j)}$ during the observation period T. We notice that $\mathcal{DB}_{(j,k)}(t)$ does not have a unique element for a given date t because we generally observe several redemptions at the same date for different funds and the same investor category.

2.3 Calibration of historical redemption scenarios

The key parameter for computing the redemption flows is the redemption rate, which is defined for an investor category and a fund category. It is not calibrated at the fund level, because past redemption data for a given specific fund are generally not enough to obtain a robust estimation. This is why we have pooled redemption data as described in the previous paragraph. Using these data, we can estimate the probability distribution $\mathbf{F}$ of the redemption rate and define several statistics that can help to build stress scenarios.

2.3.1 Data

In what follows, we consider the liability data provided by Amundi Asset Management from January, 1st 2019 to August, 19th 2020. The database is called '*Amundi Cube Database*' and contains 1 617 403 observations if we filter based on funds with assets under management greater than €5 mn. The breakdown by investor categories[5] is given in Table 40 on page 102. The number of observations is 464 399 for retail investors, 310 452 for third-party distributors, 267 600 for institutionals, etc. The investor category which is the smallest is central banks with 15 523 observations. In terms of fund categories, bond, equity and balanced funds dominate with respectively 452 942, 436 401 and 361 488 observations. The smallest

[5]The Amundi database contains 13 investor and 13 fund categories.

categories are private loan funds and real estate funds. In terms of classification matrix, the largest matrix cells are retail/balanced, third-party distributor/equity, retail/equity, institutional/bond, retail/bond, third-party distributor/bond, retail/structured, etc.

Remark 3 *In what follows, we apply a filter that consists in removing observations that corresponds to dedicated mutual funds (FCP and SICAV) and mandates (see Table 41 on page 103). The motivation is to focus on mutual funds with several investors, and this issue will be extensively discussed in Section 4.1.3 on page 54.*

2.3.2 Net flow, net redemption and gross redemption rates

Figure 4: Retail investor



We first begin by comparing the gross redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$, the net flow rate $\mathcal{R}^{\pm}$ and the net redemption rate $\mathcal{R}^{-}$. Some results are given in Figures 4 and 5 for retail and insurance investors and bond and equity funds. In the case of insurance companies, we notice that the approximation $\mathcal{R} \approx \mathcal{R}^{-} \approx -\mathcal{R}^{\pm}$ is valid when the redemption rate is greater than 20%. This is not the case for retail investors, where we observe that some large redemptions may be offset by large subscriptions[6]. The difference between retail and insurance categories lies in the investor concentration. When an investor category is concentrated, there is a low probability that this offsetting effect will be observed. This is not the case when the granularity of the investor category is high. We also observe that the approximation $\mathcal{R} \approx \mathcal{R}^{-} \approx -\mathcal{R}^{\pm}$ depends on the fund category. For instance, it is not valid for money market funds. The reason is that we generally observe subscriptions in a bull market and redemptions in a bear market when the investment decision mainly depends on the performance of the asset class. This is why large redemptions and subscriptions tend to be mutually exclusive (in the mathematical sense) in equity or bond funds. The mutual exclusivity property is more difficult

[6]We observe the same phenomenon when we consider the data of third-party distributors (see Figure 37 on page 104).

Figure 5: Insurance



Figure 6: Money market fund



to observe for money market, enhanced treasury or balanced funds, because their inflows are less dependent on market conditions. We conclude that net redemption rates may be used in order to perform stress scenarios under some conditions regarding the concentration of the investor category and the type of mutual fund.

2.3.3 Statistical risk measures

For a given investor/fund category, we note $\mathbf{F}$ as the probability distribution of the redemption rate. We can define several risk measures (Roncalli, 2020, pages 62-63):

- the mean:

$$\mathbb{M} = \int_0^1 x \, \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}(x)$$

- the standard deviation-based risk measure:

$$\mathbb{SD}(c) = \mathbb{M} + c \int_0^1 \left(x - \mathbb{M}^2\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}(x)$$

- the quantile (or the value-at-risk) at the confidence level α:

$$\mathbb{Q}(\alpha) = \mathbf{F}^{-1}(\alpha)$$

- the average beyond the quantile (or the conditional value-at-risk):

$$\mathbb{C}(\alpha) = \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{R} \mid \mathcal{R} \geq \mathbf{F}^{-1}(\alpha)\right]$$

The choice of a risk measure depends on its use. For instance, $\mathbb{M}$ can be used by the fund manager daily, because it is the expected value of the daily redemption rate. If the fund manager prefers to have a more conservative measure, he can use $\mathbb{SD}(1)$. $\mathbb{M}$ and $\mathbb{SD}(c)$ make sense in normal periods from a portfolio management perspective, but they are less relevant in a stress period. This is why it is better to use $\mathbb{Q}(\alpha)$ and $\mathbb{C}(\alpha)$ from a risk management point of view. In the asset management industry, the consensus is to set $\alpha = 99\%$.

In Table 2, we have reported the values of $\mathbb{M}$, $\mathbb{Q}(99\%)$ and $\mathbb{C}(99\%)$ by considering the empirical distribution of gross redemption rates by client category. We do not consider the $\mathbb{SD}$-measure because we will see later that there is an issue when it is directly computed from a sample of historical redemption rates. On average, the expected redemption rate is roughly equal to 20 bps. It differs from one client category to another, since the lowest value of $\mathbb{M}$ is observed for central banks whereas the highest value of $\mathbb{M}$ is observed for corporates. The 99% value-at-risk is equal to 3.5%. This means that we observe a redemption rate of 3.5% every 100 days, that is every five months. Again, there are some big differences between the client categories. The riskiest category is corporate followed by sovereign and auto-consumption. If we focus on the conditional value-at-risk, we are surprised by the high values taken by $\mathbb{C}(99\%)$. If we consider all investor categories, $\mathbb{C}(99\%)$ is more than 15%, and the ratio $\mathbb{R}(99\%)$ between $\mathbb{C}(99\%)$ and $\mathbb{Q}(99\%)$ is equal to 4.51. This is a very high figure since this ratio is generally less than 2 for market and credit risks. For example, in the case of a Gaussian distribution $\mathcal{N}\left(0, \sigma^2\right)$, the ratio $\mathbb{R}(\alpha)$ between the conditional value-at-risk and the value-at-risk is equal to:

$$\mathbb{R}(\alpha) = \frac{\mathbb{C}(\alpha)}{\mathbb{Q}(\alpha)} = \frac{\phi\left(\Phi^{-1}(\alpha)\right)}{(1-\alpha)\,\Phi^{-1}(\alpha)}$$

This ratio is respectively equal to 1.37 and 1.15 when $\alpha = 90\%$ and $\alpha = 99\%$. Moreover, Roncalli (2020, page 118) showed that it is a decreasing function of α and:

$$\lim_{\alpha \to 1^-} \mathbb{R}(\alpha) = 1$$

We deduce that the ratio is lower than 1.5 for reasonable values of the confidence level α. Therefore, the previous figure $\mathbb{R}(99\%) = 4.51$ indicates that redemption risk is more skewed than market and credit risks.

Table 2: Redemption statistical measures in % by investor category

Client	$\mathbb{M}$	$\mathbb{Q}(99\%)$	$\mathbb{C}(99\%)$	$\mathbb{R}(99\%)$
Auto-consumption	0.38	7.44	24.86	3.34
Central bank	0.04	0.00	4.38	∞
Corporate	0.54	12.71	28.21	2.22
Corporate pension fund	0.13	0.50	13.06	26.22
Employee savings plan	0.06	1.13	4.86	4.30
Institutional	0.27	5.11	22.79	4.46
Insurance	0.26	5.25	21.24	4.05
Other	0.23	3.41	20.22	5.92
Retail	0.15	1.92	9.18	4.77
Sovereign	0.45	8.28	39.85	4.81
Third-party distributor	0.23	3.90	13.72	3.52
Total	0.22	3.50	15.79	4.51

Table 3 reports the statistical measures by fund category. Again, we observe some big differences. Money market and enhanced treasury funds face a high redemption risk followed by bond and equity funds. This is normal because treasury funds can be converted to cash very quickly, investors are motivated to redeem these funds when they need cash, and their holding period is short. At the global level, we also notice that the redemption behavior is similar between bond and equity funds. For instance, their 99% value-at-risk is close to 3% (compared to 6% for the enhanced treasury category and 22% for money market funds). Another interesting result is the lower redemption rate of balanced funds compared to bond and equity funds. This result is normal because balanced funds are more diversified. Therefore, investors in balanced funds are more or less protected by a bond crisis or an equity crisis. Finally, structured funds are the least exposed category to redemption risk, because they generally include a capital guarantee or protection option.

Table 3: Redemption statistical measures in % by fund category

Fund	$\mathbb{M}$	$\mathbb{Q}(99\%)$	$\mathbb{C}(99\%)$	$\mathbb{R}(99\%)$
Balanced	0.14	1.77	8.14	4.61
Bond	0.20	3.18	14.23	4.47
Enhanced treasury	0.40	6.30	31.15	4.94
Equity	0.18	2.68	12.94	4.84
Money market	1.06	21.76	46.13	2.12
Other	0.11	1.19	9.32	7.84
Structured	0.04	0.45	3.52	7.88
Total	0.22	3.50	15.79	4.51

Table 4: Historical $\mathbb{M}$-statistic in % by investor/fund category

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Auto-consumption	0.27	0.36	0.65	0.30	1.58	0.18		0.38
Central bank	0.01	0.06		0.11				0.04
Corporate	0.08	0.15	0.27	0.25	1.52	0.07		0.54
Corporate pension fund	0.17	0.05	0.10	0.10	0.55	0.00		0.13
Employee savings plan	0.03	0.05	0.13	0.06	0.06		0.08	0.06
Institutional	0.13	0.16	0.64	0.18	1.47	0.06		0.27
Insurance	0.17	0.15	0.12	0.16	0.90	0.08		0.26
Other	0.08	0.10	0.33	0.21	0.76	0.02		0.23
Retail	0.15	0.14	0.26	0.16	0.91	0.07	0.04	0.15
Sovereign	0.01	0.01	0.16	0.19	1.91	0.06		0.45
Third-party distributor	0.12	0.24	0.67	0.19	0.92	0.28	0.08	0.23
Total	0.14	0.20	0.40	0.18	1.06	0.11	0.04	0.22

Table 5: Historical $\mathbb{Q}$-statistic in % by investor/fund category

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Auto-consumption	2.93	7.57	12.62	5.46	25.98	3.23		7.44
Central bank	0.00	0.00		0.12				0.00
Corporate	0.30	1.58	4.90	3.88	24.14	0.00		12.71
Corporate pension fund	0.39	0.05	1.30	0.03	13.09	0.00		0.50
Employee savings plan	1.06	1.70	2.35	1.08	2.51		0.25	1.13
Institutional	0.84	1.94	8.68	3.10	34.82	0.00		5.11
Insurance	0.32	0.21	3.87	0.50	18.39	0.00		5.25
Other	0.73	0.56	2.40	2.20	14.75	0.05		3.41
Retail	2.01	1.50	4.72	1.65	18.36	1.17	0.45	1.92
Sovereign	0.11	0.14	7.98	0.22	66.36	0.00		8.28
Third-party distributor	1.32	4.59	11.13	3.38	14.66	3.96	1.11	3.90
Total	1.77	3.18	6.30	2.68	21.76	1.19	0.45	3.50

Table 6: Historical $\mathbb{C}$-statistic in % by investor/fund category

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Auto-consumption	21.08	23.37	40.73	21.24	54.96	15.50		24.86
Central bank	1.28	6.05		10.11				4.38
Corporate	7.31	14.98	22.80	22.48	38.37	6.52		28.21
Corporate pension fund	17.22	5.14	9.24	9.58	32.33	0.00		13.06
Employee savings plan	2.48	3.16	10.60	4.91	4.97		7.91	4.86
Institutional	10.99	15.40	62.30	16.27	58.10	6.26		22.79
Insurance	16.35	14.65	10.59	15.32	37.28	7.62		21.24
Other	7.45	9.84	32.56	18.61	46.88	2.17		20.22
Retail	7.02	8.34	15.99	8.95	44.38	5.03	3.03	9.18
Sovereign	0.39	1.35	15.20	17.97	86.47	5.73		39.85
Third-party distributor	6.69	14.53	42.24	11.22	32.68	20.16	6.85	13.72
Total	8.14	14.23	31.15	12.94	46.13	9.32	3.52	15.79

(1) = balanced, (2) = bond, (3) = enhanced treasury, (4) = equity, (5) = money market, (6) = other, (7) = structured, (8) = total

The historical statistical measures[7] for the classification matrix are given in Tables 4, 5 and 6. We notice that the two dimensions are important, since one dimension does not dominate the other. This means that a low-risk (resp. high-risk) investor category tends to present the lowest (resp. highest) redemption statistics whatever the fund category. In addition, the ranking of redemption statistics between fund categories is similar whatever the investor category. Nevertheless, we observe some exceptions and new stylized facts. For instance, we have previously noticed that bond and equity funds have similar redemption rates on average. This is not the case for the corporate, corporate pension fund and sovereign categories, for which historical $\mathbb{C}$-statistics are more important for equity funds than bond funds. For the corporate pension fund category, the risk is also higher for balanced funds than for bond funds.

2.3.4 Defining historical stress scenarios

According to BCBS (2017, page 60), a historical stress scenario "*aims at replicating the changes in risk factor shocks that took place in an actual past episode*". If we apply this definition to the redemption risk, the computation of the historical stress scenario is simple. First, we have to choose a stress period T^{stress} and second, we compute the maximum redemption rate:

$$\mathbb{X}\left(T^{\text{stress}}\right) = \max_{t \in T^{\text{stress}}} \mathcal{R}\left(t\right)$$

For example, if we apply this definition to our study period, we obtain the results given in Table 7. We recall that the study period runs from January 2019 to August 2020 and includes the Coronavirus pandemic crisis, which was a redemption stress period. We observe that the $\mathbb{X}$-statistic is generally equal to 100%! This is a big issue, because it is not helpful to consider that liquidity stress testing of liabilities leads to a figure of 100%. The problem is that the $\mathbb{X}$-statistic is not adapted to redemption risk. Let us consider an investor category $\mathcal{IC}_{(k)}$ and a fund category $\mathcal{FC}_{(j)}$. The $\mathbb{X}$-statistic is computed by taking the maximum of all redemption rates for all funds that belong to the fund category:

$$\mathbb{X}_{(j,k)}\left(T^{\text{stress}}\right) = \max_{t \in T^{\text{stress}}} \left\{\mathcal{R}_{(f,k)}\left(t\right) : f \in \mathcal{FC}_{(j)}\right\}$$

If there is one fund with only one investor and if this investor redeems 100%, $\mathbb{X}_{(j,k)}\left(T^{\text{stress}}\right)$ is equal to 100%. However, the asset manager does not really face a liquidity risk in this situation, because there is no other investor in this fund. So, the other investors are not penalized. We have excluded this type of fund. However, we face a similar situation in many other cases: small funds with a large fund holder, funds with a low number of unitholders, etc. Moreover, this type of approach penalizes big asset managers, which have hundreds of funds. Let us consider an example. For a given investor/fund category, the fund manager A has 100 funds of \$100 million, whereas the fund manager B has one fund of \$10 billion. From a theoretical point of view, A and B face the same redemption risk, since they both manage \$10 billions for the same investor/fund category. However, it is obvious that $\mathbb{X}_A \gg \mathbb{X}_B$, meaning that the historical stress scenario for the fund manager A will be much higher than the historical stress scenario for the fund manager B. This is just a probabilistic counting principle as shown in Appendix A.1 on page 88. If we consider the previous example, the historical stress scenario for the fund manager A is larger than 99.9% when the historical stress scenario for the fund manager B is larger than 6.68% (see Figure 38 on page 105). More generally, the two stress scenarios are related in the following manner:

$$\mathbb{X}_n = 1 - \left(1 - \mathbb{X}_1\right)^n$$

where $\mathbb{X}_1$ is the $\mathbb{X}$-measure for one fund and $\mathbb{X}_n$ is the $\mathbb{X}$-measure for n funds.

[7] They are not calculated if the number of observations is less than 200.

Table 7: Historical $\mathbb{X}$-statistic in % by investor/fund category

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Auto-consumption	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	99.65	100.00	
Central bank	9.17	29.60		50.00			
Corporate	78.64	83.44	100.00	94.14	97.72	100.00	
Corporate pension fund	100.00	100.00	15.79	100.00	94.78	0.00	
Employee savings plan	50.79	15.35	100.00	100.00	14.71		100.00
Institutional	99.09	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	
Insurance	99.99	100.00	56.96	100.00	99.93	77.13	
Other	50.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	
Retail	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Sovereign	5.44	21.12	24.91	100.00	100.00	100.00	
Third-party distributor	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	97.04	100.00	97.98

(1) = balanced, (2) = bond, (3) = enhanced treasury, (4) = equity, (5) = money market, (6) = other, (7) = structured

Remark 4 *Another approach consists in computing the average redemption rate daily:*

$$\mathcal{R}_{(j,k)}(t) = \sum_{f \in \mathcal{FC}_{(j)}} \frac{\text{TNA}_{(f)}}{\sum_{f \in \mathcal{FC}_{(j)}} \text{TNA}_{(f)}} \mathcal{R}_{(f,k)}(t)$$

where the weights are proportional to the size of funds f that belong to the j^{th} fund category $\mathcal{FC}_{(j)}$. In this case, we have:

$$\mathbb{X}_{(j,k)}\left(T^{\text{stress}}\right) = \max_{t \in T^{\text{stress}}} \mathcal{R}_{(j,k)}(t)$$

This method does not have the previous drawback, but it has other shortcomings such as an information loss. However, the biggest disadvantage is that the historical stress scenario is generally based on the largest fund, except when the funds have similar size.

Since $\mathbb{X}$-measures can not be used to build redemption shocks, we propose using $\mathbb{Q}$ or $\mathbb{C}$-measures. $\mathbb{Q}(99\%)$ is the daily value-at-risk at the 99% confidence level. This means that its return period is 100 days. On average, we must observe that redemption shocks are greater than $\mathbb{Q}(99\%)$ two and a half times per year. We can also use the conditional value-at-risk $\mathbb{C}(99\%)$ if we want more severe redemption shocks. The drawback of $\mathbb{C}(99\%)$ is that we don't know the return period of such event. However, it does make sense because it is a very popular measure in risk management, and it is well received by regulatory bodies and supervisors (Roncalli, 2020). Nevertheless, we must be cautious about the computed figures obtained in Tables 5 and 6 on page 28. For example, we don't have the same confidence level between the matrix cells, because the estimates are not based on the same number of observations. In the case of retail investors or third-party distributors, we generally use a huge number of observations whereas this is not the case with the other categories. In Table 8, we give an example of confidence level codification. We see that some cells are not well estimated since the number of observations is less than 10 000. For some of them, the number of observations is very low (less than 200), implying that the confidence on these estimates is very poor.

Therefore, the estimated values cannot be directly used as redemption shocks. However, they help risk managers and business experts to build redemption shocks. Starting from these figures, they can modify them and build a table of redemption shocks that respect the risk coherency $\mathcal{C}_{\text{investor}}$ between investor categories and the risk coherency $\mathcal{C}_{\text{fund}}$ between

Table 8: Confidence in estimated values with respect to the number of observations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Auto-consumption	●●●	●●●	●●	●●●	●●	●●●	○○○
Central bank	●●	●	○○○	●	○○○	○○○	○○○
Corporate	●●	●●	●●	●●	●●	●●	○○○
Corporate pension fund	●●	●●	●	●●	●●	●●	○○○
Employee savings plan	●●	●●	●●	●●●	●●	○○○	●●
Institutional	●●	●●●	●●	●●●	●●	●●●	○○○
Insurance	●●	●●●	●●	●●●	●●	●●	○○○
Other	●●	●●●	●●	●●	●●	●●●	○○○
Retail	●●●	●●●	●●	●●●	●●●	●●●	●●●
Sovereign	●●	●●	●	●●	●●	●●	○○○
Third-party distributor	●●●	●●●	●●	●●●	●●●	●●●	●●

○○○ $0-10$, ○○ $11-50$, ○ $51-200$, ● $201-1\,000$, ●● $1\,001-10\,000$, ●●● $+10\,000$

fund categories[8]. The risk coherency $\mathcal{C}_{\text{investor}}$ means that if one investor category is assumed to be riskier than another, the global redemption shock of the first category must be greater than the global redemption shock of the second category:

$$\mathcal{IC}_{(k_1)} \succ \mathcal{IC}_{(k_2)} \Rightarrow \mathbb{S}_{(k_1)} \geq \mathbb{S}_{(k_2)}$$

For example, if we consider the $\mathbb{Q}$-measure, we can propose the following risk ordering:

1. central bank, corporate pension fund
2. employee savings plan, retail
3. other, third-party distributor
4. institutional, insurance
5. auto-consumption, corporate, sovereign

In this case, the redemption shock $\mathbb{S}_{(j,k)}$ for the (j,k)-cell depends on the global redemption shock $\mathbb{S}_{(k)}$ for the investor category $\mathcal{IC}_{(k)}$. For instance, we can set the following rule of thumb:

$$\mathbb{S}_{(j,k)} = m_{(j)} \cdot \mathbb{S}_{(k)} \tag{10}$$

where $m_{(j)}$ is the multiplicative factor of the fund category $\mathcal{FC}_{(j)}$. In a similar way, the risk coherency $\mathcal{C}_{\text{fund}}$ means that if one fund category is assumed to be riskier than another, the global redemption shock of the first category must be greater than the global redemption shock of the second category:

$$\mathcal{FC}_{(j_1)} \succ \mathcal{FC}_{(j_2)} \Rightarrow \mathbb{S}_{(j_1)} \geq \mathbb{S}_{(j_2)}$$

For example, if we consider the $\mathbb{Q}$-measure, we can propose the following risk ordering:

1. structured
2. balanced, other
3. bond, equity

[8]For instance, if we consider the sovereign category, it is difficult to explain the big difference of $\mathbb{C}(99\%)$ between bond and equity funds

4. enhanced treasury

5. money market

The redemption shock $\mathbb{S}_{(j,k)}$ for the (j,k)-cell depends then on the redemption shock $\mathbb{S}_{(j)}$ for the fund category $\mathcal{IC}_{(j)}$. Again, we can set the following rule of thumb:

$$\mathbb{S}_{(j,k)} = m_{(k)} \cdot \mathbb{S}_{(j)} \tag{11}$$

where $m_{(k)}$ is the multiplicative factor of the investor category $\mathcal{IC}_{(k)}$. We can also combine the two rules of thumb and we obtain the mixed rule:

$$\mathbb{S}_{(j,k)} = \frac{m_{(k)} \cdot \mathbb{S}_{(j)} + m_{(j)} \cdot \mathbb{S}_{(k)}}{2} \tag{12}$$

Let us illustrate the previous rules of thumb by considering the $\mathbb{Q}$-measure. Table 9 gives an example of $\mathbb{S}_{(j,k)}$ by considering the risk coherency[9] $\mathcal{C}_{\text{investor}}$, whereas Table 10 corresponds to the risk coherency[10] $\mathcal{C}_{\text{fund}}$. The mixed rule is reported in Table 11. These figures can then be modified by risk managers and business experts by considering the specificity of some matrix cells. For instance, it is perhaps not realistic to have the same redemption shock for balanced funds between auto-consumption and corporates. Moreover, these redemption shocks can also be modified by taking into account the $\mathbb{C}$-measure. For instance, the conditional value-at-risk for bond funds is much higher for third-party distributors than for sovereigns. Perhaps we can modify the redemption shock of 3.3% and have a larger value for third-party distributors. It is even more likely that the estimated values of $\mathbb{Q}$ and $\mathbb{C}$ are based on 75 591 observations for the third-party distributor category, and 2 261 for the sovereign category. Therefore, we can consider that the estimated value of 4.59% obtained in Table 5 on page 28 does make more sense than the proposed value of 3.3% obtained in Table 11 for the third-party distributor/bond matrix cell. In a similar way, we can consider that the estimated value of 0.14% does make less sense than the proposed value of 7.0% for the sovereign/bond matrix cell.

The previous analysis shows that building redemption shocks in a stress testing framework is more of an art than a science. A pure quantitative approach is dangerous because it is data-driven and it does not respect some coherency properties. However, historical statistics are very important because they provide an anchor point for risk managers and business experts in order to propose stress scenarios that are satisfactory from regulatory, risk management and fund management points of view. Historical data are also important because they help to understand the behavior of clients. It is different from one fund category to another, it also depends on the granularity of the classification, it may depend on the time period, etc. In what follows, we complete this pure historical analysis using more theoretical models. These models are important, because an historical approach is limited when we want to understand contagion effects between investors, correlation patterns between funds, time properties of redemption risk, the impact of the holding period, etc. The idea is not to substitute one model with another, but to rely on several approaches, because there is not just one single solution to the liability stress testing problem.

[9] We use the following values: $\mathbb{S}_{(k)} = 0.5\%$ for central banks and corporate pension funds, $\mathbb{S}_{(k)} = 2\%$ for employee savings plans and retail, $\mathbb{S}_{(k)} = 3.5\%$ for other and third-party distributors, $\mathbb{S}_{(k)} = 5\%$ for institutionals and insurance companies, and $\mathbb{S}_{(k)} = 8\%$ for auto-consumption, corporates and sovereigns. For the multiplication factor, we assume that $m_{(j)} = 0.25$ for structured, $m_{(j)} = 0.5$ for balanced and other, $m_{(j)} = 1$ for bond and equity, $m_{(j)} = 1.75$ for enhanced treasury, and $m_{(j)} = 6$ for money market.

[10] We use the following values: $\mathbb{S}_{(j)} = 0.5\%$ for structured, $\mathbb{S}_{(j)} = 1.5\%$ for balanced and other, $\mathbb{S}_{(j)} = 3\%$ for bond and equity, $\mathbb{S}_{(j)} = 5\%$ for enhanced treasury, and $\mathbb{S}_{(j)} = 20\%$ for money market. For the multiplication factor, we assume that $m_{(k)} = 0.25$ for central banks and corporate pension funds, $m_{(k)} = 0.5$ for employee savings plans and retail, $m_{(k)} = 1$ for other and third-party distributors, $m_{(k)} = 1.5$ for institutionals and insurance companies, and $m_{(k)} = 2$ for auto-consumption, corporates and sovereigns.

Table 9: Redemption shocks in % computed with the rule of thumb (10)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Auto-consumption	4.0	8.0	14.0	8.0	48.0	4.0	2.0	8.0
Central bank	0.3	0.5	0.9	0.5	3.0	0.3	0.1	0.5
Corporate	4.0	8.0	14.0	8.0	48.0	4.0	2.0	8.0
Corporate pension fund	0.3	0.5	0.9	0.5	3.0	0.3	0.1	0.5
Employee savings plan	1.0	2.0	3.5	2.0	12.0	1.0	0.5	2.0
Institutional	2.5	5.0	8.8	5.0	30.0	2.5	1.3	5.0
Insurance	2.5	5.0	8.8	5.0	30.0	2.5	1.3	5.0
Other	1.8	3.5	6.1	3.5	21.0	1.8	0.9	3.5
Retail	1.0	2.0	3.5	2.0	12.0	1.0	0.5	2.0
Sovereign	4.0	8.0	14.0	8.0	48.0	4.0	2.0	8.0
Third-party distributor	1.8	3.5	6.1	3.5	21.0	1.8	0.9	3.5
Total	1.8	3.5	6.1	3.5	21.0	1.8	0.9	3.5

Table 10: Redemption shocks in % computed with the rule of thumb (11)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Auto-consumption	3.0	6.0	10.0	6.0	40.0	3.0	1.0	7.0
Central bank	0.4	0.8	1.3	0.8	5.0	0.4	0.1	0.9
Corporate	3.0	6.0	10.0	6.0	40.0	3.0	1.0	7.0
Corporate pension fund	0.4	0.8	1.3	0.8	5.0	0.4	0.1	0.9
Employee savings plan	0.8	1.5	2.5	1.5	10.0	0.8	0.3	1.8
Institutional	2.3	4.5	7.5	4.5	30.0	2.3	0.8	5.3
Insurance	2.3	4.5	7.5	4.5	30.0	2.3	0.8	5.3
Other	1.5	3.0	5.0	3.0	20.0	1.5	0.5	3.5
Retail	0.8	1.5	2.5	1.5	10.0	0.8	0.3	1.8
Sovereign	3.0	6.0	10.0	6.0	40.0	3.0	1.0	7.0
Third-party distributor	1.5	3.0	5.0	3.0	20.0	1.5	0.5	3.5
Total	1.5	3.0	5.0	3.0	20.0	1.5	0.5	3.5

Table 11: Redemption shocks in % computed with the rule of thumb (12)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Auto-consumption	3.5	7.0	12.0	7.0	44.0	3.5	1.5	7.5
Central bank	0.3	0.6	1.1	0.6	4.0	0.3	0.1	0.7
Corporate	3.5	7.0	12.0	7.0	44.0	3.5	1.5	7.5
Corporate pension fund	0.3	0.6	1.1	0.6	4.0	0.3	0.1	0.7
Employee savings plan	0.9	1.8	3.0	1.8	11.0	0.9	0.4	1.9
Institutional	2.4	4.8	8.1	4.8	30.0	2.4	1.0	5.1
Insurance	2.4	4.8	8.1	4.8	30.0	2.4	1.0	5.1
Other	1.6	3.3	5.6	3.3	20.5	1.6	0.7	3.5
Retail	0.9	1.8	3.0	1.8	11.0	0.9	0.4	1.9
Sovereign	3.5	7.0	12.0	7.0	44.0	3.5	1.5	7.5
Third-party distributor	1.6	3.3	5.6	3.3	20.5	1.6	0.7	3.5
Total	1.6	3.3	5.6	3.3	20.5	1.6	0.7	3.5

(1) = balanced, (2) = bond, (3) = enhanced treasury, (4) = equity, (5) = money market, (6) = other, (7) = structured, (8) = total

3 The frequency-severity modeling approach

The direct computation of value-at-risk, conditional value-at-risk and other statistics from historical redemption rates is particularly problematic. Indeed, we observe a large proportion of zeros in the redemption rate database. On average, we have 68.9% of zeros, this proportion reaches 99.5% for some investors and it is more than 99.9% for some matrix cells. Therefore, the data of redemption rates are "*clumped-at-zero*", meaning that the redemption rate is a semi-continuous random variable, and not a continuous random variable (Min and Agresti, 2002). This discontinuity is a real problem when estimating the probability distribution $\mathbf{F}$. This is why we consider that the redemption rate is not the right redemption risk factor. We prefer to assume that the redemption risk is driven by two dimensions or two risk factors:

1. the redemption frequency, which measures the occurrence $\mathcal{E}$ of the redemption;

2. the redemption severity $\mathcal{R}^\star$, which measures the amount of the redemption.

It is obvious that this modeling approach finds its root in other risk models that deal with extreme events or counting processes, such as operational and insurance risks (Roncalli, 2020).

3.1 Zero-inflated models

In the frequency-severity approach, we distinguish the redemption event $\mathcal{E}$ that indicates if there is a redemption, and the redemption amount $\mathcal{R}^\star$ that measures the redemption rate in case of a redemption. An example is provided in Figure 7. The probability to observe a redemption is equal to 5%, and in the case of a redemption, the amount can be 2%, 5%, 15% and 50%. It follows that the redemption rate is the convolution of two risk factors.

Figure 7: Zero-inflated modeling of the redemption risk



Figure 8: Zero-inflated probability density function



3.1.1 Zero-inflated probability distribution

We assume that the redemption event $\mathcal{E}$ follows a bernoulli distribution $\mathcal{B}(p)$, whereas the redemption severity[11] $\mathcal{R}^\star$ follows a continuous probability distribution $\mathbf{G}$. We have:

$$\Pr\{\mathcal{E}=1\} = \Pr\{\mathcal{R}>0\} = p$$

and:

$$\Pr\{\mathcal{R} \leq x \mid \mathcal{E}=1\} = \mathbf{G}(x)$$

We deduce that the unconditional probability distribution of the redemption rate is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{F}(x) &= \Pr\{\mathcal{R} \leq x\} \\ &= \mathbb{1}\{x \geq 0\} \cdot (1-p) + \mathbb{1}\{x > 0\} \cdot p \cdot \mathbf{G}(x)\end{aligned}$$

Its density probability function is singular at $x=0$:

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} 1-p & \text{if } x = 0 \\ p \cdot g(x) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where $g(x)$ is the density function of $\mathbf{G}$. Some examples are provided in Figure 8 when $p = 5\%$. We observe that the density function is composed of a dirac measure and a continuous function. In the case of $\mathbf{G}_1$, the distribution is right-skewed, meaning that the probability to observe small redemptions is high. In the case of $\mathbf{G}_2$, we have a bell curve, meaning that the redemption amount is located around the mean if there is a redemption. Finally, the distribution is left-skewed in the case of $\mathbf{G}_3$, meaning that the probability to observe high redemptions is high if there is of course a redemption, because we recall that the probability to observe a redemption is only equal to 5%.

[11] It is defined as the non-zero redemption rate.

From a probabilistic point of view, the redemption rate is then the product of the redemption event and the redemption severity:

$$\mathcal{R} = \mathcal{E} \cdot \mathcal{R}^\star$$

In Appendix A.2.1 on page 88, we show that:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{R}\right] = p\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{R}^\star\right] \tag{13}$$

and:

$$\sigma^2\left(\mathcal{R}\right) = p\sigma^2\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) + p\left(1-p\right)\mathbb{E}^2\left[\mathcal{R}^\star\right] \tag{14}$$

Moreover, the skewness coefficient is equal to:

$$\gamma_1\left(\mathcal{R}\right) = \frac{\vartheta_1\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right)}{\left(p\sigma^2\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) + p\left(1-p\right)\mathbb{E}^2\left[\mathcal{R}^\star\right]\right)^{3/2}} \tag{15}$$

where:

$$\begin{aligned}\vartheta_1\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) &= p\gamma_1\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right)\sigma^3\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) + 3p\left(1-p\right)\sigma^2\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right)\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{R}^\star\right] + \\ &\quad p\left(1-p\right)\left(1-2p\right)\mathbb{E}^3\left[\mathcal{R}^\star\right]\end{aligned}$$

For the excess kurtosis coefficient, we obtain:

$$\gamma_2\left(\mathcal{R}\right) = \frac{\vartheta_2\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right)}{\left(p\sigma^2\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) + p\left(1-p\right)\mathbb{E}^2\left[\mathcal{R}^\star\right]\right)^2} \tag{16}$$

where:

$$\begin{aligned}\vartheta_2\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) &= \left(p\gamma_2\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) + 3p\left(1-p\right)\right)\sigma^4\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) + 4p\left(1-p\right)\gamma_1\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right)\sigma^3\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right)\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{R}^\star\right] + \\ &\quad 6p\left(1-p\right)\left(1-2p\right)\sigma^2\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right)\mathbb{E}^2\left[\mathcal{R}^\star\right] + p\left(1-p\right)\left(1-6p+6p^2\right)\mathbb{E}^4\left[\mathcal{R}^\star\right]\end{aligned}$$

In Figure 9 we have reported the moments of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$ by considering the following set of parameters:

#1 $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{R}^\star\right] = 40\%$, $\sigma\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) = 20\%$, $\gamma_1\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) = 0$ and $\gamma_2\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) = 0$;

#2 $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{R}^\star\right] = 20\%$, $\sigma\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) = 20\%$, $\gamma_1\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) = 0$ and $\gamma_2\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) = 0$;

#3 $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{R}^\star\right] = 40\%$, $\sigma\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) = 40\%$, $\gamma_1\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) = -1$ and $\gamma_2\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) = 0$;

#4 $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{R}^\star\right] = 40\%$, $\sigma\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) = 20\%$, $\gamma_1\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) = 0$ and $\gamma_2\left(\mathcal{R}^\star\right) = 1$.

We notice that the parameter values of $\mathcal{R}^\star$ have a major impact on the statistical moments, but the biggest effect comes from the frequency probability p. Indeed, we verify the following properties:

$$\begin{cases}\lim_{p\to 0^+}\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{R}\right] = \lim_{p\to 0^+}\sigma\left(\mathcal{R}\right) = 0 \\ \lim_{p\to 0^+}\gamma_1\left(\mathcal{R}\right) = \lim_{p\to 0^+}\gamma_2\left(\mathcal{R}\right) = \infty\end{cases} \tag{17}$$

This means that the redemption risk is very high for small frequency properties. In this case, the expected redemption rate and its standard deviation are very low, but skewness and kurtosis risk are very high! This creates a myopic situation where the asset manager may have the feeling that redemption risk is not a concern because of historical data. Indeed, when p is low, the probability of observing large redemption rates is small, implying that they are generally not observed in the database. For instance, let us consider two categories that have the same redemption severity distribution, but differ from their redemption frequency probability. One has a probability of 50%, the other has a probability of 1%. It is not obvious that the second category experienced sufficient severe redemption events such that the historical data are representative of the severity risk.

Figure 9: Statistical moments of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$ in zero-inflated models



3.1.2 Statistical risk measures of the zero-inflated model

For the $\mathbb{M}$-measure, we have:

$$\mathbb{M} = p\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{R}^\star\right] \tag{18}$$

The formula of the value-at-risk is equal to:

$$\mathbb{Q}(\alpha) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } p \leq 1-\alpha \\ \mathbf{G}^{-1}\left(\dfrac{\alpha+p-1}{p}\right) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{19}$$

We notice that computing the quantile α of the unconditional distribution $\mathbf{F}$ is equivalent to compute the quantile $\alpha_{\mathbf{G}}$ of the severity distribution $\mathbf{G}$:

$$\alpha_{\mathbf{G}} = \max\left(0, \frac{\alpha+p-1}{p}\right)$$

The relationship between p, α and $\alpha_{\mathbf{G}}$ is illustrated in Figure 39 on page 105. Let us focus on the 99% value-at-risk:

$$\mathbb{Q}(99\%) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } p \leq 1\% \\ \mathbf{G}^{-1}\left(\dfrac{p-1\%}{p}\right) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

If the redemption frequency probability is greater than 1%, the value-at-risk corresponds to the quantile $(p-1\%)/p$. The relationship between p and $\alpha_{\mathbf{G}} = (p-1\%)/p$ is shown in Figure 10. If p is greater than 20%, $\alpha_{\mathbf{G}}$ is greater than 95%. If p is less than 5%, we observe a high curvature of the relationship, implying that we face a high estimation risk. For instance, if p is equal to 1.5%, the 99% value-at-risk corresponds to the quantile 3.33% of the redemption severity. If p becomes 2.0%, the 99% value-at-risk is then equal to the

quantile 50% of the redemption severity! Therefore, there is a high sensitivity of the 99% value-at-risk when p is low, implying that a small error in the estimated value of p leads to a high impact on the value-at-risk.

Figure 10: Relationship between p and $\alpha_{\mathbf{G}}$ for the 99% value-at-risk



For the conditional value-at-risk, we obtain:

$$\mathbb{C}(\alpha) = \frac{1}{1-\alpha}\int_{\alpha}^{1} \mathbb{Q}(u)\,\mathrm{d}u \tag{20}$$

where $\mathbb{Q}(u)$ is the quantile function of $\mathcal{R}$ for the confidence level u. In the case where $p > 1-\alpha$, we obtain:

$$\mathbb{C}(\alpha) = \frac{p}{1-\alpha}\int_{1-p^{-1}(1-\alpha)}^{1} \mathbf{G}^{-1}(u)\,\mathrm{d}u$$

Another expression of the conditional value-at-risk is:

$$\mathbb{C}(\alpha) = \frac{1}{1-\alpha}\int_{\mathbb{Q}(\alpha)}^{1} x\,\mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}(x)$$

In the case where $p > 1-\alpha$, we obtain:

$$\mathbb{C}(\alpha) = \frac{p}{1-\alpha}\int_{\mathbb{Q}(\alpha)}^{1} x g(x)\,\mathrm{d}x$$

where $g(x)$ is the probability density function of $\mathbf{G}(x)$. All these formulas can be computed numerically thanks to Gauss-Legendre integration.

We now introduce a new risk measure which is very popular when considering parametric model. Roncalli (2020) defines the distribution-based (or parametric-based) stress scenario

$\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T})$ for a given horizon time $\mathcal{T}$ such that the return time of this scenario is exactly equal to $\mathcal{T}$. From a mathematical point of view, we have:

$$\frac{1}{\Pr\{\mathcal{R} \geq \mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T})\}} = \mathcal{T}$$

$\Pr\{\mathcal{R} \geq \mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T})\}$ is the exceedance probability of the stress scenario, implying that the quantity $\Pr\{\mathcal{R} \geq \mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T})\}^{-1}$ is the return time of the exceedance event. For example, if we set $\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T}) = \mathbb{Q}(\alpha)$, we have $\Pr\{\mathcal{R} \geq \mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T})\} = 1 - \alpha$ and $\mathcal{T} = (1-\alpha)^{-1}$. The return time associated to a 99% value-at-risk is then equal to 100 days, the return time associated to a 99.9% value-at-risk is equal to 1 000 days (or approximately 4 years), etc. This parametric approach of stress testing is popular among professionals, regulators and academics when they use the extreme value theory for modeling the risk factors.

By combining the two definitions $\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T}) = \mathbb{Q}(\alpha)$ and $\mathcal{T} = (1-\alpha)^{-1}$, we obtain the mathematical expression of the parametric stress scenario:

$$\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T}) = \mathbb{Q}\left(1 - \frac{1}{\mathcal{T}}\right) \tag{21}$$

If we consider the zero-inflated model, we deduce that:

$$\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T}) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } p \leq \mathcal{T}^{-1} \\ \mathbf{G}^{-1}\left(1 - \dfrac{1}{p\mathcal{T}}\right) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{22}$$

The magnitude of $\mathcal{T}$ is the year, but the unit of $\mathcal{T}$ is the day. For example, since one year corresponds to 260 market days, the five-year stress scenario is equal to[12]:

$$\mathbb{S}(5) = \mathbf{G}^{-1}\left(1 - \frac{1}{1300\,p}\right)$$

3.1.3 The zero-inflated beta model

The choice of the severity distribution is an important issue. Since $\mathcal{R}^\star$ is a random variable between 0 and 1, it is natural to use the two-parameter beta distribution $\mathcal{B}(a,b)$. We have:

$$\mathbf{G}(x) = \mathfrak{B}(x; a, b)$$

where $\mathfrak{B}(x; a, b)$ is the incomplete beta function. The corresponding probability density function is equal to:

$$g(x) = \frac{x^{a-1}(1-x)^{b-1}}{\mathfrak{B}(a,b)}$$

where $\mathfrak{B}(a,b)$ is the beta function:

$$\mathfrak{B}(a,b) = \frac{\Gamma(a)\,\Gamma(b)}{\Gamma(a+b)}$$

Concerning the statistical moments, the formulas are given in Appendix A.2.2 on page 91.

We report some examples of density function in Figure 11. Instead of providing the parameters a and b, we have indicated the value μ and σ of the mean and the volatility. The first distribution is skewed, because the volatility is high compared to the mean. The other three distributions have a mode. Figure 12 shows the corresponding statistical moments of

Figure 11: Density function of the beta distribution



Figure 12: Statistical moments of the zero-inflated beta distribution



the associated zero-inflated model. We notice that the first and third distributions have the largest skewness and kurtosis.

In Figure 13, we report the 99% value-at-risk of the redemption rate. As explained before, the $\mathbb{Q}$-measure highly depends on the redemption frequency p. Again, we observe that the sensitivity of the value-at-risk is particularly important when p is small[13]. The ratio between the 99% conditional value-at-risk and the 99% value-at-risk is given in Figure 14. When the redemption frequency p is high, the ratio is less than 1.5 and we retrieve the typical figures that we observe for market and credit risks[14]. When the redemption frequency p is small, the ratio may be greater than 2.0. These results shows that the sensitivity to redemption risk is very high when the observed redemption frequency is low. The stress scenarios $\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T})$ are given in Figure 15 when the redemption frequency p is equal to 1%. By definition, $\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T})$ increases with the return time $\mathcal{T}$. From a theoretical point of view, the limit of the stress scenario is 100%:

$$\lim_{\mathcal{T}\to\infty} \mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T}) = \lim_{\mathcal{T}\to\infty} \mathbf{G}^{-1}\left(1 - \frac{1}{p\mathcal{T}}\right) = 1$$

However, we observe that stress scenarios reach a plateau at five years, meaning that stress scenarios beyond 5 years have no interest. This is true for small values of p, but it is even more the case for larger values of p as shown in Figures 40 and 41 on page 106.

Figure 13: $\mathbb{Q}(99\%)$-measure in % with respect to the redemption frequency



Remark 5 *In order to better understand the use of the $\mathbb{C}$-measure as a stress scenario, we compute the implied return time such that the stress scenario is exactly equal to the*

[12]We assume that the redemption frequency is greater than 1/1300 or 7.69 bps. Otherwise, the quantile is equal to zero.

[13]Because of the impact of p on the confidence level $\alpha_{\mathbf{G}}$ — see Figure 10 on page 38.

[14]When p tends to one, the ratio is respectively equal to 1.15, 1.09, 1.06 and 1.03 for the four probability distributions of the redemption severity.

Figure 14: Ratio $\mathbb{R}(99\%)$ with respect to the redemption frequency



Figure 15: Stress scenario $\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T})$ in % ($p = 1\%$)



conditional value-at-risk:

$$\mathcal{T}_{\mathbb{C}(\alpha)} = \{\mathcal{T} : \mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T}) = \mathbb{C}(\alpha)\}$$

Results are given in Table 12. We notice that the value is between 0.77 *and* 1.03. *On average, we can consider that the return time of the* 99% *conditional value-at-risk is about one year. This is* 2.6 *times the return time of the* 99% *value-at-risk*[15].

Table 12: Implied return time $\mathcal{T}_{\mathbb{C}(99\%)}$ in year

	μ	10%	20%	30%	50%
	σ	10%	10%	20%	20%
p	1%	1.03	0.86	0.87	0.77
	2%	1.00	0.94	0.89	0.85
	3%	0.99	0.95	0.90	0.86
	5%	0.99	0.97	0.90	0.87
	10%	0.99	0.98	0.90	0.88
	50%	0.98	0.99	0.91	0.89
	99%	0.98	0.99	0.91	0.89

3.1.4 Extension to other probability distributions

The choice of the beta distribution is natural since the support is $[0, 1]$, but we can consider other continuous probability distributions for modeling $\mathcal{R}^\star$. For example, the Kumaraswamy distribution is another good candidate, but it is close to the beta distribution. When the support of the probability distribution is $[0, \infty)$, we apply the truncation formula[16]:

$$\mathbf{G}_{[0,1]}(x) = \frac{\mathbf{G}(x)}{\mathbf{G}(1)}$$

For instance, we can use the gamma or log-logistic distribution. However, our experience shows that some continuous probability distributions are not adapted such as the log-gamma and log-normal distributions, because the logarithm transform performs a bad scale for random variables in $[0, 1]$. Finally, we can also use the logit transformation, which is very popular for modeling the probability of default (PD) or the loss given default (LGD) in credit risk. Following Roncalli (2020, page 910), we assume that $\mathcal{R}^\star$ is a logit transformation of a random variable $X \in (-\infty, \infty)$, meaning that[17]:

$$X = \text{logit}(\mathcal{R}^\star) = \ln\left(\frac{\mathcal{R}^\star}{1 - \mathcal{R}^\star}\right)$$

For instance, in the case of the logit-normal distribution, we have:

$$\text{logit}(\mathcal{R}^\star) \sim \mathcal{N}(a, b^2)$$

[15] We recall that the return time of the 99% value-at-risk is equal to 100 market days or $\frac{100}{260} \approx 0.38$ years.

[16] For the probability density function, we have:

$$g_{[0,1]}(x) = \frac{g(x)}{\mathbf{G}(1)}$$

[17] We also have:

$$\mathcal{R}^\star = \text{logit}^{-1}(X) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-X}}$$

We deduce that:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{G}(x) &= \Pr(\mathcal{R}^\star \leq x) \\ &= \Pr(X \leq \text{logit}(x)) \\ &= \Phi\left(\frac{\text{logit}(x) - a}{b}\right)\end{aligned}$$

and:

$$g(x) = \frac{1}{bx(1-x)}\phi\left(\frac{\text{logit}(x) - a}{b}\right)$$

A summary of these alternative approaches[18] is given in Table 13. In the sequel, we continue to use the beta distribution, because it is easy to calibrate and it is the most popular approach when modeling a random variable in $[0,1]$. However, we cannot claim that it is the best fitting model. Such a debate has already taken place in operational risk with the log-normal distribution and the modeling of the severity distribution of operational risk losses (Roncalli, 2020). Nevertheless, we think that this debate is too early in the case of liability stress testing, and can wait when we will have more comprehensive redemption databases.

Table 13: List of continuous probability distributions

Distribution	Symbol	$\mathbf{G}(x)$	$g(x)$	Support
Beta	$\mathcal{B}(a,b)$	$\mathfrak{B}(x;a,b)$	$\dfrac{x^{a-1}(1-x)^{b-1}}{\mathfrak{B}(a,b)}$	$[0,1]$
Gamma	$\mathcal{G}(a,b)$	$\dfrac{\gamma(a,bx)}{\Gamma(a)}$	$\dfrac{b^a x^{a-1} e^{-bx}}{\Gamma(a)}$	$[0,\infty)$
Kumaraswamy	$\mathcal{K}(a,b)$	$1-(1-x^a)^b$	$abx^{a-1}(1-x^a)^{b-1}$	$[0,1]$
Log-logistic	$\mathcal{LL}(a,b)$	$\dfrac{x^b}{a^b+x^b}$	$\dfrac{b(x/a)^{b-1}}{a\left(1+(x/a)^b\right)^2}$	$[0,\infty)$
Logit-normal	$\mathcal{LN}(a,b^2)$	$\Phi\left(\dfrac{\text{logit}(x)-a}{b}\right)$	$\dfrac{1}{bx(1-x)}\phi\left(\dfrac{\text{logit}(x)-a}{b}\right)$	$[0,1]$

3.2 Parametric stress scenarios

As explained previously, the zero-inflated beta model is appealing for producing stress scenarios. For that, we proceed in two steps. We first calibrate the parameters of the model, and then we compute the stress scenarios for a given return time.

3.2.1 Estimation of the zero-inflated beta model

Let $\Omega = \{\mathcal{R}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{R}_n\}$ be the sample of redemption rates for a given matrix cell. Three parameters have to be estimated: the redemption frequency p and the parameters a and b that control the shape of the beta distribution. We note n_0 as the number of observations that are equal to zero and $n_1 = n - n_0$ as the number of observations that are strictly positive[19]. In Appendix A.3 on page 91, we show that the maximum likelihood estimates are:

$$\hat{p} = \frac{n_1}{n_0 + n_1}$$

[18] $\gamma(\alpha, x)$ is the lower incomplete gamma function.
[19] We have $n_0 = \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb{1}\{\mathcal{R}_i = 0\} = n - n_1$ and $n_1 = \sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb{1}\{\mathcal{R}_i > 0\} = \sum_{i=1}^n \mathcal{E}_i$.

and:

$$\left\{\hat{a}, \hat{b}\right\} = \arg\max_{a,b} -n_1 \ln \mathfrak{B}(a,b) + \sum_{\mathcal{R}_i>0} (a-1)\ln \mathcal{R}_i + \sum_{\mathcal{R}_i>0} (b-1)\ln(1-\mathcal{R}_i)$$

The estimates $\hat{a}$ and $\hat{b}$ can be found by numerical optimization.

This is the traditional approach for estimating a zero-inflated model. However, it is not convenient since the parameters $\left(\hat{p}, \hat{a}, \hat{b}\right)$ should be modified by risk managers and business experts before computing redemption shocks. Indeed, the calibration process of parametric stress scenarios follows the same process when one builds historical stress scenarios, and estimated values $\left(\hat{p}, \hat{a}, \hat{b}\right)$ cannot be directly used because they do not necessarily respect some risk coherency principles and their robustness varies across matrix cells.

A second approach consists in using the method of moments. In this case, the estimator of p has the same expression:

$$\hat{p} = \frac{n_1}{n_0 + n_1} \tag{23}$$

For the parameters of the beta distribution, we first calculate the empirical mean $\hat{\mu}$ and the standard deviation $\hat{\sigma}$ of the positive redemption rates $\mathcal{R}^\star$, and then we use the following relationships (Roncalli, 2020, page 193):

$$\hat{a} = \frac{\hat{\mu}^2(1-\hat{\mu})}{\hat{\sigma}^2} - \hat{\mu} \tag{24}$$

and:

$$\hat{b} = \frac{\hat{\mu}(1-\hat{\mu})^2}{\sigma^2} - (1-\hat{\mu}) \tag{25}$$

The differences between the two methods are the following:

- In the case of the method of maximum likelihood, a and b are explicit parameters. Once the parameters p, a and b are estimated, we can calculate the mean μ and standard deviation σ for the severity distribution. In this approach, μ and σ are implicit, because they are deduced from a and b.
- In the case of the method of moments, a and b are implicit parameters. Indeed, they are calculated after having estimated the mean μ and standard deviation σ for the severity distribution. In this approach, μ and σ are explicit and define the severity distribution.

The first approach is known as the $p-a-b$ parameterization, whereas the second approach corresponds to the $p-\mu-\sigma$ parameterization. By construction, this last approach is more convenient in a liquidity stress testing framework, because the parameters μ and σ are intuitive and self-explanatory measures, which is not the case of a and b. Therefore, they can be manipulated by risk managers and business experts.

We have estimated the parameters p, a, b, μ and σ with the two methods. Table 14 shows the redemption frequency. On average, $\hat{p}$ is equal to 31%, but we observe large differences between the matrix cells. For instance, $\hat{p}$ is less than 5% for central banks, corporate pension funds and employee savings plans, whereas the largest values of $\hat{p}$ are observed for retail investors and third-party distributors. The values of $\hat{\mu}$ and $\hat{\sigma}$ are reported in Tables 15 and 16. The average redemption severity is 0.72%, whereas the redemption volatility is 4.55%. Again, we observe some large differences between the matrix cells.

Remark 6 *In Tables 42 and 43 on page 107, we have also reported the implicit values of $\hat{a}$ and $\hat{b}$ that are deduced from $\hat{\mu}$ and $\hat{\sigma}$. Moreover, we have reported the estimated values by the method of maximum likelihood on pages 108 and 109.*

Table 14: Estimated value of p in %

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Auto-consumption	21.63	19.41	30.00	25.46	50.60	6.39		22.16
Central bank	0.16	0.34		1.47				0.47
Corporate	15.04	6.19	6.25	2.87	39.81	0.21		14.54
Corporate pension fund	8.11	3.38	3.98	3.37	7.57	0.00		4.12
Employee savings plan	2.67	2.83	2.97	2.71	2.29		2.75	2.69
Institutional	19.36	6.28	1.96	6.51	32.83	1.04		8.23
Insurance	12.19	6.72	3.45	7.22	27.92	1.04		9.71
Other	9.67	3.87	3.68	19.35	21.52	2.22		8.82
Retail	44.59	45.04	58.76	70.50	45.75	17.51	27.32	45.61
Sovereign	16.30	3.18	1.05	10.07	18.23	0.06		10.14
Third-party distributor	33.77	37.36	45.97	45.94	65.94	32.86	6.52	40.61
Total	34.66	27.10	24.19	38.34	37.57	11.14	24.79	31.11

Table 15: Estimated value of μ in % (method of moments)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Auto-consumption	1.24	1.88	2.15	1.19	3.11	2.81		1.70
Central bank								
Corporate	0.55	2.50			3.82			3.73
Corporate pension fund		1.54		2.84	7.26			3.21
Employee savings plan	1.29			2.08				2.10
Institutional	0.67	2.62		2.80	4.46			3.23
Insurance	1.36	2.20		2.19	3.21			2.66
Other	0.87	2.60		1.10	3.51	0.99		2.65
Retail	0.34	0.31	0.44	0.23	1.98	0.43	0.15	0.33
Sovereign	0.06			1.84	10.48			4.46
Third-party distributor	0.35	0.64	1.45	0.42	1.40	0.86	1.21	0.56
Total	0.40	0.73	1.64	0.48	2.82	0.98	0.18	0.72

Table 16: Estimated value of σ in % (method of moments)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Auto-consumption	7.38	6.86	9.73	5.98	8.80	9.10		7.09
Central bank								
Corporate	5.55	9.57			7.49			8.70
Corporate pension fund		10.36		13.51	13.14			12.09
Employee savings plan	3.26			8.40				8.61
Institutional	5.46	9.99		9.23	11.46			10.86
Insurance	8.66	10.56		10.11	8.13			9.35
Other	3.61	9.36		7.27	11.88	6.70		10.68
Retail	2.80	2.58	3.32	2.10	7.52	3.22	2.64	2.88
Sovereign	0.25			9.90	21.63			14.94
Third-party distributor	2.68	3.48	7.63	2.58	4.71	5.84	6.98	3.37
Total	3.31	4.35	8.93	3.50	8.66	6.08	3.03	4.55

(1) = balanced, (2) = bond, (3) = enhanced treasury, (4) = equity, (5) = money market, (6) = other, (7) = structured, (8) = total

3.2.2 Stress scenarios based on the $p - \mu - \sigma$ parameterization

Using the previous estimates $(\hat{p}, \hat{\mu}, \hat{\sigma})$, risk managers and business experts can define the triplet (p, μ, σ) for the different matrix cells. For that, they must assess the confidence in estimated values with respect to the number of observations. For the frequency parameter, we use the value of n, which has been already reported in Table 8 on page 31. For the severity parameters $\hat{\mu}$ and $\hat{\sigma}$, we use the value of n_1, which is much smaller than n. Using the data given in Table 41 on page 103, we have built the confidence measure in Table 17. We confirm that the confidence measure in $\hat{\mu}$ and $\hat{\sigma}$ is lower than the confidence measure in $\hat{p}$. In particular, there are many matrix cells, where the number n_1 of observations is lower than 200. This explains why Tables 15 and 16 contain a lot of missing values. Therefore, except for a few matrix cells, the estimated values $\hat{\mu}$ and $\hat{\sigma}$ must be challenged by risk managers and business experts. Again, they can use risk coherency principles[20] $\mathcal{C}_{\text{investor}}$ and $\mathcal{C}_{\text{fund}}$ to build their own figures of p, μ and σ.

Table 17: Confidence in estimated values $\hat{\mu}$ and $\hat{\sigma}$ with respect to the number n_1 of observations

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Auto-consumption	●●	●●	●●	●●●	●●	●	○○○
Central bank	○○○	○○○	○○○	○○○	○○○	○○○	○○○
Corporate	●	●	○	○	●●	○○○	○○○
Corporate pension fund	○	●	○○	●	●	○○○	○○○
Employee savings plan	●	○	○○	●	○	○○○	○
Institutional	●●	●●	○	●●	●●	○	○○○
Insurance	●	●	○	●●	●●	○	○○○
Other	●	●	○	●	●●	●	○○○
Retail	●●●	●●●	●●	●●●	●●	●●	●●●
Sovereign	●	○	○○○	●	●	○○○	○○○
Third-party distributor	●●●	●●●	●●	●●●	●●	●●	●

○○○ $0-10$, ○○ $11-50$, ○ $51-200$, ● $201-1\,000$, ●● $1\,001-10\,000$, ●●● $+10\,000$

Once the triplet (p, μ, σ) is defined for each matrix cell, we compute stress scenarios using the following formula:

$$\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T}; p, \mu, \sigma) = \mathcal{B}^{-1}\left(1 - \frac{1}{p\mathcal{T}}; \frac{\mu^2(1-\mu)}{\sigma^2} - \mu, \frac{\mu(1-\mu)^2}{\sigma^2} - (1-\mu)\right)$$

where $\mathcal{B}^{-1}(\alpha; a, b)$ is the α-quantile of the beta distribution with parameters a and b. The parametric stress scenario $\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T}; p, \mu, \sigma)$ depends on the return time $\mathcal{T}$ and the three parameters of the zero-inflated model. An example is provided in Figure 16. For each plot, we indicate the triplet (p, μ, σ). For instance, the first plot corresponds to the triplet $(2\%, 1\%, 2\%)$, meaning that the daily redemption frequency is 2%, the expected redemption severity is 1% and the redemption volatility is 2%. In particular, these plots illustrate the high impact of σ, which is the key parameter when computing parametric stress scenarios. The reason is that the parameters p and μ determine the mean $\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{R}]$, whereas the uncertainty around this number is mainly driven by the parameter σ. The redemption volatility controls then the shape of the probability distribution of the redemption rate (both the skewness and the kurtosis), implying that σ has a major impact on the stress scenario $\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T})$ when $\mathcal{T}$ is large.

[20] They are defined on page 30.

Figure 16: Parametric stress scenarios $\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T}; p, \mu, \sigma)$ in %



4 Behavioral modeling

In this section, we go beyond the zero-inflated model by considering the behavior of each investor. In particular, we show that the redemption rate depends on the liability structure of the mutual fund. Moreover, the behavior of investors may be correlated, in particular in a stress period. In this case, the modeling of spillover effects is important to define stress scenarios.

4.1 The individual-based model

The individual-based model and the zero-inflated model are highly connected. Indeed, the zero-inflated model can be seen as a special case of the individual-based model when we summarize the behavior of all unitholders by the behavior of a single client.

4.1.1 Definition

Let $\text{TNA}(t)$ be the assets under management of an investment fund composed of n clients:

$$\text{TNA}(t) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{TNA}_i(t)$$

where $\text{TNA}_i(t)$ is the net asset of the individual i. The redemption rate of the fund is equal to the redemption flows divided by the total net assets:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{R} &= \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{TNA}_i \cdot \mathcal{R}_i}{\text{TNA}} \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i \cdot \mathcal{R}_i \end{aligned}$$

where ω_i represents the weight of the client i in the fund:

$$\omega_i = \frac{\text{TNA}_i}{\text{TNA}}$$

Since we have $\mathcal{R}_i = \mathcal{E}_i \cdot \mathcal{R}_i^\star$, we obtain:

$$\mathcal{R} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i \cdot \mathcal{E}_i \cdot \mathcal{R}_i^\star$$

Generally, we assume that the clients are homogenous, meaning that $\mathcal{E}_i$ and $\mathcal{R}_i^\star$ are *iid* random variables. If we denote by $\tilde{p}$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{G}}$ the individual redemption probability and the individual severity distribution. The individual-based model is then characterized by the 4-tuple $\left(n, \omega, \tilde{p}, \tilde{\mathbf{G}}\right)$, where n is the number of clients and $\omega = (\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_n)$ is the vector of weights. Like the zero-inflated model, we consider a $\tilde{\mu} - \tilde{\sigma}$ parameterization of $\tilde{\mathbf{G}}$, meaning that the model is denoted by $\mathcal{IM}(n, \omega, \tilde{p}, \tilde{\mu}, \tilde{\sigma})$.

Remark 7 *When the individual severity distribution $\tilde{\mathbf{G}}$ is no specified, we assume that it is a beta distribution $\mathcal{B}\left(\tilde{a}, \tilde{b}\right)$, whose parameters $\tilde{a}$ and $\tilde{b}$ are calibrated with respect to the severity mean $\tilde{\mu}$ and the severity volatility $\tilde{\sigma}$ using the method of moments. In a similar way, we assume that the vector of weights is equally-weighted when it is not specified. In this case, the individual-based model is denoted by $\mathcal{IM}(n, \tilde{p}, \tilde{\mu}, \tilde{\sigma})$.*

Figure 17: Histogram of the redemption rate in % ($\tilde{p} = 50\%, \tilde{\mu} = 50\%, \tilde{\sigma} = 10\%$)



In Figure 17, we report the histogram of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$ in the case $\tilde{p} = 50\%$, $\tilde{\mu} = 50\%$ and $\tilde{\sigma} = 10\%$. In the case $n = 1$, we obtain a singular distribution. Indeed, there is a probability of 50% that there is no redemption. The singularity decreases with respect to the number n of investors, because the probability to have a redemption increases.

This is normal since the redemption frequency of a mutual fund depends on the number of unitholders. This explains that the redemption frequency is larger for a retail fund than for an institutional fund.

4.1.2 Statistical analysis

The skewness effect The singularity of the distribution function $\mathbf{F}$ at the point $\mathcal{R} = 0$ is entirely explained by the two parameters $\tilde{p}$ and n as shown in Appendix A.4.1 on page 93, because we have:

$$\Pr\{\mathcal{R} = 0\} = (1 - \tilde{p})^n$$

The fact that the probability distribution is not continuous has an impact on the skewness and the kurtosis. In Table 18, we have reported the probability $\Pr\{\mathcal{R} = 0\}$. If there is a few investors in the fund, the probability to observe no redemption in the fund is high. For instance, if $\tilde{p} = 5\%$ and $n = 10$, we have $\Pr\{\mathcal{R} = 0\} = 59.87\%$. If $\tilde{p} = 1\%$ and $n = 10$, we have $\Pr\{\mathcal{R} = 0\} = 90.44\%$. How to interpret these results? Since $\tilde{p}$ is the individual redemption probability, $1/\tilde{p}$ is the return time of a redemption at the investor level. For example, $\tilde{p} = 5\%$ (resp. $\tilde{p} = 1\%$) means that investors redeem every 20 days (resp. 100 days) on average. At the fund level, the return time to observe a redemption is equal to $(1 - \Pr\{\mathcal{R} = 0\})^{-1}$. For instance, in the case $\tilde{p} = 5\%$ and $n = 10$, we observe a redemption two days per week in the fund on average[21]. This analysis may help to distinguish active and passive investors. In the case of passive investors when the redemption event occurs once a year or less, $\tilde{p}$ is less than 40 bps. In the case of active investors that redeem once a month, $\tilde{p}$ is greater than 5%. Therefore, the skewness effect depends if the fund has active investors or not, and if the fund is granular or not.

Table 18: Probability to observe no redemption $\Pr\{\mathcal{R} = 0\}$ in %

p	Number n of investors							
(in %)	1	2	5	10	50	100	1000	10000
0.01	99.99	99.98	99.95	99.90	99.50	99.00	90.48	36.79
0.02	99.98	99.96	99.90	99.80	99.00	98.02	81.87	13.53
0.05	99.95	99.90	99.75	99.50	97.53	95.12	60.65	0.67
0.10	99.90	99.80	99.50	99.00	95.12	90.48	36.77	0.00
0.20	99.80	99.60	99.00	98.02	90.47	81.86	13.51	0.00
0.50	99.50	99.00	97.52	95.11	77.83	60.58	0.67	0.00
1.00	99.00	98.01	95.10	90.44	60.50	36.60	0.00	0.00
2.00	98.00	96.04	90.39	81.71	36.42	13.26	0.00	0.00
5.00	95.00	90.25	77.38	59.87	7.69	0.59	0.00	0.00
10.00	90.00	81.00	59.05	34.87	0.52	0.00	0.00	0.00
25.00	75.00	56.25	23.73	5.63	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
50.00	50.00	25.00	3.13	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

The mean effect The mean shape is easy to understand since it is the product of the redemption probability and the mean of the redemption severity:

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{R}] = \tilde{p}\tilde{\mu}$$

Curiously, it depends neither on the number of investors in the fund, nor on the liability structure (see Figure 18). Since $\tilde{\mu} \in [0, 1]$, we notice that $\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{R}] \leq \tilde{p}$, meaning that we must

[21] The exact value is equal to $1/(1 - 59.87\%) = 2.4919$.

observe very low values of the redemption mean. And we verify this property if we consider the results[22] given in Table 4 on page 28. If we consider all investor and fund categories, the mean is equal to 22 bps. The largest value is observed for the sovereign/money market category and is equal to 1.91%.

Figure 18: Mean of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$ in %



The volatility effect By assuming that the liability weights are equal ($\omega_i = 1/n$), the volatility of the redemption rate is equal to:

$$\sigma^2(\mathcal{R}) = \frac{\tilde{p}\left(\tilde{\sigma}^2 + (1-\tilde{p})\,\tilde{\mu}^2\right)}{n}$$

Globally, we observe that $\sigma^2(\mathcal{R})$ is an increasing function of $\tilde{p}$, $\tilde{\mu}$ and $\tilde{\sigma}$ as shown in Figure 19. When the redemption probability increases, we observe a convexity shape because we have:

$$\sigma^2(\mathcal{R}) = \frac{\tilde{p}\left(\tilde{\sigma}^2 + \tilde{\mu}^2\right)}{n} - \frac{\tilde{p}^2\tilde{\mu}^2}{n}$$

However, this is not realistic since $\tilde{p} \leq 20\%$ in practice. Another interesting property is that $\sigma^2(\mathcal{R})$ tends to zero when the number of investors in the fund increases (Figure 20). If we compute the volatility of the redemption rate, we obtain the figures given in Table 48 on page 110. We observe that $\sigma(\mathcal{R}) \gg \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{R}]$, implying that $\mathcal{R}$ is a high-skewed random variable. This challenges the use of the $\mathbb{SD}(c)$ measure presented on page 26.

Correspondence between zero-inflated and individual-based models We notice that the zero-inflated model $\mathcal{ZI}(p, \mu, \sigma)$ is a special case of the individual-based model by

[22] Another way to compute the empirical mean of $\mathcal{R}$ is to calculate the product of the aggregate redemption frequency p (Table 14 on page 46) and the aggregate severity mean (Table 15 on page 46).

Figure 19: Volatility of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$ in % ($n = 10$)



Figure 20: Volatility of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$ in % ($p = 10\%$, $\mu = 50\%$, $\sigma = 30\%$)



considering only one unitholder. Therefore, it is obvious that the zero-inflated model can not be seen as an explanatory model. It is a reduced-form model or a parametric model that can fit the data, but the interpretation of the $p-\mu-\sigma$ parameterization is not obvious, because $\mathcal{ZI}(p,\mu,\sigma)$ is an aggregate population model.

In this paragraph, we would like to find the relationships between the parameters of the zero-inflated model and those of the individual-based model, such that the two models are statistically equivalent:

$$\mathcal{ZI}(p,\mu,\sigma) \equiv \mathcal{IM}(n,\omega,\tilde{p},\tilde{\mu},\tilde{\sigma})$$

There are different approaches. A first one is to minimize the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistics between $\mathcal{ZI}(p,\mu,\sigma)$ and $\mathcal{IM}(n,\omega,\tilde{p},\tilde{\mu},\tilde{\sigma})$. Another approach consists in matching their moments. We consider the second approach because we obtain analytical formulas, whereas the solution of the first approach can only be numerical. In Appendix A.5 on page 95, we show that:

$$p = 1-(1-\tilde{p})^n$$

and

$$\mu = \frac{\tilde{p}}{1-(1-\tilde{p})^n}\tilde{\mu}$$

whereas the parameter σ satisfies the following relationship:

$$\begin{aligned}\sigma^2 &= \left(\frac{\tilde{p}\mathcal{H}(\omega)}{1-(1-\tilde{p})^n}\right)\tilde{\sigma}^2 + \\ &\left(\frac{\tilde{p}\left((1-\tilde{p})-(1-\tilde{p})^n\right)\mathcal{H}(\omega)-\tilde{p}^2(1-\tilde{p})^n(1-\mathcal{H}(\omega))}{\left(1-(1-\tilde{p})^n\right)^2}\right)\tilde{\mu}^2\end{aligned}$$

where $\mathcal{H}(\omega)=\sum_{i=1}^n \omega_i^2$ is the Herfindahl index. It is interesting to notice that p is a function of n and $\tilde{p}$, μ is a function of n, $\tilde{p}$ and $\tilde{\mu}$, but σ does not only depends on the parameters n, $\tilde{p}$, $\tilde{\mu}$ and $\tilde{\sigma}$:

$$\begin{cases} p = \varphi_1(n,\tilde{p}) \\ \mu = \varphi_2(n,\tilde{p},\tilde{\mu}) \\ \sigma = \varphi_3(n,\tilde{p},\tilde{\mu},\tilde{\sigma},\mathcal{H}(\omega)) \end{cases}$$

Indeed, the aggregate severity volatility also depends on the Herfindahl index of the fund liability structure.

Remark 8 *The previous relationships can be inverted in order to define the parameters of the individual-based model with respect to the parameters of the zero-inflated model:*

$$\begin{cases} \tilde{p} = \varphi_1'(p;n) \\ \tilde{\mu} = \varphi_2'(p,\mu;n) \\ \tilde{\sigma} = \varphi_3'(p,\mu,\sigma;n,\mathcal{H}(\omega)) \end{cases}$$

However, we notice that there are two degrees of freedom – n and $\mathcal{H}(\omega)$ – that must be fixed.

In Tables 19 and 20, we report some examples of calibration when n is equal to 10 and ω_i is equal to 10%. For instance, if the parameters of the individual-based model are $\tilde{p}=1.00\%$, $\tilde{\mu}=50\%$ and $\tilde{\sigma}=10\%$, we obtain $p=9.56\%$, $\mu=5.23\%$ and $\sigma=1.48\%$ for the zero-inflated model. If we know the weights of the investors in the investment fund, we can therefore calibrate the zero-inflated model from the individual-based model (Table 19), but also the individual-based model from the zero-inflated model (Table 20).

Table 19: Calibration of the zero-inflated model from the individual-based model

Parameter set	$\mathcal{IM}(n, \tilde{p}, \tilde{\mu}, \tilde{\sigma})$			$\mathcal{ZI}(p, \mu, \sigma)$		
	$\tilde{p}$	$\tilde{\mu}$	$\tilde{\sigma}$	p	μ	σ
#1	0.20%	50.00%	10.00%	1.98%	5.05%	1.11%
#2	1.00%	50.00%	10.00%	9.56%	5.23%	1.48%
#3	1.00%	30.00%	20.00%	9.56%	3.14%	2.14%

Table 20: Calibration of the individual-based model from the zero-inflated model

Parameter set	$\mathcal{ZI}(p, \mu, \sigma)$			$\mathcal{IM}(n, \tilde{p}, \tilde{\mu}, \tilde{\sigma})$		
	p	μ	σ	$\tilde{p}$	$\tilde{\mu}$	$\tilde{\sigma}$
#1	5.00%	2.00%	5.00%	0.51%	19.55%	49.34%
#2	10.00%	2.00%	5.00%	1.05%	19.08%	48.67%
#3	10.00%	5.00%	10.00%	1.05%	47.71%	97.14%

4.1.3 On the importance of the liability structure

We notice that the variance of the redemption rate depends on the Herfindahl index:

$$\mathcal{H}(\omega) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i^2$$

This implies that the liability structure ω is an important parameter to understand the probability distribution of the redemption rate.

The arithmetics of the Herfindahl index We know that the Herfindahl index is bounded:

$$\frac{1}{n} \leq \mathcal{H}(\omega) \leq 1$$

$\mathcal{H}(\omega)$ is equal to one when one investor holds 100% of the investment fund ($\exists i : \omega_i = 1$), whereas the lower bound is reached for an equally-weighted liability structure ($\omega_i = n^{-1}$). Therefore, $\mathcal{H}(\omega)$ is a measure of concentration. A related statistic is the "*effective number of unitholders*":

$$\mathcal{N}(\omega) = \frac{1}{\mathcal{H}(\omega)}$$

$\mathcal{N}(\omega)$ indicates how many equivalent investors hold the investment fund. For instance, we consider two funds with the following liability structures $\omega^{(1)} = (25\%, 25\%, 25\%, 25\%)$ and $\omega^{(2)} = (42\%, 17\%, 15\%, 13\%, 9\%, 3\%, 1\%)$. Since we have $\mathcal{N}\left(\omega^{(1)}\right) = 4$ and $\mathcal{N}\left(\omega^{(2)}\right) = 3.94$, we may consider that the first fund is not more concentrated than the second fund even if the second fund has 7 unitholders.

We assume that the liability weights follow a geometric series with $\omega_i \propto q^i$ and $0 < q < 1$. We have[23]:

$$\mathcal{N}(\omega) = \frac{1 - q^2}{(1 - q)^2}$$

[23] Because we have:

$$\mathcal{H}(\omega) = \frac{(1-q)^2}{q^2} \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} q^{2i} = \frac{(1-q)^2}{q^2} \frac{q^2}{(1-q^2)} = \frac{(1-q)^2}{1-q^2}$$

As shown in Figure 21, we have an infinite number of unitholders, but a finite number of effective unitholders. For example, if $q \leq 0.98$, then $\mathcal{N}(\omega) < 100$.

Figure 21: Effective number of unitholders with a geometric liability structure $\omega_i \propto q^i$



Approximation of the probability distribution $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \omega)$ We recall that the unconditional probability distribution of the redemption rate is given by $\mathbf{F}(x) = \Pr\{\mathcal{R} \leq x\}$. Since the redemption rate depends on the liability structure ω in the individual-based model $\mathcal{IM}(n, \omega, \tilde{p}, \tilde{\mu}, \tilde{\sigma})$, we note $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \omega)$ the associated probability distribution:

$$\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \omega) = \Pr\left\{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i \cdot \mathcal{E}_i \cdot \mathcal{R}_i^\star \leq x\right\}$$

We now consider the model $\mathcal{IM}(\mathcal{N}(\omega), \tilde{p}, \tilde{\mu}, \tilde{\sigma})$ and define $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \mathcal{H})$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \mathcal{H}) &= \Pr\left\{\frac{1}{\mathcal{N}(\omega)} \sum_{i=1}^{\mathcal{N}(\omega)} \mathcal{E}_i \cdot \mathcal{R}_i^\star \leq x\right\} \\ &= \Pr\left\{\mathcal{H}(\omega) \sum_{i=1}^{\mathcal{H}(\omega)^{-1}} \mathcal{E}_i \cdot \mathcal{R}_i^\star \leq x\right\}\end{aligned}$$

The issue is to know under which conditions we can approximate $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \omega)$ by $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \mathcal{H})$.

Let us consider some Monte Carlo experimentations. We assume that the liability weights are geometric distributed: $\omega_i \propto q^i$. In Figure 22, we compare the two probability distributions $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \omega)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \mathcal{H})$ for several sets of parameters[24] $(\tilde{p}, \tilde{\mu}, \tilde{\sigma})$. The weights ω_i for

[24] We recall that $\tilde{\mathbf{G}}$ is the beta distribution by default.

$q = 0.95$ are given in Figure 42 on page 110. We notice that the approximation of $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \omega)$ by $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \mathcal{H})$ is good and satisfies the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test at the 99% confidence level. This is not the case if we assume that $q = 0.90$ or $q = 0.50$ (see Figures 43 and 44 on page 111).

Figure 22: Comparison of $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \omega)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \mathcal{H})$ ($q = 0.95$ and $\mathcal{H}(\omega)^{-1} = 38$)



To better understand these results, we assume that $\tilde{p} = 0.3$, $\tilde{\mu} = 0.5$ and $\tilde{\sigma} = 0.4$. When q is equal to 0.50, the effective number of unitholders is low and is equal to 3. In this case, the probability distribution $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \mathcal{H})$ is far from the probability distribution $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \omega)$ as shown in Figure 23. In fact, this case corresponds to an investment fund which is highly concentrated. The risk is then to observe redemptions from the largest unitholders. In particular, we notice that $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \mathcal{H})$ presents some steps. The reason is that the redemption rate can be explained by the redemption of one unitholder, the redemption of two unitholders or the redemption of three unitholders. If we assume that q is equal to 0.90, the effective number of unitholders is larger and becomes 38. In this case, the probability distribution $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \mathcal{H})$ is close to the probability distribution $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \omega)$, because the step effects disappear (see Figure 24). To summarize, the approximation of $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \omega)$ by $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \mathcal{H})$ cannot be good when the effective number of unitholders (or $\mathcal{H}(\omega)^{-1}$) is low.

Remark 9 *In many cases, we don't know the comprehensive liability structure ω, but only the largest weights. In Appendix A.6 on page 96, we derive an upper bound $\mathcal{H}_m^+(\omega)$ of the Herfindahl index $\mathcal{H}(\omega)$ from the m largest weights. Therefore, we can deduce a lower bound of the effective number of unitholders:*

$$\mathcal{N}(\omega) > \mathcal{N}_m^-(\omega) = \frac{1}{\mathcal{H}_m^+(\omega)}$$

An example is provided in Table 21 when we assume that $\omega_i \propto q^i$. When the fund is highly concentrated, we obtain a good approximation of $\mathcal{N}(\omega)$ with the 10^{th} or 20^{th} largest

Figure 23: The case $\mathcal{H}(\omega)^{-1} = 3$



Figure 24: The case $\mathcal{H}(\omega)^{-1} = 18$



unitholders. Otherwise, $\mathcal{N}(\omega)$ is underestimated. However, this is not a real issue because we can think that generated stress scenarios will be overestimated. Indeed, using a lower value $\mathcal{N}(\omega)$ increases $\sigma(\mathcal{R})$ as shown in Figure 20 on page 52, implying that the redemption risk is generally overestimated.

Table 21: Lower bound $\mathcal{N}_m^-(\omega)$ of the effective number of unitholders

m	$q = 0.50$	$q = 0.90$	$q = 0.95$	$q = 0.97$	$q = 0.99$	$q = 0.995$
5	3	14	24	37	104	204
10	3	17	28	42	109	209
20	3	19	34	50	119	219
50	3	19	39	63	145	248
∞	3	19	39	66	199	399

Stress scenarios based on the largest unitholders The previous results show that the main risk in a concentrated fund comes from the behavior of the largest unitholders. It justifies the use of stress scenarios based on the order statistics $\omega_{k:n}$:

$$\min \omega_i = \omega_{1:n} \leq \cdots \leq \omega_{k:n} \leq \omega_{k+1:n} \leq \cdots \leq \omega_{n:n} = \max \omega_i$$

Then, we can define the stress scenario that corresponds to the full redemption of the m largest unitholders:

$$\mathbb{S}(m) = \sum_{k=1}^{m} \omega_{n-k+1:n}$$

An example is given in Table 22 when the liability structure is defined by $\omega_i \propto q^i$. Of course, these stress scenarios $\mathbb{S}(m)$ make sense only if the fund presents some liability concentration. Otherwise, they are not informative.

Table 22: Stress scenarios $\mathbb{S}(m)$ when $\omega_i \propto q^i$

m	$q = 0.50$	$q = 0.90$	$q = 0.95$	$q = 0.97$	$q = 0.99$	$q = 0.995$
1	50.0%	10.0%	5.0%	3.0%	1.0%	0.5%
2	75.0%	19.0%	9.8%	5.9%	2.0%	1.0%
5	96.9%	41.0%	22.6%	14.1%	4.9%	2.5%
10	99.9%	65.1%	40.1%	26.3%	9.6%	4.9%

4.1.4 Calibration of stress scenarios

Using collective and mutual funds The calibration of the individual-based model is much more complicated than the calibration of the zero-inflated model. The reason is that it depends on the liability structure of the funds, which are not necessarily the same for the different funds. Let us consider the case of a single fund f. We can estimate the parameters $\tilde{p}$, $\tilde{\mu}$ and $\hat{\sigma}$ using the quadratic criterion:

$$\begin{aligned}\{\tilde{p}^\star, \tilde{\mu}^\star, \tilde{\sigma}^\star\} &= \arg\min \varpi_{\tilde{p}} \left(\hat{p}_{(f)} - 1 + (1-\tilde{p})^{\mathcal{H}_{(f)}^{-1}}\right)^2 + \varpi_{\tilde{\mu}} \left(\hat{p}_{(f)}\hat{\mu}_{(f)} - \tilde{p}\tilde{\mu}\right)^2 + \\ &\quad \varpi_{\tilde{\sigma}} \left(\hat{p}_{(f)} \left(\hat{\sigma}_{(f)}^2 + \left(1 - \hat{p}_{(f)}\right)\hat{\mu}_{(f)}^2\right) - \tilde{p}\left(\tilde{\sigma}^2 + (1-\tilde{p})\,\tilde{\mu}^2\right)\mathcal{H}_{(f)}\right)^2 \quad (26)\end{aligned}$$

where $\hat{p}_{(f)}$, $\hat{\mu}_{(f)}$ and $\hat{\sigma}_{(f)}$ are the empirical estimates of the parameters p, μ and σ, and $\mathcal{H}_{(f)}$ is the Herfindahl index associated with the fund. In practice, the liability structure changes every day, meaning that the Herfindahl index is time-varying. Therefore, we can use the average of Herfindahl indices. The weights $\varpi_{\tilde{p}}$, $\varpi_{\tilde{\mu}}$ and $\varpi_{\tilde{\sigma}}$ indicate the relative importance of each moment condition. If we consider several funds, the previous criterion becomes:

$$\begin{aligned}\{\tilde{p}^\star, \tilde{\mu}^\star, \tilde{\sigma}^\star\} &= \arg\min \varpi_{\tilde{p}} \sum_f \varpi_{(f)} \left(\hat{p}_{(f)} - 1 + (1-\tilde{p})^{\mathcal{H}_{(f)}^{-1}}\right)^2 + \\ &\quad \varpi_{\tilde{\mu}} \sum_f \varpi_{(f)} \left(\hat{p}_{(f)}\hat{\mu}_{(f)} - \tilde{p}\tilde{\mu}\right)^2 + \\ &\quad \varpi_{\tilde{\sigma}} \sum_f \varpi_{(f)} \left(\hat{p}_{(f)} \left(\hat{\sigma}_{(f)}^2 + \left(1-\hat{p}_{(f)}\right)\hat{\mu}_{(f)}^2\right) - \tilde{p}\left(\tilde{\sigma}^2 + (1-\tilde{p})\,\tilde{\mu}^2\right)\mathcal{H}_{(f)}\right)^2\end{aligned} \tag{27}$$

where $\varpi_{(f)}$ is the relative weight of the fund f.

In practice, the estimates $\tilde{p}^\star$, $\tilde{\mu}^\star$ and $\tilde{\sigma}^\star$ are very sensitive to the Herfindahl index because of the first and third moment conditions. To illustrate this point, we consider the institutional category and we assume that there is only one fund. On page 46, we found that $\hat{p}_{(f)} = 8.23\%$, $\hat{\mu}_{(f)} = 3.23\%$ and $\hat{\sigma}_{(f)} = 10.86\%$. If $\mathcal{H}_{(f)} = 5$, we obtain $\tilde{p}^\star = 1.70\%$, $\tilde{\mu}^\star = 15.61\%$ and $\tilde{\sigma}^\star = 53.31\%$. If $\mathcal{H}_{(f)} = 20$, we obtain $\tilde{p}^\star = 0.43\%$, $\tilde{\mu}^\star = 62.04\%$ and $\tilde{\sigma}^\star = 212.48\%$. In the case of the retail category, we found that $\hat{p}_{(f)} = 45.61\%$, $\hat{\mu}_{(f)} = 0.33\%$ and $\hat{\sigma}_{(f)} = 2.88\%$. If $\mathcal{H}_{(f)} = 1\,000$, we obtain $\tilde{p}^\star = 0.06\%$, $\tilde{\mu}^\star = 247\%$ and $\tilde{\sigma}^\star = 2\,489\%$. If $\mathcal{H}_{(f)} = 10\,000$, we obtain $\tilde{p}^\star = 0.01\%$, $\tilde{\mu}^\star = 2\,472\%$ and $\tilde{\sigma}^\star = 24\,891\%$. These results are not realistic since $\tilde{\mu}^\star > 1$ and $\tilde{\sigma}^\star > 1$.

Using mandates and dedicated funds Collective investment and mutual funds are pooled investment vehicles, meaning that they are held by several investors. We now consider another type of funds with a single unitholder. They correspond to mandates and funds that are dedicated to a unique investor. In this case, the Herfindahl index is equal to one, and the solution of Problem (26) corresponds to the parameter set of the zero-inflated model:

$$\left\{\tilde{p}^\star = \hat{p}_{(f)}, \tilde{\mu}^\star = \hat{\mu}_{(f)}, \tilde{\sigma}^\star = \hat{\sigma}_{(f)}\right\}$$

In our database, we can separate the observations between collective and mutual funds on one side and mandates and dedicated funds on the other side. In Tables 23, 24 and 25, we have estimated the parameters $\tilde{p}$, $\tilde{\mu}$ and $\tilde{\sigma}$ by only considering mandates and dedicated funds. These results highly differ than those obtained for collective and mutual funds (Tables 14, 15 and 16 on page 46). First, we can calibrate a smaller number of cells. Indeed, we recall that the estimates are not calculated if the number of observations is less than 200. Second, the magnitude of the estimates is very different. If we consider all fund and investor categories, we obtain $\tilde{p} = 3.34\%$, $\tilde{\mu} = 2.13\%$ and $\tilde{\sigma} = 10.27\%$, whereas we have previously found $p = 31.11\%$, $\mu = 0.72\%$ and $\sigma = 4.55\%$. As expected, we verify that $\tilde{p} \ll p$ and $\tilde{\sigma} \gg \tilde{\sigma}$ because of the following reasons:

- the redemption probability is larger in a collective fund than in a dedicated fund because they are several investors;
- the volatility of the redemption severity is smaller in a collective fund than in a dedicated fund because the behavior of the different investors is averaged, implying that the dispersion of redemption is reduced.

Table 23: Estimated value of $\tilde{p}$ in %

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Central bank	0.13	0.21		0.73	2.99			0.49
Corporate	0.49	1.14		0.13		0.57		0.71
Corporate pension fund	2.16	1.40		1.60	3.06	0.41	0.47	1.57
Institutional	1.47	1.35	0.41	2.13	1.65	0.40	0.00	1.46
Insurance	2.09	2.12		1.52	0.59	0.13		1.93
Sovereign	0.23	0.44		0.35	0.16	0.03		0.32
Third-party distributor	12.71	8.07	3.46	25.40	11.68	7.17		14.22
Total	3.95	2.63	1.73	5.82	2.92	0.68	7.46	3.34

Table 24: Estimated value of $\tilde{\mu}$ in %

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Central bank								
Corporate								
Corporate pension fund	4.39	2.94						4.11
Institutional	3.88	4.05		3.29				4.00
Insurance		3.46						4.23
Sovereign								
Third-party distributor	0.77	1.52		0.44				0.77
Total	1.89	2.47		1.48	2.64	3.91		2.13

Table 25: Estimated value of $\tilde{\sigma}$ in %

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Central bank								
Corporate								
Corporate pension fund	15.37	10.65						14.53
Institutional	16.42	13.88		12.30				14.64
Insurance		13.01						14.08
Sovereign								
Third-party distributor	5.28	5.84		3.29				4.65
Total	9.61	10.35		8.29	10.39	15.06		10.27

(1) = balanced, (2) = bond, (3) = enhanced treasury, (4) = equity, (5) = money market, (6) = other, (7) = structured, (8) = total

Curiously, we do not observe that $\tilde{\mu} \approx \mu$. One explanation may be that investors in mandates are not the same as investors in collective funds. Indeed, we may consider that they are more sophisticated and bigger when they are able to put in place a mandate or a dedicated fund. For instance, they can be more active.

The results obtained with data from mandates and dedicated funds are more realistic than those obtained with data from collective and mutual funds. The drawback is that they are based on a smaller number of observations and there are many cells where we don't have enough observations for computing the estimates. Therefore, these estimates must be completed by expert judgements.

Computing the stress scenarios Once we have estimated the parameters $\tilde{p}$, $\tilde{\mu}$ and $\tilde{\sigma}$, we can compute the stress scenarios using the Monte Carlo method. Nevertheless, we face an issue here, because the stress scenario is not unique to an investor category. Indeed, it depends on the liability structure of the fund. While the individual-based model is more realistic and relevant than the zero-inflated model, then it appears to be limited from a practical point of view. Nevertheless, it is useful to understand the importance of the liability structure on the redemption rate.

4.2 Correlation risk

4.2.1 Specification of the model

We now consider an extension of the previous model by introducing correlations between the investors. We obtain the same expression of the redemption rate:

$$\mathcal{R} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i \cdot \mathcal{E}_i \cdot \mathcal{R}_i^\star$$

However, the random variables $(\mathcal{E}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{E}_n, \mathcal{R}_1^\star, \ldots, \mathcal{R}_n^\star)$ are not necessarily independent. We discuss three different correlation patterns:

1. We can assume that $\mathcal{E}_i$ and $\mathcal{E}_j$ are correlated. This is the simplest and most understandable case. Indeed, we generally observe long periods with low redemption frequencies followed by short periods with high redemption frequencies, in particular when there is a crisis or a panic.

2. We can assume that the redemption severities $\mathcal{R}_i^\star$ and $\mathcal{R}_j^\star$ are correlated. For example, it would mean that high (resp. low) redemptions are observed at the same time. Nevertheless, this severity correlation is different from the previous frequency correlation. Indeed, the severities are independent from the number of redemptions, implying that the severity correlation only concerns the unitholders that have already decided to redeem.

3. We can assume that $\mathcal{E}_i$ and $\mathcal{R}_i^\star$ are correlated. We notice that we can write the redemption rate for a given category as follows:

$$\mathcal{R} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i \cdot \mathcal{R}_i$$

   where $\mathcal{R}_i = \mathcal{E}_i \cdot \mathcal{R}_i^\star$ is the individual redemption rate for the i^{th} investor. The breakdown between the binary variable $\mathcal{E}_i$ and the continuous variable $\mathcal{R}_i^\star$ helps us to model the "*clumping-at-zero*" pattern. But there is no reason that the value taken by the redemption severity $\mathcal{R}_i^\star$ depends whether $\mathcal{E}_i$ takes the value 0 or 1, because $\mathcal{R}_i^\star$ is observed only if $\mathcal{E}_i = 1$.

Finally, only the first two correlation patterns are relevant from a financial point of view, because the third correlation model has no statistical meaning. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the first correlation model is more appropriate because the second correlation model confuses low-severity and high-severity regimes. During a liquidity crisis, both the redemption frequency and the redemption severity increase (Coval and Stafford, 2007; Duarte and Eisenbach, 2013; Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2013; Roncalli and Weisang, 2015a; Schmidt *et al.*, 2016). The first effect may be obtained by stressing the parameter $\tilde{p}$ or by considering a high-frequency regime deduced from the first correlation model, but the second effect

can only be obtained by stressing the parameter $\tilde{\mu}$ and cannot be explained by the second correlation model. Therefore, we only consider the first correlation pattern by modeling the random vector $(\mathcal{E}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{E}_n)$ with a copula decomposition. We continue to assume that $\mathcal{E}_i \sim \mathcal{B}(\tilde{p})$ are identically distributed, but the dependence function of $(\mathcal{E}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{E}_n)$ is given by the copula function $\mathbf{C}(u_1, \ldots, u_n)$. The individual-based model is then a special case of this copula-based model when the copula function is the product copula $\mathbf{C}^{\perp}$.

In what follows, we consider the Clayton copula[25]:

$$\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(u_1, \ldots, u_n) = \left(u_1^{-\theta_c} + \cdots + u_n^{-\theta_c} - n + 1\right)^{-1/\theta_c}$$

or the Normal copula:

$$\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(u_1, \ldots, u_n) = \Phi\left(\Phi^{-1}(u_1) + \cdots + \Phi^{-1}(u_n); \mathcal{C}_n(\theta_c)\right)$$

The Clayton parameter satisfies $\theta_c \geq 0$ whereas the Normal parameter θ_c lies in the range $[-1, 1]$. These two copula families are very interesting since they are positively ordered with respect to the concordance stochastic ordering. For the Clayton copula, we have:

$$\mathbf{C}_{(0)} = \mathbf{C}^{\perp} \prec \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)} \prec \mathbf{C}^{+} = \mathbf{C}_{(\infty)}$$

meaning that the product copula is reached when $\theta_c = 0$ and the upper Fréchet bound corresponds to the limiting case $\theta_c \to \infty$. For the Normal copula, we restrict our analysis to $\theta_c \in [0, 1]$ because there is no sense to obtain negative correlations. Therefore, we have:

$$\mathbf{C}_{(0)} = \mathbf{C}^{\perp} \prec \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)} \prec \mathbf{C}^{+} = \mathbf{C}_{(1)}$$

The Normal parameter θ_c is easy to interpret because it corresponds to the Pearson linear correlation between two Gaussian random variables. The interpretation of the Clayton copula θ_c is more tricky. Nevertheless, we can compute the associated Kendall's tau and Spearman's rho rank correlations[26]. Their expressions are given in Table 26. Therefore, we can deduce the Pearson correlation ρ.

Table 26: Relationship between the copula parameter θ_c, the Kendall's tau τ, the Spearman's rho ϱ and the Pearson correlation ρ

	τ	ϱ	ρ
Clayton	$\dfrac{\theta_c}{\theta_c + 2}$	$\sin\left(\dfrac{\pi\theta_c}{2\theta_c + 4}\right)$	$\sin\left(\dfrac{\pi\theta_c}{2\theta_c + 4}\right)$
Normal	$\dfrac{2}{\pi}\arcsin(\theta_c)$	$\dfrac{6}{\pi}\arcsin\left(\dfrac{\theta_c}{2}\right)$	θ_c

The previous formulas can be used to map the copula parameter space into the Kendall, Spearman or Pearson correlation space. Some numeric values are given in Table 27. For example, the Clayton copula $\theta_c = 2$ corresponds to a Kendall's tau of 50%, a Spearman's rho of 69% and a Pearson correlation of 70.7%. The following analyses will present the results with respect to the Pearson correlation, which is the most readable and known parameter.

[25] We use the notations of Roncalli (2020, Chapter 11).

[26] For the Clayton copula, we calculate an approximation of the Spearman's rho:

$$\varrho \approx \frac{6}{\pi}\arcsin\left(\frac{1}{2}\sin\left(\frac{\pi\theta_c}{2\theta_c + 4}\right)\right) \approx \sin\left(\frac{\pi\theta_c}{2\theta_c + 4}\right)$$

Table 27: Mapping of the copula parameter space

Clayton copula				Normal copula			
θ_c	τ	ϱ	ρ	θ_c	τ	ϱ	ρ
0.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
1.00	33.33%	48.26%	50.00%	0.20	12.82%	19.13%	20.00%
2.00	50.00%	69.02%	70.71%	0.50	33.33%	48.26%	50.00%
5.00	71.43%	89.25%	90.10%	0.75	53.99%	73.41%	75.00%
10.00	83.33%	96.26%	96.59%	0.90	71.29%	89.15%	90.00%
50.00	96.15%	99.80%	99.82%	0.99	90.99%	98.90%	99.00%

Remark 10 *We denote the copula-based model by* $\mathcal{CM}(n, \omega, \tilde{p}, \tilde{\mu}, \tilde{\sigma}, \rho)$ *(or* $\mathcal{CM}(n, \tilde{p}, \tilde{\mu}, \tilde{\sigma}, \rho)$ *when the vector of weights are equally-weighted). We have the following equivalence:*

$$\mathcal{IM}(n, \omega, \tilde{p}, \tilde{\mu}, \tilde{\sigma}) = \mathcal{CM}(n, \omega, \tilde{p}, \tilde{\mu}, \tilde{\sigma}, 0)$$

4.2.2 Statistical analysis

The skewness effect In Appendix A.7.1 on page 97, we show that:

$$\Pr\{\mathcal{R} = 0\} = \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(1 - \tilde{p}, \ldots, 1 - \tilde{p})$$

Since $\mathbf{C}^{\perp} \prec \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)} \prec \mathbf{C}^{+}$, we obtain the following bounds[27]:

$$(1 - \tilde{p})^n \leq \Pr\{\mathcal{R} = 0\} \leq 1 - \tilde{p}$$

We notice that the probability to observe zero redemptions converges to zero only when the number n of unitholders tends to ∞ and the copula is the product copula. By assuming that the redemption frequency $\tilde{p}$ is equal to 10%, we obtain the results given in Figure 45 on page 112 and we verify the previous statistical property. In Figure 25, we show the relationship between the Pearson correlation ρ and the probability $\Pr\{\mathcal{R} = 0\}$. As expected, it is an increasing function. We notice that the introduction of the correlation is very important to understand the empirical results we have calculated in Table 14 on page 46 and some unrealistic values we have obtained in Table 18 on page 50. For instance, the fact that $\Pr\{\mathcal{R} = 0\}$ is equal to 54.39% for the retail category can only be explained by a significant frequency correlation since the number n of unitholders is high for this category.

By construction, the frequency correlation modifies the probability distribution of the redemption frequency $\mathcal{F}$, which is defined as the proportion of unitholders that redeem:

$$\mathcal{F} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathbb{1}\{\mathcal{E}_i = 1\}$$

$\mathcal{F}$ is a random variable, whose range is between 0 and 1. $\mathcal{F}$ depends on the frequency parameter $\tilde{p}$, the number n of unitholders and the copula function $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}$ (or the Pearson

[27] Because we have:

$$\mathbf{C}^{\perp}(1 - \tilde{p}, \ldots, 1 - \tilde{p}) = \prod_{i=1}^{n} (1 - \tilde{p}) = (1 - \tilde{p})^n$$

and:

$$\mathbf{C}^{+}(1 - \tilde{p}, \ldots, 1 - \tilde{p}) = \min(1 - \tilde{p}, \ldots, 1 - \tilde{p}) = 1 - \tilde{p}$$

Figure 25: Probability to observe no redemption $\Pr\{\mathfrak{R} = 0\}$ in % with respect to the frequency correlation ρ ($\tilde{p} = 10\%$)



Figure 26: Redemption frequencies in % with respect to the frequency correlation ρ ($\tilde{p} = 20\%, n = 1\,000$)



correlation ρ). When $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}$ is the product copula $\mathbf{C}^{\perp}$, the redemption events are independent and we obtain:

$$\mathcal{F} \sim \frac{\mathcal{B}(n, \tilde{p})}{n}$$

because the sum of independent Bernoulli random variables is a binomial random variable. Therefore, we obtain the following approximation when n is sufficiently large:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\mathcal{B}(n, \tilde{p})}{n} &\approx \frac{\mathcal{N}(n\tilde{p}, n\tilde{p}(1-\tilde{p}))}{n} \\ &= \mathcal{N}\left(\tilde{p}, \frac{\tilde{p}(1-\tilde{p})}{n}\right) \end{aligned}$$

When the copula $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}$ corresponds to the upper Fréchet bound $\mathbf{C}^{+}$, the redemption frequency follows the Bernoulli distribution and does not depend on the number of unitholders:

$$\mathcal{F} \sim \mathcal{B}(\tilde{p})$$

We have represented these two extreme cases in Figure 26 when $\tilde{p} = 20\%$ and $n = 1\,000$. We have also reported the probability distribution of $\mathcal{F}$ when the Pearson correlation of the copula function is equal to 25% and 50%. We notice that the skewness risk increases with the frequency correlation. Therefore, the parameter ρ will have a high impact on the stress testing results. In particular, when the frequency correlation is high, the risk is to observe a large proportion of redemptions even if the number of unitholders is large. In this case, the diversification effect across unitholders is limited. An illustration is provided in Figure 46 on page 112 that shows the probability to observe 100% of redemptions[28] when n is set to 20.

The mean effect In Appendix A.7.3 on page 98, we show that the frequency correlation has no impact on the average redemption rate since we obtain the same expression as previously:

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{R}] = \tilde{p}\tilde{\mu}$$

Therefore, the redemption frequency changes the shape of the probability distribution of $\mathcal{R}$, but not its mean.

The volatility effect The volatility of the redemption rate is equal to:

$$\sigma^2(\mathcal{R}) = \left(\tilde{p}\tilde{\sigma}^2 + \left(\tilde{p} - \breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}(\tilde{p}, \tilde{p})\right)\tilde{\mu}^2\right)\mathcal{H}(\omega) + \left(\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}(\tilde{p}, \tilde{p}) - \tilde{p}^2\right)\tilde{\mu}^2$$

where $\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}$ is the survival copula associated to $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}$. Since we have $\mathbf{C}^{\top} \prec \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)} \prec \mathbf{C}^{+}$, we obtain the following inequalities:

$$\tilde{p}\left(\tilde{\sigma}^2 + (1-\tilde{p})\tilde{\mu}^2\right)\mathcal{H}(\omega) \leq \sigma^2(\mathcal{R}) \leq \tilde{p}\tilde{\sigma}^2\mathcal{H}(\omega) + \tilde{p}(1-\tilde{p})\tilde{\mu}^2$$

If we consider the equally-weighted case and assume that n tends to infinity, we obtain:

$$0 \leq \sigma^2(\mathcal{R}) = \left(\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}(\tilde{p}, \tilde{p}) - \tilde{p}^2\right)\tilde{\mu}^2 \leq \tilde{p}(1-\tilde{p})\tilde{\mu}^2$$

This implies that the volatility risk is not equal to zero for an infinitely fine-grained liability structure if the frequency correlation is different from zero.

[28] It corresponds to the statistic $\Pr\{\mathcal{F} = 1\}$.

Figure 27: Volatility of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$ in % with respect to the number n of unitholders ($\tilde{p} = 10\%, \tilde{\mu} = 50\%, \tilde{\sigma} = 30\%$)



Figure 28: Volatility of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$ in % with respect to the frequency correlation ($\tilde{p} = 10\%, \tilde{\mu} = 50\%, \tilde{\sigma} = 10\%$)



The impact of the frequency correlation is illustrated in Figures 27 and 28. We notice that the decrease of the volatility risk highly depends on the correlation parameter ρ. These figures confirm that the volatility risk is minimum when the frequency correlation is equal to zero. The consequence is that the frequency correlation is a key parameter when building stress testing scenarios. This is perfectly normal since ρ can been seen as a parameter that controls spillover effects and the magnitude of redemption contagion. All these results corroborate the previous intuition that the individual-based model without redemption correlation may be not appropriate for building a robust stress testing program.

The shape effect The impact of the frequency correlation on the skewness and the volatility can then change dramatically the shape of the probability distribution of the redemption rate. In Figure 17 on page 49, we have already studied the histogram of the redemption rate in the case $\tilde{p} = 50\%$, $\tilde{\mu} = 50\%$ and $\tilde{\sigma} = 10\%$. Let us reproduce the same exercise by assuming that the frequency correlation is equal to 50%. The results are given in Figure 29. The shape of the probability distributions is completely different except in the case of a single unitholder[29]. To better illustrate the impact of the frequency correlation, we report in Figure 30 the histogram of the redemption rate by fixing $n = 10$. In the case of a perfect correlation of 100% and an equally-weighted liability structure, we obtain two different cases:

1. there is zero redemption with a probability $1 - \tilde{p}$;
2. there are n redemptions with a probability $\tilde{p}$, and the redemption severity $\mathcal{R}^\star$ is the average of the individual redemption severities:

$$\mathcal{R}^\star = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{R}_i^\star$$

It follows that the probability distribution of the redemption rate is equal to:

$$\mathbf{F}(x) = \mathbb{1}\{x \geq 0\} \cdot (1 - \tilde{p}) + \mathbb{1}\{x > 0\} \cdot \tilde{p} \cdot \bar{\mathbf{G}}(x)$$

We retrieve the zero-inflated model $\mathcal{ZI}\left(\tilde{p}, \tilde{\mu}, n^{-1/2}\tilde{\sigma}\right)$ or the individual-based model with a single unitholder $\mathcal{IM}\left(1, \tilde{p}, \tilde{\mu}, n^{-1/2}\tilde{\sigma}\right)$. The only difference is the severity distribution $\bar{\mathbf{G}}$, whose variance is divided by a factor n. Spillover and contagion risks come then from the herd behavior of unitholders. Instead of having n different investors, we have a unique investor in the fund, because the decision to redeem by one investor induces the decision to redeem by all the other remaining investors.

4.2.3 Evidence of the correlation risk

Correlation risk within the same investor category In order to illustrate that redemption frequencies are correlated, we build the time series of the frequency rate $\mathcal{F}_t$ for a given category[30]:

$$\mathcal{F}_t = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_{i,t} \cdot \mathbb{1}\{\mathcal{E}_{i,t} = 1\} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_{i,t}\mathcal{E}_{i,t}$$

[29] Other illustrations are provided in Appendix C on page 113. Figures 47, 48 and 49 correspond to the cases $\rho = 25\%$, $\rho = 75\%$ and $\rho = 90\%$.

[30] We can use an equally-weighted scheme $\omega_{i,t} = 1/n$.

Figure 29: Histogram of the redemption rate in % with respect to the number n of unitholders ($\tilde{p} = 50\%, \tilde{\mu} = 50\%, \tilde{\sigma} = 10\%, \rho = 50\%$)



Figure 30: Histogram of the redemption rate in % with respect to the frequency correlation ($\tilde{p} = 50\%, \tilde{\mu} = 50\%, \tilde{\sigma} = 10\%, n = 10$)



where $\mathcal{E}_{i,t}$ is the redemption indicator for the investor i at time t. Using the sample $(\mathcal{F}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{F}_T)$, we compute the empirical mean $\overline{\mathcal{F}}$ and the standard deviation $\hat{\sigma}(\mathcal{F})$. Then, the copula parameter θ_c can be calibrated by solving the following nonlinear equation[31]:

$$\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}\left(\overline{\mathcal{F}}, \overline{\mathcal{F}}\right) = \frac{\hat{\sigma}^2(\mathcal{F}) - \overline{\mathcal{F}}\left(\mathcal{H}(\omega) - \overline{\mathcal{F}}\right)}{1 - \mathcal{H}(\omega)}$$

The copula parameter θ_c can be transformed into the Kendall, Spearman or Pearson correlation using the standard formulas given in Table 26 on page 62. For instance, if $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}$ is the Clayton copula, the Pearson correlation is equal to:

$$\rho = \sin\left(\frac{\pi\theta_c}{2\theta_c + 4}\right)$$

An example is provided in Table 28 when the fund liability structure is equally-weighted and has 20 unitholders. For instance, if the empirical mean $\overline{\mathcal{F}}$ and the standard deviation $\hat{\sigma}(\mathcal{F})$ are equal to 25% and 20%, the calibrated Pearson correlation is equal to 44.5%.

Table 28: Calibrated Pearson correlation (Clayton copula, $\mathcal{H}(\omega) = 1/20$)

$\hat{\sigma}(\mathcal{F})$	$\overline{\mathcal{F}}$				
	10.0%	20.0%	25.0%	30.0%	40.0%
10.0%	39.1%	5.1%	1.1%		
20.0%	93.9%	58.7%	44.5%	34.7%	23.5%
30.0%	100.0%	91.5%	82.3%	72.8%	57.7%
40.0%		100.0%	98.7%	95.6%	87.4%

Remark 11 *At first sight, calibrating the frequency correlation seems to be an easy task. However, it is very sensitive to the different parameters $\overline{\mathcal{F}}$, $\hat{\sigma}(\mathcal{F})$ and $\mathcal{H}(\omega)$. Moreover, it depends on the copula specification. For instance, we obtain the results given in Table 49 on page 114 when the dependence function is the Normal copula. We observe that the Pearson correlations calibrated with the Clayton copula are different from those calibrated with the Normal copula.*

Remark 12 *Another way to illustrate the frequency correlation is to split a given investor category into two subsamples $\mathcal{S}_1$ and $\mathcal{S}_2$ and calculate the time series of the redemption frequency for the two subsamples $\mathcal{S}_k$ $(k = 1, 2)$:*

$$\mathcal{F}_{k,t} = \frac{1}{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}_k} \omega_{i,t}} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}_k} \omega_{i,t} \mathcal{E}_{i,t}$$

Then, we can calculate the Pearson correlation $\rho(\mathcal{F}_1, \mathcal{F}_2)$ and calibrate the associated copula parameter θ_c using Equation (58) on page 101.

Correlation risk between investor categories The correlation risk is present within a given investor category, but it may also concern two different investor categories. In order to distinguish them, we use the classical statistical jargon of inter-class and intra-class correlations. In Table 29, we report the intra-class Spearman correlation[32] for four

[31] See Equation (56) on page 100.

[32] The correlations of retail/insurance and institutional/insurance for balanced funds and the correlations of retail/third-party distributor and retail/insurance for money market funds are not significant at the confidence level of 95%.

Table 29: Intra-class Spearman correlation

Category #1	Category #2	Balanced	Bond	Equity	Money Market
Retail	Third-party distributor	53.0%	52.9%	52.1%	3.3%
Retail	Institutional	10.4%	23.2%	22.0%	−6.5%
Retail	Insurance	3.0%	18.8%	31.6%	−12.3%
Third-party distributor	Institutional	13.5%	48.0%	54.1%	24.0%
Third-party distributor	Insurance	23.1%	21.5%	22.8%	39.2%
Institutional	Insurance	2.5%	16.2%	16.4%	29.8%
Average		17.6%	30.1%	33.2%	12.9%

investor categories (retail, third-party distributor, institutional and insurance) and four fund categories (balanced, bond, equity and money market). We observe a high inter-class correlation between retail investors and third-party distributors except for money market funds. We notice that equity and bond funds present very similar frequency correlations. On average, it is equal to 30%. For balanced and money market funds, we obtain lower figures less than 20%. These results are coherent with the academic research, since redemption runs and contagions in bond and equity funds have been extensively studied and illustrated (Lakonishok *et al.*, 1992; Wermers, 1999; Sias, 2004; Wylie, 2005; Coval and Stafford, 2007; Shleifer and Vishny, 2011; Cai *et al.*, 2019).

Figure 31: Dependogram of redemption frequencies between retail investors and third-party distributors



Remark 13 *Another way to illustrate the intra-class correlation is to report the dependogram (or empirical copula) of redemption frequencies. An example is provided in Figure 31 for retail investors and third-party distributors. We observe that these dependogram does not correspond to the product copula*[33].

[33]Examples of dependogram with the Normal copula and different correlations are provided in Figure 50 on page 115.

4.2.4 Computing the stress scenarios

The parameters of the copula-based model is made up by the parameters of the individual-based model ($\tilde{p}$, $\tilde{\mu}$ and $\tilde{\sigma}$) and the copula parameter θ_c (or the associated frequency correlation). Once these parameters are estimated for a given investor/fund category, we transform the $\tilde{\mu} - \tilde{\sigma}$ parameterization into the $a - b$ parameterization of the beta distribution and compute the risk measures $\mathbb{M}$, $\mathbb{Q}(\alpha)$, $\mathbb{C}(\alpha)$ and $\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T})$ by using the following Monte Carlo algorithm:

1. we set $k \longleftarrow 1$;
2. we generate[34] $(u_1, \ldots, u_n) \sim \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}$;
3. we compute the redemption events $(\mathcal{E}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{E}_n)$ such that:
$$\mathcal{E}_i = \mathbb{1}\{u_i \geq 1 - \tilde{p}\}$$
4. we simulate the redemption severities $(\mathcal{R}_1^\star, \ldots, \mathcal{R}_n^\star)$ from the beta distribution[35] $\mathcal{B}(a, b)$;
5. we compute the redemption rate for the k^{th} simulation iteration:
$$\mathcal{R}_{(k)} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i \mathcal{E}_i \mathcal{R}_i^\star$$
6. if k is equal to n_S, we return the simulated sample $\left(\mathcal{R}_{(1)}, \ldots, \mathcal{R}_{(n_S)}\right)$, otherwise we set $k \longleftarrow k + 1$ and go back to step 2.

Figure 32 shows the relationship between the correlation frequency[36] and $\mathbb{C}(99\%)$ for different parameter sets when the liability structure has 20 equally-weighted unitholders. The impact of the correlation risk is not negligible in some cases. This is particularly true when the frequency correlation is close to 100%, but its impact is also significant when the frequency correlation is larger than 20%. On average, we observe that the risk measure $\mathbb{C}(99\%)$ increases by 15%, 20% and 35% when the frequency correlation is respectively equal to 20%, 30% and 50% compared the independent case.

Remark 14 *The algorithm to simulate the copula-based model $\mathcal{CM}(n, \omega, \tilde{p}, \tilde{\mu}, \tilde{\sigma}, \rho)$ can be used to simulate the individual-based model $\mathcal{IM}(n, \omega, \tilde{p}, \tilde{\mu}, \tilde{\sigma})$ by setting $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)} = \mathbf{C}^\perp$. This is equivalent to replace step 2 and simulate n independent uniform random numbers $(u_1, \ldots, u_n)$.*

4.3 Time aggregation risk

In the case of daily redemptions, the correlation risk only concerns the cross-correlation between investors for a given market day. When we consider fire sales or liquidity crisis, the one-day study period is not adapted and must be extended to a weekly or monthly basis. In this case, we may face time aggregation risk, meaning that redemption flows for the subsequent market days may depend on the current redemption flows.

[34] Clayton and Normal copulas are easy to simulate using the method of transformation (Roncalli, 2020, page 803).

[35] Generally, the generation of beta random numbers is present in mathematical programming languages (Matlab, Python). Otherwise, we can use the method of rejection sampling (Roncalli, 2020, pages 886-887).

[36] It corresponds to the Pearson correlation of the Clayton copula.

Figure 32: Conditional value-at-risk $\mathbb{C}(99\%)$ with respect to the frequency correlation



4.3.1 Analysis of non-daily redemptions

We recall that the total net assets at time $t+1$ can be decomposed as follows:

$$\text{TNA}(t+1) = (1 + R(t+1)) \cdot \text{TNA}(t) + \mathcal{F}^+(t+1) - \mathcal{F}^-(t+1)$$

By assuming that $\mathcal{F}^+(t+1) = 0$, we obtain:

$$\text{TNA}(t+1) \approx (1 + R(t+1) - \mathcal{R}(t+1)) \cdot \text{TNA}(t)$$

This formula is valid on a daily basis. If we consider a period of n_h market days (e.g. a weekly period), we have:

$$\text{TNA}(t+n_h) \approx \text{TNA}(t) \prod_{h=1}^{n_h} (1 + R(t+h) - \mathcal{R}(t+h))$$

Therefore, it is not obvious to decompose the difference $\text{TNA}(t+n_h) - \text{TNA}(t)$ into a "*performance*" effect and a "*redemption*" effect since the two effects are related. Indeed, the mathematical definition of the n_h-day redemption rate is:

$$\mathcal{R}(t; t+n_h) = \frac{\sum_{h=1}^{n_h} \mathcal{F}^-(t+h)}{\text{TNA}(t)}$$

whereas the fund return over the period $[t, t+n_h]$ is given by the compound formula:

$$R(t; t+h) = \prod_{h=1}^{n_h} (1 + R(t+h)) - 1$$

Because of the cross-products (Brinson *et al.*, 1991), we cannot separate the two effects:

$$\text{TNA}(t+n_h) \neq (1 + R(t; t+n_h) - \mathcal{R}(t; t+n_h)) \cdot \text{TNA}(t)$$

4.3.2 The autocorrelation risk

In the case where the performance effect is negligible — $R(t+h) \ll \mathcal{R}(t+h)$, we have:

$$\mathcal{R}(t, t+n_h) \approx 1 - \prod_{h=1}^{n_h} (1 - \mathcal{R}(t+h)) \tag{28}$$

We can then calculate the probability distribution of $\mathcal{R}(t, t+n_h)$ by the Monte Carlo method. A first solution is to consider that the redemption rates are time-independent. A second solution is to consider that redemption rates are auto-correlated:

$$\mathcal{R}(t) = \rho_{\text{time}} \mathcal{R}(t-1) + \varepsilon(t) \tag{29}$$

where ρ_{time} is the autocorrelation parameter and $\varepsilon(t)$ is a random variable such that $\mathcal{R}(t) \in [0,1]$. Such modeling is complex because of the specification of $\varepsilon(t)$. However, this approach can be approximated by considering a time-series copula representation:

$$(\mathcal{R}(t+1), \ldots, \mathcal{R}(t+n_n)) \sim \mathbf{C}\left(\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x), \ldots, \tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x); \Sigma_{\text{time}}(n_h)\right) \tag{30}$$

where $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}$ is the probability distribution of $\mathcal{R}(t)$ defined by the individual-based (or copula-based) model, $\mathbf{C}$ is the Normal copula, whose parameters are given by the Toeplitz correlation matrix[37] $\Sigma_{\text{time}}(n_h)$ such that $\Sigma_{\text{time}}(n_h)_{i,j} = \rho_{\text{time}}^{|i-j|}$. To calculate the probability distribution of $\mathcal{R}(t, t+n_h)$, we first simulate the individual-based (or copula-based) model in order to estimate the probability distribution $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x)$ of daily redemptions. Then, we generate the sample of the time-series $(\mathcal{R}(t+1), \ldots, \mathcal{R}(t+n_n))$ by using the method of the empirical quantile function (Roncalli, 2020, pages 806-809). Finally, we calculate the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}(t, t+n_h)$ using Equation (28). An example is provided in Figure 33 when the correlation between investors is equal to zero[38]. We have also measured the impact of the autocorrelation value ρ_{time} on the value-at-risk and the conditional value-at-risk. Results are given in Tables 30 and 31 for six different individual-based models $\mathcal{IM}(n, \tilde{p}, \tilde{\mu}, \tilde{\sigma})$. When the value of the risk measure is small, we notice that the impact of ρ_{time} is high. For instance, when $n = 500$, $\tilde{p} = 1\%$, $\tilde{\mu} = 25\%$ and $\tilde{\sigma} = 10\%$, the value-at-risk $\mathbb{Q}(99\%)$ is equal to 1.9% in the independent case. This figure increases respectively by +9% and +19% when ρ_{time} is equal to 25% and 50%. We also notice that the impact on the conditional value-at-risk is close to that on the value-at-risk.

Remark 15 *The compound approach defined by Equation (28) certainly overestimates stress scenarios. Indeed, we implicitly assume that the redemptions rates $\mathcal{R}(t+h)$ are identically distributed, meaning that there is no time effect on the individual redemption behaviour. However, we can think that an investor that redeems at time $t+1$ will not redeem at time $t+2$ and $t+3$. In practice, we observe that redemptions of a given investor are mutually exclusive during a short period of time. This property is not verified by Equation (28). At time $t+h$, we notice $\mathcal{IS}(t+h)$ the set of investors that have redeemed some units before*

[37] For instance, in the case of a weekly period, the Toeplitz correlation matrix is equal to:

$$\Sigma_{\text{time}}(5) = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \rho_{\text{time}} & \rho_{\text{time}}^2 & \rho_{\text{time}}^3 & \rho_{\text{time}}^4 \\ \rho_{\text{time}} & 1 & \rho_{\text{time}} & \rho_{\text{time}}^2 & \rho_{\text{time}}^3 \\ \rho_{\text{time}}^2 & \rho_{\text{time}} & 1 & \rho_{\text{time}} & \rho_{\text{time}}^2 \\ \rho_{\text{time}}^3 & \rho_{\text{time}}^2 & \rho_{\text{time}} & 1 & \rho_{\text{time}} \\ \rho_{\text{time}}^4 & \rho_{\text{time}}^3 & \rho_{\text{time}}^2 & \rho_{\text{time}} & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

[38] The same example with a correlation of 50% between investors is given in Figure 52 on page 116.

Figure 33: Histogram of the weekly redemption rate in % with respect to the autocorrelation ρ_{time} ($\tilde{p} = 50\%, \tilde{\mu} = 50\%, \tilde{\sigma} = 10\%, \rho = 0\%, n = 10$)



Table 30: Impact of the autocorrelation ρ_{time} on the value-at-risk $\mathbb{Q}\,(99\%)$

n	$\tilde{p}$	$\tilde{\mu}$	$\tilde{\sigma}$	ρ_{time} 0%	25%	50%	75%	100%
10 000	0.1%	25%	10%	0.2%	+6%	+14%	+24%	+36%
500	1.0%	25%	10%	1.9%	+9%	+19%	+33%	+50%
50	2.0%	50%	10%	10.5%	+12%	+29%	+49%	+79%
100	5.0%	50%	30%	18.2%	+8%	+18%	+29%	+45%
10	20.0%	50%	30%	65.8%	+6%	+13%	+21%	+28%
10	50.0%	50%	30%	90.1%	+2%	+4%	+6%	+8%

Table 31: Impact of the autocorrelation ρ_{time} on the conditional value-at-risk $\mathbb{C}\,(99\%)$

n	$\tilde{p}$	$\tilde{\mu}$	$\tilde{\sigma}$	ρ_{time} 0%	25%	50%	75%	100%
10 000	0.1%	25%	10%	0.2%	+6%	+16%	+27%	+41%
500	1.0%	25%	10%	2.0%	+9%	+21%	+37%	+56%
50	2.0%	50%	10%	11.4%	+13%	+32%	+54%	+84%
100	5.0%	50%	30%	19.2%	+9%	+20%	+32%	+50%
10	20.0%	50%	30%	68.8%	+6%	+13%	+21%	+28%
10	50.0%	50%	30%	91.3%	+2%	+4%	+6%	+7%

$t+h$. *We have* $\mathcal{IS}(t+1) = \{1,\ldots,n\}$. *The mutually exclusive property implies that*[39]*:*

$$i \in \mathcal{IS}(t+h) \Rightarrow \mathcal{E}_i(t+1) = \ldots = \mathcal{E}_i(t+n_h) = 0$$

It follows that:

$$\mathcal{R}(t+h) = \sum_{i \notin \mathcal{IS}(t+h)} \omega_i(t+h) \cdot \mathcal{E}_i(t+h) \cdot \mathcal{R}_i^\star(t+h)$$

and:

$$\omega_i(t+h+1) = \frac{\omega_i(t+h)}{\sum\limits_{i \notin \mathcal{IS}(t+h)} \omega_i(t+h)}$$

Because $\omega_i(t+h-1) \neq \omega_i(t+h)$ *and* $\mathcal{IS}(t+h-1) \neq \mathcal{IS}(t+h)$*, it is obvious that* $\mathcal{R}(t+h-1) \neq \mathcal{R}(t+h)$*. Therefore, the redemption decisions taken in the recent past (e.g. two or three days ago) have an impact on the future redemptions for the next days. This is a limit of the compound approach. The solution would be to develop a comprehensive individual-based model, whose random variables are replaced by stochastic processes. Nevertheless, the complexity of such model is not worth it with respect to the large uncertainty of stress testing exercises.*

4.3.3 The sell-herding behavior risk

Herding risk is related to momentum trading. According to Grinblatt *et al.* (1995), herding behavior corresponds to the situation where investors buy and sell the same securities at the same time. Herding risk happens during good and bad times, and is highly documented in economic research (Wermers, 1999; O'Neal, 2004; Ivković and Weisbenner, 2009; Ferreira *et al.*, 2012; Lou, 2012; Cashman *et al.*, 2014; Chen and Qin, 2017; Goldstein *et al.*, 2017; Choi *et al.*, 2019; Dötz and Weth, 2019). However, we generally notice that sell herding may have more impact on asset prices than buy herding. Therefore, the sell-herding behavior risk may be associated to a price destabilizing or spillover effect. In the case of redemption risk, the spillover mechanism corresponds to two related effects:

- A first spillover effect is that the unconditional probability of redemption is not equal to the conditional probability of the redemption given the returns of the fund during the recent past period:

$$\Pr\{\mathcal{R}(t+h) \leq x\} \neq \Pr\{\mathcal{R}(t+h) \leq x \mid (R(t+1),\ldots,R(t+h-1))\}$$

- A second spillover effect is that the unconditional probability of return is not equal to the conditional probability of the return given the redemptions of the fund during the recent past period:

$$\Pr\{R(t+h) \leq x\} \neq \Pr\{R(t+h) \leq x \mid (\mathcal{R}(t+1),\ldots,\mathcal{R}(t+h-1))\}$$

This implies that the transmission of a negative shock on the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}(t+1)$ may also impact the redemption rates $\{\mathcal{R}(t+2),\mathcal{R}(t+3),\ldots\}$ because of the feedback

[39] For instance, if the investor has done a redemption at time $t+1$, the probability that he will perform a new redemption at time $t+2$ is very small, meaning that:

$$\mathcal{E}_i(t+1) = 1 \Rightarrow \mathcal{E}_i(t+2) = \ldots = \mathcal{E}_i(t+n_h) = 0$$

Figure 34: Spillover between fund redemptions and fund returns



loop on the fund performance. An illustration is provided in Figure 34. A large negative redemption $\mathcal{R}(t+1)$ may induce a negative abnormal performance $R(t+1)$, and this negative performance may encourage the remaining investors of the fund to redeem, because negative returns accelerate redemption flows. This type of behavior is generally observed in the case of fire sales and less liquid markets.

As explained in the introduction, an integrated model that combines liability risk and asset risk is too ambitious and too complex. Moreover, this means modeling the policy reaction function of other investors and asset managers. Nevertheless, if we want to take into account sell herding, spillover or fire sales, we must build an econometric model. For example, the simplest way is to consider the linear dynamic model:

$$\begin{cases} R(t) = \phi_1 \mathcal{R}(t) + u_1(t) \\ \mathcal{R}(t+1) = \overline{\mathcal{R}} + \phi_2 R(t) + u_2(t+1) \end{cases}$$

We obtain an AR(1) process:

$$\mathcal{R}(t) = \overline{\mathcal{R}} + \phi \mathcal{R}(t-1) + u(t)$$

where $\phi = \phi_1 \phi_2$ and $u(t) = u_2(t) + \phi_2 u_1(t-1)$ is a white noise process. It follows that:

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{R}(t+h)] = \frac{1}{1-\phi_1\phi_2}\overline{\mathcal{R}}$$

Therefore, spillover scenarios can be estimated by applying a scaling factor to the initial shock[40].

4.3.4 Empirical results

In order to illustrate the time dependency between redemptions, we build the time series of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}_{(j,k)}(t)$, the redemption frequency $\mathcal{F}_{(j,k)}(t)$ and the redemption severities $\mathcal{R}^{\star}_{(j,k)}(t)$ for each classification matrix cell (j,k), which is defined by a fund category $\mathcal{FC}_{(j)}$ and an investor category $\mathcal{IC}_{(k)}$. For that, we calculate $\mathcal{R}_{(f,k)}(t)$ the redemption rate of the fund f for the investor category $\mathcal{IC}_{(k)}$ at time t. Then, we estimate the daily redemption rate $\mathcal{R}_{(j,k)}(t)$ as the average of the redemption rates of all funds that belong to the fund category $\mathcal{FC}_{(j)}$:

$$\mathcal{R}_{(j,k)}(t) = \frac{1}{\left|\mathcal{S}_{(j,k)}(t)\right|} \sum_{f \in \mathcal{S}_{(j,k)}(t)} \mathcal{R}_{(f,k)}(t) \tag{31}$$

where[41] $\mathcal{S}_{(j,k)}(t) = \left\{f : f \in \mathcal{FC}_{(j)}, \mathrm{TNA}_{(f,k)}(t) > 0\right\}$. We also estimate the daily redemption frequency as follows:

$$\mathcal{F}_{(j,k)}(t) = \frac{1}{\left|\mathcal{S}_{(j,k)}(t)\right|} \sum_{f \in \mathcal{S}_{(j,k)}(t)} \mathbf{1}\left\{\mathcal{R}_{(f,k)}(t) > 0\right\} \tag{32}$$

[40] The previous analysis can be extended to more sophisticated process, e.g. VAR(p) processes.

[41] We only consider funds which have unitholders that belong to the investor category $\mathcal{IC}_{(k)}$. This is equivalent to impose that the assets under management held by the investor category $\mathcal{IC}_{(k)}$ are strictly positive: $\mathrm{TNA}_{(f,k)} > 0$.

whereas the daily redemption severity is given by the following formula:

$$\mathcal{R}^{\star}_{(j,k)}(t) = \frac{1}{\left|\mathcal{S}^{\star}_{(j,k)}(t)\right|} \sum_{f \in \mathcal{S}^{\star}_{(j,k)}(t)} \mathcal{R}_{(f,k)}(t) \tag{33}$$

where $\mathcal{S}^{\star}_{(j,k)}(t) = \left\{f : f \in \mathcal{FC}_{(j)}, \text{TNA}_{(f,k)} > 0, \mathcal{R}_{(f,k)}(t) > 0\right\}$.

Table 32: Autocorrelation of the redemption rate in %

	Balanced	Bond	Equity	Money market
Institutional	25.9**	−2.2	−1.5	24.2**
Insurance	−1.5	9.9	5.4	17.8**
Retail	1.9	−2.1	9.8	11.7**
Third-party distributor	2.7	7.4	5.5	23.2**

The computation of $\mathcal{R}_{(j,k)}(t)$, $\mathcal{F}_{(j,k)}(t)$ and $\mathcal{R}^{\star}_{(j,k)}(t)$ does make sense only if there is enough observations $\left|\mathcal{S}_{(j,k)}(t)\right|$ and $\left|\mathcal{S}^{\star}_{(j,k)}(t)\right|$ at time t. This is why we focus on the most representative investor categories (retail, third-party distributor, institutional and insurance) and fund categories (balanced, bond, equity and money market). In Table 32, we report the maximum between the autocorrelation $\rho(\mathcal{R}(t), \mathcal{R}(t-1))$ of order one and the autocorrelation $\rho(\mathcal{R}(t), \mathcal{R}(t-2))$ of order two. Moreover, we indicate with the symbol ** the matrix cells where the p-value of the autocorrelation is lower than 5%. Except for money market funds and the institutional/balanced matrix cell, redemptions are not significantly autocorrelated. If we consider redemption frequencies and severities, we observe more autocorrelation (see Tables 50 and 51 on page 116). However, for bond and equity funds, the results show that the autocorrelation is significant and high for the redemption frequency, but low for the redemption severity.

5 Factor-based liquidity stress testing

The last section of this article is dedicated to the factors that may explain a redemption stress. First, we investigate whether it is due to a redemption frequency shock or a redemption severity shock. Second, we study how market risk may explain extreme redemption rates, and we focus on three factors: stock returns, bond returns and volatility levels.

5.1 Where does the stress come from?

We may wonder whether the time variation of redemption rates is explained by the time variation of redemption frequencies or redemption severities. Using the time series built in Section 4.3.4 on page 76, we consider three linear regression models:

$$\begin{cases} \mathcal{R}(t) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathcal{F}(t) + u(t) \\ \mathcal{R}(t) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathcal{R}^{\star}(t) + u(t) \\ \mathcal{R}(t) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathcal{F}(t) + \beta_2 \mathcal{R}^{\star}(t) + u(t) \end{cases}$$

In the first model, we explain the redemption rate using the redemption frequency. In the second model, the explanatory variable is the redemption severity. Finally, the third model combines the two previous models. For each classification matrix cell (j,k), we have reported the centered coefficient of determination $\mathfrak{R}^2_c$ in Tables 33, 34 and 35.

Table 33: Coefficient of determination $\mathfrak{R}_c^2$ in % — $\mathcal{R}(t) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathcal{F}(t) + u(t)$

	Balanced	Bond	Equity	Money market
Institutional	2.4	36.2	53.4	17.2
Insurance	0.9	11.6	10.8	17.8
Retail	37.2	34.5	14.7	18.4
Third-party distributor	11.5	31.6	17.7	11.5

Table 34: Coefficient of determination $\mathfrak{R}_c^2$ in % — $\mathcal{R}(t) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathcal{R}^\star(t) + u(t)$

	Balanced	Bond	Equity	Money market
Institutional	87.2	74.8	44.5	87.5
Insurance	99.2	84.0	83.3	90.1
Retail	77.6	88.4	98.1	80.8
Third-party distributor	93.1	91.5	92.1	95.0

Table 35: Coefficient of determination $\mathfrak{R}_c^2$ in % — $\mathcal{R}(t) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathcal{F}(t) + \beta_2 \mathcal{R}^\star(t) + u(t)$

	Balanced	Bond	Equity	Money market
Institutional	88.2	84.7	81.7	93.3
Insurance	99.3	86.2	86.4	94.9
Retail	92.5	95.4	99.3	92.3
Third-party distributor	97.0	96.3	95.7	97.3

If we consider the first linear regression model, we notice that $\mathfrak{R}_c^2$ is greater than 50% only for the institutional/equity category. $\mathfrak{R}_c^2$ takes a value around 35% for the retail/balanced, retail/bond and institutional/bond categories, otherwise it is less than 20%. Results for the second linear regression are better. This indicates that the redemption severity is a better explanatory variable than the redemption frequency. The only exception is the institutional/equity category. The combination of the two variables allows us to improve the explanatory power of the model, but we also notice that the redemption severity is the primary factor. The matrix cell with the highest $\mathfrak{R}_c^2$ is retail/equity, whereas the matrix cell with the lowest $\mathfrak{R}_c^2$ is institutional/equity. The scatter plot between $\mathcal{R}(t)$, $\mathcal{F}(t)$ and $\mathcal{R}^\star(t)$ for these two extreme cases are reported in Figures 35 and 36. For the retail/equity category, we verify that the redemption severity explains the redemption rate. For the institutional/equity category, the redemption severity is not able to explain the high values of the redemption rate.

The previous results are very interesting since the redemption severity is the primary factor for explaining the redemption shocks. Therefore, a high variation of the redemption rate is generally due to an increase of the redemption severity. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions where stress scenarios are also explained by an increase in the redemption frequency.

Remark 16 *We have used the coefficient $\mathfrak{R}_c^2$ to show the power explanation of the two variables $\mathcal{F}(t)$ and $\mathcal{R}^\star(t)$ without considering the effect of the constant. For some matrix cells, we notice that the constant may be important (see Tables 52, 53 and 54 on page 116).*

Figure 35: Relationship between $\mathcal{R}(t)$, $\mathcal{F}(t)$ and $\mathcal{R}^{\star}(t)$ (retail/equity)



Figure 36: Relationship between $\mathcal{R}(t)$, $\mathcal{F}(t)$ and $\mathcal{R}^{\star}(t)$ (institutional/equity)



5.2 What market risk factors matter in stress testing?

5.2.1 The flow-performance relationship

Numerous academic research papers suggest that investor flows depend on past performance. According to Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Huang *et al.* (2007), there is an asymmetry concerning the flow-performance relationship: equity mutual funds with good performance gain a lot of money inflows, while equity mutual funds with poor performance suffer smaller outflows. However, this asymmetry concerns relative performance. Indeed, according to Ivković and Weisbenner (2009), "*inflows are related only to relative performance*" while "*outflows are related only to absolute fund performance*". Therefore, these authors suggest that investors sell the asset class when this one has a bad performance. In the case of corporate bonds, Goldstein *et al.* (2017) find that relative performance also matters in terms of explaining outflows. In order to better understand these results, we consider the following analytical model[42]:

$$\begin{cases} R_f(t) = \alpha_f(t) + \beta_f(t) R_{\text{mkt}}(t) + \varepsilon(t) \\ \mathcal{R}_f(t) = \gamma_f + \delta_f \alpha_f(t-1) + \varphi_f R_f(t-1) + \eta(t) \end{cases}$$

where $R_f(t)$ is the return of the fund f, $R_{\text{mkt}}(t)$ is the return of the market risk factor and $\mathcal{R}_f(t)$ is the redemption rate of the fund f. $\varepsilon(t)$ and $\eta(t)$ are two independent white noise processes. Using the first equation, we can estimate the relative performance of the fund, which is measured by its alpha component $\alpha_f(t)$. The second equation states that the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}_f(t)$ of the fund depends on the past relative performance $\alpha_f(t-1)$ and the past absolute performance $R_f(t-1)$. Then, we can test two assumptions: $\mathcal{H}_1 : \delta_f < 0$ and $\mathcal{H}_2 : \varphi_f < 0$. Accepting $\mathcal{H}_1$ implies that outflows depend on the relative performance, while accepting $\mathcal{H}_2$ implies that outflows depend on the absolute performance. In both cases, the value of the coefficient is negative, because we expect that a negative performance will increase the redemption rate. The previous framework can be extended to take into account a more sophisticated model for determining the relative performance[43] $\alpha_f(t)$ or to consider lagged variables (Bellando and Tran-Dieu, 2011; Ferreira *et al.*, 2012; Lou, 2012; Cashman *et al.*, 2014; Barber *et al.*, 2016; Fricke and Fricke, 2017). More generally, we have:

$$\mathcal{R}_f(t) = \gamma_f + \sum_{h=1}^{p} \left(\phi_f^{(h)} \mathcal{R}_f(t-h) + \delta_f^{(h)} \alpha_f(t-h) + \varphi_f^{(h)} R_f(t-h) \right) + \eta(t) \tag{34}$$

Even if this type of flow-performance relationship is interesting to understand the investor behavior, it is however not adapted in the case of a stress testing program for two reasons. The first reason is that Equation (34) is calibrated using low frequency data, e.g. quarterly or monthly data. Therefore, the goal of Equation (34) is to describe long-term behavior of investors, whereas stress testing of liabilities concerns short-term periods. The second reason is the inadequacy of this approach with macro stress testing approaches developed by regulators and institutional bodies.

5.2.2 The macro stress testing approach

If we consider stress testing programs developed in the banking sector (Roncalli, 2020, pages 893-922), we distinguish historical, probabilistic and macroeconomic approaches. While the first two methods have been developed in the previous sections, we focus on the third method, which is the approach used by the regulators (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

[42] See Arora *et al.* (2019).
[43] For instance, we can use the three-factor Fama-French model or the four-factor Carhart model.

System, 2017; EBA, 2020a,b; ECB, 2019; Ong, 2014). The macroeconomic approach consists in defining stress scenarios by a set of risk factors corresponding to some exogenous shocks. In this article, we focus on three market risk factors:

- the performance of the bond market;
- the performance of the stock market;
- market volatility.

Therefore, we assume that there is a linear relationship between the redemption rate and these factors:

$$\mathcal{R}(t) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathcal{F}_{\text{bond}}(t) + \beta_2 \mathcal{F}_{\text{stock}}(t) + \beta_3 \mathcal{F}_{\text{vol}}(t) + u(t) \tag{35}$$

where $\mathcal{F}_{\text{bond}}(t)$ and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{stock}}(t)$ are the h-day total returns of the FTSE World Broad Investment-Grade Bond index and the MSCI World index, $\mathcal{F}_{\text{vol}}(t)$ is the difference of the VIX index between $t-h$ and t, and h is the time horizon.

In Table 36, we report the coefficient of determination $\mathfrak{R}_c^2$ for the one-day time horizon. These figures are disappointing since the impact of the market risk factors are very low[44]. For instance, the highest $\mathfrak{R}$-squared is reached for the third-party distributor/money market category, but it is equal to 4.4%. If we consider a longer time horizon, results do not improve and we always have $\mathfrak{R}_c^2 \ll 5\%$ (see Tables 55 and 56 on page 117).

Table 36: Coefficient of determination $\mathfrak{R}_c^2$ in % — Equation (35), one-day time horizon

	Balanced	Bond	Equity	Money market
Institutional	0.3	0.8	1.6	1.9
Insurance	0.1	0.1	0.6	0.8
Retail	0.5	3.1	1.4	0.6
Third-party distributor	0.7	1.5	1.3	4.4

Remark 17 *The previous results suggest that redemption rates do not depend on market risk factors on a short-term basis. However, fund managers generally have the feeling that redemption rates increase when there is a stress on market returns. Nevertheless, we know that returns are more or less independent from one day to another. Therefore, we consider another approach using market sentiment. For that, we compute the average redemption rate when the VIX index is above 30, and calculate its relative variation with respect to the entire period. Results are given in Table 37. We observe an impact in particular for bond/equity funds and institutional/third-party distributor investors.*

Table 37: Relative variation of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}(t)$ when VIX ≥ 30

	Balanced	Bond	Equity	Money market
Institutional	+17.3%	+54.7%	+74.3%	+64.7%
Insurance	−63.4%	−1.1%	−14.2%	+75.7%
Retail	+6.1%	+21.5%	+13.8%	−4.5%
Third-party distributor	+37.6%	+43.6%	+49.5%	+22.7%

[44] Nevertheless, we verify that β_2 is negative for equity funds, even though the relationship between redemption rate and stock returns is not convincing as shown in Figure 53 on page 118.

6 Conclusion

Liquidity stress testing is a recent topic in asset management, which has given rise to numerous publications from regulators (AMF, 2017; BaFin, 2017; ESMA, 2019; FSB, 2017; IOSCO, 2015, 2018), investment management associations (AFG, 2015; EFAMA, 2020) and affiliated researchers from central banks and international bodies (Arora *et al.*, 2019; Baranova *et al.*, 2017; Bouveret, 2017; Fricke and Fricke, 2017; Gourdel *et al.*, 2018). On the academic side, few studies specifically concern liquidity stress testing in asset management[45]. Therefore, we observe a gap between general concepts and specific measurement models. As such, the purpose of our study is to propose several analytical approaches in order to implement LST practical programs.

Besides the historical approach that considers non-parametric risk measures, we have developed a frequency-severity model that is useful when building parametric risk measures of liquidity stress testing. This statistical approach can be seen as a reduced-form model based on three parameters: the redemption frequency, the expected redemption severity and the redemption uncertainty. Like the historical approach, the frequency-severity model requires some expert judgements to correct some data biases. Nevertheless, both historical and analytical approaches are simple enough to verify properties of risk ordering coherency between fund and investor categories.

We have also developed an individual-based behavioral model, which is an extension of the frequency-severity model. We have shown that redemption risk depends on the fund liability structure, and is related to the Herfindahl index of assets under management held by unitholders. Even if this model is hard to implement because it requires knowing the comprehensive liability structure, it allows us to justify liquidity stress testing based on the largest fund holders. Moreover, this model shows the importance of cross-correlation between unitholders of a same investor category, but also of several investor categories. Nevertheless, the individual-based behavioral model is flexible enough that it can easily take into account dependencies between investors by incorporating a copula model. Again, the issue with this extended individual-based behavioral model lies in the knowledge of the liability structure.

The production of stress scenarios can be obtained by considering a risk measure applied to the redemption rate. For the historical approach, we can use a value-at-risk or a conditional value-at-risk figure, which is estimated with non-parametric statistical methods. For the frequency-severity and individual-based behavioral models, the estimation of the VaR or CVaR is based on analytical formulas. Moreover, these models may produce parametric stress scenarios for a given return time. Another issue concerns the choice of data between gross or net redemption rates for calibrating these stress scenarios. For some categories, net redemption rates may be used to proxy gross redemption rates, because they are very close in stress periods. However, we also demonstrate that it is better to use gross redemption rates for some investor or fund categories (e.g. retail investors or money market funds).

The design of macro stress testing programs is more complicated than expected. Since the flow-performance relationship is extensively documented by academic research, it is valid at low frequencies, typically on a quarterly or annual basis. In this case, we may observe inflows towards the best fund managers. However, this relationship mainly concerns relative performance, whereas macro stress testing programs deal with absolute performance. Indeed, relative performance is a key parameter when we want to analyze the idiosyncratic liability liquidity risk at the fund level. Nevertheless, the liquidity risk in asset management

[45] Because data on liabilities are not publicly available. However, we can cite Christoffersen and Xu (2017) and Darolles *et al.* (2018), who specifically study asset management flows with respect to the liability structure of the investment fund.

primarily involves systemic periods of liquidity shortage that impact a given asset class. Our empirical results are mixed since drawing a relationship between redemption rates and market risk factors in stress periods is not obvious because there are lead/lag effects and liquidity stress periods never look the same. For instance, the redemption stress scenario on money market funds during the covid-19 crisis and the first quarter of 2020 is very different from the redemption stress scenario during the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy in September and October 2008. Indeed, we observe a significant lag of one/two months in the case of the covid-19 crisis. In a similar way, the liquidity stress transmission to equity funds has not been immediate and has been delayed by several weeks.

The current interest in liquidity stress testing is related to the Financial Stability Board's tasks on systemic risk (FSB, 2010, 2015) and shadow banking supervision (FSB, 2017, 2018). As explained by Blanqué and Mortier (2019b), "*regulation of asset managers has been lagging behind that of banks since the global financial crisis*". The implementation of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR), the use of liquidity and high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) buffers and the definition of regulatory monitoring tools date back to 2010 for the banking industry[46] (BCBS, 2010, 2013). The regulatory framework on liquidity stress testing proposed by ESMA (2019) is an important step for the development of liquidity measurement in the asset management industry. In this paper, we develop an analytical framework and give some answers. However, it is still early days and much remains to be done.

[46]The LCR became a minimum requirement for BCBS member countries in January 2015.

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Appendix

A Mathematical results

A.1 Granularity and the $\mathbb{X}$-statistic

We consider n funds whose redemption rate is equal to p. The assets under management of each fund are set to \$1. The maximum redemption rate of n funds is equal to the mathematical expectation of n Bernoulli random variables:

$$\begin{aligned} p(\max) &= \mathbb{E}\left[\max\left(\mathcal{B}_1(p), \ldots, \mathcal{B}_n(p)\right)\right] \\ &= 1-(1-p)^n \end{aligned}$$

whereas the redemption rate of the sum of n funds is equal to the expected frequency of a Binomial random variable:

$$p(\text{sum}) = \frac{\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{B}(n,p)\right]}{n} = p$$

In Table 38, we report the value taken by the ratio $p(\max)/p(\text{sum})$. For example, this ratio is equal to 3.71 if $p = 5\%$ and $n = 4$. To understand this ratio, we can consider a large fund whose redemption probability is p. This fund is split into n funds of the same size. The ratio indicates the multiplication factor to obtain the maximum of the redemption rates among the n funds.

Table 38: Value of the ratio $p(\max)/p(\text{sum})$

n	Probability p						
	1 bp	10 bps	1%	5%	10%	20%	50%
1	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
2	2.00	2.00	1.99	1.95	1.90	1.80	1.50
3	3.00	3.00	2.97	2.85	2.71	2.44	1.75
4	4.00	3.99	3.94	3.71	3.44	2.95	1.88
5	5.00	4.99	4.90	4.52	4.10	3.36	1.94
10	10.00	9.96	9.56	8.03	6.51	4.46	2.00
50	49.88	48.79	39.50	18.46	9.95	5.00	2.00
100	99.51	95.21	63.40	19.88	10.00	5.00	2.00

A.2 Statistical moments of zero-inflated probability distribution

A.2.1 General formulas

A zero-inflated random variable Z can be written as the product of a Bernoulli random variables $X \sim \mathcal{B}(p)$ and a positive random variable Y:

$$Z = XY$$

Let $\mu'_m(Z)$ for the m-th moment of Z. Using the previous relationship, we deduce that:

$$\begin{aligned} \mu'_m(Z) &= \mathbb{E}\left[Z^m\right] \\ &= \mathbb{E}\left[X^m Y^m\right] \\ &= \mathbb{E}\left[X^m\right]\mathbb{E}\left[Y^m\right] \\ &= p\mu'_m(Y) \end{aligned} \tag{36}$$

because X and Y are independent by definition, and $X^m = X$, implying that X^m follows a Bernoulli distribution $\mathcal{B}(p)$. From Equation (36), we can compute the m-th centered moment $\mu_m(Z)$. For that, we recall that:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mu_1 &= \mu'_1 \\
\mu_2 &= \mu'_2 - \mu_1^2 \\
\mu_3 &= \mu'_3 - 3\mu'_2\mu_1 + 2\mu_1^3 \\
\mu_4 &= \mu'_4 - 4\mu'_3\mu_1 + 6\mu'_2\mu_1^2 - 3\mu_1^4
\end{aligned}$$

We deduce the expression of the second moment:

$$\mu'_2 = \mu_2 + \mu_1^2$$

For the third moment, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mu'_3 &= \mu_3 + 3\mu'_2\mu_1 - 2\mu_1^3 \\
&= \mu_3 + 3\left(\mu_2 + \mu_1^2\right)\mu_1 - 2\mu_1^3 \\
&= \mu_3 + 3\mu_2\mu_1 + \mu_1^3 \\
&= \gamma_1\mu_2^{3/2} + 3\mu_2\mu_1 + \mu_1^3
\end{aligned}$$

where γ_1 is the skewness coefficient. For the fourth moment, it follows that:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mu'_4 &= \mu_4 + 4\mu'_3\mu_1 - 6\mu'_2\mu_1^2 + 3\mu_1^4 \\
&= \mu_4 + 4\left(\gamma_1\mu_2^{3/2} + 3\mu_2\mu_1 + \mu_1^3\right)\mu_1 - 6\left(\mu_2 + \mu_1^2\right)\mu_1^2 + 3\mu_1^4 \\
&= \mu_4 + 4\gamma_1\mu_2^{3/2}\mu_1 + 12\mu_2\mu_1^2 + 4\mu_1^4 - 6\mu_2\mu_1^2 - 6\mu_1^4 + 3\mu_1^4 \\
&= \mu_4 + 4\gamma_1\mu_2^{3/2}\mu_1 + 6\mu_2\mu_1^2 + \mu_1^4 \\
&= (\gamma_2 + 3)\mu_2^2 + 4\gamma_1\mu_2^{3/2}\mu_1 + 6\mu_2\mu_1^2 + \mu_1^4
\end{aligned}$$

where γ_2 is the excess kurtosis coefficient. We can then compute the moments of Z. For the mean, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mu_1(Z) &= \mu'_1(Z) \\
&= p\mu_1(Y)
\end{aligned} \tag{37}$$

We deduce that the variance of Z is equal to:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mu_2(Z) &= \mu'_2(Z) - \mu_1^2(Z) \\
&= p\mu'_2(Y) - p^2\mu_1^2(Y) \\
&= p\mu_2(Y) + p(1-p)\mu_1^2(Y)
\end{aligned} \tag{38}$$

For the third moment, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mu_3(Z) &= \mu'_3(Z) - 3\mu'_2(Z)\mu_1(Z) + 2\mu_1^3(Z) \\
&= p\mu'_3(Y) - 3p^2\mu'_2(Y)\mu_1(Y) + 2p^3\mu_1^3(Y) \\
&= p\left(\gamma_1(Y)\mu_2^{3/2}(Y) + 3\mu_2(Y)\mu_1(Y) + \mu_1^3(Y)\right) - \\
&\quad 3p^2\left(\mu_2(Y) + \mu_1^2(Y)\right)\mu_1(Y) + 2p^3\mu_1^3(Y) \\
&= p\gamma_1(Y)\mu_2^{3/2}(Y) + 3p(1-p)\mu_2(Y)\mu_1(Y) + p(1-p)(1-2p)\mu_1^3(Y)
\end{aligned}$$

It follows that the skewness coefficient is equal to:

$$\begin{aligned}\gamma_1(Z) &= \frac{\mu_3(Z)}{\mu_2^{3/2}(Z)} \\ &= \frac{\vartheta_1(Z)}{\left(p\mu_2(Y)+p(1-p)\mu_1^2(Y)\right)^{3/2}}\end{aligned} \tag{39}$$

where:

$$\vartheta_1(Z) = p\gamma_1(Y)\mu_2^{3/2}(Y) + 3p(1-p)\mu_2(Y)\mu_1(Y) + p(1-p)(1-2p)\mu_1^3(Y)$$

For the fourth moment, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}\mu_4(Z) &= \mu_4'(Z) - 4\mu_3'(Z)\mu_1(Z) + 6\mu_2'(Z)\mu_1^2(Z) - 3\mu_1^4(Z) \\ &= p\mu_4'(Y) - 4p^2\mu_3'(Y)\mu_1(Y) + 6p^3\mu_2'(Y)\mu_1^2(Y) - 3p^4\mu_1^4(Y) \\ &= p(\gamma_2(Y)+3)\mu_2^2(Y) + 4p\gamma_1(Y)\mu_2^{3/2}(Y)\mu_1(Y) + 6p\mu_2(Y)\mu_1^2(Y) + p\mu_1^4(Y) - \\ &\quad 4p^2\gamma_1(Y)\mu_2^{3/2}(Y)\mu_1(Y) - 12p^2\mu_2(Y)\mu_1^2(Y) - 4p^2\mu_1^4(Y) + \\ &\quad 6p^3\mu_2(Y)\mu_1^2(Y) + 6p^3\mu_1^4(Y) - 3p^4\mu_1^4(Y) \\ &= p(\gamma_2(Y)+3)\mu_2^2(Y) + 4p(1-p)\gamma_1(Y)\mu_2^{3/2}(Y)\mu_1(Y) + \\ &\quad 6p(1-p)^2\mu_2(Y)\mu_1^2(Y) + p(1-p)\left(1-3p+3p^2\right)\mu_1^4(Y)\end{aligned} \tag{40}$$

We deduce that the excess kurtosis coefficient is equal to:

$$\begin{aligned}\gamma_2(Z) &= \frac{\mu_4(Z)}{\mu_2^2(Z)} - 3 \\ &= \frac{\vartheta_2(Z)}{\left(p\mu_2(Y)+p(1-p)\mu_1^2(Y)\right)^2}\end{aligned} \tag{41}$$

where:

$$\begin{aligned}\vartheta_2(Z) &= p(\gamma_2(Y)+3)\mu_2^2(Y) + 4p(1-p)\gamma_1(Y)\mu_2^{3/2}(Y)\mu_1(Y) + \\ &\quad 6p(1-p)^2\mu_2(Y)\mu_1^2(Y) + p(1-p)\left(1-3p+3p^2\right)\mu_1^4(Y) - \\ &\quad 3p^2\mu_2^2(Y) - 6p^2(1-p)\mu_2(Y)\mu_1^2(Y) - 3p^2(1-p)^2\mu_1^4(Y) \\ &= (p\gamma_2(Y)+3p(1-p))\mu_2^2(Y) + 4p(1-p)\gamma_1(Y)\mu_2^{3/2}(Y)\mu_1(Y) + \\ &\quad 6p(1-p)(1-2p)\mu_2(Y)\mu_1^2(Y) + p(1-p)\left(1-6p+6p^2\right)\mu_1^4(Y)\end{aligned}$$

We can deduce the following properties:

1. The skewness of Z is equal to zero if and only if:
   (a) the skewness of Y is equal to zero and the frequency probability p is equal to one;
   (b) the frequency probability p is equal to zero, meaning that Z is always equal to zero.
2. The excess kurtosis of Z is equal to zero if and only if:
   (a) the kurtosis of Y is equal to 3 and the frequency probability p is equal to one;

(b) the frequency probability p is equal to zero, meaning that Z is always equal to zero.

In other cases, the skewness and excess kurtosis coefficients of Z are different from zero even if the random variable Y is not skewed and has not fat tails.

Remark 18 *The previous results seem to be contradictory with the properties given in Equation (17) on page 36. In fact, the limit case $p \to 0^+$ is not equal to $p = 0$, because there is a singularity at the point $p = 0$.*

A.2.2 Application to the beta distribution

We assume that $Y \sim \mathcal{B}(a, b)$. Since we have:

$$\mu_1(Y) = \frac{a}{a+b}$$

we deduce that:

$$\mu_1(Z) = p\frac{a}{a+b}$$

For the second moment, we have:

$$\mu_2(Y) = \frac{ab}{(a+b)^2(a+b+1)}$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned}\mu_2(Z) &= p\frac{ab}{(a+b)^2(a+b+1)} + p(1-p)\left(\frac{a}{a+b}\right)^2 \\ &= p\frac{ab + (1-p)a^2(a+b+1)}{(a+b)^2(a+b+1)}\end{aligned}$$

This formula has been already found by Ospina and Ferrari (2010). The skewness and excess kurtosis coefficients of the beta distribution are equal to:

$$\gamma_1(Y) = \frac{2(b-a)\sqrt{a+b+1}}{(a+b+2)\sqrt{ab}}$$

and:

$$\gamma_2(Y) = \frac{6(a-b)^2(a+b+1)}{ab(a+b+2)(a+b+3)} - \frac{6}{(a+b+3)}$$

We plug these different expressions into the general formulas[47] to obtain $\gamma_1(Z)$ and $\gamma_2(Z)$.

A.3 Maximum likelihood of the zero-inflated model

We consider a sample $\{x_1, \ldots, x_n\}$ of n observations, and we assume that X follows a zero-inflated model, whose frequency and probability distributions are p and $\mathbf{G}(x;\theta)$. The log-likelihood of the i^{th} observation is equal to:

$$\begin{aligned}\ell_i(p,\theta) &= \ln \Pr\{X = x_i\} \\ &= \ln f(x_i) \\ &= \mathbb{1}\{x_i = 0\} \cdot \ln(1-p) + \mathbb{1}\{x_i > 0\} \cdot \ln(pg(x_i;\theta)) \\ &= \mathbb{1}\{x_i = 0\} \cdot \ln(1-p) + \mathbb{1}\{x_i > 0\} \cdot \ln p + \mathbb{1}\{x_i > 0\} \cdot \ln g(x_i;\theta)\end{aligned}$$

[47] The formulas are not reported here because they don't have a lot of interest.

We deduce that the log-likelihood function is equal to:

$$\begin{aligned}\ell(p,\theta) &= \sum_{i=1}^{n}\ell_i(p,\theta)\\ &= n_0\ln(1-p)+(n-n_0)\ln p+\sum_{x_i>0}\ln g(x_i)\end{aligned}$$

where n_0 is the number of observations x_i that are equal to zero. The maximum likelihood estimator $\left(\hat{p},\hat{\theta}\right)$ is defined as follows:

$$\left\{\hat{p},\hat{\theta}\right\}=\arg\max\ell(p,\theta)$$

and satisfies the first-order conditions:

$$\begin{cases}\partial_p\ell\left(\hat{p};\hat{\theta}\right)=0\\ \partial_\theta\ell\left(\hat{p};\hat{\theta}\right)=\mathbf{0}\end{cases}$$

We deduce that:

$$\begin{aligned}\partial_p\ell\left(\hat{p};\hat{\theta}\right) &= 0\Leftrightarrow-\frac{n_0}{1-\hat{p}}+\frac{n-n_0}{\hat{p}}=0\\ &\Leftrightarrow \hat{p}=\frac{n-n_0}{n}\end{aligned}\tag{42}$$

The concentrated log-likelihood function becomes:

$$\ell(\hat{p},\theta)=n_0\ln n_0+(n-n_0)\ln(n-n_0)-n\ln n+\sum_{x_i>0}\ln g(x_i)$$

Therefore, the ML estimator $\hat{\theta}$ corresponds to the ML estimator of θ when considering only the observations x_i that are strictly positive:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{\theta} &= \arg\max\ell(\hat{p},\theta)\\ &= \arg\max\sum_{x_i>0}\ln g(x_i)\end{aligned}\tag{43}$$

Remark 19 *In the case of the zero-inflated beta model, we have $\theta=(a,b)$ and:*

$$\left\{\hat{a},\hat{b}\right\}=\arg\max\sum_{x_i>0}\left((a-1)\ln x_i+(b-1)\ln(1-x_i)-\ln\mathfrak{B}(a,b)\right)\tag{44}$$

A.4 Statistical properties of the individual-based model

We define the random variable $\tilde{Z}$ as the sum of products of two random variables:

$$\tilde{Z}=\sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i\tilde{X}_i\tilde{Y}_i$$

where $\tilde{X}_i\sim\mathcal{B}(\tilde{p})$ and $\tilde{Y}_i$ are *iid* random variables. Moreover, we assume that $\omega_i>0$ and $\sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i=1$.

A.4.1 Computation of $\Pr\left\{\tilde{Z}=0\right\}$

This case corresponds to the situation where no client redeems:

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr\left\{\tilde{Z}=0\right\} &= \Pr\left\{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i\tilde{X}_i\tilde{Y}_i=0\right\}\\ &= \Pr\left\{\tilde{X}_1=0,\ldots,\tilde{X}_n=0\right\}\\ &= \prod_{i=1}^{n}\Pr\left\{\tilde{X}_i=0\right\}\\ &= (1-\tilde{p})^n \end{aligned} \tag{45}$$

A.4.2 Statistical moments

First moment For the mean, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{Z}\right] &= \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i\tilde{X}_i\tilde{Y}_i\right]\\ &= \sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i\mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{X}_i\right]\mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{Y}_i\right]\end{aligned}$$

We deduce that:

$$\mu_1\left(\tilde{Z}\right)=\tilde{p}\mu_1\left(\tilde{Y}\right) \tag{46}$$

Second moment Since we have $\mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{X}_i^2\right]=\tilde{p}$ and $\mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{Y}_i^2\right]=\mu_2'\left(\tilde{Y}\right)$, it follows that:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{Z}^2\right] &= \mathbb{E}\left[\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i\tilde{X}_i\tilde{Y}_i\right)^2\right]\\ &= \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i^2\tilde{X}_i^2\tilde{Y}_i^2+2\sum_{j>i}\omega_i\omega_j\tilde{X}_i\tilde{X}_j\tilde{Y}_i\tilde{Y}_j\right]\\ &= \tilde{p}\mu_2'\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i^2+2\tilde{p}^2\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\sum_{j>i}\omega_i\omega_j\end{aligned}$$

We notice that:

$$\begin{aligned}1 &= \sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i\\ &= \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i\right)^2\\ &= \sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i^2+2\sum_{j>i}\omega_i\omega_j\end{aligned}$$

We deduce that:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mu_2\left(\tilde{Z}\right) &= \mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{Z}^2\right] - \mathbb{E}^2\left[\tilde{Z}\right] \\
&= \tilde{p}\mu_2'\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i^2 + 2\tilde{p}^2\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\sum_{j>i}\omega_i\omega_j - \tilde{p}^2\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right) \\
&= \tilde{p}\mu_2'\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i^2 + 2\tilde{p}^2\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\sum_{j>i}\omega_i\omega_j - \\
&\quad \tilde{p}^2\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i^2 + 2\sum_{j>i}\omega_i\omega_j\right)
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the variance of $\tilde{Z}$ is equal to:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mu_2\left(\tilde{Z}\right) &= \left(\tilde{p}\mu_2'\left(\tilde{Y}\right) - \tilde{p}^2\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\right)\sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i^2 \\
&= \tilde{p}\left(\mu_2\left(\tilde{Y}\right) + (1-\tilde{p})\,\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\right)\sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i^2 \qquad (47)
\end{aligned}$$

Remark 20 *In the equally-weighted case, we obtain:*

$$\mu_2\left(\tilde{Z}\right) = \frac{\tilde{p}\left(\mu_2\left(\tilde{Y}\right) + (1-\tilde{p})\,\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\right)}{n}$$

Application to the beta severity distribution If we assume that $\tilde{Y}_i \sim \mathcal{B}\left(\tilde{a}, \tilde{b}\right)$, we have:

$$\mu_1\left(\tilde{Y}\right) = \frac{\tilde{a}}{\tilde{a}+\tilde{b}}$$

and:

$$\mu_2\left(\tilde{Y}\right) = \frac{\tilde{a}\tilde{b}}{\left(\tilde{a}+\tilde{b}\right)^2\left(\tilde{a}+\tilde{b}+1\right)}$$

We deduce that:

$$\mu_1\left(\tilde{Z}\right) = \tilde{p}\frac{\tilde{a}}{\tilde{a}+\tilde{b}}$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mu_2\left(\tilde{Z}\right) &= \frac{\tilde{p}}{n}\left(\frac{\tilde{a}\tilde{b}}{\left(\tilde{a}+\tilde{b}\right)^2\left(\tilde{a}+\tilde{b}+1\right)} + (1-\tilde{p})\frac{\tilde{a}^2}{\left(\tilde{a}+\tilde{b}\right)^2}\right) \\
&= \tilde{p}\frac{\tilde{a}}{n}\left(\frac{\tilde{b} + (1-\tilde{p})\,\tilde{a}\left(\tilde{a}+\tilde{b}+1\right)}{\left(\tilde{a}+\tilde{b}\right)^2\left(\tilde{a}+\tilde{b}+1\right)}\right)
\end{aligned}$$

A.5 Moment matching between the zero-inflated model and the individual-based model

In order to calibrate the probability p, we match the redemption probability $\Pr\{\mathcal{R} > 0\}$. Using the results in Appendix A.4.1 on page 93, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} p &= 1 - \Pr\{\mathcal{R} = 0\} \\ &= 1 - (1-\tilde{p})^n \end{aligned}$$

For the first moment, we have:

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{R}] = p\mu = \tilde{p}\tilde{\mu}$$

We deduce that:

$$\mu = \frac{\tilde{p}}{1-(1-\tilde{p})^n}\tilde{\mu}$$

For the second moment, we have:

$$\sigma^2(\mathcal{R}) = p\sigma^2 + p(1-p)\mu^2 = \tilde{p}\left(\tilde{\sigma}^2 + (1-\tilde{p})\tilde{\mu}^2\right)\sum_{i=1}^n \omega_i^2$$

It follows that:

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma^2 &= \frac{\tilde{p}\left(\tilde{\sigma}^2 + (1-\tilde{p})\tilde{\mu}^2\right)\sum_{i=1}^n \omega_i^2 - p(1-p)\mu^2}{p} \\ &= \frac{\tilde{p}\left(\tilde{\sigma}^2 + (1-\tilde{p})\tilde{\mu}^2\right)\sum_{i=1}^n \omega_i^2}{1-(1-\tilde{p})^n} - \frac{(1-\tilde{p})^n\tilde{p}^2}{\left(1-(1-\tilde{p})^n\right)^2}\tilde{\mu}^2 \\ &= \left(\frac{\tilde{p}\mathcal{H}(\omega)}{1-(1-\tilde{p})^n}\right)\tilde{\sigma}^2 + \\ &\quad \left(\frac{\tilde{p}\left((1-\tilde{p}) - (1-\tilde{p})^n\right)\mathcal{H}(\omega) - \tilde{p}^2(1-\tilde{p})^n(1-\mathcal{H}(\omega))}{\left(1-(1-\tilde{p})^n\right)^2}\right)\tilde{\mu}^2 \end{aligned}$$

where $\mathcal{H}(\omega) = \sum_{i=1}^n \omega_i^2$ is the Herfindahl index.

Remark 21 *If we consider the equally-weighted case $\omega_i = n^{-1}$, we have $\mathcal{H}(\omega) = n^{-1}$ and:*

$$\sigma^2 = \frac{1}{n}\left(\frac{\tilde{p}}{1-(1-\tilde{p})^n}\right)\tilde{\sigma}^2 + \frac{1}{n}\left(\frac{\tilde{p}\left((1-\tilde{p}) - (1-\tilde{p})^n\right) - \tilde{p}^2(1-\tilde{p})^n(n-1)}{\left(1-(1-\tilde{p})^n\right)^2}\right)\tilde{\mu}^2$$

When $\tilde{p} \neq 0$, the limit cases are:

$$\lim_{n\to\infty} p = 1$$

and:

$$\lim_{n\to\infty} \mu = \tilde{p}\tilde{\mu}$$

For the parameter σ, we obtain:

$$\lim_{n\to\infty} \sigma^2 = \tilde{p}\left(\tilde{\sigma}^2 + (1-\tilde{p})\tilde{\mu}^2\right)\mathcal{H}(\omega)$$

For an infinitely fine-grained liability structure, we have:

$$\lim_{n\to\infty} \sigma^2 = 0$$

A.6 Upper bound of the Herfindahl index under partial information

Let π_k be a probability distribution, meaning that $\pi_k \geq 0$ and $\sum_{k=1}^n \pi_k = 1$. The Herfindahl index is equal to:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{H} &= \sum_{k=1}^n \pi_k^2 \\ &= \sum_{k=1}^n \pi_{k:n}^2 \\ &= \sum_{k=1}^n \pi_{n-k+1:n}^2\end{aligned}$$

where:

$$0 \leq \min \pi_k = \pi_{1:n} \leq \pi_{2:n} \leq \cdots \leq \pi_{k:n} \leq \pi_{k+1:n} \leq \cdots \leq \pi_{n:n} = \max \pi_k$$

We have:

$$\mathcal{H} = \sum_{k=1}^m \pi_{n-k+1:n}^2 + \sum_{k=m+1}^n \pi_{n-k+1:n}^2$$

where $k = 1 : m$ denotes the largest contributions that are known, meaning that we don't know the values taken by $\{\pi_{1:n}, \ldots, \pi_{n-m:n}\}$. Since we have $\pi_{n-k:n} \leq \pi_{n-k+1:n}$, we deduce that:

$$\begin{aligned}\sum_{k=m+1}^n \pi_{n-k+1:n}^2 &\leq \left(\frac{1 - \sum_{k=1}^m \pi_{n-k+1:n}}{\pi_{n-m+1:n}}\right) \pi_{n-m+1:n}^2 \\ &= \left(1 - \sum_{k=1}^m \pi_{n-k+1:n}\right) \pi_{n-m+1:n}\end{aligned}$$

and[48]:

$$\mathcal{H} \leq \mathcal{H}_m^+ = \sum_{k=1}^m \pi_{n-k+1:n}^2 + \left(1 - \sum_{k=1}^m \pi_{n-k+1:n}\right) \pi_{n-m+1:n} \tag{48}$$

An example is given in Table 39. The Herfindahl index is equal to 17.96%. Using the first three largest values, we obtain an estimate of 20.50%.

Table 39: Example of partial Herfindahl index computation

m	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
π_m (in %)	30.00	20.00	15.00	10.00	9.00	7.00	5.00	4.00
$\mathcal{H}_m^+$ (in %)	30.00	23.00	20.50	18.75	18.50	18.18	18.00	17.96

A.7 Correlated redemptions with copula functions

We define the random variable $\tilde{Z}$ as previously:

$$\tilde{Z} = \sum_{i=1}^n \omega_i \tilde{X}_i \tilde{Y}_i$$

[48] We verify that $\mathcal{H}_n^+ = \mathcal{H}$.

where $\tilde{Y}_i$ are *iid* random variables. We assume that $\tilde{X}_i \sim \mathcal{B}(\tilde{p})$ are identically distributed, but not independent. We note $\mathbf{C}(u_1, \ldots, u_n)$ the copula function of the random vector $\left(\tilde{X}_1, \ldots, \tilde{X}_n\right)$ and $\mathbf{B}(x)$ the cumulative distribution function of the Bernoulli random variable $\mathcal{B}(\tilde{p})$. This means that $\mathbf{B}(0) = 1 - \tilde{p}$ and $\mathbf{B}(1) = 1$.

In practice we use the Clayton copula:

$$\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(u_1, \ldots, u_n) = \left(u_1^{-\theta_c} + \cdots + u_n^{-\theta_c} - n + 1\right)^{-1/\theta_c}$$

or the Normal copula[49]:

$$\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(u_1, \ldots, u_n) = \Phi\left(\Phi^{-1}(u_1) + \cdots + \Phi^{-1}(u_n); \mathcal{C}_n(\theta_c)\right)$$

The Clayton parameter satisfies $\theta_c \geq 0$ whereas the Normal parameter θ_c lies in the range $[-1, 1]$. Moreover, we notice that the expressions of the bivariate copula functions are:

$$\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(u_1, u_2) = \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(u_1, u_2, 1, \ldots, 1) = \left(u_1^{-\theta_c} + u_2^{-\theta_c} - 1\right)^{-1/\theta_c}$$

and:

$$\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(u_1, u_2) = \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(u_1, u_2, 1, \ldots, 1) = \Phi\left(\Phi^{-1}(u_1) + \Phi^{-1}(u_2); \mathcal{C}_2(\theta_c)\right)$$

A.7.1 Joint probability of two $\tilde{X}_i$'s

We consider the bivariate case. The probability mass function is described by the following contingency table:

	$\tilde{X}_2 = 0$	$\tilde{X}_1 = 1$	
$\tilde{X}_1 = 0$	$\pi_{0,0}$	$\pi_{0,1}$	$\pi_0 = 1 - \tilde{p}$
$\tilde{X}_1 = 1$	$\pi_{1,0}$	$\pi_{1,1}$	$\pi_1 = \tilde{p}$
	$\pi_0 = 1 - \tilde{p}$	$\pi_1 = \tilde{p}$	1

(49)

Since we have $\Pr\left\{\tilde{X}_1 \leq u_1, \tilde{X}_2 \leq u_2\right\} = \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(\mathbf{B}(u_1), \mathbf{B}(u_2))$, we deduce that:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(\mathbf{B}(0), \mathbf{B}(0)) &= \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(1 - \tilde{p}, 1 - \tilde{p}) \\
\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(\mathbf{B}(0), \mathbf{B}(1)) &= \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(1 - \tilde{p}, 1) = 1 - \tilde{p} \\
\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(\mathbf{B}(1), \mathbf{B}(0)) &= \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(1, 1 - \tilde{p}) = 1 - \tilde{p} \\
\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(\mathbf{B}(1), \mathbf{B}(1)) &= \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(1, 1) = 1
\end{aligned}$$

and:

	$\tilde{X}_2 = 0$	$\tilde{X}_1 = 1$	
$\tilde{X}_1 = 0$	$\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(1 - \tilde{p}, 1 - \tilde{p})$	$1 - \tilde{p} - \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(1 - \tilde{p}, 1 - \tilde{p})$	$1 - \tilde{p}$
$\tilde{X}_1 = 1$	$1 - \tilde{p} - \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(1 - \tilde{p}, 1 - \tilde{p})$	$\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(1 - \tilde{p}, 1 - \tilde{p}) + 2\tilde{p} - 1$	$\tilde{p}$
	$1 - \tilde{p}$	$\tilde{p}$	1

(50)

In the case where $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)} = \mathbf{C}^{\perp}$, $\tilde{X}_1$ and $\tilde{X}_2$ are independent, we retrieve the results obtained for the individual-based model:

	$\tilde{X}_2 = 0$	$\tilde{X}_1 = 1$	
$\tilde{X}_1 = 0$	$(1 - \tilde{p})^2$	$(1 - \tilde{p})\,\tilde{p}$	$1 - \tilde{p}$
$\tilde{X}_1 = 1$	$(1 - \tilde{p})\,\tilde{p}$	$\tilde{p}^2$	$\tilde{p}$
	$1 - \tilde{p}$	$\tilde{p}$	1

(51)

[49] The Normal copula depends on the correlation matrix Σ. Here, we assume a uniform redemption correlation, implying that Σ is the constant correlation matrix $\mathcal{C}_n(\theta_c)$ where θ_c is the pairwise correlation.

because $\mathbf{C}^{\perp}(u_1, u_2) = u_1 u_2$. In the case where $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)} = \mathbf{C}^{+}$, $\tilde{X}_1$ and $\tilde{X}_2$ are perfectly dependent and we obtain the following contingency table:

	$\tilde{X}_2 = 0$	$\tilde{X}_1 = 1$	
$\tilde{X}_1 = 0$	$1 - \tilde{p}$	0	$1 - \tilde{p}$
$\tilde{X}_1 = 1$	0	$\tilde{p}$	$\tilde{p}$
	$1 - \tilde{p}$	$\tilde{p}$	1

(52)

because $\mathbf{C}^{+}(u_1, u_2) = \min(u_1, u_2)$. The contingency tables (51) and (52) represent the two extremes cases.

Remark 22 *If we use a radially symmetric copula (Nelsen, 2006) such that:*

$$\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(u_1, u_2) = u_1 + u_2 - 1 + \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(1 - u_1, 1 - u_2)$$

the contingency table (50) becomes:

	$\tilde{X}_2 = 0$	$\tilde{X}_1 = 1$	
$\tilde{X}_1 = 0$	$1 - 2\tilde{p} + \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(\tilde{p}, \tilde{p})$	$\tilde{p} - \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(\tilde{p}, \tilde{p})$	$1 - \tilde{p}$
$\tilde{X}_1 = 1$	$p - \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(\tilde{p}, \tilde{p})$	$\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(\tilde{p}, \tilde{p})$	$\tilde{p}$
	$1 - \tilde{p}$	$\tilde{p}$	1

In the general case, we obtain a similar contingency table by replacing the copula function $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(u_1, u_2)$ by its corresponding survival function $\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}(u_1, u_2)$ because we have (Nelsen, 2006):

$$\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}(u_1, u_2) = u_1 + u_2 - 1 + \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(1 - u_1, 1 - u_2)$$

A.7.2 Computation of $\Pr\left\{\tilde{Z} = 0\right\}$

This case corresponds to the situation where no client redeems:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr\left\{\tilde{Z} = 0\right\} &= \Pr\left\{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i \tilde{X}_i \tilde{Y}_i = 0\right\} \\
&= \Pr\left\{\tilde{X}_1 = 0, \ldots, \tilde{X}_n = 0\right\} \\
&= \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}(1 - \tilde{p}, \ldots, 1 - \tilde{p})
\end{aligned} \tag{53}$$

In the case where $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)} = \mathbf{C}^{\perp}$, we retrieve the result $\Pr\left\{\tilde{Z} = 0\right\} = (1 - \tilde{p})^n$. In the case where $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)} = \mathbf{C}^{+}$, we obtain $\Pr\left\{\tilde{Z} = 0\right\} = 1 - \tilde{p}$.

A.7.3 Statistical moments

First moment For the mean, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{Z}\right] &= \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i \tilde{X}_i \tilde{Y}_i\right] \\
&= \sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i \mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{X}_i\right] \mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{Y}_i\right]
\end{aligned}$$

We deduce that:

$$\mu_1\left(\tilde{Z}\right) = \tilde{p}\mu_1\left(\tilde{Y}\right) \tag{54}$$

Second moment Using the contingency table (50), we have:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{X}_1\tilde{X}_2\right] &= \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}\left(1-\tilde{p},1-\tilde{p}\right)+2\tilde{p}-1\\ &= \breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}\left(\tilde{p},\tilde{p}\right)\end{aligned}$$

It follows that:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{Z}^2\right] &= \mathbb{E}\left[\left(\sum_{i=1}^n \omega_i\tilde{X}_i\tilde{Y}_i\right)^2\right]\\ &= \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{i=1}^n \omega_i^2\tilde{X}_i^2\tilde{Y}_i^2+2\sum_{j>i}\omega_i\omega_j\tilde{X}_i\tilde{X}_j\tilde{Y}_i\tilde{Y}_j\right]\\ &= \tilde{p}\mu_2'\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\sum_{i=1}^n\omega_i^2+2\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}\left(\tilde{p},\tilde{p}\right)\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\sum_{j>i}\omega_i\omega_j\end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned}\mu_2\left(\tilde{Z}\right) &= \mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{Z}^2\right]-\mathbb{E}^2\left[\tilde{Z}\right]\\ &= \tilde{p}\mu_2'\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\sum_{i=1}^n\omega_i^2+2\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}\left(\tilde{p},\tilde{p}\right)\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\sum_{j>i}\omega_i\omega_j-\tilde{p}^2\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\\ &= \tilde{p}\left(\mu_2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)+\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\right)\mathcal{H}\left(\omega\right)+\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}\left(\tilde{p},\tilde{p}\right)\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\left(1-\mathcal{H}\left(\omega\right)\right)-\tilde{p}^2\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\\ &= \tilde{p}\mu_2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\mathcal{H}\left(\omega\right)+\left(\tilde{p}\mathcal{H}\left(\omega\right)+\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}\left(\tilde{p},\tilde{p}\right)\left(1-\mathcal{H}\left(\omega\right)\right)-\tilde{p}^2\right)\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\\ &= \left(\tilde{p}\mu_2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)+\left(\tilde{p}-\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}\left(\tilde{p},\tilde{p}\right)\right)\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\right)\mathcal{H}\left(\omega\right)+\left(\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}\left(\tilde{p},\tilde{p}\right)-\tilde{p}^2\right)\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\end{aligned} \tag{55}$$

In the case where $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}=\mathbf{C}^{\perp}$, we have $\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_\mathbf{c})}\left(\tilde{p},\tilde{p}\right)=\tilde{p}^2$. Therefore, we retrieve the result found in Equation (47) on page 94:

$$\mu_2\left(\tilde{Z}\right)=\tilde{p}\left(\mu_2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)+\left(1-\tilde{p}\right)\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\right)\mathcal{H}\left(\omega\right)$$

In the case where $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}=\mathbf{C}^{+}$, we have $\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}\left(\tilde{p},\tilde{p}\right)=\tilde{p}$ and we obtain:

$$\mu_2\left(\tilde{Z}\right)=\tilde{p}\mu_2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)\mathcal{H}\left(\omega\right)+\tilde{p}\left(1-\tilde{p}\right)\mu_1^2\left(\tilde{Y}\right)$$

A.8 Statistical moments of the redemption frequency

We recall that $\tilde{X}_i\sim\mathcal{B}\left(\tilde{p}\right)$, meaning that $\mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{X}_i\right]=\mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{X}_i^2\right]=\tilde{p}$. The weighted redemption frequency is defined as follows:

$$\mathcal{F}=\sum_{i=1}^n\omega_i\tilde{X}_i$$

We have:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{F}\right] &= \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{i=1}^n\omega_i\tilde{X}_i\right]\\ &= \tilde{p}\end{aligned}$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{F}^2\right] &= \mathbb{E}\left[\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i\tilde{X}_i\right)^2\right] \\
&= \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i^2\tilde{X}_i^2 + 2\sum_{j>i}\omega_i\omega_j\tilde{X}_i\tilde{X}_j\right] \\
&= \tilde{p}\mathcal{H}(\omega) + \breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}(\tilde{p},\tilde{p})(1-\mathcal{H}(\omega))
\end{aligned}$$

We deduce that:

$$\mu_2(\mathcal{F}) = \tilde{p}\mathcal{H}(\omega) + \breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}(\tilde{p},\tilde{p})(1-\mathcal{H}(\omega)) - \tilde{p}^2$$

Remark 23 *We notice that the expected value and the volatility of the redemption frequency are related in the following way:*

$$\mu_2(\mathcal{F}) = \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{F}](\mathcal{H}(\omega) - \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{F}]) + \breve{\mathbf{C}}(\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{F}],\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{F}])(1-\mathcal{H}(\omega)) \tag{56}$$

A.9 Pearson correlation between two redemption frequencies

We consider two redemption frequencies $\mathcal{F}_1$ and $\mathcal{F}_2$. The redemption frequency $\mathcal{F}_k$ is associated to the liability structure $(\omega_{k,1},\ldots,\omega_{k,n_k})$ and corresponds to an investor category, whose redemption probability is $\tilde{p}_k$ and frequency correlation is characterized by the copula function $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_k)}$ $(k=1,2)$. We also assume that the redemption correlation between the two investor categories is defined by the copula function $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_{12})}$. It follows that we have three copula functions:

- $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_1)}$ is the copula function that defines the frequency correlation between the investors of the first category;
- $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_2)}$ is the copula function that defines the frequency correlation between the investors of the second category;
- $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_{12})}$ is the copula function that defines the frequency correlation between the investors of the first category and those of the second category.

In the case where the two categories are the same, we have $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_1)} = \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_2)} = \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_{12})} = \mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}$.

To compute the covariance between $\mathcal{F}_1$ and $\mathcal{F}_2$, we calculate the mathematical expectation of the cross product:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{F}_1\mathcal{F}_2] &= \mathbb{E}\left[\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n_1}\omega_{1,i}\tilde{X}_{1,i}\right)\left(\sum_{j=1}^{n_2}\omega_{2,j}\tilde{X}_{2,j}\right)\right] \\
&= \mathbb{E}\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n_1}\sum_{j=1}^{n_2}\omega_{1,i}\omega_{2,j}\tilde{X}_{1,i}\tilde{X}_{2,j}\right] \\
&= \mathbb{E}\left[\tilde{X}_{1,i}\tilde{X}_{2,j}\right]\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n_1}\sum_{j=1}^{n_2}\omega_{1,i}\omega_{2,j}\right) \\
&= \breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_{12})}(\tilde{p}_1,\tilde{p}_2)
\end{aligned}$$

because $\sum_{i=1}^{n_1}\sum_{j=1}^{n_2}\omega_{1,i}\omega_{2,j}=1$. We deduce the expression of the Pearson correlation:

$$\rho\left(\mathcal{F}_1,\mathcal{F}_2\right)=\frac{\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_{12})}\left(\tilde{p}_1,\tilde{p}_2\right)-\tilde{p}_1\tilde{p}_2}{\sqrt{\mu_2\left(\mathcal{F}_1\right)\mu_2\left(\mathcal{F}_2\right)}} \tag{57}$$

where:

$$\mu_2\left(\mathcal{F}_k\right)=\tilde{p}_k\left(\mathcal{H}\left(\omega_k\right)-\tilde{p}_k\right)+\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_k)}\left(\tilde{p}_k,\tilde{p}_k\right)\left(1-\mathcal{H}\left(\omega_k\right)\right)\qquad k=1,2$$

Remark 24 *The Pearson correlation $\rho\left(\mathcal{F}_1,\mathcal{F}_2\right)$ is equal to zero if only if*[50] $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_k)}$ *is the product copula* $\mathbf{C}^{\perp}$.

Remark 25 *In the case where the two investor categories are the same and the liability structures are equally-weighted, we have* $\tilde{p}_1=\tilde{p}_2=\tilde{p}$ *and* $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_1)}=\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_2)}=\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_{12})}=\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_c)}$, *and we obtain:*

$$\rho\left(\mathcal{F}_1,\mathcal{F}_2\right)=\frac{\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}\left(\tilde{p},\tilde{p}\right)-\tilde{p}^2}{\sqrt{\mu_2\left(\mathcal{F}_1\right)\mu_2\left(\mathcal{F}_2\right)}} \tag{58}$$

where:

$$\mu_2\left(\mathcal{F}_k\right)=\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}\left(\tilde{p},\tilde{p}\right)-\tilde{p}^2+\frac{\tilde{p}-\breve{\mathbf{C}}_{(\theta_c)}\left(\tilde{p},\tilde{p}\right)}{n_k}\qquad k=1,2$$

The limiting case $n_k\to\infty$ is equal to $\rho\left(\mathcal{F}_1,\mathcal{F}_2\right)=1$. This is normal since $\mathcal{F}_1$ and $\mathcal{F}_2$ converges to $\tilde{p}$ when the liability structure is infinitely fine-grained.

B Data

[50] We recall that $\mathbf{C}_{(\theta_k)}$ is the Clayton or the Normal copula. In the general case, this property does not hold.

Table 40: Breakdown of the liability dataset by investor and fund categories

Total number n of observations	Balanced	Bond	Enhanced Treasury	Equity	Money Market	Other	Structured	Total
Auto-consumption	22 762	46 651	3 784	46 678	6 175	34 064	0	160 114
Central bank	2 791	7 400	0	4 730	602	0	0	15 523
Corporate	10 780	13 457	2 305	6 962	7 812	6 164	0	47 480
Corporate pension fund	14 827	24 429	427	17 975	3 029	5 474	427	66 588
Employee savings plan	9 894	4 240	1 349	19 145	3 232	0	5 279	43 139
Institutional	50 813	95 013	3 961	76 057	9 542	31 973	241	267 600
Insurance	10 577	45 494	3 303	23 145	12 633	6 528	0	101 680
Other	27 938	29 817	5 816	4 898	9 347	18 717	0	96 533
Retail	140 023	86 937	7 531	99 624	15 418	31 370	83 496	464 399
Sovereign	7 291	12 788	854	14 183	3 471	5 308	0	43 895
Third-party distributor	63 792	86 716	5 247	123 004	11 160	15 407	5 126	310 452
Total	361 488	452 942	34 577	436 401	82 421	155 005	94 569	1 617 403

Total number n_1 of redemptions	Balanced	Bond	Enhanced Treasury	Equity	Money Market	Other	Structured	Total
Auto-consumption	3 744	8 796	1 135	11 871	3 040	883	0	29 469
Central bank	4	16	0	38	18	0	0	76
Corporate	324	484	144	159	3 110	20	0	4 241
Corporate pension fund	460	513	17	447	213	17	2	1 669
Employee savings plan	264	120	40	519	74	0	145	1 162
Institutional	1 973	3 098	74	3 422	2 754	229	0	11 550
Insurance	568	1 562	114	1 596	2 409	61	0	6 310
Other	1 145	926	219	805	2 009	278	0	5 382
Retail	54 095	36 018	3 932	67 862	6 882	5 030	22 783	196 602
Sovereign	494	118	9	381	521	2	0	1 525
Third-party distributor	19 837	29 140	2 277	54 689	7 127	4 569	334	117 973
Total	82 908	80 791	7 961	141 789	28 157	11 089	23 264	375 959

Source: Amundi Cube Database (2020) and authors' calculation.

Table 41: Breakdown of the liability dataset by investor and fund categories (without mandates and dedicated mutual funds)

Total number n of observations	Balanced	Bond	Enhanced Treasury	Equity	Money Market	Other	Structured	Total
Auto-consumption	16 147	43 189	3 783	43 737	6 008	13 793	0	126 657
Central bank	1 281	580	0	476	0	0	0	2 337
Corporate	1 862	6 542	2 305	5 468	7 812	4 235	0	28 224
Corporate pension fund	2 344	8 650	427	9 031	2 670	1 277	0	24 399
Employee savings plan	9 894	4 240	1 349	19 145	3 232	0	5 279	43 139
Institutional	6 858	36 792	3 716	41 104	8 329	16 029	0	112 828
Insurance	3 436	13 011	3 303	21 832	8 543	5 750	0	55 875
Other	7 577	12 751	5 428	4 155	9 333	11 788	0	51 032
Retail	115 394	77 879	6 692	95 393	14 798	27 834	83 118	421 108
Sovereign	2 969	2 261	854	3 405	2 853	1 746	0	14 088
Third-party distributor	55 696	75 591	4 929	114 171	10 732	13 483	5 126	279 728
Total	223 458	281 486	32 786	357 917	74 310	95 935	93 523	1 159 415

Total number n_1 of redemptions	Balanced	Bond	Enhanced Treasury	Equity	Money Market	Other	Structured	Total
Auto-consumption	3 492	8 385	1 135	11 137	3 040	881	0	28 070
Central bank	2	2	0	7	0	0	0	11
Corporate	280	405	144	157	3 110	9	0	4 105
Corporate pension fund	190	292	17	304	202	0	0	1 005
Employee savings plan	264	120	40	519	74	0	145	1 162
Institutional	1 328	2 312	73	2 677	2 734	166	0	9 290
Insurance	419	874	114	1 576	2 385	60	0	5 428
Other	733	493	200	804	2 008	262	0	4 500
Retail	51 454	35 079	3 932	67 250	6 770	4 875	22 707	192 067
Sovereign	484	72	9	343	520	1	0	1 429
Third-party distributor	18 808	28 242	2 266	52 445	7 077	4 431	334	113 603
Total	77 454	76 276	7 930	137 219	27 920	10 685	23 186	360 670

Source: Amundi Cube Database (2020) and authors' calculation.

C Additional results

Figure 37: Third-party distributor



Figure 38: Relationship between the stress scenario of the big fund and the stress scenario of n equivalent small funds



Figure 39: Relationship between the confidence level α of $\mathbf{F}^{-1}(\alpha)$ and the confidence level $\alpha_{\mathbf{G}}$ of $\mathbf{G}^{-1}(\alpha_{\mathbf{G}})$



Figure 40: Stress scenario $\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T})$ in % ($p = 5\%$)



Figure 41: Stress scenario $\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T})$ in % ($p = 50\%$)



Table 42: Estimated value of a (method of moments)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Auto-consumption	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.09	0.06		0.04
Central bank								
Corporate	0.00	0.04			0.21			0.14
Corporate pension fund		0.01		0.01	0.21			0.04
Employee savings plan	0.14			0.04				0.04
Institutional	0.01	0.04		0.06	0.10			0.05
Insurance	0.01	0.02		0.02	0.12			0.05
Other	0.05	0.05		0.01	0.05	0.01		0.03
Retail	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.01
Sovereign	0.05			0.02	0.11			0.04
Third-party distributor	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.02
Total	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.07	0.02	0.00	0.02

(1) = balanced, (2) = bond, (3) = enhanced treasury, (4) = equity, (5) = money market, (6) = other, (7) = structured, (8) = total

Table 43: Estimated value of b (method of moments)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Auto-consumption	1.23	2.86	1.20	2.25	2.81	2.23		2.28
Central bank								
Corporate	0.78	1.62			5.34			3.61
Corporate pension fund		0.41		0.50	2.69			1.09
Employee savings plan	10.89			1.84				1.73
Institutional	1.21	1.52		2.13	2.15			1.60
Insurance	0.78	0.91		1.07	3.58			1.91
Other	5.58	1.84		1.04	1.35	1.17		1.23
Retail	3.29	3.56	2.98	4.11	2.39	3.07	1.11	3.00
Sovereign	86.69			0.83	0.90			0.87
Third-party distributor	3.83	4.21	1.44	5.22	5.14	1.48	1.43	3.89
Total	2.68	2.80	1.01	2.89	2.58	1.60	0.97	2.43

(1) = balanced, (2) = bond, (3) = enhanced treasury, (4) = equity, (5) = money market, (6) = other, (7) = structured, (8) = total

Table 44: Estimated value of a (method of maximum likelihood)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Auto-consumption	0.20	0.26	0.26	0.23	0.32	0.25		0.24
Central bank								
Corporate	0.23	0.19			0.39			0.30
Corporate pension fund		0.13		0.13	0.37			0.16
Employee savings plan	1.03			0.52				0.57
Institutional	0.22	0.19		0.21	0.28			0.22
Insurance	0.14	0.15		0.17	0.28			0.19
Other	0.26	0.21		0.27	0.25	0.28		0.23
Retail	0.31	0.30	0.26	0.33	0.27	0.27	0.36	0.29
Sovereign	0.68			0.17	0.31			0.19
Third-party distributor	0.40	0.28	0.24	0.30	0.34	0.27	0.26	0.30
Total	0.29	0.25	0.23	0.27	0.29	0.24	0.32	0.25

(1) = balanced, (2) = bond, (3) = enhanced treasury, (4) = equity, (5) = money market, (6) = other, (7) = structured, (8) = total

Table 45: Estimated value of b (method of maximum likelihood)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Auto-consumption	6.53	11.36	17.89	15.80	7.50	8.40		10.51
Central bank								
Corporate	26.32	6.03			8.96			6.55
Corporate pension fund		1.66		3.12	4.14			2.70
Employee savings plan	74.62			24.41				30.29
Institutional	16.24	4.94		5.65	4.64			5.04
Insurance	3.56	5.42		5.26	7.14			5.46
Other	28.00	7.99		31.90	4.82	43.34		6.72
Retail	56.99	82.20	51.08	116.86	10.51	48.15	309.26	65.57
Sovereign	1225.65			4.84	2.06			2.92
Third-party distributor	111.38	39.19	15.23	64.70	21.61	36.15	12.11	47.77
Total	44.28	26.79	15.16	44.67	7.80	20.02	206.39	26.76

(1) = balanced, (2) = bond, (3) = enhanced treasury, (4) = equity, (5) = money market, (6) = other, (7) = structured, (8) = total

Table 46: Estimated value of μ in % (method of maximum likelihood)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Auto-consumption	2.92	2.23	1.45	1.43	4.08	2.91		2.20
Central bank								
Corporate	0.87	3.10			4.12			4.43
Corporate pension fund		7.47		4.03	8.29			5.58
Employee savings plan	1.36			2.07				1.85
Institutional	1.32	3.78		3.55	5.77			4.11
Insurance	3.78	2.62		3.08	3.80			3.44
Other	0.93	2.56		0.83	4.99	0.64		3.26
Retail	0.54	0.36	0.51	0.28	2.47	0.56	0.12	0.44
Sovereign	0.06			3.47	13.01			6.08
Third-party distributor	0.36	0.72	1.55	0.46	1.55	0.75	2.13	0.62
Total	0.66	0.92	1.46	0.59	3.53	1.16	0.15	0.92

(1) = balanced, (2) = bond, (3) = enhanced treasury, (4) = equity, (5) = money market, (6) = other, (7) = structured, (8) = total

Table 47: Estimated value of σ in % (method of maximum likelihood)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Auto-consumption	6.05	4.16	2.74	2.88	6.66	5.41		4.28
Central bank								
Corporate	1.77	6.45			6.18			7.34
Corporate pension fund		15.74		9.53	11.74			11.68
Employee savings plan	1.32			2.80				2.39
Institutional	2.73	7.70		7.06	9.59			7.94
Insurance	8.80	6.23		6.82	6.58			7.07
Other	1.78	5.21		1.58	8.84	1.20		6.30
Retail	0.96	0.65	0.99	0.48	4.52	1.06	0.19	0.81
Sovereign	0.07			7.46	18.33			11.79
Third-party distributor	0.56	1.33	3.04	0.83	2.58	1.41	3.95	1.12
Total	1.20	1.80	2.97	1.13	6.13	2.33	0.27	1.81

(1) = balanced, (2) = bond, (3) = enhanced treasury, (4) = equity, (5) = money market, (6) = other, (7) = structured, (8) = total

Table 48: Volatility of the redemption rate in %

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Auto-consumption	3.47	3.11	5.42	3.06	6.45	2.40		3.41
Central bank	0.33	1.25		2.29				1.23
Corporate	2.16	2.45	3.43	3.07	5.08	2.22		3.57
Corporate pension fund	3.02	1.92	1.03	2.53	4.09	0.00		2.53
Employee savings plan	0.57	0.41	2.75	1.42	0.59		2.65	1.45
Institutional	2.42	2.58	7.07	2.45	6.89	1.87		3.24
Insurance	3.05	2.79	1.49	2.77	4.53	1.89		3.02
Other	1.15	1.90	4.79	3.22	5.70	1.01		3.26
Retail	1.88	1.74	2.55	1.76	5.18	1.36	1.38	1.95
Sovereign	0.10	0.45	1.66	3.19	10.07	2.39		4.94
Third-party distributor	1.57	2.15	5.22	1.76	3.88	3.37	1.80	2.17
Total	1.96	2.29	4.45	2.18	5.48	2.05	1.51	2.56

(1) = balanced, (2) = bond, (3) = enhanced treasury, (4) = equity, (5) = money market, (6) = other, (7) = structured, (8) = total

Figure 42: Liability weights in the case of the geometric liability structure $\omega_i \propto q^i$



Figure 43: Comparison of $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \omega)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \mathcal{H})$ ($q = 0.9$ and $\mathcal{H}(\omega)^{-1} = 18$))



Figure 44: Comparison of $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \omega)$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{F}}(x \mid \mathcal{H})$ ($q = 0.5$ and $\mathcal{H}(\omega)^{-1} = 3$))



Figure 45: Probability to observe no redemption $\Pr\{\mathcal{R} = 0\}$ in % with respect to the number n of unitholders ($\tilde{p} = 10\%$)



Figure 46: Probability to observe 100% of redemptions $\Pr\{\mathcal{F} = 1\}$ in % ($n = 20$)



Figure 47: Histogram of the redemption rate in % with respect to the number n of unitholders ($\tilde{p} = 50\%, \tilde{\mu} = 50\%, \tilde{\sigma} = 10\%, \rho = 25\%$)



Figure 48: Histogram of the redemption rate in % with respect to the number n of unitholders ($\tilde{p} = 50\%, \tilde{\mu} = 50\%, \tilde{\sigma} = 10\%, \rho = 75\%$)



Figure 49: Histogram of the redemption rate in % with respect to the number n of unitholders ($\tilde{p} = 50\%, \tilde{\mu} = 50\%, \tilde{\sigma} = 10\%, \rho = 90\%$)



Table 49: Calibrated Pearson correlation (Normal copula, $\mathcal{H}(\omega) = 1/20$)

$\hat{\sigma}(\mathcal{F})$	$\overline{\mathcal{F}}$				
	10.0%	20.0%	25.0%	30.0%	40.0%
10.0%					
20.0%	39.88%	24.58%			
30.0%	50.00%	42.83%	38.88%	35.70%	31.70%
40.0%		50.00%	49.20%	47.77%	45.30%

Figure 50: Dependogram of the bivariate Normal copula



Figure 51: Dependogram of redemption rate frequencies for equity funds



Figure 52: Histogram of the weekly redemption rate in % with respect to the autocorrelation ρ_{time} ($\tilde{p} = 50\%, \tilde{\mu} = 50\%, \tilde{\sigma} = 10\%, \rho = 50\%, n = 10$)



Table 50: Autocorrelation of the redemption frequency in %

	Balanced	Bond	Equity	Money market
Institutional	26.3**	12.9**	3.8	33.9**
Insurance	39.8**	10.5**	1.8	16.9**
Retail	7.9	9.8	25.2**	−0.1
Third-party distributor	15.0**	32.5**	42.4**	13.9**

Table 51: Autocorrelation of the redemption severity in %

	Balanced	Bond	Equity	Money market
Institutional	16.9**	2.0	6.1	21.4**
Insurance	−1.1	8.4	8.5	18.3**
Retail	13.5**	3.1	10.1**	12.5**
Third-party distributor	1.6	13.4**	9.9**	21.3**

Table 52: Coefficient of determination $\mathfrak{R}_c^2$ in % — $\mathcal{R}(t) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathcal{F}(t) + u(t)$

	Balanced	Bond	Equity	Money market
Institutional	9.2	45.2	59.1	55.1
Insurance	2.8	18.4	22.2	53.3
Retail	68.2	61.9	60.1	55.2
Third-party distributor	51.8	66.4	54.2	64.7

Table 53: Coefficient of determination $\mathfrak{R}_c^2$ in % — $\mathcal{R}(t) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathcal{R}^\star(t) + u(t)$

	Balanced	Bond	Equity	Money market
Institutional	88.1	78.3	51.3	93.2
Insurance	99.2	85.3	85.4	94.4
Retail	88.6	93.2	99.1	89.4
Third-party distributor	96.3	95.9	95.6	98.0

Table 54: Coefficient of determination $\mathfrak{R}_c^2$ in % — $\mathcal{R}(t) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \mathcal{F}(t) + \beta_2 \mathcal{R}^\star(t) + u(t)$

	Balanced	Bond	Equity	Money market
Institutional	89.0	86.8	84.0	96.4
Insurance	99.3	87.2	88.2	97.1
Retail	96.2	97.3	99.7	95.7
Third-party distributor	98.4	98.2	97.6	98.9

Table 55: Coefficient of determination $\mathfrak{R}_c^2$ in % — Equation (35), one-week time horizon

	Balanced	Bond	Equity	Money market
Institutional	0.3	0.7	1.0	1.4
Insurance	0.2	0.5	1.4	2.3
Retail	0.8	2.3	0.6	0.3
Third-party distributor	0.8	0.8	1.2	3.8

Table 56: Coefficient of determination $\mathfrak{R}_c^2$ in % — Equation (35), two-week time horizon

	Balanced	Bond	Equity	Money market
Institutional	1.3	0.7	2.8	2.8
Insurance	0.1	0.3	1.5	5.1
Retail	2.3	2.0	0.8	0.9
Third-party distributor	1.1	2.1	1.5	3.7

Figure 53: Relationship between redemption rate and two-week stock returns (equity category)



Part II
Modeling the Asset Liquidity Risk

Liquidity Stress Testing in Asset Management Part 2. Modeling the Asset Liquidity Risk*

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Abstract

This article is part of a comprehensive research project on liquidity risk in asset management, which can be divided into three dimensions. The first dimension covers liability liquidity risk (or funding liquidity) modeling, the second dimension focuses on asset liquidity risk (or market liquidity) modeling, and the third dimension considers the asset-liability management of the liquidity gap risk (or asset-liability matching). The purpose of this research is to propose a methodological and practical framework in order to perform liquidity stress testing programs, which comply with regulatory guidelines (ESMA, 2019, 2020) and are useful for fund managers. The review of the academic literature and professional research studies shows that there is a lack of standardized and analytical models. The aim of this research project is then to fill the gap with the goal of developing mathematical and statistical approaches, and providing appropriate answers.

In this second article focused on asset liquidity risk modeling, we propose a market impact model to estimate transaction costs. After presenting a toy model that helps to understand the main concepts of asset liquidity, we consider a two-regime model, which is based on the power-law property of price impact. Then, we define several asset liquidity measures such as liquidity cost, liquidation ratio and shortfall or time to liquidation in order to assess the different dimensions of asset liquidity. Finally, we apply this asset liquidity framework to stocks and bonds and discuss the issues of calibrating the transaction cost model.

Keywords: Asset liquidity, stress testing, bid-ask spread, market impact, transaction cost, participation rate, power law, liquidation cost, liquidation ratio, liquidation shortfall, time to liquidation.

JEL classification: C02, G32.

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1 Introduction

Since September 2020, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has required asset managers to adopt a liquidity stress testing (LST) policy for their investment funds (ESMA, 2020). More precisely, each asset manager must assess the liquidity risk factors across their funds in order to ensure that stress testing is tailored to the liquidity risk profile of each fund. The issue of liquidity stress testing is that the analysis should include both sides of the equation: liability (or funding) liquidity and asset (or market) liquidity. This issue is not specific to the asset management industry, because it is a general problem faced by financial firms including the banking industry:

> "*A liquidity stress test is the process of assessing the impact of an adverse scenario on institution's cash flows as well as on the availability of funding sources, and on market prices of liquid assets*" (BCBS, 2017, page 60).

However, the main difference between the asset management and banking sectors is that banks have a longer experience than asset managers, both in the field of stress testing and liquidity management (BCBS, 2013b). Another difference is that the methodology for computing the liquidity coverage ratio and the monitoring tools are precise, comprehensive and very detailed by the regulator (BCBS, 2013a). This is not the case for the redemption coverage ratio, since the regulatory text only contains guidelines and no methodological aspects. Certainly, these differences can be explained by the lack of maturity of this topic in the asset management industry.

The aim of this research is to provide a methodological support for managing liquidity risk of investment funds. Since it is a huge project, we have divided it into three dimensions: (1) liability liquidity risk modeling, (2) asset liquidity risk measurement and (3) asset-liability liquidity risk management. This article only covers the second dimension and proposes a framework for assessing the liquidity of a portfolio given a redemption scenario[1].

Assessing the asset liquidity risk is equivalent to measuring the transaction cost of liquidating a portfolio. This means estimating the bid-ask spread component, the price impact of the transaction, the time to liquidation, the implementation shortfall, etc. This also implies defining a liquidation policy. Contrary to the liability liquidity risk where the academic literature is poor and not helpful, there are many quantitative works on the aspects of asset liquidity risk. This is particularly true for the modeling of transaction costs, much less for liquidation policies. The challenge is then to use the most interesting studies that are relevant from a professional point of view, and to cast them into a practical stress testing framework. This means simplifying and defining a few appropriate parameters that are useful to assess the asset liquidity risk.

This paper is organized as follows. Section Two deals with transaction cost modeling. A toy model will be useful to define the concepts of price impact and liquidation policies. Then, we consider a two-regime transaction cost model based on the power-law property of the price impact. In Section Three, we present the asset liquidity measures such as the liquidation ratio, the time to liquidation or the implementation shortfall. The implementation of a stress testing framework is developed in Section Four. In particular, we consider an approach that distinguishes invariant parameters and risk parameters that are impacted by a stress regime. We also discuss the portfolio distortion that may be induced by a liquidation policy, which does not correspond to the proportional rule. Finally, Section Five applies the analytical framework to stocks and bonds, and Section Six offers some concluding remarks.

[1] The liability liquidity risk is studied in Roncalli *et al.* (2020), whereas the asset-liability management tools are presented in Roncalli *et al.* (2021)

2 Transaction cost modeling

In this section, we develop a transaction cost model that incorporates both the bid-ask spread and the market impact. For that, we first define these two concepts and explain the difference between real and nominal variables. Then, we present a toy model that allows to understand the main characteristics of a transaction cost function. Using the power-law property of price impact, we derive the square-root-linear model and show how this model can be calibrated.

2.1 Definition

2.1.1 Unit transaction cost

In what follows, we break down the unit transaction cost into two parts:

$$\boldsymbol{c}(x) = s + \boldsymbol{\pi}(x) \tag{1}$$

where s does not depend on the trade size and represents half of the bid-ask spread of the security, and $\boldsymbol{\pi}(x)$ depends on the trade size x and represents the price impact (or PI) of the trade. The trade size x is an invariant variable and is the ratio between the number of traded shares q (sold or purchased) and the daily trading volume v:

$$x = \frac{q}{v} \tag{2}$$

It is also called the participation rate.

Remark 1 *If we express the quantities in nominal terms, we have:*

$$x = \frac{Q}{V} = \frac{q \cdot P}{v \cdot P} = \frac{q}{v}$$

where P is the security price that is observed for the current date, and $Q = q \cdot P$ and $V = v \cdot P$ are the nominal values of q and v (expressed in USD or EUR). In the sequel, lowercase symbols generally represent quantities or numbers of shares whereas uppercase symbols are reserved for nominal values. For example, the unit transaction cost $\boldsymbol{C}(Q, V)$ is defined by:

$$\boldsymbol{C}(Q, V) = \boldsymbol{c}\left(\frac{Q}{V}\right) = \boldsymbol{c}\left(\frac{q}{v}\right) \tag{3}$$

2.1.2 Total transaction cost

The total transaction cost of the trade is the product of the unit transaction cost and the order size expressed in dollars:

$$\mathcal{TC}(q) = q \cdot P \cdot \boldsymbol{c}(x) = Q \cdot \boldsymbol{c}(x) \tag{4}$$

where P is the price of the security. Again, we can break down $\mathcal{TC}(q)$ into two components:

$$\mathcal{TC}(q) = \mathcal{BAS}(q) + \mathcal{PI}(q) \tag{5}$$

where $\mathcal{BAS}(q) = Q \cdot s$ is the trading cost due to the bid-ask spread and $\mathcal{PI}(q) = Q \cdot \boldsymbol{\pi}(x)$ is the trading cost due to the market impact.

Remark 2 *By construction, we have:*

$$\mathcal{TC}(Q, V) = Q \cdot \boldsymbol{C}(Q, V) \tag{6}$$

2.1.3 Trading limit

The previous framework only assumes that $x \geq 0$. However, this is not realistic since we cannot trade any values of x in practice. From a theoretical point of view, we have $q \leq v$, meaning that $x \leq 1$ and x is a participation rate. From a practical point of view, q is an ex-post quantity whereas v is an ex-ante quantity, implying that x is a relative trading size and can be larger than one. Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that the fund manager will trade a quantity larger than the ex-ante daily trading volume. It is more likely that the asset manager's trading policy imposes a trading limit x^+ beyond which the fund manager cannot trade:

$$0 \leq x \leq x^+ < 1 \tag{7}$$

This is equivalent to say that the unit transaction cost becomes infinite when the trade size is larger than the trading limit. It follows that the unit transaction cost may be designed in the following way:

$$\boldsymbol{c}(x) = \begin{cases} s + \boldsymbol{\pi}(x) & \text{if } x \in [0, x^+] \\ +\infty & \text{if } x > x^+ \end{cases} \tag{8}$$

In this case, the concept of total transaction cost (or trading cost) only makes sense if the trade size x is lower than the trading limit x^+. Therefore, we will see later that the trading (or liquidation) cost must be completed by liquidation measures such as liquidation ratio or liquidation time.

Remark 3 *The trading limit x^+ is expressed in %. For instance, it is generally set at 10% for equity trading desks. This means that the trader can sell any volume up to 10% of the average daily volume without any permissions. Above the 10% trading limit, the trader must inform the risk manager and obtain authorization to execute its sell order. This trading limit x^+ can be expressed as a maximum number of shares q^+. The advantage of this trading policy is that it does not depend on the daily volume, which is time-varying. Another option is to express the trading limit in nominal terms. Let Q^+ be the nominal trading limit. We have the following relationship:*

$$x^+ = \frac{q^+}{v} = \frac{Q^+}{V} \tag{9}$$

2.2 A toy model of transaction cost

Let us consider a simple model where the unit transaction cost has the functional form given in Figure 1. In this toy model, we assume that the unit transaction cost corresponds to the bid-ask spread if the selling amount x is lower than a threshold $\tilde{x}$. Beyond this normal market size, the transaction cost includes a market impact. This market impact is linear and is an increasing function of x. Moreover, we generally assume that market impact becomes infinite if the selling amount is larger than x^+, which is known as the maximum trading size or the trading limit. It follows that the unit transaction cost may be parameterized by this function:

$$\boldsymbol{c}'(x) = \begin{cases} s & \text{if } x \leq \tilde{x} \\ s + \alpha(x - \tilde{x}) & \text{if } \tilde{x} \leq x \leq x^+ \\ +\infty & \text{if } x > x^+ \end{cases} \tag{10}$$

It depends on four parameters: the bid-ask spread s, the slope α of the market impact and two thresholds: the normal size $\tilde{x}$ and the maximum trading size x^+. For example, we obtain Figure 1 with the following set of parameters: $s = 2$ bps, $\alpha = 2\%$, $\tilde{x} = 2\%$ and $x^+ = 8\%$. The unit transaction cost is equal to 2 bps for small orders and reaches 14 bps when the trade size equals to the trading limit that is equal to 8%.

Figure 1: Simple modeling of unitary transaction costs



For each security i, the unit transaction cost is then defined by the 4-tuple $\left(s_i, \alpha_i, \tilde{x}_i, x_i^+\right)$ where s_i is a security-specific parameter and α_i is a model parameter. This means that α_i is the same for all securities that belong to the same liquidity bucket $\mathcal{LB}_j$. For instance, $\mathcal{LB}_j$ may group all large cap US stocks. $\tilde{x}_i$ and x_i^+ may be security-specific parameters, but they are generally considered as model parameters in order to simplify the calibration of the unit transaction cost.

The previous approach may be simplified by considering that the market impact begins at $x = \tilde{x} = 0$. In this case, the unit transaction cost becomes:

$$\boldsymbol{c}''(x) = \begin{cases} s + \alpha x & \text{if } x \leq x^+ \\ +\infty & \text{if } x > x^+ \end{cases} \tag{11}$$

The interest of this parametrization is to reduce the number of parameters since this unit transaction cost function is then defined by the triplet $\left(s_i, \alpha_i, x_i^+\right)$ for each security i. An example is provided in Figure 29 on page 199.

Remark 4 *The parameterization $\boldsymbol{c}''(x)$ allows us to use the traditional mean-variance framework based on QP optimization (Chen et al., 2019). This explains the practitioners' great interest in the function $\boldsymbol{c}''(x)$ because it is highly tractable and is compatible with the Markowitz approach with low computational complexity*[2].

Remark 5 *In Appendix B.1 on page 191, we show how to transform the function $\boldsymbol{c}'(x)$ into the function $\boldsymbol{c}''(x)$, and vice versa. However, the right issue is to estimate $\hat{\boldsymbol{c}}''(x)$ or more precisely the slope $\hat{\alpha}$ of the market impact. In this case, we use Equations (61) and (62) on page 192 to transform $\hat{\alpha}$ into α for the functions $\boldsymbol{c}'(x)$ and $\boldsymbol{c}''(x)$.*

[2]Nevertheless, this parameterization is less frequent than the simple approach that only considers the bid-ask spread (Scherer, 2007): $\boldsymbol{c}'''(x) = s$.

2.3 The power-law model of price impact

2.3.1 General formula for the market impact

The previous trading cost model is useful for portfolio optimization, but price impact is certainly too simple from a trading or risk management perspective. Nevertheless, price impact has been extensively studied by academics[3], and it is now well-accepted that market impact is power-law:

$$\boldsymbol{\pi}(x) := \boldsymbol{\pi}(x;\gamma) = \varphi_\gamma \sigma x^\gamma \tag{12}$$

where $\gamma > 0$ is a scalar, σ is the daily volatility of the security[4] and φ_γ is a scaling factor[5]. In particular, Equation (12) is valid under a no-arbitrage condition (Jusselin and Rosenbaum, 2020). Empirical studies showed that $\gamma \in [0.3, 0.7]$. For example, the seminal paper of Loeb (1983) has been extensively used by Torre (1997) to develop the MSCI Barra market impact model, which considers that $\gamma = 0.5$. Almgren *et al.* (2005) concluded that $\gamma = 3/5$ is a better figure than $\gamma = 1/2$. On the contrary, Engle *et al.* (2012) found that $\gamma \approx 0.43$ for NYSE stocks and $\gamma \approx 0.37$ for NASDAQ stocks, while Frazzini *et al.* (2018) estimated that the average exponent is equal to 0.35 for developed equity markets. Bacry *et al.* (2015) confirmed a square root temporary impact in the daily participation and observed a power-law pattern with an exponent between 0.5 and 0.8. However, the results obtained by academics are generally valid for small values of x. For instance, the median value of x is equal to 0.6% in Almgren *et al.* (2005), Tóth *et al.* (2011) have used trades[6], which are smaller than 0.01%, Zarinelli *et al.* (2015) have considered a database of seven million metaorders, implying that data with small values of x dominate data with large values of x, etc.

Even though there is an academic consensus[7] that $\gamma \approx 0.5$, this assumption is not satisfactory from a practical point of view when we have to sell or buy a large order ($x \gg 0.5\%$). Some academics have also exhibited that γ is an increasing function of x. For instance, Moro *et al.* (2009) found that γ is equal to 0.64 for LSE stocks when there is a low fraction of market orders, but γ is equal to 0.72 when there is a high fraction of market orders. Similarly, Cont *et al.* (2014) estimated that γ is equal to 1 when we aggregate trades and consider order flow imbalance instead of single trade sizes. Breen *et al.* (2002) used a linear regression model for estimating the price impact. We also recall that the seminal paper of Kyle (1985) assumes that $\gamma = 1$. In fact, these two concepts of transaction cost are not necessarily exclusive:

> "*Empirically, both a linear model and a square root model explain transaction costs well. A square-root model explains transaction costs for orders in the 90th to 99th percentiles better than a linear model; a linear model explains transaction costs for the largest* 1% *of orders slightly better than the square-root model*" (Kyle and Obizhaeva, 2016, page 1347).

This finding is shared by Boussema *et al.* (2002) and D'Hondt and Giraud (2008), who observed that market impact increases significantly when trade size is greater than 1% or turnover is lower than 0.03%.

[3] See for instance the survey articles of Bouchaud (2010) and Kyle and Obizhaeva (2018).

[4] The daily volatility is equal to the annualized volatility divided by the factor $\sqrt{260}$. In the sequel, we use the symbol σ to name both the daily and annualized volatilities. When the volatility is used in a transaction cost formula, it corresponds to a daily volatility. In the text, the volatility is always expressed on an annual basis.

[5] The value of φ_γ depends on the value taken by the exponent γ.

[6] See Figure 1 in Tóth *et al.* (2011).

[7] For instance, the square-root model is used by Gârleanu and Pedersen (2013), Frazzini *et al.* (2018) and Briere *et al.* (2020).

Remark 6 *According to Bucci et al. (2019), the relationship between trade size and market impact is close to a square-root function for intermediate trading volumes (i.e. when* $0.1\% \leq x \leq 10\%$*), but shows an approximate linear behavior for smaller trading volumes (i.e. when* $0.001\% \leq x \leq 0.1\%$*). These different results demonstrate that there is no consensus on a unique functional form for computing the price impact.*

Figure 2: Convexity measure of the power-law model



In Figure 2, we report the power function $y = x^\gamma$ and its first and second derivatives for three exponents γ. We deduce that the concavity is larger for low values of γ and x. When x is equal to 1, the power function converges to the same value $y = 1$ whatever the value of γ. It follows that the choice of γ primarily impacts small trading sizes.

2.3.2 Special cases

From Equation (12), we deduce the two previous competing approaches of Loeb (1983) and Kyle (1985), and also the constant (or bid-ask spread) model:

- The square-root model ($\gamma = 1/2$):

$$\boldsymbol{\pi}(x; 1/2) \approx \varphi_{1/2}\sigma\sqrt{x} \tag{13}$$

  Generally, we assume that the scaling factor $\varphi_{1/2}$ is close to one, implying that the multiplicative factor is equal to the daily volatility.

- The linear model ($\gamma = 1$):

$$\boldsymbol{\pi}(x; 1) \approx \varphi_1\sigma x \tag{14}$$

In this case, the scaling factor φ_1 may be calibrated with respect to $\varphi_{1/2}$ by considering that the two price impact functions coincide at a threshold $\tilde{x}$. We deduce that[8]:

$$\boldsymbol{\pi}(x;1) \approx \varphi_{1/2}\sigma\frac{x}{\sqrt{\tilde{x}}} \tag{15}$$

- The constant model ($\gamma = 0$):

$$\boldsymbol{\pi}(x;0) \approx \varphi_0\sigma \tag{16}$$

By assuming that $\varphi_0 = 0$, we obtain the bid-ask spread model:

$$\boldsymbol{c}(x) = s$$

In Tables 1 and 2, we have reported the values taken by the price impact function $\boldsymbol{\pi}(x)$ for different values of the annualized volatility σ and trade size x. We assume that $\varphi_{1/2} = 1$ and $\tilde{x} = 1\%$. It follows that $\varphi_1 = 10$. Results must be read as follows: a trade size of 0.50% has a price impact of 4.4 bps when the asset volatility is 10% in the case of the square-root model, whereas the price impact becomes 3.1 bps if we consider the linear model.

Table 1: Price impact in bps when $\gamma = 1/2$ (square-root model)

	x	0.01%	0.05%	0.10%	0.50%	1%	2%	5%	10%	15%
σ	1%	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.9	1.4	2.0	2.4
	5%	0.3	0.7	1.0	2.2	3.1	4.4	6.9	9.8	12.0
	10%	0.6	1.4	2.0	4.4	6.2	8.8	13.9	19.6	24.0
	15%	0.9	2.1	2.9	6.6	9.3	13.2	20.8	29.4	36.0
	20%	1.2	2.8	3.9	8.8	12.4	17.5	27.7	39.2	48.0
	25%	1.6	3.5	4.9	11.0	15.5	21.9	34.7	49.0	60.0
	30%	1.9	4.2	5.9	13.2	18.6	26.3	41.6	58.8	72.1
	50%	3.1	6.9	9.8	21.9	31.0	43.9	69.3	98.1	120.1

Table 2: Price impact in bps when $\gamma = 1$ (linear model)

	x	0.01%	0.05%	0.10%	0.50%	1%	2%	5%	10%	15%
σ	1%	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.6	1.2	3.1	6.2	9.3
	5%	0.0	0.2	0.3	1.6	3.1	6.2	15.5	31.0	46.5
	10%	0.1	0.3	0.6	3.1	6.2	12.4	31.0	62.0	93.0
	15%	0.1	0.5	0.9	4.7	9.3	18.6	46.5	93.0	139.5
	20%	0.1	0.6	1.2	6.2	12.4	24.8	62.0	124.0	186.1
	25%	0.2	0.8	1.6	7.8	15.5	31.0	77.5	155.0	232.6
	30%	0.2	0.9	1.9	9.3	18.6	37.2	93.0	186.1	279.1
	50%	0.3	1.6	3.1	15.5	31.0	62.0	155.0	310.1	465.1

Figure 3 shows the differences between the two models when the annualized volatility is set to 10%. First, we notice that the concavity of the square-root model is mainly located

[8] We have:

$$\begin{aligned}\boldsymbol{\pi}(\tilde{x};1) = \boldsymbol{\pi}(\tilde{x};1/2) &\Leftrightarrow \varphi_1\sigma\tilde{x} = \varphi_{1/2}\sigma\sqrt{\tilde{x}} \\ &\Leftrightarrow \varphi_1 = \frac{\varphi_{1/2}}{\sqrt{\tilde{x}}}\end{aligned}$$

Figure 3: Square-root model versus linear model ($\sigma = 10\%$)



for small values of x, since the trading cost function $\boldsymbol{\pi}(x; 1/2)$ may be approximated by a piecewise linear function with only three or four knots. Second, the square-root model implies higher trading costs than the linear model when trade sizes are *small*, and we verify that $\boldsymbol{\pi}(x; 1/2) \geq \boldsymbol{\pi}(x; 1)$ when $x \leq \tilde{x} = 1\%$. For large trade sizes, it is the linear model that produces higher trading costs compared to the square-root model[9]: $\boldsymbol{\pi}(x; 1) \gg \boldsymbol{\pi}(x; 1/2)$.

2.4 A two-regime transaction cost model

2.4.1 General formula

In the toy model, we distinguish two market impact regimes. The first one corresponds to small trading sizes — $x \in [0, \tilde{x}]$, which generate a low price impact. In the second regime, trading sizes are larger — $x \in [\tilde{x}, x^+]$, and the price impact has a significant contribution to the transaction cost. The research studies on the power-law model also show that there may be several regimes of market impact depending on the value of γ. Therefore, we can generalize the toy model where the two regimes correspond to two power functions:

$$\boldsymbol{\pi}(x) = \begin{cases} \varphi_1 \sigma x^{\gamma_1} & \text{if } x \leq \tilde{x} \\ \varphi_2 \sigma x^{\gamma_2} & \text{if } \tilde{x} \leq x \leq x^+ \\ +\infty & \text{if } x > x^+ \end{cases} \tag{17}$$

where γ_1 and γ_2 are the exponents of the two market impact regimes. Moreover, the scalars φ_1 and φ_2 are related since the cost function $\boldsymbol{\pi}(x)$ is continuous. This implies that $\varphi_2 = \varphi_1 \tilde{x}^{\gamma_1 - \gamma_2}$. In this case, the price impact model is defined by the 5-tuple $(\varphi_1, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \tilde{x}, x^+)$ since φ_2 is computed from these parameters. An alternative approach is to define the model

[9] This large difference between square-root and linear models has been already observed by Frazzini *et al.* (2018).

by the parameter set $(\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \tilde{x}, x^+, \boldsymbol{\pi}(\tilde{x}))$. Here, we fix the market impact at the inflection point, and we have $\varphi_1 = \sigma^{-1}\tilde{x}^{-\gamma_1} \cdot \boldsymbol{\pi}(\tilde{x})$ and $\varphi_2 = \varphi_1 \tilde{x}^{\gamma_1 - \gamma_2}$.

Remark 7 *Another parameterization of the two-regime model may be:*

$$\boldsymbol{\pi}(x) = \begin{cases} \varphi_1 \sigma x^{\gamma_1} & \text{if } x \leq \tilde{x} \\ \boldsymbol{\pi}(\tilde{x}) + \varphi_2 \sigma (x - \tilde{x})^{\gamma_2} & \text{if } \tilde{x} < x \leq x^+ \\ +\infty & \text{if } x > x^+ \end{cases} \tag{18}$$

where $\boldsymbol{\pi}(\tilde{x}) = \varphi_1 \sigma \tilde{x}^{\gamma_1}$. *This model is defined by the parameter set* $(\varphi_1, \gamma_1, \varphi_2, \gamma_2, \tilde{x}, x^+)$.

Remark 8 *The model of Bucci et al. (2019) is obtained with the two parameterizations by setting* $\gamma_1 = 1$, $\tilde{x} = 0.1\%$ *and* $\gamma_2 = 1/2$.

In Figure 4, we report three examples of the two-regime model. The first two examples correspond to the first parameterization, whereas the last example uses the second parameterization. In this last case, we observe a step effect due to the high concavity[10] applied to the small values of $x - \tilde{x}$. Therefore, it is better to use the first parameterization.

Figure 4: Two-regime model (annualized volatility $\sigma = 10\%$)



Remark 9 *One of the questions which emerges with the calibration of the two-regime model is the effective difference between the two regimes. In particular, we have the choice between* $\gamma_1 > \gamma_2$ *and* $\gamma_2 > \gamma_1$. *In other words, we have the choice to decrease or increase the convexity beyond the inflection point* $\tilde{x}$. *The "small size effect" described by Bucci et al. (2019) is not really an issue, because the impact is so small. Indeed, the order of magnitude of the price impact for* $x \leq 0.1\%$ *is one or two basis points in the power-law model*[11]. *The significant*

[10] This step effect has been illustrated in Figure 2 on page 127.
[11] For instance, we have $\boldsymbol{\pi}(0.01\%) = 0.62$ bps and $\boldsymbol{\pi}(0.1\%) = 1.92$ bps when $\sigma = 10\%$ and $\gamma = 0.5$.

issue is more to have a coherent approach when the trading size is close to the trading limit x^+. *An example is provided in Figure 5 when the annualized volatility* σ *is* 10% *and* $\varphi_1 = 1$. *We recall that* $\boldsymbol{\pi}(x) = \infty$ *when* $x > x^+$ *because of the order execution policy imposed by the asset manager. Therefore, it is obvious that the right choice is* $\gamma_2 > \gamma_1$, *implying that the convexity must increase. Otherwise, it is not consistent to impose a low convexity below* x^+ *and an infinite convexity beyond* x^+.

Figure 5: Two-regime model ($\sigma = 10\%, \varphi_1 = 1$)



2.4.2 The square-root-linear model

From the two-regime model, we can define the square-root-linear (SQRL) model which has been suggested by Kyle and Obizhaeva (2016):

$$\boldsymbol{\pi}(x) = \begin{cases} \varphi_1 \sigma \sqrt{x} & \text{if } x \leq \tilde{x} \\ \varphi_1 \sigma \dfrac{x}{\sqrt{\tilde{x}}} & \text{if } \tilde{x} \leq x \leq x^+ \\ +\infty & \text{if } x > x^+ \end{cases} \tag{19}$$

In this case, we assume that the square-root model is valid for *small* trade sizes ($x \leq \tilde{x}$), whereas the linear model is better for *large* trade sizes ($\tilde{x} \leq \tilde{x} \leq x^+$). However, beyond the threshold value x^+, we consider that trading costs are prohibitive and infinite. As for the toy model, the value x^+ may be interpreted as a trading limit. We have represented the SQRL model in Figure 6 for the previous parameters ($\sigma = 10\%$ and $\varphi_1 = 1$) when the inflection point $\tilde{x}$ is equal to 1%.

In Table 3, we report the price impact of this model for several values of the annualized volatility σ. We can compare these figures with those given in Tables 1 and 2 on page 128. Let us consider the case when the volatility is equal to 20%, which corresponds to the typical

Figure 6: Square-root-linear model ($\sigma = 10\%$)



volatility observed for single stocks. We observe that there is an acceleration of the price impact beyond the inflection point. For instance, the price impact is equal to 24.8 bps for $x = 2\%$, 62.0 bps for $x = 5\%$, etc.

Table 3: Price impact in bps (square-root-linear model)

	x	0.01%	0.05%	0.10%	0.50%	1%	2%	5%	10%	15%
σ	1%	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.6	1.2	3.1	6.2	9.3
	5%	0.3	0.7	1.0	2.2	3.1	6.2	15.5	31.0	46.5
	10%	0.6	1.4	2.0	4.4	6.2	12.4	31.0	62.0	93.0
	15%	0.9	2.1	2.9	6.6	9.3	18.6	46.5	93.0	139.5
	20%	1.2	2.8	3.9	8.8	12.4	24.8	62.0	124.0	186.1
	25%	1.6	3.5	4.9	11.0	15.5	31.0	77.5	155.0	232.6
	30%	1.9	4.2	5.9	13.2	18.6	37.2	93.0	186.1	279.1
	50%	3.1	6.9	9.8	21.9	31.0	62.0	155.0	310.1	465.1

Remark 10 *The SQRL model and more generally the two-regime model can be used as an incentive trading model, since trades are penalized when they are larger than $\tilde{x}$. In this case, x^+ is a hard threshold limit while $\tilde{x}$ can be considered as a soft threshold limit. Indeed, the asset manager does not explicitly prohibit the fund manager from trading between $\tilde{x}$ and x^+, but he is clearly not encouraged to trade, because the transaction costs are high*[12]*. This is particularly true if the asset manager has a centralized trading desk and ex-ante trading costs are charged to the fund manager.*

[12]For instance, the price impact is equal to 35.1 bps for $x = 2\%$ and 138.7 bps for $x = 5\%$ when we use a two-regime model with the following parameters: $\sigma = 20\%$, $\varphi_1 = 1$, $\gamma_1 = 1/2$, $\gamma_2 = 3/2$ and $\tilde{x} = 1\%$.

3 Asset liquidity measures

Since liquidity is a multi-faceted concept, we must use several measures in order to encompass the different dimensions (Roncalli, 2020, page 347). If we focus on asset liquidity, we generally distinguish two types of measurement. The first category assesses the liquidity risk profile and includes the liquidation ratio, the time to liquidation and the liquidation shortfall. The second category concerns liquidity costs such as transaction costs and effective costs. The main difference between the two categories is that the first one focuses on the volume, while the second one mixes both volume and price dimensions.

3.1 Redemption scenario

In Roncalli *et al.* (2020), we have developed several methods and tools in order to define a redemption shock $\mathcal{R}$ for a given investment fund. This redemption shock is expressed as a percentage of the fund's total net asset TNA. Therefore, we can deduce the stress liability outflow:

$$\mathcal{F}^{-}(t) := \mathbb{R} = \mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA}(t)$$

The asset structure of the fund is given by the vector $\omega = (\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_n)$ where ω_i is the number of shares of security i and n is the number of assets that make up the asset portfolio. By construction, we have:

$$\text{TNA}(t) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i \cdot P_i(t)$$

where $P_i(t)$ is the current price of security i. The redemption shock $\mathcal{R}$ must be translated into the redemption scenario $q = (q_1, \ldots, q_n)$, where q_i is the number of shares of security i that must be sold. After the sell order, we must have the following equality[13]:

$$\text{TNA}(t^+) := \text{TNA}(t) - \mathcal{F}^{-}(t) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (\omega_i - q_i) \cdot P_i(t) \tag{20}$$

where t^+ means $t + \mathrm{d}t$ and $\mathrm{d}t$ is a small time step. Generally, we assume that the portfolio composition remains the same, meaning that:

$$\frac{q_i \cdot P_i(t)}{q_j \cdot P_j(t)} = \frac{\omega_i \cdot P_i(t)}{\omega_j \cdot P_j(t)}$$

It follows that the solution is simple and is equal to the proportional rule:

$$q_i = \mathcal{R} \cdot \omega_i \tag{21}$$

It is called the vertical slicing approach (or pro-rata liquidation). Nevertheless, since $\omega_i - q_i$ must be a natural number, q_i must also be a natural number. Therefore, due to round-off errors, the final redemption shock may not match the proportional rule.

Remark 11 *In Section 4.3 on page 152, we discuss the construction of the redemption scenario in more detail, in particular how to manage the distortion of the portfolio allocation weights.*

[13] We notice that the dollar value of the redemption is equal to $\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i \cdot P_i(t)$.

3.2 Liquidity risk profile

We first consider volume-related liquidity measures. One of the most popular measures is the liquidation ratio $\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$, which measures the proportion of a portfolio q that can be liquidated after h trading days. This statistic depends on the size of each exposure q_i and the liquidation policy, which is defined by the trading limit q_i^+. Another interesting statistic is the liquidation time (or time to liquidation) $\mathcal{LT}(q;p)$, which is the inverse function of the liquidity ratio. It indicates the number of required trading days in order to liquidate a proportion p of the portfolio.

3.2.1 Liquidation ratio

For each security that makes up the portfolio, we recall that q_i^+ denotes the maximum number of shares that can be sold during a trading day for the asset i. The number of shares $q_i(h)$ liquidated after h trading days is defined as follows:

$$q_i(h) = \min\left(\left(q_i - \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} q_i(k)\right)^+, q_i^+\right) \tag{22}$$

where $q_i(0) = 0$. The liquidation ratio $\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$ is then the proportion of the redemption scenario q that is liquidated after h trading days:

$$\mathcal{LR}(q;h) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{k=1}^h q_i(k) \cdot P_i}{\sum_{i=1}^n q_i \cdot P_i} \tag{23}$$

By definition, $\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$ is between 0 and 1. For instance, $\mathcal{LR}(q;1) = 50\%$ means that we can fulfill 50% of the redemption on the first trading day, $\mathcal{LR}(q;5) = 80\%$ means that we can fulfill 80% of the redemption after five trading days, etc.

We consider a portfolio, which is made up of 5 assets. The redemption scenario is defined below by the number of shares q_i that have to be sold:

Asset	1	2	3	4	5
q_i	4 351	2 005	755	175	18
q_i^+	1 000	1 000	200	200	200
P_i	89	102	67	119	589

We also indicate the trading limit q_i^+ and the current price P_i of each asset. In Table 4, we report the number of liquidated shares $q_i(h)$ and the liquidation ratio $\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$. After the first trading day, we have liquidated 1 000 shares of Asset #1 because of the trading policy that imposes a trading limit of 1 000. We notice that we need 5 trading days in order to sell 4 351 shares of Asset #1. If we consider the liquidation ratio, we obtain $\mathcal{LR}(q;1) = 35\%$, $\mathcal{LR}(q;2) = 65.34\%$, etc.

Remark 12 *The liquidation period* $h^+ = \inf\{h : \mathcal{LR}(q;h) = 1\}$ *indicates how many trading days we need to liquidate the redemption scenario* q*. In the previous example,* h^+ *is equal to* 5*, meaning that the liquidation of this redemption scenario requires five trading days.*

We can break down the liquidation ratio as follows:

$$\mathcal{LR}(q;h) = \frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^n q_i \cdot P_i} \sum_{k=1}^h \sum_{i=1}^n \mathcal{LA}_{i,k}(q)$$

Table 4: Number of liquidated shares $q_i(h)$

h	Asset #1	Asset #2	Asset #3	Asset #4	Asset #5	$\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$
1	1 000	1 000	200	175	18	35.00%
2	1 000	1 000	200	0	0	65.34%
3	1 000	5	200	0	0	80.61%
4	1 000	0	155	0	0	95.36%
5	351	0	0	0	0	100.00%
Total	4 351	2 005	755	175	18	

where $\mathcal{LA}_{i,k}(q) = q_i(k) \cdot P_i$ is the liquidation amount for security i and trading day k. It follows that:

$$\mathcal{LR}(q;h) = \sum_{k=1}^{h}\sum_{i=1}^{n}\mathcal{LC}_{i,k}(q) = \sum_{k=1}^{h}\mathcal{LC}_k(q)$$

where $\mathcal{LC}_{i,k}(q)$ is the liquidation contribution for security i and trading day k:

$$\mathcal{LC}_{i,k}(q) = \frac{\mathcal{LA}_{i,k}(q)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i \cdot P_i}$$

and $\mathcal{LC}_k(q) = \sum_{i=1}^{n}\mathcal{LC}_{i,k}(q)$ is the liquidation contribution for trading day k. Another useful decomposition is to consider the break-down by security:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{LR}(q;h) &= \sum_{i=1}^{n}\frac{q_i \cdot P_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i \cdot P_i}\frac{\sum_{k=1}^{h}\mathcal{LA}_{i,k}(q)}{q_i \cdot P_i} \\
&= \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i \cdot \mathcal{LR}(q_i;h) \\
&= \sum_{i=1}^{n}\mathcal{LC}_i(q;h)
\end{aligned}$$

where w_i is the relative weight of security i in portfolio q and $\mathcal{LR}(q_i;h)$ is the liquidation ratio applied to the selling order q_i:

$$\mathcal{LR}(q_i;h) = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{h}\mathcal{LA}_{i,k}(q)}{q_i \cdot P_i}$$

$\mathcal{LC}_i(q;h) = w_i \cdot \mathcal{LR}(q_i;h)$ is the liquidation contribution of asset i.

We consider the previous example. Table 5 shows the values taken by the liquidation contribution $\mathcal{LC}_{i,h}(q)$. For instance, $\mathcal{LC}_{1,2}(q) = 15.14\%$ means that the liquidation of 1 000 shares of the second asset during the first trading day represents 15.14% of the redemption scenario. The sum of each row h corresponds to the liquidation contribution $\mathcal{LC}_h(q)$. For instance, we have $13.21\% + 15.14\% + 1.99\% + 3.09\% + 1.57\% = 35.00\%$. The sum of each column corresponds to the weights w_i because we have[14] $w_i = \sum_{k=1}^{h^+}\mathcal{LC}_{i,k}(q)$. The weights w_i and the liquidation ratios $\mathcal{LR}(q_i;h)$ are given in Table 6. We observe that the

[14]This result comes from the following identity:

$$\sum_{k=1}^{h^+}\mathcal{LC}_{i,k}(q) = \sum_{k=1}^{h^+}\frac{\mathcal{LA}_{i,k}(q)}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} q_j \cdot P_j} = \sum_{k=1}^{h^+}\frac{q_i(k) \cdot P_i}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} q_j \cdot P_j} = \frac{q_i \cdot P_i}{\sum_{j=1}^{n} q_j \cdot P_j} = w_i$$

Table 5: Liquidation contribution $\mathcal{LC}_{i,h}(q)$ by trading day

h	Asset #1	Asset #2	Asset #3	Asset #4	Asset #5	$\mathcal{LC}_h(q)$
1	13.21%	15.14%	1.99%	3.09%	1.57%	35.00%
2	13.21%	15.14%	1.99%	0.00%	0.00%	30.34%
3	13.21%	0.08%	1.99%	0.00%	0.00%	15.27%
4	13.21%	0.00%	1.54%	0.00%	0.00%	14.75%
5	4.64%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	4.64%
Total	57.47%	30.35%	7.51%	3.09%	1.57%	100.00%

Table 6: Weight w_i and liquidation ratio $\mathcal{LR}(q_i;h)$ of the assets

	Asset #1	Asset #2	Asset #3	Asset #4	Asset #5
$\mathcal{LR}(q_i;1)$	22.98%	49.88%	26.49%	100.00%	100.00%
$\mathcal{LR}(q_i;2)$	45.97%	99.75%	52.98%	100.00%	100.00%
$\mathcal{LR}(q_i;3)$	68.95%	100.00%	79.47%	100.00%	100.00%
$\mathcal{LR}(q_i;4)$	91.93%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
$\mathcal{LR}(q_i;5)$	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
w_i	57.47%	30.35%	7.51%	3.09%	1.57%

Table 7: Liquidation contribution $\mathcal{LC}_i(q;h)$ by asset

h	Asset #1	Asset #2	Asset #3	Asset #4	Asset #5	$\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$
1	13.21%	15.14%	1.99%	3.09%	1.57%	35.00%
2	26.42%	30.28%	3.98%	3.09%	1.57%	65.34%
3	39.63%	30.35%	5.97%	3.09%	1.57%	80.61%
4	52.84%	30.35%	7.51%	3.09%	1.57%	95.36%
5	57.47%	30.35%	7.51%	3.09%	1.57%	100.00%

assets are respectively liquidated in five, three, three, four, one and one trading days. If we multiply the weights w_i by the liquidation ratios $\mathcal{LR}(q_i;h)$, we obtain the liquidation contribution $\mathcal{LC}_i(q;h)$ by asset. If we sum the elements of each row, we obtain the liquidity ratio $\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$.

As explained by Roncalli and Weisang (2015a), the liquidation ratio will depend on three factors: the liquidity of the portfolio to sell, the amount to sell and the liquidation policy. They illustrated the impact of these factors using several index portfolios. For instance, we report in Figure 7 the example of the EUROSTOXX 50 index portfolio. We notice that the liquidation ratio is different if we consider a selling order of \$1, \$10 or \$50 bn. It is also different if the trading limit is equal to 10% or 30% of the average daily volume[15] (ADV). In Figure 8, we compare the liquidation ratio for different index portfolios when the trading limit is set to 10% of ADV. We notice that the liquidity profile is better for the S&P 500 Index and a size of \$50 bn than for the EUROSTOXX 50 Index and a size of \$10 bn. We also observe that liquidating \$1 bn of the MSCI INDIA Index is approximately equivalent to liquidating \$10 bn of the EUROSTOXX 50 Index. Of course, these results may differ from one period to another, because the liquidity is time-varying. Nevertheless, we observe that the liquidity of the portfolio is different depending on whether we consider small cap stocks or large cap stocks. The liquidity ratio also decreases with the amount to sell. Finally, the liquidity ratio also depends on the trading constraints or the liquidation policy.

[15] Roncalli and Weisang (2015a) used the three-month average daily volume computed by Bloomberg.

Figure 7: Liquidation ratio (in %) of the EUROSTOX 50 index portfolio



Source: Roncalli and Weisang (2015a, Figure 15, page 50), data as of April 30, 2015.

Figure 8: Comparing the liquidation ratio (in %) between equity index portfolios



Source: Roncalli and Weisang (2015a, Figure 5, page 28), data as of April 30, 2015.

3.2.2 Time to liquidation

The liquidation time is the inverse function of the liquidation ratio:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{LT}(q;p) &= \mathcal{LR}^{-1}(q;p)\\ &= \inf\{h : \mathcal{LR}(q;h) \geq p\}\end{aligned}$$

For instance, $\mathcal{LT}(q;75\%) = 8$ means that we need 8 trading days to fulfill 75% of the redemption. The liquidation time is a step function because $\mathcal{LT}(q;p)$ is an integer. If we consider the previous example, we have $\mathcal{LR}(q;0) = 0$, $\mathcal{LR}(q;1) = 35\%$, $\mathcal{LR}(q;2) = 65.34\%$, etc. We deduce that $\mathcal{LT}(q;p) = 0$ if $p < 35\%$, $\mathcal{LT}(q;p) = 1$ if $35\% \leq p < 65.34\%$, etc.

In Table 8, we report some figures of liquidation time that were calculated by Roncalli and Weisang (2015a). The size of the equity index portfolio is set to \$10 bn, and two liquidation policies are tested (10% and 30% of the average daily volume). In the case of the S&P 500 Index, liquidating 90% of a \$10 bn equity index portfolio takes two trading days with a trading limit of 10% of the ADV and one trading day with a trading limit of 30% of the ADV. In the case of the MSCI EMU Small Cap Index, these liquidation times becomes 74 and 25 trading days.

Table 8: Time to liquidation (size = \$10 bn)

Index	S&P 500	ES 50	DAX	NASDAQ	MSCI EM	MSCI INDIA	MSCI EMU SC
p (in %)				10% of ADV			
50	1	5	11	2	3	37	21
75	1	7	17	3	5	71	43
90	2	10	23	3	9	110	74
99	2	15	29	5	17	156	455
p (in %)				30% of ADV			
50	1	2	4	1	1	13	7
75	1	3	6	1	2	24	15
90	1	4	8	1	3	37	25
99	1	5	10	2	6	52	152

Source: Roncalli and Weisang (2015a, Tables 6 and 7, page 26), data as of April 30, 2015.

Remark 13 *The liquidation risk profile of the redemption scenario q can be defined by the function $h \mapsto \mathcal{LR}(q;h)$ or the function $p \mapsto \mathcal{LT}(q;p)$. As shown by Roncalli and Weisang (2015a), it depends on the asset liquidity, the liquidation policy and the portfolio composition.*

3.2.3 Liquidation shortfall

The liquidation shortfall $\mathcal{LS}(q)$ is defined as the remaining redemption that cannot be fulfilled after one trading day:

$$\mathcal{LS}(q) = 1 - \mathcal{LR}(q;1) \tag{24}$$

For instance, it is equal to 65% for the previous example described on page 134. The liquidation shortfall is an increasing function of the order size. An illustration is given in Figure 9 by considering three different liquidation policies.

Figure 9: Liquidation shortfall with respect to the portfolio notional



3.3 Liquidity cost

We now turn to liquidity measures that incorporate the price (or cost) dimension. Generally, we measure the liquidity cost by the transaction cost. However, in a liquidity stress testing program, this measure is merely theoretical since it is based on the transaction cost model. Therefore, it can be completed by the ex-post liquidity cost, which is also called the effective cost.

3.3.1 Transaction cost

We define the transaction cost of the redemption scenario $q = (q_1, \ldots, q_n)$ as the product of the unit costs and the dollar volumes:

$$\mathcal{TC}(q) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i \cdot P_i \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_i(x_i) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} Q_i \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_i(x_i) \tag{25}$$

where $Q_i = q_i \cdot P_i$ is the nominal volume (expressed in \$), $x_i = v_i^{-1} q_i$ is the participation rate when selling security i and $\boldsymbol{c}_i(x)$ is the unit transaction cost associated with security i. We can then break down the liquidity cost into two parts[16]:

$$\mathcal{TC}(q) = \mathcal{BAS}(q) + \mathcal{PI}(q)$$

where the bid-ask spread component is equal to:

$$\mathcal{BAS}(q) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} Q_i \cdot s_i$$

[16] We have:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i(x) = s_i + \boldsymbol{\pi}_i(x)$$

and the market impact cost is given by:

$$\mathcal{PI}(q) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} Q_i \cdot \boldsymbol{\pi}_i(x_i)$$

The previous analysis assumes that we can sell the portfolio q instantaneously or during the same day. However, Equation (25) is only valid if the volumes q_i are less than the trading limits $q_i^+ = x_i^+ \cdot v_i$. Otherwise, we have:

$$\mathcal{TC}(q) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{h=1}^{h^+} \mathbb{1}\{q_i(h) > 0\} \cdot q_i(h) \cdot P_i \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_i\left(\frac{q_i(h)}{v_i}\right) \tag{26}$$

In this case, the bid-ask spread component has the same expression, but the market impact component is different. Indeed, we have[17]:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{BAS}(q) &= \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{h=1}^{h^+} \mathbb{1}\{q_i(h) > 0\} \cdot q_i(h) \cdot P_i \cdot s_i \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^{n} Q_i \cdot s_i \end{aligned} \tag{27}$$

but:

$$\mathcal{PI}(q) = \mathcal{TC}(q) - \mathcal{BAS}(q) \neq \sum_{i=1}^{n} Q_i \cdot \boldsymbol{\pi}_i(x_i) \tag{28}$$

Remark 14 *We assume that $q_i \leq q_i^+$. We have $q_i(1) = q_i$ and $q_i(h) = 0$ for $h > 1$. We obtain:*

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{TC}(q) &= \sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i(1) \cdot P_i \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_i\left(\frac{q_i(1)}{v_i}\right) \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i \cdot P_i \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_i(x_i)\end{aligned}$$

We retrieve the expression given in Equation (25).

Remark 15 *Since the transaction cost is measured in dollars, it may be useful to express it as a percentage of the redemption value:*

$$\mathcal{TC}_r(q) = \frac{\mathcal{TC}(q)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i \cdot P_i}$$

An alternative measure is to compare the total transaction cost with the bid-ask spread component:

$$\mathcal{TC}_s(q) = \frac{\mathcal{TC}(q)}{\mathcal{BAS}(q)}$$

[17] Because of the following identity:

$$\sum_{h=1}^{h^+} \mathbb{1}\{q_i(h) > 0\} \cdot q_i(h) = q_i$$

We consider the previous example. We recall the characteristics of the redemption portfolio:

Asset	1	2	3	4	5
q_i	4 351	2 005	755	175	18
q_i^+	1 000	1 000	200	200	200
P_i (in \$)	89	102	67	119	589
$\boldsymbol{\pi}_i(x)$	SQRL model with $\varphi_1 = 1$, $\tilde{x} = 5\%$ and $x^+ = 10\%$				
σ_i (in %)	25	20	18	30	20
s_i (in bps)	4	4	5	5	5
v_i	10 000	10 000	2 000	2 000	2 000

We also indicate the transaction cost function. It is given by the SQRL model with $\varphi_1 = 1$, $\tilde{x} = 5\%$ and $x^+ = 10\%$. For each asset i, we also indicate the annualized volatility σ_i, the value of the bid-ask spread s_i and the daily volume v_i.

The value of the redemption portfolio is equal to \$673 761. The total transaction cost is equal to $\mathcal{TC}(q) = \$4\,373.55$ with the following breakdown: $\mathcal{BAS}(q) = \$277.71$ and $\mathcal{PI}(q) = \$4\,095.85$. These figures represent respectively 64.9, 4.1 and 60.8 bps of the portfolio value. We deduce that the price impact explains 93.7% of the transaction cost. The contribution of each asset is respectively equal to 34.6%, 30.5% and 16.6%, 16.0% and 2.4%. More results can be found in Tables 37–41 on page 200.

3.3.2 Implementation shortfall and effective cost

The previous analysis assumes that the transaction cost is calculated with a model. Therefore, Equation (26) defines an ex-ante transaction cost. In practice, this ex-ante transaction cost will differ from the effective transaction cost. In order to define the latter, we must reintroduce the time index t in the analysis. The current value of the redemption scenario is equal to:

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{mid}}(q) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i(t) \cdot P_i^{\text{mid}}(t)$$

where $q_i(t)$ and $P_i^{\text{mid}}(t)$ are the number of shares to sell and the mid-price for the security i at the current time t. The value of the liquidated portfolio is equal to:

$$\mathbb{V}^{\text{liquidated}}(q) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{t_k \geq t} q_i(t_k) \cdot P_i^{\text{bid}}(t_k)$$

where $q_i(t_k)$ and $P_i^{\text{bid}}(t_k)$ are the number of shares that were sold and the bid price for the security i at the execution time t_k. The effective cost is then the difference between $V^{\text{mid}}(t)$ and $V^{\text{liquidated}}(t)$:

$$\mathcal{IS}(q) = \max\left(\mathbb{V}^{\text{mid}}(q) - \mathbb{V}^{\text{liquidated}}(q), 0\right) \tag{29}$$

The effective cost[18] $\mathcal{IS}(q)$ is called by Perold (1988) the implementation shortfall, which measures the difference in price between the time a portfolio manager makes an investment decision and the actual traded price. Therefore, $\mathbb{V}^{\text{mid}}(q)$ is the benchmark price, $\mathbb{V}^{\text{liquidated}}(q)$ is the traded price and $\mathcal{IS}(q)$ is the total amount of slippage.

[18] Since $\mathbb{V}^{\text{liquidated}}(q)$ can be higher than $\mathbb{V}^{\text{mid}}(q)$, $\mathcal{IS}(q)$ is floored at zero. This situation occurs when execution times t_k are very different than the current time t and market prices have gone up — $P_i^{\text{bid}}(t_k) \geq P_i^{\text{mid}}(t)$.

4 Implementing the stress testing framework

In this section, we detail the general approach for implementing the liquidity stress testing program on the asset side. We will see that it is based on three steps. First, we have to correctly define the asset liquidity buckets (or asset liquidity classes). Each asset liquidity bucket is associated with a unique unit transaction cost function and a given liquidation policy. Second, we have to calibrate the parameters of the transaction cost function that are related to a given liquidity bucket. Third, we must define the appropriate estimation method of the security-specific parameters. Nevertheless, before presenting the three-step approach, we must understand how stress testing impacts transaction costs. Does stress testing modify the conventional transaction cost function? Does stress testing change the liquidation policy? What parameters are impacted? This analysis will help to justify the three-step approach of asset liquidity stress testing. Finally, the last part of this section is dedicated to an issue that generally occurs when implementing the LST program. This concerns the distortion of the redemption scenario on the asset side. In this article, we only present general considerations, but this issue will be extensively studied in our third article dedicated to liquidity stress testing in asset management (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021).

4.1 How does stress testing impact transaction costs?

If we consider the two-regime model, we have:

$$\boldsymbol{c}\left(\frac{q}{v}\right) = \begin{cases} s + \varphi_1 \sigma \left(\dfrac{q}{v}\right)^{\gamma_1} & \text{if } q \leq \tilde{x} \cdot v \\ s + \varphi_1 \tilde{x}^{\gamma_1 - \gamma_2} \sigma \left(\dfrac{q}{v}\right)^{\gamma_2} & \text{if } \tilde{x} \cdot v \leq q \leq x^+ \cdot v \\ +\infty & \text{if } q > x^+ \cdot v \end{cases}$$

The parameters of the transaction cost model are s, φ_1, σ, γ_1, γ_2, $\tilde{x}$ and x^+. The question is whether we need two sets of parameters:

1. $\left(s^{\text{normal}}, \varphi_1^{\text{normal}}, \sigma^{\text{normal}}, \gamma_1^{\text{normal}}, \gamma_2^{\text{normal}}, \tilde{x}^{\text{normal}}, x^{+\text{normal}}\right)$ for normal periods;
2. $\left(s^{\text{stress}}, \varphi_1^{\text{stress}}, \sigma^{\text{stress}}, \gamma_1^{\text{stress}}, \gamma_2^{\text{stress}}, \tilde{x}^{\text{stress}}, x^{+\text{stressl}}\right)$ for stress periods.

This is equivalent having two different transaction cost functions: $\boldsymbol{c}^{\text{normal}}(x)$ and $\boldsymbol{c}^{\text{stress}}(x)$. This is not satisfactory because this means that we need to calibrate many parameters in the stress period. Moreover, we do not distinguish between parameters that are related to the security and parameters that are related to the liquidity bucket. Clearly, we can assume that the parameters $(\varphi_1, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \tilde{x}, x^+)$ are the same for all the assets belonging to the same liquidity bucket. They can change, but at a low frequency, for instance because of the annual calibration exercise or a change to the liquidation policy. The other parameters s and σ are defined at the security level and can change daily[19]. Therefore, the unit transaction cost function must be written as $\boldsymbol{c}_x(x; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t})$ because $s_{i,t}$ and $\sigma_{i,t}$ change with the security and the time. We notice that this transaction cost function uses the participation ratio x, which is the ratio between the order size q and the daily volume v. However, v is another related-security parameter since it changes every day. This is not equivalent to selling 1 000 shares in the market if the daily volume is 10 000 or 20 000. It follows that the unit transaction cost function must be written as $\boldsymbol{c}_q(q; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, v_{i,t})$ because $s_{i,t}$, $\sigma_{i,t}$ and $v_{i,t}$ change with the security and the time. The q-approach to the unit transaction cost $\boldsymbol{c}(q; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, v_{i,t})$ differs then from the x-approach to the unit transaction cost $\boldsymbol{c}(x; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t})$ because it has an additional parameter, which is the daily volume.

[19] Indeed, the spread and the volatility of the security change every day because of market conditions.

Figure 10: The x-approach of the unit transaction cost



Figure 11: The q-approach of the unit transaction cost



Figure 12: Impact of security-specific parameters in the x-approach



Figure 13: Impact of security-specific parameters in the q-approach



At first sight, it seems that introducing the volume is a subtle distinction. For instance, we have reported in Figures 10 and 11 the functions $\boldsymbol{c}_x(x; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t})$ and $\boldsymbol{c}_q(q; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, v_{i,t})$ when the price impact is given by the SQRL model[20], the security-related parameters are equal to $s_{i,t} = 4$ bps, $\sigma_{i,t} = 10\%$ and $v_{i,t} = 100\,000$, and the liquidation policy is set to $x^+ = 10\%$. The two figures have exactly the same shape and we have the following correspondence:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_q(q; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, v_{i,t}) := \boldsymbol{c}_x\left(x = \frac{q}{v_{i,t}}; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}\right)$$

Let us now see the impact of changing the parameters $s_{i,t}$, $\sigma_{i,t}$ and $v_{i,t}$. In a stress period, we generally observe an increase in the bid-ask spread and the asset volatility, and a reduction in the daily volume that is traded in the market. In the top panel in Figures 12 and 13, we show the difference between the two unit transaction costs when the bid-ask spread increases from 4 bps to 7 bps. We observe that the functions $\boldsymbol{c}_x$ and $\boldsymbol{c}_q$ are both shifted up, but they are the same. In the bottom/left panel, we report the impact when the volatility in the stress period is twice the volatility in the normal period[21]. We notice that the higher volatility has shifted the trading cost upward and it has also changed the shape of the unit transaction cost function. But again, the two functions $\boldsymbol{c}_x$ and $\boldsymbol{c}_q$ are the same using the equivalence relationship $q = x \cdot v_{i,t}$. We now consider the impact of the volume. Generally, the daily volume is reduced in stress periods. In the bottom/right panel in Figures 12 and 13, we assume that the daily volume is equal to $v_{i,t} = 100\,000$ in the normal period and $v_{i,t} = 70\,000$ in the stress period. Contrary to the parameters $s_{i,t}$ and $\sigma_{i,t}$, we observe that the two functions $\boldsymbol{c}_x$ and $\boldsymbol{c}_q$ are not equivalent in this case. Indeed, $v_{i,t}$ has no impact on $\boldsymbol{c}_x$ whereas it completely changes the shape of $\boldsymbol{c}_q$ because the inflection point $\tilde{q}$ and the trading limit q^+ are different. It follows that the invariance with respect to x does not imply the invariance with respect to q.

In the case of a liquidity stress program, we have to consider the combination of the three effects. Results are reported in Figure 14. We recall that the normal period is defined by $s_{i,t} = 4$ bps, $\sigma_{i,t} = 10\%$ and $v_{i,t} = 100\,000$, while the stress period is defined by $s_{i,t} = 7$ bps, $\sigma_{i,t} = 20\%$ and $v_{i,t} = 70\,000$. During the stress period, the transaction cost is higher because the spread is larger, the volatility has shifted the trading cost upward and the lower volume has moved the inflection point to the left. This is the primary effect. For instance, selling 40 000 shares of the security costs 16.40 bps during the normal period and 38.70 bps during the stress period (see Table 9). The secondary effect is on the liquidation profile, because the trading limit q^+ expressed as a number of shares is reduced in the stress period even if the liquidation policy does not change. This is because the liquidation policy is defined in terms of the maximum participation rate x^+. For instance, 100 000 shares of the security can be sold in one trading day in the normal period. This is no longer true in the stress period, and the position is liquidated in two trading days (see Table 9). It follows that the stress testing program has a negative, non-linear impact both on the transaction cost and the liquidation profile. In Table 9, we have $\boldsymbol{c}(40\,000) = 38.70$ bps, $\boldsymbol{c}(80\,000) = 57.39$ bps and $\boldsymbol{c}(100\,000) = 53.53$ bps. We observe that $\boldsymbol{c}(q)$ is not necessarily an increasing function of q because of the liquidation policy. Indeed, in the last case, 70 000 shares are sold at 62.47 bps during the first trading day and 30 000 shares are sold at 32.68 bps during the second trading day. The relative cost of selling 100 000 shares is lower than the relative cost of selling 70 000 shares, because the price impact is not at its maximum during the second day. In Figure 30 on page 199, we report the two functions, the relative (or unit) transaction cost $\boldsymbol{c}(q)$ and the total transaction cost $\mathcal{TC}(q)$, by assuming that the price is equal to \$1. We notice that the maximum relative cost is equal to 62.47 bps and is reached when the number

[20] We assume that $\varphi_1 = 1$ and $\tilde{x} = 5\%$.

[21] The annualized volatility $\sigma_{i,t}$ increases from 10% to 20%.

Figure 14: Comparing the unit transaction cost in the normal and stress periods



of shares is a multiple of 70 000, which is the trading limit. Therefore, $\boldsymbol{c}(q)$ is not increasing because of the averaging effect. Of course, this is not the case for the total transaction cost, which is an increasing function of q.

Table 9: Computation of the unit transaction cost

	Normal	Stress	Normal	Stress	Normal	Stress	Normal	Stress
q	10 000		40 000		80 000		100 000	
$q(h)$	10 000	10 000	40 000	40 000	80 000	70 000 10 000	100 000	70 000 30 000
s	4.00	7.00	4.00	7.00	4.00	7.00 7.00	4.00	7.00 7.00
$\boldsymbol{\pi}(q(h))$	6.20	14.82	12.40	31.70	22.19	55.47 14.82	27.74	55.47 25.68
$\boldsymbol{c}(q(h))$	10.20	21.82	16.40	38.70	26.19	62.47 21.82	31.74	62.47 32.68
$\boldsymbol{c}(q)$	10.20	21.82	16.40	38.70	26.19	57.39	31.74	53.53

Remark 16 *The previous analysis shows that we do not need a new transaction cost function for the stress period, because there is no reason for the functional form to change and the impact of the security-specific parameters are sufficient to implement the asset liquidity stress testing program.*

4.2 A three-step approach

As explained above, implementing an asset liquidity stress testing program involves three steps. In the first step, we define liquidity buckets. The second step corresponds to the estimation of the transaction cost function for a given liquidity bucket. Finally, the third step consists in calibrating the security-specific parameters.

4.2.1 Liquidity bucketing

Table 10: An example of classification matrix of liquidity buckets

Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	HQLA Class
Equity	Large cap	DM	Region	1
		EM		1
	Small cap	DM	Region	2
		EM		2
	Derivatives	Futures	Turnover	1
		Options		2
	Private			5
Fixed-income	Sovereign	DM	Region	1/2
		EM		2/3
	Municipal			2
	Inflation-linked	DM	Region	1/2
		EM		2/3
	Corporate	IG	Currency	3
		HY		4
	Securitization	ABS CLO CMBS RMBS	US/Non-US	2/3/4
	Derivatives	Caps/floors Futures Options Swaps	Turnover	1/2/3
	CDS	Single-name	Turnover	3
		Multi-name		2
Currency	G10			1
	Others			1/2/3
Commodity	Agriculture	Grain & Oilseed		4
		Livestock		4
		Soft		4
	Energy	Electricity		2
		Gas		2
		Oil		2
	Metal	Gold		1
		Industrial		2/4
		Precious		2

Classification matrix A liquidity bucket is a set of homogenous securities such that they share the same functional form of the unit transaction cost[22]. For instance, we may consider that equities and bonds correspond to two liquidity buckets, meaning that we need two different functions. But we can also split equities between large cap and small cap equities.

[22] Most of the time, they also share the same liquidation policy.

An example of matrix classification is provided in Table 10. There are several levels depending on the requirements of the asset manager and the confidence level on the calibration. Generally, Level 2 is sufficiently granular and enough to implement a liquidity stress testing program. For instance, it is extensively used by external providers of LST solutions (MSCI LiquidityMetrics, Bloomberg Liquidity Assessment (LQA), StateStreet Liquidity Risk Solution, etc.). Nevertheless, the asset manager may wish to go beyond Level 2 and adopt Level 3 for some buckets. For example, it could make sense to distinguish the functional form for DM and EM sovereign bonds. Level 4 is the ultimate level and differentiates securities by region, currency or turnover[23]. For example, if we consider the DM large cap stocks, we may split this category by region, e.g., North America, Eurozone, Japan and Europe-ex-EMU. In the case of corporate IG bonds, one generally splits these securities by currency, e.g., USD IG bonds, EUR IG bonds, GBP IG bonds, etc. For derivatives, one may build two categories depending on the turnover value, e.g., the most liquid contacts and the other derivative products.

HQLA classes In this article, we focus on the transaction cost. The asset-liability management will be studied in the third part of our comprehensive research project on liquidity risk in asset management (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021). Nevertheless, we notice that the asset manager must develop two asset liquidity classification matrices: liquidity buckets and HQLA classes. The term HQLA refers to the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) introduced in the Basel III framework (BCBS, 2010, 2013a). An asset is considered to be a high-quality liquid asset if it can be easily converted into cash. Therefore, the concept of HQLA is related to asset quality and asset liquidity. It is obvious that the LST regulation is inspired by the liquidity management regulation developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. For instance, the redemption coverage ratio (RCR) for asset managers is related to the liquidity coverage ratio for banks. According to ESMA (2020), the redemption coverage ratio is "*a measurement of the ability of a fund's assets to meet funding obligations arising from the liabilities side of the balance sheet, such as a redemption shock*". In Roncalli *et al.* (2021), we will see that it is helpful to define another asset liquidity classification matrix that is complementary to the previous liquidity buckets. This new classification matrix uses HQLA classes, whose goal is to group assets by their relative liquidity risk. For instance, such asset liquidity classification matrix is already used in the US with the Rule 22e-4(b) (Roncalli *et al.*, 2020, page 5), which considers four classes: (1) highly liquid investments, (2) moderately liquid investments, (3) less liquid investments and (4) illiquid investments. Here is an example based on five HQLA classes[24]:

- Tier 1: Sovereign bonds (EUR, USD, GBP, AUD, JPY, SEK, CAD and domestic currency of the asset manager), large cap equities, specified currency pairs[25], bond futures, equity index futures, etc.

- Tier 2: Other IG sovereign bonds, municipal bonds, small cap equities, other IG currency pairs, multi-name CDS, commodity futures (energy, precious metals, non-ferrous metals), equity options, etc.

[23] The turnover is defined as "*the gross value of all new deals entered into during a given period and is measured in terms of the nominal or notional amount of the contracts. It provides a measure of market activity and can also be seen as a rough proxy for market liquidity*" (Bank for International Settlements, 2014).

[24] It is derived from the liquidity period buckets defined in the Basel III capital requirements for market risk (BCBS, 2019).

[25] They correspond to the 20 most liquid currencies: USD, EUR, JPY, GBP, AUD, CAD, CHF, MXN, CNY, NZD, RUB, HKD, SGD, TRY, KRW, SEK, ZAR, INR, NOK and BRL.

- Tier 3: IG corporate bonds, HY sovereign bonds, HY currency pairs, single-name CDS, etc.
- Tier 4: HY corporate bonds, other commodity futures, etc.
- Tier 5: Private equities, real estate, etc.

For derivatives on interest rates, we can map them with respect to sovereign bonds. For instance, interest rate swaps on EUR, USD, GBP, AUD, JPY, SEK and CAD are assigned to Tier 1, interest rate swaps on IG currencies are assigned to Tier 2, interest rate swaps on HY currencies are assigned to Tier 3, etc. For securitization products, the best approach is to classify them with respect to their external credit rating.

4.2.2 Defining the unit transaction cost function

We consider that the two-regime model is the appropriate function to estimate the transaction cost of a redemption scenario. Nevertheless, we introduce some slight modifications, because the power-law model has been mainly investigated in the stock market. These modifications are necessary when we consider fixed-income products and derivatives.

The econometric model We assume that Security i belongs the j^{th} liquidity bucket $\mathcal{LB}_j$ and rewrite the two-regime model as follows[26]:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i\left(q_i; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, v_{i,t}\right) = \beta_j^{(s)} s_{i,t} + \beta_j^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \sigma_{i,t} \boldsymbol{\pi}_j^{\star}\left(q_i; v_{i,t}\right) \tag{30}$$

where:

$$\boldsymbol{\pi}_j^{\star}\left(q_i; v_{i,t}\right) = \begin{cases} \left(\dfrac{q_i}{v_{i,t}}\right)^{\gamma_{1,j}} & \text{if } q_i \leq \tilde{q}_{i,t} \\ \left(\dfrac{\tilde{q}_{i,t}}{v_{i,t}}\right)^{\gamma_{1,j}} \left(\dfrac{q_i}{\tilde{q}_{i,t}}\right)^{\gamma_{2,j}} & \text{if } \tilde{q}_{i,t} \leq q_i \leq q_{i,t}^{+} \\ +\infty & \text{if } q_i > q_{i,t}^{+} \end{cases} \tag{31}$$

The total transaction cost of selling q_i shares is then equal to[27]:

$$\mathcal{TC}\left(q_i\right) = \alpha_i q_i + Q_i \boldsymbol{c}_i\left(q_i; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, v_{i,t}\right)$$

Compared to the conventional two-regime model, we notice the introduction of two new parameters: α_i and $\beta_j^{(s)}$. For some securities (e.g., derivatives), we have to pay a fixed cost for each share, which motivates the addition of the term $\alpha_i q_i$. The introduction of the scaling factor $\beta_j^{(s)}$ is motivated because quoted bid-ask spreads are not always available for some liquidity buckets $\mathcal{LB}_j$. In this case, we can use an empirical model for computing $s_{i,t}$. From a theoretical point of view, we should have $\beta_j^{(s)} = 1$. This is the case for equities for instance, but not necessarily the case for some fixed-income securities. The reason is that asset managers do not necessarily face the same bid-ask spread costs. Therefore, $\beta_j^{(s)}$ may be less or greater than one.

[26] We have the following relationship: $\beta_j^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} = \varphi_1$. We also recall that $\sigma_{i,t}$ corresponds to the daily volatility in the transaction cost formula.

[27] In the case of a redemption scenario $q = (q_1, \ldots, q_n)$, we obtain:

$$\mathcal{TC}\left(q\right) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{h=1}^{h^+} \mathbb{1}\left\{q_i\left(h\right) > 0\right\} \cdot \left(\alpha_i q_i\left(h\right) + q_i\left(h\right) P_i \boldsymbol{c}_i\left(q_i; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, v_{i,t}\right)\right)$$

The model parameters The calibration of the functional form consists in estimating at least four parameters: $\beta_j^{(s)}$, $\beta_j^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$, $\gamma_{1,j}$ and $\gamma_{2,j}$. We can use the method of non-linear least squares. But we generally prefer to consider a two-stage approach by first determining the exponents $\gamma_{1,j}$ and $\gamma_{2,j}$ and then running a linear regression in order to obtain the OLS estimates of $\beta_j^{(s)}$ and $\beta_j^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$.

Remark 17 *The parameters $\tilde{q}_{i,t}$ and $q_{i,t}^+$ are particular. From a theoretical point of view, they are equal to $\tilde{q}_{i,t} = \tilde{x}_j v_{i,t}$ and $q_{i,t}^+ = x_j^+ v_{i,t}$, meaning that we have two other parameters $\tilde{x}_j$ and x_j^+ that are related to $\mathcal{LB}_j$. Nevertheless, for some liquidity buckets, the asset manager may choose to define the trading limit $q_{i,t}^+$ at the security level, meaning that we have $q_{i,t}^+ = x_i^+ v_{i,t}$. For instance, if we consider the category of DM sovereign bonds, trading limits may be fixed by country and maturity. Therefore, the liquidation policy may be different if we consider 10Y US, German, French and UK government bonds. When the inflection point $\tilde{x}_j$ (or $\tilde{x}_i$) is difficult to estimate, it can be a fraction of the trading limit x_j^+ (or x_i^+). The most frequent cases are $\tilde{x}_j = x_j^+/2$ (or $\tilde{x}_i = x_i^+/2$), and $\tilde{x}_j = x_j^+$ (or $\tilde{x}_i = x_i^+$) if we prefer to consider only one regime.*

The security-specific parameters They correspond to the bid-ask spread $s_{i,t}$, the volatility $\sigma_{i,t}$ and the daily volume $v_{i,t}$. Contrary to the model parameters, these parameters[28] depend on the time t. They are the key elements of the stress testing program, since their values will differ in normal and stress regimes.

Concerning the parameter $s_{i,t}$, we can consider an average of the bid-ask spread observed during a normal period (e.g., the last month) or we can use the daily quoted bid-ask spread in the case of stocks. For some fixed-income securities (e.g., corporate bonds, securitization products, etc.), quoted bid-ask spreads are not always available. In this case, we can use a statistical model that depends on the characteristics of the security. A simple model may distinguish bid-ask spreads by credit ratings[29]. A more sophisticated model may use intrinsic bond features such as maturity, notional outstanding, coupon value, credit rating, industrial sector, etc. (Ben Slimane and de Jong, 2017; Jurksas, 2018; Feldhütter and Poulsen, 2018; Guo *et al.*, 2019).

The parameter $\sigma_{i,t}$ measures the volatility of the asset i at time t. In the normal regime, $\sigma_{i,t}$ is measured with the historical volatility. We can consider a long-term volatility using a study period of three months, or we can consider a short-term estimator such as the exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) volatility, the two-week empirical volatility or the GARCH volatility. In this last case, the volatility rapidly changes on a daily basis, and we can observe jumps in the transaction cost for the same securities from one day to the next. Therefore, we think that it is better to use a long-term estimator, in particular because the stress regime will incorporate these abnormal high-volatility regimes. For some securities, the daily volatility is not the most appropriate measure for measuring their risk. Therefore, it may be convenient to define $\sigma_{i,t}$ as a function of the security characteristics. For instance, we show in Appendix B.3 on page 196 that the main component of a corporate bond's volatility is the duration-times-spread (or DTS) of the bond[30].

The third security-specific parameter is the daily volume $v_{i,t}$. As for the volatility, we can use a short-term or a long-term measure. For instance, we can use the daily volume

[28] In some cases, they also include $\tilde{q}_{i,t}$ and $q_{i,t}^+$.

[29] In this case, we assume that the bid-ask spread decreases with the credit quality, implying that the bid-ask spread of AAA-rated bonds is less than the bid-ask spread of BBB-rated bonds. Generally, credit ratings are grouped in order to form three or four categories.

[30] See Section 5.2.3 on page 168.

of the previous day. However, there is a consensus to use a longer period and to consider the three-month average daily volume. Again, we can alternatively use a statistical model when the data of daily volumes are not available. For instance, it can be a function of the outstanding amount for bonds, the turnover for derivatives, etc.

The trading limit $q_{i,t}^+$ has a particular status because it may be either a security-specific parameter or a model parameter. When it is a security-specific parameter, the asset manager defines $q_{i,t}^+$ at a low frequency, for instance every year or when there is a market change for trading the security i. However, the most frequent case is to consider $q_{i,t}^+$ as a model parameter: $q_{i,t}^+ = x_j^+ v_{i,t}$. In this situation, the asset manager generally uses the traditional rule of thumb $x_j^+ = \mathcal{LR}_j^+$ where $\mathcal{LR}_j^+$ is the liquidation policy ratio of the liquidity bucket $\mathcal{LB}_j$. A typical value is 10% in the case of the stock market.

4.2.3 Calibration of the risk parameters in the stress regime

According to Roncalli (2020), there are three main approaches to generate a stress scenario: historical, macro-economic and probabilistic. However, in the case of asset management, the first two categories are more relevant, because asset managers do not have the same experience as banks in this domain, and data on transaction costs under stress periods are scarce. In this case, it is better to implement the probabilistic approach using the method of multiplicative factors.

As explained previously, the values of the security-specific parameters allow to distinguish the normal period and the stress period. The model parameters do not change, meaning that we use the same unit transaction cost function whatever the study period. It follows that the risk parameters are the bid-ask spread, the volatility and the volume. Therefore, asset liquidity stress testing leads to stressing the values of these three parameters.

Historical stress scenarios The underlying idea of historical stress testing is to define the triple $(s_i^{\text{stress}}, \sigma_i^{\text{stress}}, v_i^{\text{stress}})$ from the sample $\{(s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, v_{i,t}), t \in T^{\text{stress}}\}$ where T^{stress} is the stress period and then to compute the stress transaction cost function:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i^{\text{stress}}(q_i) := \boldsymbol{c}_i\left(q_i; s_i^{\text{stress}}, \sigma_i^{\text{stress}}, v_i^{\text{stress}}\right) \tag{32}$$

For instance, we can consider the empirical mean or the empirical quantile[31] at the confidence level α (e.g., $\alpha = 99\%$). Since this method seems to be very simple, we face a drawback because the triple $(s_i^{\text{stress}}, \sigma_i^{\text{stress}}, v_i^{\text{stress}})$ does not necessarily occur at the same trading day. A more coherent approach consists in computing the trading cost for all days that make up the stress period and taking the supremum:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i^{\text{stress}}(q_i) := \sup_{t \in T^{\text{stress}}} \boldsymbol{c}_i(q_i; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, v_{i,t}) \tag{33}$$

Remark 18 *An alternative approach is to implement the worst-case scenario. The underlying idea is to consider one stress period or several stress periods and to consider the worst-case value:* $s_i^{\text{wcs}} = \max_{t \in T^{\text{stress}}} s_{i,t}$, $\sigma_i^{\text{wcs}} = \max_{t \in T^{\text{stress}}} \sigma_{i,t}$ *and* $v_i^{\text{wcs}} = \min_{t \in T^{\text{stress}}} v_{i,t}$. *By construction, we verify the relationship* $\boldsymbol{c}_i^{\text{wcs}}(q_i) \geq \boldsymbol{c}_i^{\text{stress}}(q_i)$.

Remark 19 *According to ESMA (2020, page 12, §31), "historical scenarios for LST could include the 2008-2010 global financial crisis or the 2010-2012 European debt crisis".*

[31] For the volume, we consider the empirical quantile $1 - \alpha$.

Conditional stress scenarios In the case of macro-economic (or conditional) stress testing, the goal is to estimate the relationship between risk parameters and risk factors that define a stress scenario, and then deduce the stress value of these risk parameters (Roncalli, 2020, page 909). Let p_i be a parameter (s_i, σ_i or v_i). First, we consider the linear factor model:

$$p_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{m} \beta_k \mathcal{F}_{k,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \tag{34}$$

where $\varepsilon_{i,t} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \sigma_{\varepsilon_i}^2\right)$ and $(\mathcal{F}_{1,t}, \ldots, \mathcal{F}_{m,t})$ is the set of risk factors at time t. Then, the estimates $\left(\hat{\beta}_0, \hat{\beta}_1, \ldots, \hat{\beta}_m\right)$ are deduced from the method of ordinary least squares or the quantile regression. Finally, we translate the stress scenario on the risk factors $(\mathcal{F}_1^{\text{stress}}, \ldots, \mathcal{F}_m^{\text{stress}})$ into a stress scenario on the risk parameter:

$$p_i^{\text{stress}} = \hat{\beta}_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{m} \hat{\beta}_k \mathcal{F}_k^{\text{stress}} \tag{35}$$

Remark 20 *From a practical point of view, pooling the data for the same liquidity class offers a more robust basis for estimating the coefficients $(\beta_0, \beta_1, \ldots, \beta_m)$. This is why the estimation may use the panel data analysis with fixed effects instead of the classic linear regression.*

Remark 21 *Concerning risk factors, we can use those provided by the "Dodd-Frank Act stress testing" (DFAST) that was developed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2017). They concern activity, interest rates, inflation and market prices of financial assets.*

The method of multiplicative factors Conditional stress testing is the appropriate approach for dealing with hypothetical stress scenarios. Nevertheless, it is not obvious to find an empirical relationship between the risk factors $(\mathcal{F}_{1,t}, \ldots, \mathcal{F}_{m,t})$ and the risk parameters $(s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, v_{i,t})$. This is why it is better to use the method of multiplicative factors to generate hypothetical scenarios. This approach assumes that there is a relationship between the stress parameter and its normal value:

$$p_i^{\text{stress}} = m_p p_i^{\text{normal}} \tag{36}$$

where m_p is the multiplicative factor. Therefore, defining the hypothetical stress scenario is equivalent to applying the multiplicative factors to the current values of the risk parameters:

$$\left(s_i^{\text{stress}}, \sigma_i^{\text{stress}}, v_i^{\text{stress}}\right) := \left(m_s s_{i,t}, m_\sigma \sigma_{i,t}, m_v v_{i,t}\right) \tag{37}$$

In this approach, the hypothetical stress scenario is determined by the triple (m_s, m_σ, m_v).

4.3 Measuring the portfolio distortion

If we consider the proportional rule $q \propto \omega$ (vertical slicing approach), the portfolio distortion is equal to zero, but we may face high liquidation costs because of some illiquid securities. On the contrary, we can concentrate the liquidation on the most liquid securities (waterfall approach), but there is a risk of a high portfolio distortion. Therefore, we have a trade-off between the liquidation cost and the portfolio distortion.

In Appendix B.2.3 on page 195, we show that the optimal portfolio liquidation can be obtained using the following optimization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} q^\star(\lambda) &= \arg\min \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(q \mid \omega) + \lambda c(q \mid \omega) \\ &\text{s.t.} \begin{cases} \mathbf{1}_n^\top w(\omega - q) = 1 \\ w^-(\omega - q) \leq w(\omega - q) \leq w^+(\omega - q) \end{cases} \end{aligned} \tag{38}$$

where $\sigma(q \mid \omega)$ is the tracking error due to the redemption and $c(q \mid \omega)$ is the liquidation cost. The portfolio distortion is then measured by the tracking error between the portfolio before the redemption and the portfolio after the redemption. Using the optimization problem, we can find liquidation portfolios that induce a lower transaction cost than the proportional rule for the same redemption amount $\mathbb{R}$. The downside is that they also generate a tracking error. Let us illustrate this trade-off with the following example[32]:

Asset	1	2	3	4	5
ω_i	20 000	20 000	18 000	9 000	8 000
P_i (in \$)	80	100	130	120	90
σ_i (in %)	30	30	30	15	15
s_i (in bps)	10	10	10	5	5
v_i	10 000	10 000	10 000	20 000	20 000

The transaction cost function is given by the SQRL model with $\varphi_1 = 1$, $\tilde{x} = 5\%$ and $x^+ = 10\%$. In Figure 15, we report the efficient frontier of liquidation. We notice that the proportional rule implies a transaction cost of 88 bps. In order to reduce this cost, we must accept a tracking error risk. For instance, if we reduce the transaction cost to 70 bps, the liquidation has generated 22 bps of tracking error risk.

Therefore, managing the asset liquidity risk is not only a question of transaction cost, but also a question of portfolio management. Indeed, the fund manager may choose to change the portfolio allocation in a stress period by selling the most liquid assets in order to fulfill the redemptions. The fund manager may also choose to maintain an exposure on some assets in the event of a liquidity crisis. In these situations, the proportional rule is not optimal and depends on the investment constraints. For instance, the definition of the optimal liquidation policy is not the same for active managers and passive managers. This is why liquidity stress testing on the asset side is not only a top-down approach, but must also be completed by a bottom-up approach.

Remark 22 *The liquidation tracking error is the right measure for assessing the portfolio distortion in the case of an equity portfolio:*

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{D}(q \mid \omega) &= \sigma(q \mid \omega) \\ &= \sqrt{(w(\omega) - w(\omega - q))^\top \Sigma (w(\omega) - w(\omega - q))} \end{aligned}$$

where $w(\omega)$ is the vector of portfolio weights before the redemption, $w(\omega - q)$ is the vector of portfolio weights after the redemption and Σ is the covariance matrix of stock returns.

[32] The correlation matrix of asset returns is equal to:

$$\rho = \begin{pmatrix} 100\% & & & & \\ 10\% & 100\% & & & \\ 40\% & 70\% & 100\% & & \\ 50\% & 40\% & 80\% & 100\% & \\ 30\% & 30\% & 50\% & 50\% & 100\% \end{pmatrix}$$

Figure 15: Optimal portfolio liquidation



For a bond portfolio, it can be replaced by the liquidation active risk, which measures the active risk due to the redemption:

$$\mathcal{D}(q \mid \omega) = \mathcal{AR}(q \mid \omega)$$

The active risk can be measured with respect to the modified duration (MD) or the duration-times-spread (DTS). We can also use a hybrid approach by considering the average of the MD and DTS active risks:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{AR}(q \mid \omega) &= \frac{1}{2}\sum_{j=1}^{n_{\mathcal{S}ector}}\left(\sum_{i\in\mathcal{S}ector_j}(w_i(\omega-q)-w_i(\omega))\,\mathrm{MD}_i\right)^2 + \\ &\quad \frac{1}{2}\sum_{j=1}^{n_{\mathcal{S}ector}}\left(\sum_{i\in\mathcal{S}ector_j}(w_i(\omega-q)-w_i(\omega))\,\mathrm{DTS}_i\right)^2\end{aligned}$$

where $n_{\mathcal{S}ector}$ is the number of sectors, MD_i is the modified duration of Bond i and DTS_i is the duration-times-spread of Bond i.

5 Application to stock and bond markets

The accuracy of the model and the calibration is an issue. Indeed, we may wonder which accuracy we must target for a liquidity stress testing exercise, given that there are multiple unknowns in a liquidity crisis. In particular, the LST model may be different from the proprietary pre-trade model and less precise because of two main reasons. First, in a liquidity stress testing exercise, we are more interested in the global figures at the fund manager level,

the asset class level and the asset manager level, and less interested in the figures at the portfolio (or security) level. Second, the model must be simple in order to identify the stress parameters. This is why the LST market impact model used by the risk department may be less accurate than the pre-trade model used by the trading desk, because the challenges are very different. The framework presented above is not complex enough for order execution[33], but it is sufficiently flexible and accurate to give the right order of magnitude for liquidity stress testing purposes.

In our analytical framework, we recall that the backbone of the LST exercise on the asset side is given by Equations (30) and (31) on page 149, and Equation (32) on page 151:

1. for each liquidity bucket $\mathcal{LB}_j$, we have to estimate the parameters $\beta_j^{(s)}$, $\beta_j^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$, $\gamma_{1,j}$ and $\gamma_{2,j}$ of the unit transaction cost model;
2. for each security i, we have to define the bid-ask spread $s_{i,t}$, the volatility $\sigma_{i,t}$ and the daily volume $v_{i,t}$;
3. we also have to specify the inflection point $\tilde{q}_{i,t} = \tilde{x}_j v_{i,t}$:
   (a) we generally estimate $\tilde{x}_j$ at the level of the liquidity bucket;
   (b) if $\tilde{q}_{i,t} = q_{i,t}^+$, there is only one regime, implying that the parameters $\gamma_{2,j}$ and $\tilde{x}_j$ vanish;
4. we then have to specify the trading limit $q_{i,t}^+$ for each security; except for large cap equities and some sovereign bonds, we use the proportional rule $q_{i,t}^+ = x_j^+ v_{i,t}$, where x_j^+ is the maximum trading limit of the liquidity bucket $\mathcal{LB}_j$ defined by the asset manager's risk department;
5. finally, we have to specify how the three security parameters are stressed: s_i^{stress}, σ_i^{stress} and v_i^{stress}.

It is obvious that the key challenge of the LST calibration is data availability. Since the LST model may include a lot of parameters, we suggest proceeding step by step. For instance, as a first step, we may calibrate the model for all global equities. Then, we may distinguish between large cap and small cap equities. Next, we may consider an LST model region by region (e.g., US, Eurozone, UK, Japan, etc.), and so on. In the early stages, we may also use expert judgement in order to fix some parameters, for instance $\gamma_{2,j}$, $\tilde{x}_j$, etc. Some parameters are also difficult to observe. For instance, the bid-ask spread $s_{i,t}$ and the trading volume $v_{i,t}$ are not available for many bonds. This is why we use a model or an approximation formula. For example, we can replace the trading volume $v_{i,t}$ by the notional outstanding amount $\imath_i$. The volume-based participation rate $x_i = v_{i,t}^{-1} q_i$ is then replaced by the outstanding-based participation rate $y_i = \imath_i^{-1} q_i$, implying that we have to calibrate the scaling factor $\beta_j^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ in order to take into account this new parameterization. We can also use the rule $V_{i,t} = \xi \mathcal{M}_{i,t}$ where ξ is the proportionality factor between volume and outstanding amount. Moreover, the volatility parameter is not always pertinent in the case of bonds, and it may be better to use the duration-times-spread (DTS).

Remark 23 *In this section, we remove the reference to the liquidity bucket $\mathcal{LB}_j$ in order to reduce the amount of notation when it is possible. This concerns the four parameters $\beta_j^{(s)}$,*

[33] Nevertheless, Curato *et al.* (2017) tested different pre-trade order models and concluded that "*a fully satisfactory and practical model of market impact [...] seems to be still lacking*". As such, pre-trade models are not yet completely accurate, except perhaps for large cap equities.

$\beta_j^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$, $\gamma_{1,j}$ *and* $\gamma_{2,j}$. *Moreover, we consider the calibration of the single-regime model as a first step:*

$$\begin{aligned}\boldsymbol{c}_i\left(q_i; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, v_{i,t}\right) &= \beta^{(s)} s_{i,t} + \beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \sigma_{i,t} \left(\frac{q_i}{v_{i,t}}\right)^{\gamma_1} \\ &= \beta^{(s)} s_{i,t} + \beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \sigma_{i,t} x_{i,t}^{\gamma_1} \end{aligned} \tag{39}$$

The second regime is calibrated during the second step as shown in Section 5.3 on page 170. We also assume that the annualized volatility is scaled by the factor $1/\sqrt{260}$ *in order to represent a daily volatility measure. This helps to understand the magnitude of the parameter* $\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$. *By default, we can then consider that* $\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \approx 1$.

5.1 The case of stocks

5.1.1 Large cap equities

We consider the dataset described in Appendix C.1 on page 197. We filter the data in order to keep only the stocks that belong to the MSCI USA and MSCI Europe indices. For each observation i, we have the transaction cost $\boldsymbol{c}_i$, the (end-of-day) bid-ask spread s_i, the participation rate x_i and the daily volatility σ_i. We first test a highly constrained statistical model:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i = s_i + \sigma_i \sqrt{x_i} + \varepsilon_i \tag{40}$$

where $\varepsilon_i \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \sigma_\varepsilon^2\right)$. We obtain $R^2 = 53.47\%$ and $R_c^2 = 15.87\%$. Since we observe a large discrepancy between R^2 and R_c^2, we must be careful about the interpretation of the statistical models. This means that the average cost $\bar{\boldsymbol{c}}$ explains a significant part of the trading cost, implying that the dispersion of trading costs is not very large.

In order to improve the explanatory power of the transaction cost function, we consider two alternative models:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i = \beta^{(s)} s_i + \beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \sigma_i \sqrt{x_i} + \varepsilon_i \tag{41}$$

and:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i = \beta^{(s)} s_i + \beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \sigma_i x_i^{\gamma_1} + \varepsilon_i \tag{42}$$

Model (41) can be seen as a special case of Model (42) when the exponent γ_1 is set to $1/2$. Using the method of non-linear least squares, we estimate the parameters, and the results are reported in Tables 11 and 12. We notice that the assumptions $(\mathcal{H}_1)$ $\beta^{(s)} = 1$ and $(\mathcal{H}_2)$ $\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} = 1$ are both rejected. When the estimation of γ_1 is not constrained, its optimal value is equal to 0.5873, which is a little bit higher than 0.5. Nevertheless, we observe that the explanatory powers are very close for the constrained and unconstrained models. The fact that $\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ is larger for the unconstrained model (0.2970 versus 0.1898) indicates a bias in our dataset. The model tends to overfit the lowest values of x_i and not the highest value of x_i, which are certainly not sufficiently represented in the dataset.

Table 11: Non-linear least squares estimation of Model (41)

Parameter	Estimate	Stderr	t-student	p-value
$\beta^{(s)}$	1.4465	0.0014	1049.9020	0.0000
$\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$	0.1898	0.0030	62.7720	0.0000
γ_1	0.5000	0.0053	93.5817	0.0000
$R^2 = 98.41\%$		$R_c^2 = 97.12\%$		

Table 12: Non-linear least squares estimation of Model (42)

Parameter	Estimate	Stderr	t-student	p-value
$\beta^{(s)}$	1.4468	0.0012	1213.2593	0.0000
$\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$	0.2970	0.0039	76.0394	0.0000
γ_1	0.5873	0.0044	132.7093	0.0000
$R^2 = 98.81\%$		$R_c^2 = 97.84\%$		

Figure 16: Histogram of estimated parameters



Table 13: Descriptive statistics of the estimates

Parameter	Mean	Median	Min.	$Q\,(10\%)$	$Q\,(25\%)$	$Q\,(75\%)$	$Q\,(90\%)$	Max.
$\beta^{(s)}$	1.256	1.234	0.992	1.001	1.082	1.443	1.487	1.558
$\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$	0.434	0.448	−0.209	0.330	0.391	0.500	0.510	0.527
γ_1	0.531	0.525	0.368	0.446	0.488	0.563	0.597	1.676
R_c^2	0.557	0.681	0.000	0.000	0.094	0.916	0.961	0.992

The figures taken by R^2 and R_c^2 are extremely high and not realistic. This confirms that there is a bias in our dataset. To better understand this issue, we estimate Model (42) for each stock. Results are reported in Figure 16 and Table 13. On average, R_c^2 is equal to 55.7%, which is far from the previous result. We observe that the model presents a high explanatory power for some stocks and a low explanatory power for other stocks (bottom/right panel in Figure 16). These results highlight the heterogeneity of the database. Therefore, estimating a transaction cost model is not easy when mixing small and large values of transaction costs and participation rates. Finally, we propose the following benchmark formula for the transaction cost model:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i\left(q_i; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, v_{i,t}\right) = 1.25 \cdot s_{i,t} + 0.40 \cdot \sigma_{i,t}\sqrt{x_{i,t}} \tag{43}$$

The price impact of this function is reported in Figure 17 in the case where the annualized volatility of the stock return is equal to 30%.

Figure 17: Estimated price impact (in bps)



Remark 24 *We notice sensitivity of the results when we filter the data with respect to the participation rate. For instance, we obtain:*

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i\left(q_i; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, v_{i,t}\right) = 1.51 \cdot s_{i,t} + 0.56 \cdot \sigma_{i,t} x_{i,t}^{0.78}$$

when we only consider the observations with a participation rate larger than 0.5%.

5.1.2 Small cap equities

In this analysis, we consider all the stocks that belong to the MSCI USA, MSCI Europe, MSCI USA Small Cap and MSCI Europe Small cap indices. This means that the dataset

Figure 18: Relationship between the market capitalization and the parameter $\beta^{(s)}$



Figure 19: Relationship between the market capitalization and the parameter $\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$



Figure 20: Ratio of the parameters $\beta^{(s)}$ and $\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ with respect to the values of the large cap class



corresponds to large cap and small cap stocks. We run the linear regression (41) for the different stocks and estimate the parameters $\beta^{(s)}$ and $\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$. In Figures 18 and 19, we report the scatterplot between the market capitalization[34] and these parameters. On average, the estimate of $\beta^{(s)}$ is higher when the market capitalization is low than when the market capitalization is high. In a similar way, we observe more dispersion of the estimate $\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ for small cap stocks. In order to verify that small cap stocks are riskier than large cap stocks, we split the stock universe into three buckets according to market capitalization[35]. In Figure 20, we plot the ratio of the estimates $\beta^{(s)}$ and $\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ with the values obtained for the large cap class. We notice that the two parameters are larger for small cap stocks, especially if we consider the 99% quantile. To take into account this additional risk, we propose the following benchmark formula for small cap stocks:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i\left(q_i; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, v_{i,t}\right) = 1.40 \cdot s_{i,t} + 0.50 \cdot \sigma_{i,t}\sqrt{x_{i,t}} \tag{44}$$

If we compare this function with Equation (43), we notice that the parameter $\beta^{(s)}$ is equal to 1.40 instead of 1.25, implying an additional fixed transaction cost of +12% for small cap stocks. For the parameter $\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$, the value is equal to 0.50 instead of 0.40, implying that the price impact is 25% higher for small cap stocks.

Remark 25 *A conservative approach consists in using the highest values of $\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$. For instance, we can define $\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} = 0.50$ for large cap stocks and $\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} = 0.75$ for small cap stocks. In this case, the price impact is 50% higher for small cap stocks.*

[34] In order to obtain an easy-to-read graph, the x-axis corresponds to the logarithm of the market capitalization, which is expressed in billions of US dollars.

[35] We use the following classification: +\$10 bn for large caps, \$2 – \$10 bn for mid caps and −\$2 bn for small caps.

5.2 The case of bonds

5.2.1 Defining the participation rate

The key variable of the transaction cost formula is the participation rate:

$$x = \frac{q}{v} = \frac{Q}{V}$$

where q is the number of shares to trade and v is the daily trading volume (expressed in number of shares). We can also formulate the participation rate with the nominal values Q and V expressed in USD or EUR. In the case of bonds, the daily trading volume is not observed. Moreover, this statistic is not always relevant because some bonds are traded infrequently. To illustrate this phenomenon, we can use the zero-trading days statistic, which is defined as the ratio between the number of days with zero trades and the total number of trading days within the period. For instance, Hotchkiss and Jostova (2017) report that 79.4% of US IG bonds and 84.1% of US HY bonds are not traded monthly between January 1995 to December 1999. Dick-Nielsen *et al.* (2012) find that the median number of zero-trading days was equal to 60.7% on a quarterly basis from Q4 2004 to Q2 2009 in the US corporate bond market.

The turnover is a measure related to the trading volume. It is the ratio between the nominal trading volume V and the market capitalization $\mathcal{M}$ of the security, or between the trading volume v and the number of issued shares[36] n:

$$\tau = \frac{V}{\mathcal{M}} = \frac{v}{n}$$

In the case of bonds, $\mathcal{M}$ and n correspond to the outstanding amount and the number of issued bonds. It follows that $V = \tau\mathcal{M}$ and:

$$x = \frac{Q}{\tau\mathcal{M}} = \frac{q}{\tau n}$$

We deduce that the volume-based participation rate x is related to the outstanding-based participation rate y:

$$y = \frac{q}{n}$$

The scaling factor between y and x is then exactly equal to the daily turnover ratio τ.

According to SIFMA (2021a), the daily turnover ratio is equal to 0.36% for US corporate bonds in 2019. This figure is relatively stable since it is in the range $0.30\% - 0.36\%$ between 2005 and 2019, except in 2008 where we observe a turnover of 0.26%. However, it was highest before 2005. For instance, it was equal to 0.44% in 2002. If we make the distinction between IG and HY bonds, it seems that the turnover ratio is greater for the latter. For instance, we obtain a turnover ratio of 0.27% for US IG bonds and 0.65% for HY bonds. In the case of US treasury securities, the five-year average daily turnover figure is 4.6% for bills, 1.2% for TIPS and 3.5% for notes and bonds (SIFMA, 2021b).

In the case of European bonds, statistics are only available for government bonds. We can classify the countries into three categories (AFME, 2020):

- The daily turnover ratio is above 1% and close to 1.5% for Germany, Spain and UK.
- The daily turnover ratio is between 0.5% and 1.0% for Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and Portugal.

[36] The market capitalization is equal to the number of shares times the price: $\mathcal{M} = nP$.

- The daily turnover ratio is lower than 0.5% for Denmark and Greece.

These different figures show that the turnover ratio cannot be considered as constant. Therefore, the single-regime transaction cost function becomes:

$$\begin{aligned}\boldsymbol{c}_i\left(q_i; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, v_{i,t}\right) &= \beta^{(s)} s_{i,t} + \beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \sigma_{i,t} \left(\frac{q_i}{\boldsymbol{\tau}_{i,t} n_i}\right)^{\gamma_1} \\ &= \beta^{(s)} s_{i,t} + \beta_{i,t}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \sigma_{i,t} y_i^{\gamma_1} \end{aligned} \tag{45}$$

where $y_i = n_i^{-1} q_i$ is the outstanding-based participation rate and $\beta_{i,t}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ is the scaling factor of the price impact:

$$\beta_{i,t}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} = \frac{\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}}{\boldsymbol{\tau}_{i,t}^{\gamma_1}} \tag{46}$$

Since the turnover ratio is time-varying and depends on the security, it follows that $\beta_{i,t}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ depends on the time t and the security i. Equation (45) for bonds is then less attractive than Equation (39) for equities. However, we can make two assumptions:

1. the turnover ratio $\boldsymbol{\tau}_{i,t}$ is stable on long-run periods;
2. the turnover ratio $\boldsymbol{\tau}_{i,t}$ computed at the security level is not representative of its trading activity.

We notice that turnover ratios are generally computed for a group of bonds, for instance all German government bonds or all US corporate IG bonds. The reason lies again in the fact that the daily turnover of a given bond may be equal to zero very often because of the zero-trading days effect. Nevertheless, if one bond is not traded at all for a given period (e.g., a day or a week), it does not mean that it is perfectly illiquid during this period. This may be due to a very low supply or demand during this period. In a bullish market, if no investors want to sell some bonds because there is strong demand and low supply, these investors are rational to keep their bonds. Since buy-and-hold strategies dominate in bond markets, trading a bond is a signal that the bond is not priced fairly. In this framework, the fundamental price of a bond must change in order to observe a trading activity on this bond. The situation in the stock market is different because the computation of the fair price uses a more short-term window and buy-and-hold strategies do not dominate.

Therefore, we can assume that the turnover ratio is equal for the same family of bonds, implying that:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i\left(q_i; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, n_i\right) = \beta^{(s)} s_{i,t} + \tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \sigma_{i,t} y_i^{\gamma_1} \tag{47}$$

This equation is similar to Equation (39) for equities. Nevertheless, there is a difference between the two scaling coefficients $\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ and $\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$. The last one is more sensitive because we have:

$$\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} = \frac{\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}}{\boldsymbol{\tau}^{\gamma_1}}$$

The underlying idea is then to consider more granular liquidity buckets $\mathcal{LB}_j$ for the bond asset class than the equity asset class in order to be sure that the securities belonging to the same liquidity bucket have a similar turnover ratio $\boldsymbol{\tau}$. In Figure 21, we report the relationship between $\boldsymbol{\tau}$ and $\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ for several values of the exponent γ_1. When γ_1 is low, the impact of $\boldsymbol{\tau}$ on $\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ is very low, meaning that we can consider $\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ as a constant. However, when γ_1 is high (greater than 0.25), the turnover may have a high impact and $\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ cannot be assumed to be a constant. In the first case, the estimation of $\beta^{(s)}$ and $\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ is robust. In the second case, the estimation of $\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ only makes sense if the turnover is comparable between the securities of the liquidity bucket $\mathcal{LB}_j$.

Figure 21: Relationship between the turnover $\boldsymbol{\tau}$ and the scaling factor $\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$



Remark 26 *In Table 14, we report the values of the outstanding-based participation rate with respect to the volume-based participation rate x and the daily turnover τ. For example, if $x = 30\%$ and $\tau = 4\%$, we obtain a participation rate of 1.2%. While volume-based participation rates are expressed in %, we conclude that outstanding-based participation rates are better expressed in bps.*

Table 14: Outstanding-based participation rate (in bps) with respect to x and τ

τ	x (in %)								
(in %)	0.01	0.05	0.10	0.50	1	5	10	20	30
0.5	0.005	0.025	0.05	0.25	0.5	2.5	5	10	15
1.0	0.010	0.050	0.10	0.50	1.0	5.0	10	20	30
2.0	0.020	0.100	0.20	1.00	2.0	10.0	20	40	60
4.0	0.040	0.200	0.40	2.00	4.0	20.0	40	80	120

5.2.2 Sovereign bonds

We consider a dataset of sovereign bond trades, whose description is given in Appendix C.2 on page 197. For each observation i, we have the transaction cost $\boldsymbol{c}_i$, the spread s_i, the outstanding-based participation rate y_i and the daily volatility σ_i. We run a two-stage regression model:

$$\begin{cases} \ln(\boldsymbol{c}_i - s_i) - \ln \sigma_i = c_\gamma + \gamma_1 \ln y_i + u_i & \text{if } \boldsymbol{c}_i > s_i \\ \boldsymbol{c}_i = c_\beta + \beta^{(s)} s_i + \mathcal{D}_i^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \sigma_i y_i^{\gamma_1} + v_i \end{cases} \tag{48}$$

Table 15: Two-stage estimation of the sovereign bond transaction cost model

Parameter	Estimate	Stderr	t-student	p-value
c_γ	0.3004	0.0500	6.0096	0.0000
γ_1	0.2037	0.0046	44.6050	0.0000
c_β	0.0002	0.0000	15.7270	0.0000
$\beta^{(s)}$	0.9099	0.0109	83.3412	0.0000
$\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$	2.1521	0.0153	140.6059	0.0000
$R^2 = 39.87\%$		$R_c^2 = 28.94\%$		

where c_γ and c_β are two intercepts, and u_i and v_i are two residuals. Since the transaction cost can be lower than the bid-ask spread[37], we introduce the dummy variable $\mathcal{D}_i^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} = \mathbb{1}\{\boldsymbol{c}_i > s_i\}$. We estimate the exponent γ_1 using the first linear regression model. Then, we estimate the parameters $\beta^{(s)}$ and $\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ using the second linear regression by considering the OLS estimate of γ_1. Results are given in Table 15. We obtain $\gamma_1 = 0.2037 \ll 0.5$, which is lower than the standard value for equities. We also obtain $\beta^{(s)} = 0.9099$ and $\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} = 2.1521$. Curiously, the value of $\beta^{(s)}$ is less than one. One possible explanation is that we use trades from a big asset manager that may have a power to negotiate and the capacity to trade inside the bid-ask spreads when the participation rate is low. Nevertheless, the explanatory power of the model is relatively good. Indeed, we obtain $R^2 = 39.87\%$ and $R_c^2 = 28.94\%$.

Another approach for calibrating the model is to consider a grid-search process. In this case, we estimate the linear regression:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i = c_\beta + \beta^{(s)} s_i + \mathcal{D}_i^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \sigma_i y_i^{\gamma_1} + v_i$$

by considering several values of γ_1. The optimal model corresponds then to the linear regression that maximizes the coefficient of determination R_c^2. Figure 22 illustrates the grid search process. The optimal solution is reached for $\gamma_1 = 0.0925$, and we obtain the results given in Table 16. The explanatory power is close to the one calibrated with the two-stage approach (30.56% versus 28.94%). However, the two calibrated models differ if we compare the parameters γ_1 and $\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$. In order to understand the differences, we draw the estimated price impact function in Figure 23 when the annualized volatility of the sovereign bond is equal to 4.36%, which is the median volatility of our dataset. We conclude that the two estimated functions are in fact very close[38].

Table 16: Grid-search estimation of the sovereign bond transaction cost model

Parameter	Estimate	Stderr	t-student	p-value
γ_1	0.0925			
c_β	0.0000	0.0000	0.9309	0.3519
$\beta^{(s)}$	0.9556	0.0107	89.4426	0.0000
$\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$	0.8482	0.0057	149.2147	0.0000
$R^2 = 41.24\%$		$R_c^2 = 30.56\%$		

[37] We recall that the bond market is not an electronic market. Bid-ask spreads are generally declarative and not computed with quoted bid and ask prices.

[38] See Figure 31 on page 201 for a logarithmic scale. We note that the grid-search estimate is more conservative for very low participation rates.

Figure 22: Parameter estimation using the grid-search approach



Figure 23: Estimated price impact (in bps)



Figure 24: Estimated price impact (in bps) with respect to the volume-based participation rate



In order to better understand the transaction cost function, we consider the parameterization with respect to the volume-based participation rate by using the following relationship:

$$x = \frac{y}{\boldsymbol{\tau}}$$

Results are given in Figure 24 for different assumptions of the daily turnover $\boldsymbol{\tau}$. Again, it is very difficult to prefer one of the two estimated models. Therefore, we perform an implicit analysis. Using the estimates of the parameters, we can compute the implied scaling factor:

$$\hat{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} = \boldsymbol{\tau}^{\gamma_1} \tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$$

for a given value of the daily turnover. We can also compute the implied turnover:

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\tau}} = \left(\frac{\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}}{\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\gamma_1}}$$

for a given scaling factor $\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$. If we analyze the results reported in Table 17, it is obvious that the two-stage estimated model is more realistic than the grid-search estimated model. Indeed, when $\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ is set to 0.80, the implicit turnover $\hat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}$ is respectively equal to 0.78% and 53.13%. This second figure is not realistic if we compare it to the empirical statistics of daily turnover.

The previous model can be easily improved by considering more liquidity buckets. For instance, if we calibrate[39] the model by issuer or currency, we obtain the results reported in Tables 18 and 19. We observe that $\gamma_1 \in [0.05, 0.29]$. We also notice that $\beta^{(s)} < 1$ in most cases, except for Italy, Spain and the US. Moreover, we observe a large dispersion of the parameter $\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$. In a similar way, we can propose a parameterization of $\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$:

$$\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} = f\left(\mathcal{F}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{F}_m\right)$$

[39] We use the two-stage estimation approach.

Table 17: Implicit analysis

$\beta^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$		0.40	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10
$\hat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}$ (in %)	Two-stage	0.03	0.08	0.19	0.40	0.78	1.38	2.32	3.71
	Grid-search	0.03	0.33	2.37	12.54	53.13	189.81	592.91	1661.42
$\boldsymbol{\tau}$ (in %)		0.40	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.50
$\hat{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$	Two-stage	0.70	0.73	0.76	0.78	0.80	0.82	0.84	0.91
	Grid-search	0.51	0.52	0.53	0.54	0.54	0.55	0.55	0.58

where $\{\mathcal{F}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{F}_m\}$ are a set of bond characteristics (Ben Slimane and de Jong, 2017). For instance, if we assume that the parameters γ_1 and $\beta^{(s)}$ are the same for all the bonds, we observe that $\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ is an increasing function of the credit spread, the duration and the issue date (or the age of the bond).

Table 18: Two-stage estimation of the sovereign bond transaction cost model by issuer

Issuer	γ_1	c_β	$\beta^{(s)}$	$\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$	R^2 (in %)	R_c^2 (in %)
Austria	0.2255	−0.0002	0.8599	3.1385	54.1	48.4
Belgium	0.2482	−0.0000	0.8097	3.3974	44.0	32.5
EM	0.0519	0.0010	0.6828	0.4473	74.9	47.4
Finland	0.2894	0.0000	0.7002	4.0287	46.3	31.8
France	0.2138	0.0000	0.8794	3.0087	40.1	29.7
Germany	0.2415	0.0001	0.9811	2.7007	51.6	38.7
Ireland	0.2098	0.0001	0.5403	2.4097	43.9	26.7
Italy	0.1744	−0.0004	2.7385	1.9030	31.3	22.3
Japan	0.0657	0.0001	0.4700	0.6407	79.5	56.4
Netherlands	0.2320	−0.0000	0.7640	3.7709	46.9	34.2
Portugal	0.2318	0.0001	0.9250	3.0248	49.6	33.0
Spain	0.2185	0.0000	1.2547	2.0758	40.9	26.7
United Kingdom	0.2194	0.0003	0.6837	2.3367	51.2	30.3
USA	0.1252	0.0001	1.0626	1.2866	53.8	40.9

Table 19: Two-stage estimation of the sovereign bond transaction cost model by currency

Currency	γ_1	c_β	$\beta^{(s)}$	$\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$	R^2 (in %)	R_c^2 (in %)
EUR	0.2262	0.0000	1.0233	2.9122	35.2	25.7
GBP	0.2117	0.0002	1.3602	2.0878	48.8	30.2
JPY	0.0834	0.0001	0.4811	0.8553	75.6	50.9
USD	0.1408	0.0004	0.8430	1.0121	61.5	46.9

Remark 27 *If we perform the linear regression without the intercept c_β, we obtain the results reported in Tables 42 and 43 on page 201. We notice that the impact on the coefficients $\beta^{(s)}$ and $\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$ is weak.*

The choice of the value of γ_1 is not obvious. Finally, we decide to fix its value at 0.25. Based on the results given in Table 20, $\beta^{(s)} = 1.00$ seems to be a good choice. If we consider the results given in Tables 42 and 43, $\beta^{(s)} = 1.25$ is more appropriate. We have used end-of-day bid-ask spreads, which are generally lower than intra-day bisk-ask spreads. Therefore,

Table 20: Estimation of the sovereign bond transaction cost model when γ_1 is set to 0.25

Parameter	Estimate	Stderr	t-student	p-value
γ_1	0.2500			
$\beta^{(s)}$	1.0068	0.0103	97.9041	0.0000
$\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$	3.1365	0.0214	146.6939	0.0000
$R^2 = 38.35\%$		$R_c^2 = 27.15\%$		

to reflect this risk, it may be more prudent to assume that $\beta^{(s)} = 1.25$. Finally, we propose the following benchmark formula for computing the transaction cost for sovereign bonds:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i\left(q_i; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, n_i\right) = 1.25 \cdot s_{i,t} + 3.00 \cdot \sigma_{i,t} y_i^{0.25} \tag{49}$$

If we compare this expression with Equation (43), we notice that the coefficient of the bid-ask spread is the same and the price impact exponent is lower (0.25 versus 0.50 for stocks), implying a lower liquidity risk.

5.2.3 Corporate bonds

We estimate Model (48) by using a dataset of corporate bond trades, whose description is given in Appendix C.3 on page 197. Results are given in Table 21. We notice that all the estimates are significant at the 99% confidence level and the explanatory power is relatively high since we have $R^2 = 64.77\%$ and $R_c^2 = 41.66\%$.

Table 21: Two-stage estimation of the corporate bond transaction cost model with the volatility risk measure

Parameter	Estimate	Stderr	t-student	p-value
c_γ	0.3652	0.0338	10.8119	0.0000
γ_1	0.1168	0.0045	26.1322	0.0000
c_β	0.0008	0.0000	77.4368	0.0000
$\beta^{(s)}$	0.7623	0.0042	183.1617	0.0000
$\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$	0.9770	0.0044	224.1741	0.0000
$R^2 = 64.77\%$		$R_c^2 = 41.66\%$		

The previous model's good results should be considered cautiously because of two reasons. The first one is that the explanatory power depends on the maturity of the bonds. For instance, if we focus on short-term corporate bonds when the time-to-maturity is less than two years, we obtain $R_c^2 = 18.86\%$, which is low compared to the previous figure of 41.66%. The second reason is that the volatility data is not always available. This is particularly true when the age of corporate bonds is very low. On average, we do not have the value of the historical volatility for 20.95% of observations. Moreover, we recall that the asset risk is measured by the daily volatility σ_i in the model. However, we know that the price volatility is not a good measure for measuring the risk of a bond when the bond is traded at a very low frequency. This is why we observe a poor explanatory power when we consider bonds that present a high ratio of zero-trading days or a low turnover. This is the case of some EM corporate bonds or some mid-cap issuers. Therefore, we propose replacing the transaction cost function (47) with the following function:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i\left(q_i; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, n_i\right) = \beta^{(s)} s_{i,t} + \tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \mathcal{R}_{i,t} y_i^{\gamma_1} \tag{50}$$

where $\mathcal{R}_{i,t}$ is a better risk measure than the bond return volatility.

Table 22: Two-stage estimation of the corporate bond transaction cost model with the DTS risk measure

Parameter	Estimate	Stderr	t-student	p-value
c_γ	−3.4023	0.0309	−109.9488	0.0000
γ_1	0.0796	0.0041	19.5020	0.0000
c_β	0.0005	0.0000	55.7256	0.0000
$\beta^{(s)}$	0.7153	0.0034	207.4743	0.0000
$\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$	0.0356	0.0001	300.5100	0.0000
$R^2 = 68.64\%$		$R_c^2 = 46.45\%$		

In Appendix B.3 on page 196, we show that the corporate bond risk is a function of the duration-times-spread or DTS. Therefore, we consider the following transaction cost function:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i\left(q_i; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, \imath_i\right) = \beta^{(s)} s_{i,t} + \tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \operatorname{DTS}_{i,t}\, y_i^{\gamma_1} \tag{51}$$

Using our dataset of bond rates, we estimate the parameters by using the two-stage method:

$$\begin{cases} \ln\left(\boldsymbol{c}_i - s_i\right) - \ln \operatorname{DTS}_i = c_\gamma + \gamma_1 \ln y_i + u_i & \text{if } \boldsymbol{c}_i > s_i \\ \boldsymbol{c}_i = c_\beta + \beta^{(s)} s_i + \mathcal{D}_i^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \operatorname{DTS}_i\, y_i^{\gamma_1} + v_i \end{cases} \tag{52}$$

Results are given in Table 22. We notice that the results are a little bit better since the explanatory power R_c^2 is equal to 46.45% instead of 41.66%, and all estimated coefficients are significant at the 99% confidence level. Moreover, if we focus on corporate bonds where the time-to-maturity is less than two years, we obtain $R_c^2 = 38.21\%$ or an absolute improvement of 20%! Nevertheless, the value of γ_1 is equal to 0.0796, which is a low value. This result is disappointing because the model does not depend on the participation rate when $\gamma_1 \approx 0$:

$$\lim_{\gamma_1 \to 0} \boldsymbol{c}_i\left(q_i; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, \imath_i\right) = \beta^{(s)} s_{i,t} + \tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \operatorname{DTS}_{i,t}$$

This type of model is not useful and realistic when performing liquidity stress testing since the liquidity cost does not depend on the trade size!

The asset manager that provided the data uses a trading/dealing desk with specialized bond traders in order to minimize trading impacts and transaction costs. In particular, we observe that bond traders may be very active. For example, they may decide to not sell or buy the bond if the transaction cost is high. In this case, with the agreement of the fund manager, they can exchange the bond of an issuer with another bond of the same issuer[40], a bond of another issuer or a basket of bonds in order to reduce the transaction cost. More generally, they execute a sell or buy order of a bond with a high participation rate only if the trading impact is limited, implying that these big trades are opportunistic and not systematic contrary to small and medium trades. In a similar way, bond traders may know the inventory or the axis of the brokers and market markers. They can offer to fund managers to initiate a trade because the trade impact will be limited or even because the transaction cost is negative! We conclude that the behavior of bond traders is different depending on whether the trade is small/medium or large.

Since the goal of bond traders is to limit sensitivity to high participation rates, it is normal that we obtain a low value for the coefficient γ_1. We decide to force the coefficient

[40] With other characteristics such as the maturity.

Table 23: Estimation of the corporate bond transaction cost model when γ_1 is set to 0.25

Parameter	Estimate	Stderr	t-student	p-value
γ_1	0.2500			
$\beta^{(s)}$	0.8979	0.0028	323.2676	0.0000
$\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$	0.1131	0.0004	293.5226	0.0000
$R^2 = 66.24\%$		$R_c^2 = 42.35\%$		

γ_1 and to use the standard value of 0.25 that has been chosen for the sovereign bond model. Based on the results reported in Table 23, we finally propose the following benchmark formula to compute the transaction cost for corporate bonds:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i\left(q_i; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, n_i\right) = 1.50 \cdot s_{i,t} + 0.125 \cdot \mathrm{DTS}_{i,t}\, y_i^{0.25} \tag{53}$$

If we compare this expression with Equation (49), we notice that the coefficient of the bid-ask spread is larger (1.50 versus 1.25 for sovereign bonds), because of the larger uncertainty on the quoted spreads in the corporate bond universe. Concerning the price impact exponent, we use the same value.

Remark 28 *In order to compare sovereign and corporate bonds, we can transform Equation (49) by considering the relationship between the DTS and the daily volatility. In our sample*[41]*, the average ratio is equal to* 30.3*. We deduce that the equivalent transaction cost formula based on the DTS measure for sovereign bonds is equal to:*

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i\left(q_i; s_{i,t}, \sigma_{i,t}, n_i\right) = 1.25 \cdot s_{i,t} + 0.10 \cdot \mathrm{DTS}_{i,t}\, y_i^{0.25} \tag{54}$$

We notice that the price impact is +25% *higher for corporate bonds compared to sovereign bonds.*

5.3 Extension to the two-regime model

As explained in Section 2.1.3 on page 124, the asset manager generally imposes a trading limit, because it is not possible to have a 100% participation rate. In Figure 25, we have reported the estimated price impact for corporate bonds[42]. Panel (a) corresponds to the estimated raw function. From a mathematical point of view, the price impact is defined even if the participation rate is larger than 100%. In the case of stocks, a 150% volume-based participation rate is plausible, but it corresponds to a very big trade. In the case of bonds, a 150% outstanding-based participation rate is impossible, because this trade size is larger than the issued size! As such, imposing a trading limit is a first modification to obtain a realistic transaction cost function. However, as explained in Section 2.4 on page 129, this is not sufficient. For instance, we use a trading limit of 300 bps in Panel (b). Beyond this trading limit, the price impact is infinite. But if we trade exactly 300 bps, the price impact is equal to 34 bps, and we obtain a concave price impact before this limit. It is better to introduce a second regime (see Equation 17 on page 129), implying the following function

[41] Figure 32 on page 202 reports the relationship between the volatility and the duration-times-spread of sovereign bonds.

[42] we recall that $\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} = 0.125$ and $\gamma_1 = 0.25$ for corporate bonds.

for the price impact:

$$\boldsymbol{\pi}(y) = \begin{cases} \tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \, \text{DTS} \, y^{\gamma_1} & \text{if } y \leq \tilde{y} \\ \left(\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})} \frac{\tilde{y}^{\gamma_1}}{\tilde{y}^{\gamma_2}} \right) \text{DTS} \, y^{\gamma_2} & \text{if } \tilde{y} \leq y \leq y^+ \\ +\infty & \text{if } y > y^+ \end{cases}$$

In Panel (c), the inflection point $\tilde{y}$ and the power γ_2 are set to 200 bps and 1. We have two areas. The grey area indicates that the trading is prohibitive beyond 300 bps. The red area indicates that the trading is penalized between 200 bps and 300 bps, because trading costs are no longer concave, but convex. Of course, we can use a larger value of γ_2 to penalize this area of participation rates (for example $\gamma_2 = 2$). Finally, we obtain the final transaction cost function in Panel (d).

Figure 25: From the single-regime model to the two-regime model (corporate bonds)



The issue of using a two-regime model is the calibration of the second regime. However, as said previously, it is unrealistic to believe that we can estimate the inflection point and the parameter γ_2 from data. Indeed, asset managers do not experience sufficient big trades and do not have enough data to calibrate the second regime. We are in an uncertain area, and it is better that these values are given by experts. For instance, we can use $\gamma_2 = 1$ or $\gamma_2 = 2$ to force the convexity of the second regime. The inflection point can be equal to $3/4$ or $2/3$ of the trading limit.

5.4 Stress testing of security-specific parameters

In this section, we conduct a stress testing program in order to define the transaction cost function in a stress regime. We first define the methodological framework based on the extreme value theory (EVT). Then, we apply the EVT approach to the security-specific

parameters. Finally, we give the transaction cost function in the case of a LST program for equity funds.

5.4.1 Methodological aspects

Following Roncalli (2020, Chapters 12 and 14), we consider the extreme value theory for performing stress testing. We summarize this framework below and provide the main results[43].

The block maxima (BM) approach We note $X \sim \mathbf{F}$ a continuous random variable and $X_{i:n}$ the i^{th} order statistic in the sample[44] $\{X_1, \ldots, X_n\}$. The maximum order statistic is defined by $X_{n:n} = \max(X_1, \ldots, X_n)$. We can show that $\mathbf{F}_{n:n}(x) = \mathbf{F}(x)^n$. If there exist two constants a_n and b_n and a non-degenerate distribution function $\mathbf{G}$ such that $\lim_{n\to\infty} \mathbf{F}_{n:n}(a_n x + b_n) = \mathbf{G}(x)$, the Fisher-Tippett theorem tells us that $\mathbf{G}$ can only be a Gumbel, Fréchet or Weibull probability distribution. In practice, these three distributions are replaced by the GEV distribution $\mathcal{GEV}(\mu, \sigma, \xi)$:

$$\mathbf{G}(x; \mu, \sigma, \xi) = \exp\left(-\left(1 + \xi\left(\frac{x-\mu}{\sigma}\right)\right)^{-1/\xi}\right)$$

defined on the support $\Delta = \left\{x : 1 + \xi\sigma^{-1}(x-\mu) > 0\right\}$. The parameters $\theta = (\mu, \sigma, \xi)$ can be calibrated by maximizing the log-likelihood function[45]:

$$\hat{\theta} = \arg\max \sum_t -\frac{1}{2}\ln\sigma^2 - \left(\frac{1+\xi}{\xi}\right)\ln\left(1 + \xi\left(\frac{x_t-\mu}{\sigma}\right)\right) - \left(1 + \xi\left(\frac{x_t-\mu}{\sigma}\right)\right)^{-1/\xi}$$

where x_t is the observed maximum for the t^{th} block maxima period[46]. By assuming that the length of the block maxima period is equal to n_{BM} trading days, the stress scenario associated with the random variable X for a given return time $\mathcal{T}$ is equal to:

$$\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T}) = \mathbf{G}^{-1}\left(\alpha; \hat{\mu}, \hat{\sigma}, \hat{\xi}\right)$$

where:

$$\alpha = 1 - \frac{n_{\text{BM}}}{\mathcal{T}}$$

and $\mathbf{G}^{-1}$ is the quantile function:

$$\mathbf{G}^{-1}(\alpha; \mu, \sigma, \xi) = \mu - \frac{\sigma}{\xi}\left(1 - (-\ln\alpha)^{-\xi}\right)$$

Finally, we obtain:

$$\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T}) = \hat{\mu} - \frac{\hat{\sigma}}{\hat{\xi}}\left(1 - \left(-\ln\left(1 - \frac{n_{\text{BM}}}{\mathcal{T}}\right)\right)^{-\hat{\xi}}\right) \tag{55}$$

[43] See Roncalli (2020, pages 753-777 and 904-909) for a detailed presentation of extreme value theory and its application to stress testing and scenario analysis.

[44] We assume that the random variables are *iid*.

[45] We recall that the probability density function of the GEV distribution is equal to:

$$g(x; \mu, \sigma, \xi) = \frac{1}{\sigma}\left(1 + \xi\left(\frac{x-\mu}{\sigma}\right)\right)^{-(1+\xi)/\xi} \exp\left(-\left(1 + \xi\left(\frac{x-\mu}{\sigma}\right)\right)^{-1/\xi}\right)$$

[46] The block maxima approach consists of dividing the observation period into non-overlapping periods of fixed size and computing the maximum of each period.

The peak over threshold (POT) approach In this approach, we are interested in estimating the distribution of exceedance over a certain threshold u:

$$\mathbf{F}_u(x) = \Pr\{X - u \leq x \mid X > u\}$$

where $0 \leq x < x_0 - u$ and $x_0 = \sup\{x \in \mathbb{R} : \mathbf{F}(x) < 1\}$. We notice that:

$$\mathbf{F}_u(x) = \frac{\mathbf{F}(u+x) - \mathbf{F}(u)}{1 - \mathbf{F}(u)}$$

For very large u, $\mathbf{F}_u(x)$ follows a generalized Pareto distribution $\mathcal{GPD}(\sigma, \xi)$:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{F}_u(x) &\approx \mathbf{H}(x; \sigma, \xi) \\ &= 1 - \left(1 + \frac{\xi x}{\sigma}\right)^{-1/\xi} \end{aligned}$$

defined on the support $\Delta = \left\{x : 1 + \xi\sigma^{-1}x > 0\right\}$.

Remark 29 *In fact, there is a strong link between the block maxima approach and the peak over threshold method. Suppose that $X_{n:n} \sim \mathcal{GEV}(\mu, \sigma, \xi)$. Using the fact that $\mathbf{F}_{n:n}(x) = \mathbf{F}(x)^n$, we can show that (Roncalli, 2020, page 774):*

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{F}_u(x) &\approx 1 - \left(1 + \frac{\xi x}{\sigma + \xi(u - \mu)}\right)^{-1/\xi} \\ &= \mathbf{H}(x; \sigma + \xi(u - \mu), \xi) \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, we obtain a duality between GEV and GPD distribution functions.

The parameters $\theta = (\sigma, \xi)$ are estimated by the method of maximum likelihood[47] once the threshold u_0 is found. To determine u_0, we use the mean residual life plot, which consists in plotting u against the empirical mean $\hat{e}(u)$ of the excess:

$$\hat{e}(u) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n (x_i - u)^+}{\sum_{i=1}^n \mathbb{1}\{x_i > u\}}$$

For any value $u \geq u_0$, we must verify that the mean residual life is a linear function of u since we have:

$$\mathbb{E}[X - u \mid X > u] = \frac{\sigma + \xi u}{1 - \xi}$$

The threshold u_0 is then found graphically.

To compute the stress scenario $\mathbb{S}(T)$, we recall that:

$$\mathbf{F}_u(x) = \frac{\mathbf{F}(u+x) - \mathbf{F}(u)}{1 - \mathbf{F}(u)} \approx \mathbf{H}(x)$$

where $\mathbf{H} \sim \mathcal{GPD}(\sigma, \xi)$. We deduce that:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{F}(x) &= \mathbf{F}(u) + (1 - \mathbf{F}(u)) \cdot \mathbf{F}_u(x - u) \\ &\approx \mathbf{F}(u) + (1 - \mathbf{F}(u)) \cdot \mathbf{H}(x - u) \end{aligned}$$

[47] The probability density function of the GPD distribution is equal to:

$$h(x; \sigma, \xi) = \frac{1}{\sigma}\left(1 + \frac{\xi x}{\sigma}\right)^{-(1+\xi)/\xi}$$

We consider a sample of size n. We note n' as the number of observations whose value x_i is larger than the threshold u_0. The non-parametric estimate of $\mathbf{F}(u_0)$ is then equal to:

$$\hat{\mathbf{F}}(u_0) = 1 - \frac{n'}{n}$$

Therefore, we obtain the following semi-parametric estimate of $\mathbf{F}(x)$ for x larger than u_0:

$$\begin{aligned}
\hat{\mathbf{F}}(x) &= \hat{\mathbf{F}}(u_0) + \left(1 - \hat{\mathbf{F}}(u_0)\right) \cdot \hat{\mathbf{H}}(x - u_0) \\
&= \left(1 - \frac{n'}{n}\right) + \frac{n'}{n}\left(1 - \left(1 + \frac{\hat{\xi}(x - u_0)}{\hat{\sigma}}\right)^{-1/\hat{\xi}}\right) \\
&= 1 - \frac{n'}{n}\left(1 + \frac{\hat{\xi}(x - u_0)}{\hat{\sigma}}\right)^{-1/\hat{\xi}}
\end{aligned}$$

We can interpret $\hat{\mathbf{F}}(x)$ as the historical estimate of the probability distribution tail that is improved by the extreme value theory. We have[48]:

$$\hat{\mathbf{F}}^{-1}(\alpha) = u_0 + \frac{\hat{\sigma}}{\hat{\xi}}\left(\left(\frac{n}{n'}(1 - \alpha)\right)^{-\hat{\xi}} - 1\right)$$

We recall that the stress scenario of the random variable X associated with the return time $\mathcal{T}$ is equal to $\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T}) = \hat{\mathbf{F}}^{-1}(\alpha)$ where $\alpha = 1 - \mathcal{T}^{-1}$. Finally, we deduce that:

$$\mathbb{S}(\mathcal{T}) = u_0 + \frac{\hat{\sigma}}{\hat{\xi}}\left(\left(\frac{n}{n'\mathcal{T}}\right)^{-\hat{\xi}} - 1\right) \tag{56}$$

5.4.2 Application to asset liquidity

We assume that the current date t is not a stress period. Let $p_{i,t}$ be a security-specific parameter observed at time t. We would like to compute its stress value $p_{i,t+h}^{\text{stress}}$ for a given time horizon h. As explained in Section 4.2.3 on page 151, we can use a multiplicative shock:

$$p_{i,t+h}^{\text{stress}} = m_p \cdot p_{i,t}$$

where m_p is the multiplier factor. Depending on the nature of the parameter, we can also use an additive shock:

$$p_{i,t+h}^{\text{stress}} = p_{i,t} + \Delta_p$$

where Δ_p is the additive factor. For instance, we can assume that a multiplicative shock is relevant for the trading volume, but an additive shock is more appropriate for the credit spread. Using a sample $\{p_{i,1}, \ldots, p_{i,T}\}$ of the parameter p, we compute $m_t = \dfrac{p_{i,t+h}}{p_{i,t}}$ or $m_t = p_{i,t+h} - p_{i,t}$. Then, we apply the previous EVT framework to the time series $\{m_1, \ldots, m_T\}$ and estimate the stress scenario m_p or Δ_p for a given return time $\mathcal{T}$ and a holding period h. We notice that two periods are used to define the stress scenario. The time horizon h indicates the frequency of the stress scenario. It is different to compute a daily, weekly or monthly stress. The return time $\mathcal{T}$ indicates the severity of the stress scenario. If $\mathcal{T}$ is set to one year, we observe this stress scenario every year on average. Again, it is different to compute a stress with a return time of one year, two years or five years. In some sense, h corresponds to the holding period whereas $\mathcal{T}$ measures the occurrence probability.

[48] The quantile function of the GPD distribution is equal to:

$$\mathbf{H}^{-1}(\alpha; \sigma, \xi) = \frac{\sigma}{\xi}\left((1 - \alpha)^{-\xi} - 1\right)$$

Market risk We consider the VIX index from January 1990 to February 2021. We have a sample of 7 850 observations. In Figure 26, we report the histogram of the VIX index and the multiplicative factor m_σ for three time horizons (one day, one week and one month). The estimates of the GEV and GPD distributions are reported in Table 24. Using Equations 55 and 55, we deduce the stress scenarios associated with m_σ and Δ_σ for three time horizons (1D, 1W and 1M) and five return times (6M, 1Y, 2Y, 5Y, 10Y and 50Y) in Tables 25 and 26.

Figure 26: Empirical distribution of the multiplicative factor m_σ



Table 24: EVT estimates of the VIX index

		GEV			GPD		
		$\hat{\mu}$	$\hat{\sigma}$	$\hat{\xi}$	u_0	$\hat{\sigma}$	$\hat{\xi}$
m_σ	1D	1.103	0.049	0.299	1.229	0.096	0.138
	1W	1.157	0.101	0.229	1.460	0.203	0.243
	1M	1.138	0.185	0.238	1.960	0.425	0.410
Δ_σ	1D	1.739	1.036	0.424	4.943	2.560	0.238
	1W	2.568	1.821	0.322	2.950	2.022	0.291
	1M	2.277	3.179	0.201	16.830	11.522	0.008

How should we interpret these results? For example, the multiplicative weekly stress scenario is equal to 1.50 if we consider a return time of one year and the BM/GEV approach. For the additive scenario, we obtain a figure of 9.66%. This means that the volatility can be multiplied by 1.50 or increased by 9.66% in one week, and we observe this event (or an equivalent more severe event) every year. If we average the historical, BM/GEV and POT/GPD approaches, the 2Y weekly stress scenario is respectively $\times 1.80$ (multiplicative

stress) and +17% (additive stress). If we focus on the monthly stress scenario, these figures become ×2.66 and +29%.

Table 25: Multiplicative stress scenarios of the volatility

$\mathcal{T}$ (in years)		0.385	1/2	1	2	5	10	50
α (in %)		99.00	99.23	99.62	99.81	99.92	99.96	99.99
1D	Historical	1.23	1.25	1.32	1.43	1.50	1.57	
	BM/GEV	1.20	1.22	1.29	1.37	1.51	1.65	2.09
	POT/GPD	1.23	1.25	1.33	1.41	1.52	1.62	1.90
1W	Historical	1.46	1.51	1.70	1.89	2.26	2.56	
	BM/GEV	1.34	1.38	1.50	1.64	1.86	2.06	2.66
	POT/GPD	1.46	1.51	1.68	1.87	2.18	2.47	3.35
1M	Historical	1.96	2.05	2.44	2.99	4.23	5.08	
	BM/GEV	1.47	1.55	1.78	2.04	2.46	2.83	3.99
	POT/GPD	1.96	2.08	2.45	2.96	3.88	4.86	8.53

Table 26: Additive stress scenarios of the volatility

$\mathcal{T}$ (in years)		0.385	1/2	1	2	5	10	50
α (in %)		99.00	99.23	99.62	99.81	99.92	99.96	99.99
1D	Historical	4.94	5.50	7.72	10.77	14.15	18.22	
	BM/GEV	3.91	4.51	6.42	8.94	13.59	18.50	37.34
	POT/GPD	4.93	5.58	7.12	8.42	9.85	10.74	12.31
1W	Historical	9.49	10.88	14.50	20.43	24.56	27.97	
	BM/GEV	6.08	6.97	9.66	12.95	18.53	23.96	42.34
	POT/GPD	9.57	10.65	13.92	17.92	24.61	30.99	51.86
1M	Historical	16.83	19.04	27.22	35.62	46.59	61.40	
	BM/GEV	7.84	9.13	12.74	16.80	23.03	28.54	44.68
	POT/GPD	16.64	19.67	27.70	35.77	46.51	54.70	73.88

Trading volume Dealing with volatility is relatively simple thanks to the availability of the VIX. In the case of the trading volume, we face more difficulties because there is not a standard index that measures the market depth. This means that we must use the trading volume of the stocks. From a robustness point of view, it is obvious that computing a stress for each stock is not relevant. Therefore, given the times series of $v_{i,t}$ for several stocks, we would like to compute a synthetic stress scenario that is valid for all stocks. The first idea is to compute the multipliers for each stock and to pool all the data. The second idea is to compute the multipliers for each date and to average the data by date. For the BM/GEV approach, we compute the maximum for each block and each stock, and then we average the maxima by block.

We consider the 30-day average daily volume of the stocks that make up[49] the EuroStoxx 50 Index from January 2010 to December 2020. At each date, we compute the multiplicative factor of the trading volume[50]. Then, we apply the previous pooling and averaging

[49] Since the composition changes from one month to another, we have 73 stocks during the period. Nevertheless, at each date, we only consider the 50 stocks that are valid at the first trading day of the month.

[50] In fact, it is a reductive factor since the risk is not that daily volumes increase, but that they decrease.

approaches to these data[51]. Results are given in Table 27. If we average the historical, BM/GEV and POT/GPD approaches, the 2Y weekly and monthly stress scenarios are respectively $\times 0.75$ and $\times 0.48$. This means that the daily volume is approximately reduced by 25% if we consider a one-week holding period and 50% if we consider a one-month holding period.

Table 27: Multiplicative stress scenarios of the trading volume

	$\mathcal{T}$ (in years)		0.385	1/2	1	2	5	10	50
	α (in %)		99.00	99.23	99.62	99.81	99.92	99.96	99.99
	Historical		0.93	0.93	0.91	0.88	0.84	0.80	0.71
	BM/GEV	Pooling	0.94	0.94	0.92	0.90	0.87	0.85	0.80
1W	POT/GPD	Pooling	0.95	0.94	0.91	0.88	0.84	0.80	0.70
	BM/GEV	Averaging	0.94	0.94	0.93	0.92	0.91	0.90	0.89
	POT/GPD	Averaging	0.93	0.92	0.92	0.91	0.91	0.90	0.89
	Historical		0.79	0.77	0.72	0.67	0.61	0.55	0.48
	BM/GEV	Pooling	0.86	0.85	0.81	0.78	0.74	0.71	0.65
1W	POT/GPD	Pooling	0.87	0.83	0.75	0.68	0.61	0.56	0.47
	BM/GEV	Averaging	0.87	0.86	0.84	0.82	0.79	0.77	0.73
	POT/GPD	Averaging	0.82	0.81	0.79	0.78	0.76	0.75	0.72
	Historical		0.50	0.48	0.41	0.36	0.31	0.29	0.26
	BM/GEV	Pooling	0.72	0.69	0.62	0.56	0.50	0.46	0.39
1M	POT/GPD	Pooling	0.40	0.38	0.36	0.33	0.31	0.29	0.26
	BM/GEV	Averaging	0.75	0.73	0.68	0.63	0.58	0.55	0.49
	POT/GPD	Averaging	0.62	0.60	0.57	0.54	0.50	0.48	0.42

Bid-ask spread We have seen that stress scenarios of the daily volume are more difficult to compute than stress scenarios of the volatility. This issue is even more important with bid-ask spreads because of the data quality. Ideally, we would like to obtain the weighted average bid-ask spread adjusted by the volume for each stock and each trading day. However, this information is not easily available or is expensive. This is why databases of asset managers and trading platforms generally report the end-of-day bid-ask spread. However, unlike the closing price, which corresponds to the security's end-of-day transaction price observed during a regular market trading period, there is no standard definition of the bid and ask end-of-day prices. In particular, it is not obvious that the end-of-day bid-ask spread corresponds to the last bid-ask spread observed during the regular market trading period. Rather, our experience shows that the end-of-day bid-ask spread may be impacted by after-hours trading orders. It seems that this synchronization bias between regular trading and after-hours trading only impacts bid-ask spreads and not closing prices.

To illustrate this issue, we report the end-of-day bid-ask spread of the BNP Paribas stock between January 2010 and December 2020 in Figure 27. During this period, the stock's median bid-ask spread is equal to 1.22 bps. This value is relatively low, however, we observe many trading days where the bid-ask spread is larger than 20 bps[52]. Therefore, the bid-ask spread may jump from 2 bps to 80 bps in one day. It is obvious that these extreme variations are not realistic and no institutional investor has paid a bid-ask spread of 80 bps for the BNP Paribas stock during the period. These extreme points are not unusual

[51] We can also transform these stress scenarios on the trading volume into stress scenarios on the participation rate using the following formula: $m_x = \frac{1}{m_v}$. Results are reported in Table 44 on page 204.

[52] These observations correspond to the red bars in 27

Figure 27: Historical bid-ask spread of BNP Paribas (in bps)



as illustrated by the figures reported in Table 28. For the 50 stocks of the Eurostoxx 50 Index, we have computed the frequency at which the bid-ask spread is negative, the daily multiplicative factor is greater than 5 or 10, and the absolute variation is greater than 25 and 100 bps. We consider two well-known data providers, FactSet and Bloomberg, that are extensively used by equity portfolio managers. These results illustrate that reported bid and ask end-of-day prices may deviate substantially from the closing price because of the synchronization bias between regular and after-hours trading.

Table 28: Statistics of daily multiplicative and additive factors for the Eurostoxx 50 stocks (2010 – 2020)

Frequency	Factset	Bloomberg
$\Pr\{s < 0\}$	0.01%	0.24%
$\Pr\{m_s > 10\}$	0.77%	0.62%
$\Pr\{m_s > 5\}$	3.49%	3.12%
$\Pr\{\lvert\Delta_s\rvert > 100 \text{ bps}\}$	0.63%	0.44%
$\Pr\{\lvert\Delta_s\rvert > 25 \text{ bps}\}$	4.52%	3.05%

There are different ways to fix the previous problem. For example, we can consider a ten-day moving average of daily bid-ask spreads for each stock. Or we can calculate the weighted average of the bid-ask spreads for a given universe of stocks for each trading day. The first case corresponds to a time-series average, whereas the second case corresponds to a cross-section average. In both cases, the underlying idea is to apply a denoising filter in order to estimate the average trend. A variant of the second method is to consider the median bid-ask spread, and we apply this approach to the stocks of the Eurostoxx 50 Index from January 2010 to December 2020. As in the case of the daily volume, we only consider

the 50 stocks that are in the index at each trading day. The empirical distributions of m_s and Δ_s are given in Figures 35 and 36 on page 203. Using these data, we calibrate the GEV and GPD models, and we obtain the stress scenarios that are reported in Tables 29 and 30. If we average the historical, BM/GEV and POT/GPD approaches, the 2Y weekly stress scenario is respectively $\times 3$ (multiplicative stress) and $+6.5$ bps (additive stress).

Table 29: Multiplicative stress scenarios of the bid-ask spread

$\mathcal{T}$ (in years)		0.385	1/2	1	2	5	10	50
α (in %)		99.00	99.23	99.62	99.81	99.92	99.96	99.99
1D	Historical	1.66	1.73	1.93	2.40	2.75	7.11	
	BM/GEV	1.63	1.70	1.92	2.19	2.64	3.08	4.56
	POT/GPD	1.65	1.71	1.94	2.32	3.24	4.49	11.70
1W	Historical	1.74	1.88	2.58	3.49	6.78	9.76	
	BM/GEV	1.67	1.76	2.05	2.41	3.07	3.75	6.27
	POT/GPD	1.81	1.93	2.41	3.22	5.20	7.92	23.78
1M	Historical	2.54	2.92	5.12	6.65	9.62	9.98	
	BM/GEV	1.75	1.86	2.18	2.58	3.25	3.90	6.12
	POT/GPD	2.40	2.64	3.52	4.85	7.72	11.21	27.90

Table 30: Additive stress scenarios of the bid-ask spread

$\mathcal{T}$ (in years)		0.385	1/2	1	2	5	10	50
α (in %)		99.00	99.23	99.62	99.81	99.92	99.96	99.99
1D	Historical	1.67	1.82	2.93	6.46	10.94	18.14	
	BM/GEV	1.42	1.63	2.28	3.14	4.71	6.37	12.70
	POT/GPD	1.77	2.04	3.07	4.76	8.78	14.17	44.13
1W	Historical	1.98	2.37	5.19	10.10	12.36	19.11	
	BM/GEV	1.48	1.70	2.40	3.33	5.08	6.94	14.17
	POT/GPD	2.19	2.57	3.91	6.00	10.63	16.43	45.46
1M	Historical	3.36	3.98	7.90	10.60	16.04	21.36	
	BM/GEV	1.51	1.77	2.62	3.82	6.20	8.91	20.46
	POT/GPD	2.99	3.57	5.73	9.23	17.33	27.95	84.86

5.4.3 Definition of the stress transaction cost function

If we assume that $x^+ = 10\%$, $\tilde{x} = \frac{2}{3}x^+$ and $\gamma_2 = 1$, the transaction cost function for large cap stocks is equal to:

$$\boldsymbol{c}(q; s, \sigma, v) = \begin{cases} 1.25 \cdot s + 0.40 \cdot \sigma\sqrt{x} & \text{if } x \leq 6.66\% \\ 1.25 \cdot s + 1.55 \cdot \sigma x & \text{if } 6.66\% \leq x \leq 10\% \\ +\infty & \text{if } x > 10\% \end{cases} \tag{57}$$

We consider the following stress scenario[53]:

- $\Delta_s = 8$ bps
- $\Delta_\sigma = 20\%$

[53] This stress scenario is approximatively the 2Y weekly stress scenario.

- $m_v = 0.75$

We deduce that the transaction cost function in the stress regime becomes:

$$\boldsymbol{c}(q; s, \sigma, v) = \begin{cases} 1.25 \cdot (s + 8 \text{ bps}) + 0.40 \cdot \left(\sigma + \dfrac{20\%}{\sqrt{260}}\right) \sqrt{\dfrac{4}{3}x} & \text{if } x \leq 5\% \\ 1.25 \cdot (s + 8 \text{ bps}) + 1.55 \cdot \left(\sigma + \dfrac{20\%}{\sqrt{260}}\right) \dfrac{4}{3}x & \text{if } 5\% \leq x \leq 7.5\% \\ +\infty & \text{if } x > 7.5\% \end{cases}$$

Table 31: Stress testing computation

x	Case	Annualized volatility 10%	15%	20%	25%	30%	35%	40%	Liquidation $\mathcal{LT}$	$\mathcal{LS}$ one-day	$\mathcal{LS}$ two-day
		$\boldsymbol{c}(q; s, \sigma, v)$ (in bps)									
0.00%	Normal	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	5.0	1	0%	0%
	Stress	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	1	0%	0%
0.01%	Normal	5.2	5.4	5.5	5.6	5.7	5.9	6.0	1	0%	0%
	Stress	15.9	16.0	16.1	16.3	16.4	16.6	16.7	1	0%	0%
0.05%	Normal	5.6	5.8	6.1	6.4	6.7	6.9	7.2	1	0%	0%
	Stress	16.9	17.2	17.6	17.9	18.2	18.5	18.8	1	0%	0%
0.10%	Normal	5.8	6.2	6.6	7.0	7.4	7.7	8.1	1	0%	0%
	Stress	17.7	18.2	18.6	19.1	19.5	20.0	20.4	1	0%	0%
0.50%	Normal	6.8	7.6	8.5	9.4	10.3	11.1	12.0	1	0%	0%
	Stress	21.1	22.1	23.1	24.1	25.1	26.1	27.2	1	0%	0%
1.00%	Normal	7.5	8.7	10.0	11.2	12.4	13.7	14.9	1	0%	0%
	Stress	23.6	25.0	26.5	27.9	29.3	30.8	32.2	1	0%	0%
5.00%	Normal	10.5	13.3	16.1	18.9	21.6	24.4	27.2	1	0%	0%
	Stress	34.2	37.4	40.6	43.8	47.0	50.2	53.4	1	0%	0%
7.50%	Normal	12.2	15.8	19.4	23.0	26.6	30.2	33.8	1	0%	0%
	Stress	43.8	48.6	53.4	58.2	63.0	67.8	72.6	1	0%	0%
10.00%	Normal	14.6	19.4	24.2	29.0	33.8	38.6	43.4	1	0%	0%
	Stress	40.0	44.2	48.4	52.5	56.7	60.9	65.0	2	2.5%	0%
20.00%	Normal	14.6	19.4	24.2	29.0	33.8	38.6	43.4	2	10%	0%
	Stress	41.4	45.8	50.2	54.6	59.0	63.4	67.8	3	12.5%	5.5%

In Table 31, we have reported an example of stress testing applied to single stocks. For each value of σ and x, we report the unit cost $\boldsymbol{c}(q; s, \sigma, v)$ in bps for the normal and stress regimes. For instance, if the annualized volatility is equal to 30% and the liquidation of the exposure on the single stock represents 0.05% of the normal daily volume, the transaction cost is equal to 6.7 bps in the normal period. In the stress period, it increases to 18.2 bps, which is an increase of 171%. We have also reported the liquidation time, the one-day liquidation shortfall and the two-day liquidation shortfall. Let us consider a 10% liquidation. Because of the liquidity policy, we can liquidate 7.5% the first day and 2.5% the second day during the stress period, whereas we can liquidate the full exposure during the normal period. Therefore, the liquidation time, which is normally equal to one day, takes two days in the stress period. If we consider a 20% liquidation, the (one-day) liquidation shortfall is equal to 12.5% and the time-to-liquidation is equal to three days.

6 Conclusion and discussion

Liquidity stress testing is a recent topic in asset management, which has given rise to numerous publications from regulators (AMF, 2017; BaFin, 2017; ESMA, 2019, 2020; FSB, 2017; IOSCO, 2015, 2018). In particular, LST has been mandatory in Europe since September 2020. However, contrary to banks, asset managers have less experience conducting a liquidity stress testing program at the global portfolio level. Moreover, this topic has not been extensively studied by the academic research. Therefore, we are in a trial-and-error period where standard models are not really established, and asset managers use very different approaches to assess liquidity stress tests. The aim of this research project is to propose a simple LST approach that may become a benchmark for asset managers. In a previous paper, we have already developed a framework for modeling the liability liquidity risk (Roncalli *et al.*, 2020). In a forthcoming paper, we will propose several tools for managing the asset-liability liquidity gap. In this paper, we focus on measuring the asset liquidity risk.

Contrary to the first and third parts of this project, there is a large body of academic literature that has studied the estimation of transaction costs. In particular, we assume that price impact verifies the power-law property. This means that there is a concave relationship between the participation rate and the transaction cost. This model is appealing because (1) it has been proposed by the academic research in the case of stocks, (2) it is simple and (3) it is suitable for stress testing purposes. The first reason is important, because the model must be approved by the regulators. The fact that this model has academic roots is therefore a key element in terms of robustness and independent validation. The second reason is critical, because a complex transaction cost model with many parameters and variables may be not an industrial solution. This is particularly true if the calibration requires a large amount of data. In the case of our model, we have three parameters (spread sensitivity, price impact sensitivity and price impact exponent) and three explanatory variables (bid-ask spread, volatility risk and participation rate). If the asset manager does not have enough data, it can always use some internal experts to set the value of these parameters. Moreover, we have seen that this model can also be applied to bonds with some minor corrections. For instance, in the case of corporate bonds, it is better to use the DTS instead of the volatility in order to measure the market risk. Finally, the third reason is convenient when we perform stress testing programs. When applied to liquidity in asset management, they can concern the liability side and/or the asset side (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). For instance, the asset manager can assume that the liquidity crisis is due to funding issues. In this case, the stress scenario could be a severe redemption scenario. But it can also assume that the liquidity crisis is due to market issues. In this case, the stress scenario could be a market liquidity crisis with a substantial reduction in trading volumes and an increase in volatility risk. Therefore, it is important that a stress scenario of market liquidity risk could be implemented, and not only a stress scenario of funding liquidity risk. Our transaction cost model has three variables that can be stressed: the spread, the market risk and the trading volume (or the market depth). We think that these three transmission channels are enough to represent a market liquidity crisis. Nevertheless, the high concavity of the price impact function when the exponent is smaller than $1/2$ is not always relevant when we also impose trading policy limits. Therefore, we propose an extension of the previous model by considering two regimes with two power-law models where the second exponent takes a larger value than the first exponent. In this case, the transaction cost function has two additional parameters: the exponent of the second regime and the inflection point that separates the first and second regimes. Therefore, we can obtain a price impact which is more convex in the second regime when the participation rate is high. In terms of calibration, we propose using expert estimates, implying no more data analysis.

Table 32: Impact of size on the market impact

Size	Stocks			Bonds		
	Unit cost	Total cost	Average cost	Unit cost	Total cost	Average cost
×1	×1.0	×1.0	+0%	×1.0	×1.0	+0%
×2	×1.4	×2.8	+41%	×1.2	×2.4	+19%
×3	×1.7	×5.2	+73%	×1.3	×3.9	+32%
×4	×2.0	×8.0	+100%	×1.4	×5.7	+41%
×5	×2.2	×11	+124%	×1.5	×7.5	+50%
×10	×3.2	×32	+216%	×1.8	×18	+78%

We have proposed some formulas for large cap stocks, small cap stocks, sovereign bonds and corporate bonds[54]. This is an especially challenging exercise. Indeed, the calibrated formulas highly depend on the data[55]. Because we use a small sample on a particular period and this sample is specific to an asset manager, the data are not representative of the industry as a whole. Moreover, in the case of bonds, we have decided to exclude opportunistic trades with a negative transaction cost. This is why these calibrated formulas must be adjusted and validated by the asset manager before using them. On page 198, we have reported the values of the unit transaction cost. These tables can be used as a preliminary pricing grid that can be modified. For instance, the asset manager generally knows its average price impact, and can then change the values of β^s, $\beta^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}$ and γ_1 in order to retrieve its average cost. This pricing grid can also be modified by the trading desk cell by cell in order to avoid some unrealistic values[56]. One of the difficulties is to maintain some coherency properties between the different cells of the pricing grid. In the case of the power-law model, if we multiply the size by α, the unit cost is multiplied by α^{γ_1} while the total cost is multiplied by $\alpha^{1+\gamma_1}$. In Table 32, we have reported the impact of the size on the price impact when we consider our benchmark formulas[57]. For example, we notice that if we multiply the size of the trade by 5, the average cost due to the price impact increases by 124% for stocks and 50% for bonds. Quantifying these size effects is essential in a liquidity stress testing program because the risk in a stress period is mainly related to the size issue. And it is not always obvious to obtain a pricing grid that satisfies some basic coherency properties.

As explained in the introduction, our motivation is to propose a framework that can help asset managers to implement liquidity stress testing, which is a relative new topic for this industry. We are aware that it is challenging, and the final model can appear too simple to describe the transaction cost function of any stocks and bonds. This is true. For instance, it is not precise enough to calibrate swing prices. However, we reiterate that the goal is not to build a pre-trade system, but to implement a liquidity stress testing program from an industrial viewpoint. In a liquidity crisis, there are so many unknowns and uncertainties that a sophisticated model does not necessarily enable redemption issues to be managed better. An LST model must be sufficiently realistic and pragmatic in order to give the magnitude order of the stress severity and compare the different outcomes. We think that the model proposed here has some appealing properties to become a benchmark for asset managers. However, the road to obtain the same standardization that we encounter in the banking regulation of market, credit or counterparty risk is long. More research in this area from academics and professionals is needed.

[54] These formulas correspond to Equations (43), (44), (49) and (53).

[55] For example, using Reuters bid-ask spreads instead of Bloomberg bid-ask spreads dramatically changes the parameter β^s for sovereign and corporate bonds.

[56] For instance, a price impact of 198 bps may be considered too high when the outstanding-based participation rate is set to 100 bps and the DTS of the corporate bond is equal to 5 000 bps.

[57] We recall that γ_1 is equal to 0.5 for stocks and 0.25 for bonds.

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Appendix

A Glossary

Bid-ask spread

The bid-ask spread corresponds to the difference between the ask price and the bid price of a security divided by its mid-point price. It is a component of the liquidity cost, since the unit transaction cost depends on the half bid-ask spread. In this article, we use the term bid-ask spread in place of half bid-ask spread, and we denote it by s.

Break-even redemption scenario

The break-even redemption scenario is the maximum amount expressed in dollars that can be liquidated in one day:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{R}^{\text{break-even}} &= \sup\left\{\mathbb{R} : \mathcal{LS}\left(\mathbb{R}\right) = 0\right\} \\ &= \inf\left\{\mathbb{R} : \mathcal{LR}\left(\mathbb{R}; 1\right) = 1\right\}\end{aligned}$$

HQLA class

The term HQLA refers to high-quality liquid asset. An HQLA class groups all the securities that present the same ability to be converted into cash. An HQLA class is different than a liquidity bucket, because this latter classification is used to define the unit transaction cost function. For instance, it does not make sense that a bond and a stock share the same transaction cost function. However, they can belong to the same HQLA class if they have the same conversion property into cash.

Implementation shortfall

The implementation shortfall measures the total amount of slippage, that is the difference in price between the time a portfolio manager makes an investment decision and the actual traded price. Its mathematical expression is:

$$\mathcal{IS}\left(q\right) = \max\left(\mathbb{V}^{\text{mid}}\left(q\right) - \mathbb{V}^{\text{liquidated}}\left(q\right), 0\right)$$

where $\mathbb{V}^{\text{mid}}\left(q\right)$ is the current value of the redemption scenario and $\mathbb{V}^{\text{liquidated}}\left(q\right)$ is the value of the liquidated portfolio.

Liquidation policy

See trading limit.

Liquidation ratio

The liquidation ratio $\mathcal{LR}\left(q; h\right)$ is the proportion of the redemption trade that is liquidated after h trading days. We generally focus on daily and weekly liquidation ratios $\mathcal{LR}\left(q; 1\right)$ and $\mathcal{LR}\left(q; 5\right)$. The liquidation ratio is also used to define the liquidation time (or time to liquidation), which is an important measure for managing the liquidity risk. We also use the notation $\mathcal{LR}\left(\mathbb{R}; h\right)$ where $\mathbb{R}$ is the dollar amount of the redemption scenario.

Liquidation shortfall

The liquidation shortfall is defined as the residual redemption that cannot be fulfilled after one trading day. It is expressed as a percentage of the redemption value. If it is equal to 0%, this means that we can liquidate the redemption in one trading day. More generally, its mathematical expression is:

$$\mathcal{LS}(q) = 1 - \mathcal{LR}(q; 1)$$

where $\mathcal{LR}(q; h)$ is the liquidation ratio. If the redemption scenario is expressed in dollars, we have:

$$\mathcal{LS}(\mathbb{R}) = 1 - \mathcal{LR}(\mathbb{R}; 1)$$

Liquidation time

See time to liquidation.

Liquidity bucket

A liquidity bucket defines a set of securities that share the same liquidity properties. Therefore, the securities have the same functional form of the unit transaction cost. Examples of liquidity buckets are large cap DM stocks, small cap stocks, sovereign bonds, corporate IG bonds, HY USD bonds, HY EUR bonds, EM bonds, energy commodities, soft commodities, metal commodities, agricultural commodities, G10 currencies, EM currencies, REITS, etc. The j^{th} liquidity bucket is denoted by $\mathcal{LB}_j$.

Market impact

See price impact.

Outstanding-based participation rate

The outstanding-based participation rate is a normalization of the trade size:

$$y = \frac{q}{n}$$

where q is the number of shares that have been sold and n is the number of issued shares. The outstanding-based participation rate is a modification of the (volume-based) participation rate, because the trading volume cannot always be computed for some securities, for example bonds.

Participation rate

The participation rate is a normalization of the trade size:

$$x = \frac{q}{v}$$

where q is the number of shares that have been sold and v is the trading volume. The participation rate is used to define the unit transaction cost function $\boldsymbol{c}(x)$.

Price impact (unit)

The (unit) price impact $\pi(q)$ is the part of the unit transaction cost function which is not explained by the bid-ask spread.

Price impact (total)

The price impact (or market impact) $\mathcal{PI}(q)$ is the part of the transaction cost due to the trade size:

$$\mathcal{PI}(q) = \mathcal{TC}(q) - \mathcal{BAS}(q)$$

We generally expect that it is an increasing function of the redemption size.

Pro-rata liquidation

The pro-rata liquidation uses the proportional rule, implying that each asset is liquidated such that the structure of the portfolio is the same before and after the liquidation.

Redemption scenario

A redemption scenario q is defined by the vector $(q_1, \ldots, q_n)$ where q_i is the number of shares of security i to sell. This scenario can be expressed in dollars:

$$Q := (Q_1, \ldots, Q_n) = (q_1 P_1, \ldots, q_n P_n)$$

where P_i is the price of security i. The redemption scenario may also be defined by its dollar value $\mathbb{R}$:

$$\mathbb{R} = \mathbb{V}(q) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i P_i$$

If we consider a portfolio defined by its weights $w = (w_1, \ldots, w_n)$, we have:

$$w_i = \frac{q_i P_i}{\mathbb{R}}$$

Time to liquidation

The time to liquidation is the inverse function of the liquidation ratio. It indicates the minimum number of days that it is necessary to liquidate the proportion p of the redemption. It is denoted by the function $\mathcal{LT}(q; p)$ or $\mathcal{LT}(\mathbb{R}; p)$.

Trading limit

The trading limit q^+ is the maximum number of shares that can be sold in one trading day. It can be expressed using the maximum participation rate:

$$x^+ = \frac{q^+}{v}$$

where v is the daily volume.

Transaction cost

The transaction cost of a redemption is made up of two components: the bid-ask spread cost and the price impact cost. It is denoted by $\mathcal{TC}(q)$.

Unit transaction cost

The unit transaction cost function $\boldsymbol{c}(x)$ is the percentage cost associated with the participation rate x for selling one share. It has two components:

$$\boldsymbol{c}(x) = s + \boldsymbol{\pi}(x)$$

where s is the half bid-ask spread and $\boldsymbol{\pi}(x)$ is the price impact. The total transaction cost of selling q shares is then:

$$\mathcal{TC}(q) = q \cdot P \cdot \boldsymbol{c}(x) = Q \cdot \boldsymbol{c}(x)$$

where P is the security price and $Q = q \cdot P$ is the nominal selling volume expressed in \$.

Valuation function

The valuation function $\mathbb{V}(\omega)$ gives the dollar value of the portfolio $\omega = (\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_n)$, which is expressed in number of shares:

$$\mathbb{V}(\omega) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i P_i$$

The dollar value of the redemption is equal to $\mathbb{R} = \mathbb{V}(q) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i P_i$, whereas the dollar value of the portfolio becomes $\mathbb{V}(\omega - q) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} (\omega_i - q_i) P_i$ after the liquidation of the redemption scenario.

Vertical slicing

See pro-rata liquidation.

Volume-based participation rate

See participation rate.

Waterfall liquidation

In this approach, the portfolio is liquidate by selling the most liquid assets first.

B Mathematical results

B.1 Relationship between the two unit cost functions in the toy model

We note:

$$\boldsymbol{c}'(x) = \begin{cases} s' & \text{if } x \leq \tilde{x} \\ s' + \alpha'(x - \tilde{x}) & \text{if } \tilde{x} \leq x < x^+ \\ +\infty & \text{if } x \geq x^+ \end{cases} \tag{58}$$

and:

$$\boldsymbol{c}''(x) = \begin{cases} s'' + \alpha'' x & \text{if } x < x^+ \\ +\infty & \text{if } x \geq x^+ \end{cases} \tag{59}$$

If we assume that $\boldsymbol{c}'(0) = \boldsymbol{c}''(0)$ and $\boldsymbol{c}'(x^+) = \boldsymbol{c}''(x^+)$, we have the following relationships:

$$\alpha' = \alpha'' \left(\frac{x^+}{x^+ - \tilde{x}} \right)$$

and:

$$\alpha'' = \alpha' \left(\frac{x^+ - \tilde{x}}{x^+} \right)$$

However, most of the time, we do not know the two analytical functions. Let us assume that the true model is given by $\boldsymbol{c}'(x)$, whereas we estimate the approximated model $\hat{\boldsymbol{c}}''(x)$, which is defined by:

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{c}}''(x) = \begin{cases} \hat{s}'' + \hat{\alpha}'' x & \text{if } x < x^+ \\ +\infty & \text{if } x \geq x^+ \end{cases} \tag{60}$$

The least square estimates $\hat{s}''$ and $\hat{\alpha}''$ are equal to:

$$\hat{s}'' = \bar{\boldsymbol{c}}'(x) - \hat{\alpha}'' \bar{x}$$

and:

$$\hat{\alpha}'' = \frac{\int_0^{x^+} (x - \bar{x}) \left(\boldsymbol{c}'(x) - \bar{\boldsymbol{c}}'(x) \right) \mathrm{d}x}{\int_0^{x^+} (x - \bar{x})^2 \, \mathrm{d}x}$$

where $\bar{x}$ and $\bar{\boldsymbol{c}}'(x)$ are given by the mean value theorem:

$$\bar{x} = \frac{\int_0^{x^+} x \, \mathrm{d}x}{x^+} = \frac{x^+}{2}$$

and:

$$\bar{\boldsymbol{c}}'(x) = \frac{\int_0^{x^+} \boldsymbol{c}'(x) \, \mathrm{d}x}{x^+} = s' + \alpha' \frac{(x^+ - \tilde{x})^2}{2x^+}$$

We deduce that the least square estimates are:

$$\hat{\alpha}'' = \alpha' \left(1 + 2 \left(\frac{\tilde{x}}{x^+} \right)^3 - 3 \left(\frac{\tilde{x}}{x^+} \right)^2 \right)$$

and:

$$\hat{s}'' = s' - \alpha' \tilde{x} \left(1 - \frac{\tilde{x}}{x^+} \right)^2$$

because we have:

$$\begin{aligned}\int_0^{x^+} (x-\bar{x})^2 \,\mathrm{d}x &= \int_0^{x^+} \left(x-\frac{x^+}{2}\right)^2 \mathrm{d}x \\ &= \frac{1}{3}\left[\left(x-\frac{x^+}{2}\right)^3\right]_0^{x^+} \\ &= \frac{2}{3}\left(\frac{x^+}{2}\right)^3\end{aligned}$$

and[58]:

$$\begin{aligned}(*) &= \int_0^{x^+} (x-\bar{x})\left(\boldsymbol{c}'(x)-\bar{c}'(x)\right)\mathrm{d}x \\ &= \int_0^{\tilde{x}} \left(x-\frac{x^+}{2}\right)\left(s'-s'-\alpha'\frac{\left(x^+-\tilde{x}\right)^2}{2x^+}\right)\mathrm{d}x + \\ &\quad \int_{\tilde{x}}^{x^+} \left(x-\frac{x^+}{2}\right)\left(s'+\alpha'(x-\tilde{x})-s'-\alpha'\frac{\left(x^+-\tilde{x}\right)^2}{2x^+}\right)\mathrm{d}x \\ &= \alpha'\int_{\tilde{x}}^{x^+} \left(x-\frac{x^+}{2}\right)(x-\tilde{x})\,\mathrm{d}x - \alpha'\frac{\left(x^+-\tilde{x}\right)^2}{2x^+}\int_0^{x^+}\left(x-\frac{x^+}{2}\right)\mathrm{d}x \\ &= \alpha'\int_{\tilde{x}}^{x^+}\left(x^2-\left(\frac{2\tilde{x}+x^+}{2}\right)x+\frac{\tilde{x}x^+}{2}\right)\mathrm{d}x \\ &= \alpha'\left[\frac{x^3}{3}-\left(\frac{2\tilde{x}+x^+}{4}\right)x^2+\frac{\tilde{x}x^+}{2}x\right]_{\tilde{x}}^{x^+} \\ &= \alpha'\left(\frac{1}{12}\left(x^+\right)^3+\frac{1}{6}\tilde{x}^3-\frac{1}{4}\tilde{x}^2x^+\right)\end{aligned}$$

In Figure 28, we illustrate how to transform one form of cost function into another form. In practice, we do not know the models $\boldsymbol{c}'(x)$ and $\boldsymbol{c}''(x)$. In fact, we estimate $\hat{\boldsymbol{c}}''(x)$. The right issue is then to transform $\hat{\boldsymbol{c}}''(x)$ into $\boldsymbol{c}'(x)$ or even $\boldsymbol{c}''(x)$. If we consider that the true model is $\boldsymbol{c}'(x)$, we have the following relationships:

$$\alpha' = \hat{\alpha}''\frac{\left(x^+\right)^3}{\left(\left(x^+\right)^3+2\tilde{x}^3-3\tilde{x}^2x^+\right)} \tag{61}$$

and:

$$\alpha'' = \hat{\alpha}''\frac{\left(x^+\right)^2\left(x^+-\tilde{x}\right)}{\left(\left(x^+\right)^3+2\tilde{x}^3-3\tilde{x}^2x^+\right)} \tag{62}$$

If the true model is $\boldsymbol{c}''(x)$, we have $\alpha'' = \hat{\alpha}''$.

Remark 30 *In Figure 28, the parameters are equal to $s' = 2$ bps, $\alpha' = 2\%$, $\tilde{x} = 2\%$ and $x^+ = 8\%$. We find that $\alpha'' = 1.5\%$, while the OLS estimation gives $\hat{s}'' = -0.25$ bps and $\hat{\alpha}'' = 1.6875\%$.*

[58] We have:

$$\int_0^{x^+}\left(x-\frac{x^+}{2}\right)\mathrm{d}x = 0$$

Figure 28: Equivalence of cost models



B.2 Analytics of portfolio distortion

B.2.1 Portfolio weights

We recall that the asset structure of the fund is given by the portfolio $\omega = (\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_n)$, where ω_i is the number of shares of security i. The portfolio weights are then equal to $w(\omega) = (w_1(\omega), \ldots, w_n(\omega))$ where:

$$w_i(\omega) = \frac{\omega_i P_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n \omega_j P_j} \tag{63}$$

and P_i is the current price of security i. Let $q = (q_1, \ldots, q_n)$ be the redemption scenario. It follows that the redemption weights are given by:

$$w_i(q) = \frac{q_i P_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n q_j P_j} \tag{64}$$

After the liquidation of q, the new asset structure is equal to $\omega - q$, and the new weights of the portfolio become:

$$w_i(\omega - q) = \frac{(\omega_i - q_i) P_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n (\omega_j - q_j) P_j} \tag{65}$$

We note $\mathbb{V}(\omega) = \sum_{j=1}^n \omega_j P_j$ and $\mathbb{V}(\omega - q) = \sum_{j=1}^n (\omega_j - q_j) P_j$ the dollar value of the portfolios before and after the liquidation. We notice that $\mathbb{V}(\omega) - \mathbb{V}(\omega - q)$ is exactly equal to the dollar value $\mathbb{R}$ of the redemption:

$$\mathbb{R} = \mathbb{V}(\omega) - \mathbb{V}(\omega - q) = \sum_{j=1}^n q_j P_j = \mathbb{V}(q)$$

We have:

$$\begin{aligned} w_i(\omega - q) &= \frac{\omega_i P_i}{\mathbb{V}(\omega) - \mathbb{R}} - \frac{q_i P_i}{\mathbb{V}(\omega) - \mathbb{R}} \\ &= \frac{\mathbb{V}(\omega)}{\mathbb{V}(\omega) - \mathbb{R}} w_i(\omega) - \frac{\mathbb{R}}{\mathbb{V}(\omega) - \mathbb{R}} w_i(q) \end{aligned}$$

The new weights $w_i(\omega - q)$ are a non-linear function of the portfolio weights $w_i(\omega)$, the redemption weights $w_i(q)$ and the redemption value $\mathbb{R}$. Except in the case[59] where $q_i \propto \omega_i$, computing the new weights is not straightforward because they depend on $\mathbb{R}$. From a theoretical point of view, we have $0 \leq q_i \leq \omega_i$ because the maximum we can sell is the number of shares in the portfolio. One problem is that the weights $w_i(\omega - q)$ are continuous whereas the number of shares q_i is an integer. This is why we prefer to consider the fuzzy constraint $-\epsilon \leq q_i \leq \omega_i + \epsilon$, where ϵ is typically equal to $1/2$. Since $\sum_{i=1}^n w_i(\omega - q) = 1$, we deduce that:

$$-\epsilon \leq q_i \leq \omega_i + \epsilon \Leftrightarrow -\epsilon_i \leq w_i(\omega - q) \leq \min\left(\frac{\mathbb{V}(\omega)}{\mathbb{V}(\omega) - \mathbb{R}} w_i(\omega) + \epsilon_i, 1\right)$$

where:

$$\epsilon_i = \frac{\epsilon P_i}{\mathbb{V}(\omega) - \mathbb{R}}$$

We note the two bounds $w_i^-(\omega - q)$ and $w_i^+(\omega - q)$.

Remark 31 *From Equation (65), we deduce that:*

$$q_i = \frac{\mathbb{V}(\omega)(w_i(\omega) - w_i(\omega - q)) + \mathbb{R} w_i(\omega - q)}{P_i}$$

We can then compute q_i thanks to the previous equation when we know the portfolios weights $w_i(\omega)$ and $w_i(\omega - q)$.

B.2.2 Liquidation tracking error

We assume that the asset returns are normally distributed: $R = (R_1, \ldots, R_n) \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \Sigma)$. The random return of the portfolio ω is then equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} R(\omega) &= \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \omega_i P_i R_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n \omega_j P_j} \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^n w_i(\omega) R_i \\ &= w_i(\omega)^\top R \end{aligned}$$

We conclude that:

$$R(\omega) \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, w(\omega)^\top \Sigma w(\omega)\right)$$

If we consider the portfolio $\omega - q$, we have $R(\omega - q) = w(\omega - q)^\top R$ and:

$$\begin{pmatrix} R(\omega) \\ R(\omega - q) \end{pmatrix} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} w(\omega)^\top \Sigma w(\omega) & w(\omega)^\top \Sigma w(\omega - q) \\ w(\omega - q)^\top \Sigma w(\omega) & w(\omega - q)^\top \Sigma w(\omega - q) \end{pmatrix}\right)$$

[59] We have $w_i(\omega - q) = w_i(\omega)$.

Let e be the tracking error between the portfolios before and after the redemption. We have:

$$\begin{aligned} e &= R(\omega - q) - R(\omega) \\ &= (w(\omega) - w(\omega - q))^\top R \end{aligned}$$

The standard deviation of e is called the "*liquidation tracking error*" and is denoted by $\sigma(q \mid \omega)$:

$$\sigma(q \mid \omega) = \sqrt{(w(\omega) - w(\omega - q))^\top \Sigma (w(\omega) - w(\omega - q))}$$

This is our measure of the portfolio distortion $\mathcal{D}(q \mid \omega)$.

Remark 32 *In the case where the redemption scenario does not modify the asset structure, we have $q_i = \mathcal{R}\omega_i$ and:*

$$\begin{aligned} w(\omega - q) &= \frac{(\omega_i - q_i) P_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n (\omega_j - q_j) P_j} \\ &= \frac{(\omega_i - \mathcal{R}\omega_i) P_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n (\omega_j - \mathcal{R}\omega_j) P_j} \\ &= \frac{(1 - \mathcal{R}) \omega_i P_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n (1 - \mathcal{R}) \omega_j P_j} \\ &= w_i \end{aligned}$$

We conclude that the portfolio distortion is equal to zero.

B.2.3 Optimal portfolio liquidation

Let $c(q \mid \omega)$ be the cost of liquidating the redemption scenario q. The problem of optimal portfolio liquidation is:

$$\begin{aligned} q^\star &= \arg\min_q c(q \mid \omega) \\ &\text{s.t.} \begin{cases} \sigma(q \mid \omega) \leq \mathcal{D}^+ \\ \mathbf{1}_n^\top w(\omega - q) = 1 \\ w^-(\omega - q) \leq w(\omega - q) \leq w^+(\omega - q) \end{cases} \end{aligned} \tag{66}$$

where $\mathcal{D}^+ \geq 0$ is the maximum portfolio distortion. If $\mathcal{D}^+ = 0$, the optimal solution is $q^\star \propto \omega$. If $\mathcal{D}^+ = \infty$, the distortion constraint vanishes, and the solution corresponds to the redemption scenario that presents the lower liquidating cost.

We can rewrite the previous problem as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} q^\star(\lambda) &= \arg\min \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(q \mid \omega) + \lambda c(q \mid \omega) \\ &\text{s.t.} \begin{cases} \mathbf{1}_n^\top w(\omega - q) = 1 \\ w^-(\omega - q) \leq w(\omega - q) \leq w^+(\omega - q) \end{cases} \end{aligned} \tag{67}$$

This optimization problem is close to the γ-problem of mean-variance optimization (Roncalli, 2013). Nevertheless, this is not a QP problem, meaning that it is more complex to solve numerically. The underlying idea is then to write q as a function of $w(q)$ with $q_i = w_i(q)\,\mathbb{R}/P_i$ and minimizing the objective function (67) with respect to $w(q)$. Given a dollar value $\mathbb{R}$ of redemption, the set of optimal portfolio liquidations is given by $\{q^\star(\lambda), \lambda \in [0, \infty)\}$ and the efficient frontier corresponds to the parametric curve $(\sigma(q^\star(\lambda) \mid \omega), c(q^\star(\lambda) \mid \omega))$.

B.3 Modeling the market risk of corporate bonds

Let $\mathfrak{s}_i(t)$ be the credit spread of the i^{th} bond issuer. Following Roncalli (2013, pages 223-227), we assume that the credit spread follows a general diffusion process:

$$\mathrm{d}\mathfrak{s}_i(t) = \sigma_i^{\mathfrak{s}} \mathfrak{s}_i(t)\, \mathrm{d}W_i(t) \tag{68}$$

where $W_i(t)$ is a standard Brownian motion and $\sigma_i^{\mathfrak{s}}$ is a volatility parameter. We note $B_i(t, D_i)$ the zero-coupon bond price with maturity (or duration) D_i of the i^{th} issuer. If we assume that the recovery date is equal to zero, we have:

$$\mathrm{d}\ln B_i(t, D_i) = -D_i\, \mathrm{d}r(t) - D_i\, \mathrm{d}\mathfrak{s}_i(t)$$

where $r(t)$ is the risk-free interest rate. If we assume that the credit spread is not correlated with the risk-free interest rate, we deduce that:

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma^2(\mathrm{d}\ln B_i(t, D_i)) &= D_i^2\sigma^2(\mathrm{d}r(t)) + D_i^2\sigma^2(\mathrm{d}\mathfrak{s}_i(t)) \\ &= D_i^2\sigma^2(\mathrm{d}r(t)) + D_i^2(\sigma_i^{\mathfrak{s}})^2\mathfrak{s}_i^2(t)\,\mathrm{d}t \end{aligned} \tag{69}$$

We deduce that the volatility of a bond has two parts: an interest rate component and a credit spread component.

If the credit risk component is sufficiently large with respect to the interest rate component, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma(\mathrm{d}\ln B_i(t, D_i)) &\approx \sigma_i^{\mathfrak{s}} \cdot D_i \cdot \mathfrak{s}_i(t) \\ &= \sigma_i^{\mathfrak{s}} \cdot \mathrm{DTS}_i(t) \end{aligned} \tag{70}$$

where $\mathrm{DTS}_i(t)$ is the duration-times-spread (or DTS) measure (Ben Dor *et al.*, 2007).

C Data

We consider the asset liquidity data provided by Amundi Asset Management. The database is called "*Amundi Liquidity Lab*" and contains the trades made by Amundi, but also other information such as order books for equities and the price quotations for bonds[60]. We filter the data in order to obtain a dataset with all the available characteristics, which are representative of normal trading. For instance, we exclude bond trades that are initiated by the counterparty. We also exclude equity trades that are made by an index fund manager when the transaction concerns a basket of stocks that replicate the index. Indeed, in this case, the transaction cost is generally related to the index, and does not necessarily reflect the transaction cost of each component. Finally, we use a subset of the data.

C.1 Equities

We use a sample of trades for the stocks that belong to the MSCI USA, MSCI Europe, MSCI USA Small Cap and MSCI Europe Small Cap indices. We also complete this database with pre-trade transaction costs computed by the BECS system (Citigroup, 2020) when we observe few observations for a given stock. Finally, we have a sample of 149 896 trades.

C.2 Sovereign bonds

We use a sample of 196 286 trades from January 2018 to December 2020 with the following split by currency:

Currency	EUR	USD	GBP	JPY	AUD	CAD	DKK
# of trades	129 904	34 965	7 354	6 831	4 277	3 586	1 409
Currency	SEK	MXN	PLN	MYR	SGD	ZAR	Other
# of trades	915	882	794	592	581	458	3 738

and the following split by the issuer's country:

Country	IT	FR	US	DE	ES	BE	GB
# of trades	31 870	23 033	20 798	19 587	16 668	8 961	7 646
Country	JP	NL	AT	AU	CA	PT	Other
# of trades	6 874	6 663	6 619	4 383	3 950	3 900	35 334

C.3 Corporate bonds

We use a sample of 258 153 trades from January 2018 to December 2020 with the following split by currency:

Currency	EUR	USD	GBP	SGD	AUD	CAD	CNH	Other
# of trades	204 724	46 620	5 791	307	194	138	128	251

and the following split by the issuer's country:

Country	US	FR	NL	GB	DE	IT	LU
# of trades	49 410	48 257	34 782	21 710	16 358	16 037	12 150
Country	ES	SE	IE	MX	AT	BE	Other
# of trades	11 797	5 857	4 775	3 799	3 289	3 173	27 709

[60] For each trade, we have at least three price quotations by three different banks and brokers.

D Price impact of the benchmark formulas

Table 33: Price impact (in bps) for large cap stocks

σ	x (in %)								
(in %)	0.01	0.05	0.10	0.50	1	5	10	20	30
10	0.2	0.6	0.8	1.8	2	6	8	11	14
20	0.5	1.1	1.6	3.5	5	11	16	22	27
30	0.7	1.7	2.4	5.3	7	17	24	33	41
40	1.0	2.2	3.1	7.0	10	22	31	44	54
50	1.2	2.8	3.9	8.8	12	28	39	55	68
60	1.5	3.3	4.7	10.5	15	33	47	67	82

Table 34: Price impact (in bps) for small cap stocks

σ	x (in %)								
(in %)	0.01	0.05	0.10	0.50	1	5	10	20	30
10	0.3	0.7	1.0	2.2	3	7	10	14	17
20	0.6	1.4	2.0	4.4	6	14	20	28	34
30	0.9	2.1	2.9	6.6	9	21	29	42	51
40	1.2	2.8	3.9	8.8	12	28	39	55	68
50	1.6	3.5	4.9	11.0	16	35	49	69	85
60	1.9	4.2	5.9	13.2	19	42	59	83	102

Table 35: Price impact (in bps) for sovereign bonds

σ	y (in bps)								
(in %)	0.01	0.10	1	2.5	5	10	20	50	100
1	0.6	1.0	1.9	2.3	2.8	3	4	5	6
2	1.2	2.1	3.7	4.7	5.6	7	8	10	12
3	1.8	3.1	5.6	7.0	8.3	10	12	15	18
5	2.9	5.2	9.3	11.7	13.9	17	20	25	29
10	5.9	10.5	18.6	23.4	27.8	33	39	49	59
15	8.8	15.7	27.9	35.1	41.7	50	59	74	88
20	11.8	20.9	37.2	46.8	55.6	66	79	99	118

Table 36: Price impact (in bps) for corporate bonds

DTS	y (in bps)								
(in bps)	0.01	0.10	1	2.5	5	10	20	50	100
50	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.9	1	1	2	2
100	0.4	0.7	1.3	1.6	1.9	2	3	3	4
250	1.0	1.8	3.1	3.9	4.7	6	7	8	10
500	2.0	3.5	6.3	7.9	9.3	11	13	17	20
1 000	4.0	7.0	12.5	15.7	18.7	22	26	33	40
2 500	9.9	17.6	31.3	39.3	46.7	56	66	83	99
5 000	19.8	35.1	62.5	78.6	93.5	111	132	166	198

E Additional results

Figure 29: Linear modeling of unit transaction costs



Figure 30: Comparing unit and total transaction costs in normal and stress periods



Table 37: Participation rate $x_i\,(h)$ (in %)

h	Asset #1	Asset #2	Asset #3	Asset #4	Asset #5
1	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%	8.75%	0.90%
2	10.00%	10.00%	10.00%		
3	10.00%	0.05%	10.00%		
4	10.00%		7.75%		
5	3.51%				

Table 38: Notional $Q_i\,(h)$ (in \$)

h	Asset #1	Asset #2	Asset #3	Asset #4	Asset #5
1	89 000	102 000	13 400	20 825	10 602
2	89 000	102 000	13 400		
3	89 000	510	13 400		
4	89 000		10 385		
5	31 239				

Table 39: Bid-ask spread cost (in \$)

h	Asset #1	Asset #2	Asset #3	Asset #4	Asset #5	Total
1	35.60	40.80	6.70	10.41	5.30	98.81
2	35.60	40.80	6.70			83.10
3	35.60		6.70			42.50
4	35.60		5.19			40.79
5	12.50					12.50
Total	154.90	81.80	25.29	10.41	5.30	277.71

Table 40: Price impact cost (in \$)

h	Asset #1	Asset #2	Asset #3	Asset #4	Asset #5	Total
1	617.10	565.79	66.90	151.62	12.48	1 413.89
2	617.10	565.79	66.90			1 249.80
3	617.10	0.14	66.90			684.14
4	617.10		40.18			657.28
5	90.74					90.74
Total	2 559.16	1 131.73	240.87	151.62	12.48	4 095.85

Table 41: Transaction cost (in \$)

h	Asset #1	Asset #2	Asset #3	Asset #4	Asset #5	Total
1	652.70	606.59	73.60	162.03	17.78	1 512.70
2	652.70	606.59	73.60			1 332.90
3	652.70	0.35	73.60			726.65
4	652.70		45.37			698.08
5	103.24					103.24
Total	2 714.05	1 213.53	266.16	162.03	17.78	4 373.55

Figure 31: Estimated price impact (in bps) — logarithmic scale



Table 42: Two-stage estimation of the sovereign bond transaction cost model without the intercept by issuer

Issuer	γ_1	$\beta^{(s)}$	$\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$	R^2 (in %)	R_c^2 (in %)
Austria	0.2255	0.8023	3.0845	53.9	48.2
Belgium	0.2482	0.7789	3.3738	44.0	32.5
EM	0.0519	0.9158	0.4746	73.6	44.7
Finland	0.2894	0.7114	4.0416	46.3	31.8
France	0.2138	0.8942	3.0148	40.1	29.7
Germany	0.2415	1.0413	2.7838	51.5	38.5
Ireland	0.2098	0.6600	2.4977	43.8	26.4
Italy	0.1744	2.4706	1.7640	31.0	22.0
Japan	0.0657	0.5635	0.7315	78.0	53.4
Netherlands	0.2320	0.7219	3.7355	46.9	34.2
Portugal	0.2318	0.9693	3.0639	49.6	33.0
Spain	0.2185	1.3000	2.0990	40.8	26.7
United Kingdom	0.2194	0.9739	2.6262	49.9	28.5
USA	0.1252	1.1055	1.3395	53.6	40.7

Table 43: Two-stage estimation of the sovereign bond transaction cost model without the intercept by currency

Currency	γ_1	$\beta^{(s)}$	$\tilde{\beta}^{(\boldsymbol{\pi})}$	R^2 (in %)	R_c^2 (in %)
EUR	0.2262	1.0428	2.9347	35.2	25.7
GBP	0.2117	1.5328	2.2890	48.3	29.5
JPY	0.0834	0.5744	0.9771	74.2	48.2
USD	0.1408	0.9502	1.0906	60.4	45.4

Figure 32: Relationship between volatility and duration-times-spread (sovereign bonds)



Figure 33: Empirical distribution of the additive factor Δ_σ



Figure 34: Empirical distribution of the multiplicative factor m_v



Figure 35: Empirical distribution of the multiplicative factor m_s



Figure 36: Empirical distribution of the additive factor Δ_s



Table 44: Stress scenarios of the participation rate

	$\mathcal{T}$ (in years)		0.385	1/2	1	2	5	10	50
	α (in %)		99.00	99.23	99.62	99.81	99.92	99.96	99.99
1W	Empirical		1.26	1.30	1.39	1.49	1.64	1.81	2.07
	BM/GEV	Pooling	1.16	1.18	1.23	1.28	1.35	1.40	1.53
	POT/GPD	Pooling	1.15	1.20	1.33	1.46	1.64	1.78	2.12
	BM/GEV	Averaging	1.14	1.16	1.19	1.22	1.27	1.30	1.37
	POT/GPD	Averaging	1.23	1.24	1.26	1.28	1.31	1.34	1.39
1M	Empirical		1.99	2.10	2.45	2.81	3.27	3.49	3.79
	BM/GEV	Pooling	1.39	1.45	1.61	1.78	1.99	2.15	2.55
	POT/GPD	Pooling	2.53	2.60	2.80	2.99	3.25	3.45	3.90
	BM/GEV	Averaging	1.34	1.38	1.48	1.58	1.71	1.81	2.04
	POT/GPD	Averaging	1.62	1.65	1.75	1.85	1.98	2.10	2.38

Part III
Managing the Asset-Liability Liquidity Risk

Liquidity Stress Testing in Asset Management Part 3. Managing the Asset-Liability Liquidity Risk*

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Abstract

This article is part of a comprehensive research project on liquidity risk in asset management, which can be divided into three dimensions. The first dimension covers the modeling of the liability liquidity risk (or funding liquidity), the second dimension is dedicated to the modeling of the asset liquidity risk (or market liquidity), whereas the third dimension considers the management of the asset-liability liquidity risk (or asset-liability matching). The purpose of this research is to propose a methodological and practical framework in order to perform liquidity stress testing programs, which comply with regulatory guidelines (ESMA, 2019a, 2020a) and are useful for fund managers. The review of the academic literature and professional research studies shows that there is a lack of standardized and analytical models. The aim of this research project is then to fill the gap with the goal of developing mathematical and statistical approaches, and providing appropriate answers.

In this third and last research paper focused on managing the asset-liability liquidity risk, we explore the ALM tools that can be put in place to control the liquidity gap. These ALM tools can be split into three categories: measurement tools, management tools and monitoring tools. In terms of measurement tools, we focus on the computation of the redemption coverage ratio (RCR), which is the central instrument of liquidity stress testing programs. We also study the redemption liquidation policy and the different implementation methodologies, and we show how reverse stress testing can be developed. In terms of liquidity management tools, we study the calibration of liquidity buffers, the pros and cons of special arrangements (redemption suspensions, gates, side pockets and in-kind redemptions) and the effectiveness of swing pricing. In terms of liquidity monitoring tools, we compare the macro- and micro-approaches to liquidity monitoring in order to identify the transmission channels of liquidity risk.

Keywords: asset-liability management, liquidity risk, liquidity management tool (LMT), stress testing, redemption coverage ratio, liquidity buffer, swing pricing.

JEL classification: C02, G32.

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1 Introduction

The guidelines on liquidity stress testing in UCITS and AIFs produced by ESMA (2020a) are rooted in the banking regulation defined by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS, 2010, 2013). For instance, the redemption coverage ratio, which is the key instrument of LST programs, is a copy-paste of the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) in the Basel III Accord. According to BCBS (2008), liquidity risk management in the banking industry must be structured around three pillars: measurement, management and monitoring. Beyond the redemption coverage ratio, which is typically a measurement tool, ESMA (2020a) adopt a similar approach by mixing the three Ms.

Liquidity risk is an important topic for the banking sector because it concerns systemic risk. We face similar issues for the asset management industry because it can generate big market risks. Since liquidity risk is an ALM risk (Roncalli, 2020, Chapter 7), it concerns both liabilities and assets. As mentioned by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), the interconnectedness between funding liquidity and market liquidity amplifies the liquidity risk. This is obvious in stress periods, but this is even the case in normal periods when we consider the asset management industry. The reason is that redeeming investors impose negative externalities on the remaining investors:

> "*Strategic interaction is a key determinant of investors' behavior in financial markets and institutions. When choosing their investment strategy, investors have to consider, not only the expected fundamentals of the investment, but also the expected behavior of other investors, which could have a first-order effect on investment returns. Particularly interesting are situations with payoff complementarities, where investors' incentives to take a certain action increase if they expect that more investors will take such an action. Payoff complementarities are expected to generate a multiplier effect, by which they amplify the impact that shocks to fundamentals have on investors' behavior. Such amplification is often referred to as financial fragility*" (Chen *et al.*, 2010, page 239).

This *financial fragility* has been documented in several asset classes (Bouveret and Yu, 2021; Chernenko and Sunderam, 2020; Fricke and Fricke, 2021; Fricke and Wilke, 2020; Rohleder *et al.*, 2017; Goldstein *et al.*, 2017). The negative externalities and their major impact when considering stress periods explain that financial regulators have recently paid more attention to liquidity management in the asset management industry (AMF, 2017; BaFin, 2017; EFAMA, 2020; ESRB, 2017), while the regulation of asset managers in terms of liquidity management was light in the 2000s. Nevertheless, introducing more stringent regulations in the asset management industry is not a new concept and dates back to the roadmap of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) when it was created in April 2009 after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis to monitor the stability of the financial system and manage systemic risk (Roncalli, 2020, page 453).

However, the lack of maturity and benchmarking is an obstacle for the development of liquidity stress testing in the asset management industry. One of the big challenges for regulators is standardizing models and practices. In the case of the banking industry, the Basel Committee has been successful in proposing statistical frameworks for market and credit risks. This is not the case in the asset management industry, where academic research is relatively invisible on the liability side. As such, most solutions are in-house and not published, implying limited distribution of best practices and, generally simplistic and naive methods being developed. Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that mathematical and statistical models are completely absent from regulatory publications, especially in the case of the ESMA guidelines on liquidity stress testing in asset management.

This paper completes a research project that began in April 2020 and was organized into three streams. The first stream covered the liability side and funding liquidity modeling. In Roncalli *et al.* (2021a), we introduced two statistical approaches that can be used to define a redemption shock scenario. The first one is the historical approach and considers non-parametric risk measures such as the historical or conditional value-at-risk. The second approach deals with frequency-severity models, which produces parametric risk measures and stress scenarios. Three of these probabilistic models are particularly interesting: the zero-inflated (or population-based) statistical model, the behavioral (or individual-based) model and the factor-based model. The second stream focused on the asset side and transaction cost modeling. In Roncalli *et al.* (2021b), we proposed a two-regime model to estimate ex-ante transaction costs and market impacts. This model is an extension of the square-root model and considers trading limits in order to comply with the practices of asset managers. Based on proprietary and industry data, we were able to perform the calibration for large cap stocks, small cap stocks, sovereign bonds and corporate bonds. Moreover, we have detailed the analytics of liquidation rate, time to liquidation and liquidation shortfall to assess the liquidity risk profile of investment funds. The third stream corresponds to this research paper. The aim is to combine liability and asset risks in order to define the ALM tools. Therefore, this paper extensively mixes the previous models. For instance, a stress scenario may originate from the liabilities or the assets or both. Synthetic measures such as the funding gap or funding ratio are essential for asset-liability management. These measures are particularly exploited for the purpose of defining appropriate liquidation policies and the management tools that can be put in place. Besides traditional management methods, asset managers are paying more and more attention to liquidity buffers. The widespread use of cash buffers for the purpose of liquidity stress testing may have some significant impacts in terms of reducing or increasing systemic risk. The recent debate on cash buffering versus cash hoarding and the "*dash for cash*" episode during the Covid-19 crisis in March 2020 demonstrate that the liquidity issue in asset management remains as before. This implies that asset managers must continue to develop the required tools and adopt more responsive tools. This is especially true for monitoring tools that must use higher frequency data.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the liquidity measurement tools. We introduce the redemption coverage ratio (RCR) and the two computational approaches (time to liquidation and high-quality liquid assets). We also focus on the redemption liquidation policy and the differences between vertical and horizontal slicing. Compared to banks, reverse stress testing (RST) is more complex because two dimensions can be chosen, implying that we can define a liability or an asset RST scenario. Section 3 is dedicated to liquidity managements tools (LMTs). Besides swing pricing and special arrangements (redemption suspensions, gates, side pockets and in-kind redemptions), we extensively study the set-up of a liquidity buffer. We propose an optimization model that considers the costs and benefits of implementing a cash buffer and derive the optimal solution that depends on the risk premium of assets, the tracking error risk and the liquidation gain. Using the square-root transaction cost model, we obtain analytical formulas and test the impact of the different parameters. The liquidity monitoring tools are discussed in Section 4. We distinguish the macro-economic and micro-economic approaches. The macro-economic approach helps to define overall liquidity and is related to central bank liquidity and the economic outlook. This approach is extensively used by financial regulators and international bodies. In a liquidity stress testing framework, it must be complemented by a micro-economic approach that considers the daily liquidity at the asset class, security and issuer levels. Data collection from order books, market infrastructure and the trading desk of the asset manager is the key to successfully building a suitable monitoring system. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.

2 Liquidity measurement tools

Among the three Ms, measurement is certainly the most important and difficult step of liquidity stress testing programs. Indeed, it encompasses two sources of uncertainty: liability risk and asset risk. As shown by Roncalli *et al.* (2021a), there are two main approaches for measuring the liability risk. We can use an historical approach or a frequency-severity framework. For this latter, we also have the choice between three models: the zero-inflated statistical model, the behavioral model or the factor-based model. On the asset risk side, things are simpler since we generally consider the power-law model as a standard approach. However, calibrating the parameters remains a fragile exercise that is highly dependent on the historical data of the asset manager (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021b).

As explained in the introduction, benchmarking will be a key factor for improving these measures. Nevertheless, there is certainly another issue that is even more detrimental. Indeed, the definition of the concepts is not always precise, and the regulators of the asset management industry are less prolific than the regulators of the banking industry. However, the devil is in the details. This is why we define the different measurement concepts more precisely in this section. First, we present the redemption coverage ratio and the two approaches for computing it. Then, we focus on the redemption liquidation policy, which must specify the appropriate decision in the case of a liquidity crisis. Finally, the regulation requires that the asset manager defines reverse stress testing scenarios and explores circumstances that might cause them to occur.

2.1 Redemption coverage ratio

According to ESMA (2020a), the redemption coverage ratio (RCR) is "*a measurement of the ability of a fund's assets to meet funding obligations arising from the liabilities side of the balance sheet, such as a redemption shock*". Except for this definition[1], there are no other references to this concept in the ESMA guidelines. Therefore, we must explore other resources to clarify it, but they are few in number (Bouveret, 2017; IMF, 2017; ESMA, 2020b).

The redemption coverage ratio was introduced by Bouveret (2017), who defines it as follows:

$$\text{RCR} = \frac{\text{Liquid assets}}{\text{Net outflows}} \tag{1}$$

where net outflows and liquid assets correspond respectively to redemption shocks and the amount of the portfolio that can be liquidated over a given time horizon. There are two possible cases:

- if the RCR is above 1, then the fund's portfolio is sufficiently liquid to cope with the redemption scenario;
- if the RCR is below 1, then the liquidity profile of the fund may be worsened when the redemption scenario occurs.

In this second case, the outcome will depend largely on the market liquidity conditions. Indeed, there is a pricing risk on the NAV because the fund will have to sell illiquid assets in an illiquid market. The amount of additional assets to be sold is called the liquidity shortfall (LS):

$$\text{LS} = \max\left(0, \text{Net outflows} - \text{Liquid assets}\right) \tag{2}$$

[1] It can be found on page 7 of the ESMA guidelines (ESMA, 2020a).

In order to compare the liquidity profile of several funds, the measure LS is expressed as a percentage of the fund's total net assets (TNA).

Remark 1 *The RCR and LS measures refer to banking ALM concepts. Indeed, asset-liability management is based on two risk measures: the funding ratio and the funding gap (Roncalli, 2020, Chapter 7, page 376). When the ALM is applied to liquidity risk, we refer to liquidity ratio and liquidity gap. It is obvious that the redemption coverage ratio is related to the liquidity (coverage) ratio, while the liquidity shortfall is equivalent to the liquidity gap.*

The International Monetary Fund has used the redemption coverage ratio in the case of its financial sector assessment program (FSAP) for two countries: Luxembourg in 2017 and the United States in 2020. These two FSAP exercises showed that a significant proportion of the funds would have enough liquid assets to meet redemption shocks. However, the IMF found that the most vulnerable categories are HY and EM bond funds in Luxembourg (IMF, 2017) and HY and loan mutual funds in the US (IMF, 2020). In the case of Luxembourg funds, Figure 1 shows that about 30 bond funds have an RCR below 1, and 50% of them have a liquidity shortfall greater than 10%, which is the borrowing limit for UCITS funds.

Figure 1: LS and RCR for selected investment funds



Source: IMF (2017, Figure 19, page 59).

2.1.1 Time to liquidation approach

Mathematical framework We consider a fund, whose asset structure is given by the vector $\omega = (\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_n)$ where ω_i is the number of shares of security i and n is the number of securities that make up the asset portfolio. By construction, the fund's total net assets are equal to:

$$\text{TNA} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i \cdot P_i \tag{3}$$

where P_i is the current price of security i. The mathematical expressions of Equations (1) and (2) are:

$$\text{RCR} = \frac{\mathcal{A}}{\mathcal{R}} \tag{4}$$

and:

$$\text{LS} = \max\left(0, \mathcal{R} - \mathcal{A}\right) \tag{5}$$

where $\mathcal{A}$ is the ratio of liquid assets in the fund and $\mathcal{R}$ is the redemption shock expressed in %. Following Roncalli *et al.* (2021b), the redemption shock expressed in dollars is equal to $\mathbb{R} = \mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA}$. Let $q = (q_1, \ldots, q_n)$ be a redemption portfolio and $q_i(h)$ be the number of shares liquidated after h trading days[2]. The amount of liquid assets is equal to the amount of assets that can be sold:

$$\mathbb{A}(h) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{h} q_i(k) \cdot P_i \tag{7}$$

By definition, we have $\mathbb{A}(h) = \mathcal{A}(h) \cdot \text{TNA}$. We notice that asset liquidation requires a parameter h to be defined, which is the time horizon. Therefore, it is better to define RCR and LS measures as follows:

$$\text{RCR}(h) = \frac{\mathbb{A}(h)}{\mathbb{R}} = \frac{\mathcal{A}(h)}{\mathcal{R}} \tag{8}$$

and:

$$\text{LS}(h) = \frac{\max\left(0, \mathbb{R} - \mathbb{A}(h)\right)}{\text{TNA}} = \mathcal{R} \cdot \max\left(0, 1 - \text{RCR}(h)\right) \tag{9}$$

Since h is a liquidation time horizon, the previous computation method is called the time to liquidation (TTL) approach (Bouveret, 2017).

Relationship with the liquidation ratio As its name suggests, the time to liquidation approach is related to the liquidation ratio. Following Roncalli *et al.* (2021b), the liquidation ratio $\mathcal{LR}(q; h)$ is the proportion of the redemption scenario q that is liquidated after h trading days:

$$\mathcal{LR}(q; h) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{k=1}^{h} q_i(k) \cdot P_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i \cdot P_i} \tag{10}$$

By definition, $\mathcal{LR}(q; h)$ is between 0 and 1 whereas $\text{RCR}(h) \geq 0$. Using Equation (7), we deduce that:

$$\mathbb{A}(h) = \mathcal{LR}(q; h) \cdot \mathbb{V}(q) \tag{11}$$

where $\mathbb{V}(q) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i \cdot P_i$ is the value function of the portfolio q. It follows that:

$$\text{RCR}(h) = \frac{\mathbb{V}(q)}{\mathbb{R}} \cdot \mathcal{LR}(q; h) \tag{12}$$

The redemption coverage ratio can be seen as an extension of the concept of the liquidation ratio when the liquidation portfolio q corresponds to the pool of liquid assets and the redemption shock is defined without any reference to q. Roncalli *et al.* (2021b) define the liquidation period $h^+ = \{\inf h : \mathcal{LR}(q; h) = 1\}$ as the number of trading days we need to liquidate the portfolio q. We can then have three cases:

[2] We recall that $q_i(h)$ is equal to:

$$q_i(h) = \min\left(\left(q_i - \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} q_i(k)\right)^+, q_i^+\right) \tag{6}$$

where $q_i(0) = 0$ and q_i^+ denotes the maximum number of shares that can be sold during a trading day for the asset i (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021b, Section 3.2, page 14).

1. The redemption coverage ratio is equal to the liquidation ratio if and only if the redemption scenario is equal to the value of the liquidation portfolio:

$$\text{RCR}(h) = \mathcal{LR}(q;h) \Leftrightarrow \mathbb{R} = \mathbb{V}(q) \tag{13}$$

   Since $\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$ is an increasing function of h and $\mathcal{LR}(q;h^+) = 1$, we have:

$$\begin{cases} \text{RCR}(h) < 1 & \text{if } h < h^+ \\ \text{RCR}(h) = 1 & \text{if } h \geq h^+ \end{cases} \tag{14}$$

2. If $\mathbb{V}(q) > \mathbb{R}$, we have $\text{RCR}(h) > \mathcal{LR}(q;h)$ and:

$$\text{RCR}(h) = \frac{\mathbb{V}(q)}{\mathbb{R}} > 1 \qquad \forall\, h \geq h^+ \tag{15}$$

3. If $\mathbb{V}(q) < \mathbb{R}$, we have $\text{RCR}(h) < \mathcal{LR}(q;h)$ and:

$$\text{RCR}(h) < 1 \qquad \forall\, h \geq 0 \tag{16}$$

Equation (12) shows that the redemption coverage ratio is an increasing function of h. From a risk management perspective, the RCR is below one if the value $\mathbb{V}(q)$ of liquid assets is lower than the redemption shock $\mathbb{R}$ or if the time to liquidation is not acceptable. Let $h^\star = \{\inf h : \text{RCR}(h) > 1\}$ be the number of trading days we need to absorb the redemption shock. The shorter the period $h^\star$ is, the better the liquidity profile. Indeed, if the period $h^\star$ is too long and even if $\text{RCR}(h^\star) > 1$, we cannot consider that the criterion is satisfied. This is why the risk management department must define an acceptable time to liquidation τ_h. In this case, the liquidity profile of the fund is appropriate if and only if $\text{RCR}(\tau_h) > 1$. By definition, τ_h depends on the asset class. In the case of public equities, τ_h is equal to a few days, whereas τ_h may range from a few weeks to several months for private equities, depending on the liquidity objective of the investment fund.

Similarly, the liquidity shortfall $\text{LS}(h)$ can be seen as an extension of the liquidation shortfall, which is defined as "*the remaining redemption that cannot be fulfilled after one trading day*" (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021b, Section 3.2.3, page 18):

$$\mathcal{LS}(q) = 1 - \mathcal{LR}(q;1) \tag{17}$$

Indeed, we have:

$$\text{LS}(h) = \mathcal{R} \cdot \max\left(0, 1 - \frac{\mathbb{V}(q)}{\mathbb{R}} \cdot \mathcal{LR}(q;h)\right) \tag{18}$$

In the case where $\mathbb{V}(q) = \mathbb{R}$, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{LS}(h) &= \mathcal{R} \cdot \max(0, 1 - \mathcal{LR}(q;h)) \\ &= \mathcal{R} \cdot (1 - \mathcal{LR}(q;h)) \\ &= \mathcal{R} \cdot \mathcal{LS}(q;h) \end{aligned} \tag{19}$$

where $\mathcal{LS}(q;h) = 1 - \mathcal{LR}(q;h)$ is the *generalized* liquidation shortfall, that is the remaining redemption that cannot be fulfilled after h trading days. While the liquidation shortfall is calculated with one trading day, the liquidity shortfall can be calculated with $h \leq \tau_h$. In the other cases, the liquidity shortfall is not equal to the product of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$ and the generalized liquidation shortfall because we have:

$$\text{LS}(h) = \mathcal{R} \cdot \max\left(0, 1 - \frac{\mathbb{V}(q)}{\mathbb{R}} \cdot (1 - \mathcal{LS}(q;h))\right) \tag{20}$$

Nevertheless, we always verify that:

$$0 \leq \mathrm{LS}(h) \leq \mathcal{R} \tag{21}$$

By construction, the liquidity shortfall cannot exceed the redemption rate.

Portfolio distortion Since the asset structure of the fund is given by the portfolio $\omega = (\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_n)$, the portfolio weights are equal to $w(\omega) = (w_1(\omega), \ldots, w_n(\omega))$ where:

$$w_i(\omega) = \frac{\omega_i \cdot P_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n \omega_j \cdot P_j} \tag{22}$$

Let $q = (q_1, \ldots, q_n)$ be the redemption scenario. It follows that the redemption weights are given by:

$$w_i(q) = \frac{q_i \cdot P_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n q_j \cdot P_j} \tag{23}$$

After the liquidation of q, the new asset structure is equal to $\omega - q$, and the new weights of the portfolio become:

$$w_i(\omega - q) = \frac{(\omega_i - q_i) \cdot P_i}{\sum_{j=1}^n (\omega_j - q_j) \cdot P_j} \tag{24}$$

Except in the case of the proportional rule $q_i \propto \omega_i$, there is no reason that $w_i(\omega - q) = w_i(\omega)$. In fact, we have[3]:

$$\begin{aligned} w_i(\omega - q) &= w_i(\omega) + \Delta w_i(\omega \mid q) \\ &= w_i(\omega) + \frac{\mathbb{V}(q)}{(\mathbb{V}(\omega) - \mathbb{V}(q))}(w_i(\omega) - w_i(q)) \end{aligned} \tag{25}$$

The previous analysis can be extended to the case $h < h^+$. Indeed, it assumes that the liquidation is fully executed. Again, we can have $h^+ \gg \tau_h$, meaning the redemption shock cannot be perfectly absorbed. In this case, we can compute $w_i(q; h)$ and $w_i(\omega - q; h)$ by replacing q_i with $\sum_{k=1}^h q_i(k)$.

Examples We consider a fund, whose asset structure ω is given in Table 1. The investment universe is made up of 7 assets. We also indicate the current price P_i and the trading limit q_i^+ of each asset. The fund's total net assets are equal to \$141.734 mn. We assume that the redemption shock is equal to 20% or \$28.347 mn.

[3] The weight difference $\Delta w_i(\omega \mid q)$ is equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta w_i(\omega \mid q) &= w_i(\omega - q) - w_i(\omega) \\ &= \frac{(\omega_i - q_i) \cdot P_i}{\mathbb{V}(\omega) - \mathbb{V}(q)} - \frac{\omega_i \cdot P_i}{\mathbb{V}(\omega)} \\ &= \frac{\mathbb{V}(\omega) \cdot (\omega_i - q_i) \cdot P_i - (\mathbb{V}(\omega) - \mathbb{V}(q)) \cdot \omega_i \cdot P_i}{(\mathbb{V}(\omega) - \mathbb{V}(q)) \cdot \mathbb{V}(\omega)} \\ &= \frac{\mathbb{V}(q) \cdot \omega_i \cdot P_i - \mathbb{V}(\omega) \cdot q_i \cdot P_i}{(\mathbb{V}(\omega) - \mathbb{V}(q)) \cdot \mathbb{V}(\omega)} \\ &= \frac{\mathbb{V}(q) \cdot w_i(\omega) \cdot \mathbb{V}(\omega) - \mathbb{V}(\omega) \cdot w_i(q) \cdot \mathbb{V}(q)}{(\mathbb{V}(\omega) - \mathbb{V}(q)) \cdot \mathbb{V}(\omega)} \\ &= \frac{\mathbb{V}(q)}{(\mathbb{V}(\omega) - \mathbb{V}(q))}(w_i(\omega) - w_i(q)) \end{aligned}$$

Table 1: Fund's asset structure and liquidation policy

Asset	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
ω_i	435 100	300 100	50 400	200 500	75 500	17 500	1 800
$w_i(\omega)$	27.32%	26.04%	17.35%	14.43%	8.90%	3.94%	2.02%
P_i	89	123	488	102	167	319	1 589
q_i^+	20 000	20 000	10 000	20 000	20 000	2 000	1 000

Example 1 (naive pro-rata liquidation) *We first consider the pro-rata liquidation (also called the proportional rule or the vertical slicing approach). In this case, the liquidation portfolio is equal to* $q = \mathcal{R} \cdot \omega = 0.20 \cdot \omega$.

We first determine the number of liquidated shares $q_i(h)$ for $h = 1, 2, \ldots$ (see Table 12 on page 282) in order to compute the value of $\mathbb{A}(h)$ and the associated redemption coverage ratio $\mathrm{RCR}(h)$. Results are given below in Table 2. We notice that $\mathrm{RCR}(1) = 52.53\%$ and $\mathrm{LS}(1) = 9.49\%$. If the time horizon τ_h to absorb the redemption shock is equal to one day, then there are not enough liquid assets since the redemption coverage ratio is less than 1. Indeed, we need a week (or five trading days) to perfectly absorb the redemption shock. In this case, we have $\mathrm{RCR}(5) = 100\%$ and $\mathrm{LS}(5) = 0\%$. In Table 2, we also verify that $\mathrm{RCR}(h) = \mathcal{LR}(q; h)$. Moreover, we notice the convergence of the portfolio weights after the liquidation to the current portfolio weights (see Table 14 on page 282). Nevertheless, the matching of the two portfolios $\omega - q$ and ω is only valid when $h \geq h^+ = 5$.

Table 2: Computation of the RCR (Example 1, naive pro-rata liquidation)

h	$\mathcal{LR}(q; h)$ (in %)	$\mathbb{A}(h)$ (in \$ mn)	$\mathrm{RCR}(h)$ (in %)	$\mathrm{LS}(h)$ (in %)
1	52.53	14.892	52.53	9.49
2	76.51	21.689	76.51	4.70
3	91.51	25.939	91.51	1.70
4	97.80	27.722	97.80	0.44
5	100.00	28.347	100.00	0.00
6	100.00	28.347	100.00	0.00

In this example, we assume that $q = \mathcal{R} \cdot \omega$, implying that $\mathbb{V}(q) = \mathbb{R}$. This scheme is not optimal because we have demonstrated that $\mathrm{RCR}(h^+) = 1$ and $\mathrm{RCR}(\tau_h) \leq 1$. The best case is then obtained if $\tau_h = h^+$, implying the following constraints:

$$\mathrm{RCR}(\tau_h) = 1 \Leftrightarrow \left\{\forall\, i = 1, \ldots, n : q_i = \mathcal{R} \cdot \omega_i \leq \tau_h \cdot q_i^+\right\} \tag{26}$$

If we set $\tau_h < h^+$, we necessarily have $\mathrm{RCR}(\tau_h) < 1$, meaning that there are not enough liquid assets to fulfill the redemption scenario. Moreover, we are not sure that $q = \mathcal{R} \cdot \omega$ is the optimal solution to maximize the redemption coverage ratio $\mathrm{RCR}(\tau_h)$. Indeed, the previous analysis suggests that $\mathbb{V}(q) > \mathbb{R}$ is a better choice when it is possible. However, this constraint is not always satisfied and is highly dependent on the value τ_h of the time horizon. In fact, the optimal solution necessarily depends on τ_h and is given by the following optimization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} q^\star(\tau_h) &= \arg\max \mathrm{RCR}(\tau_h) \\ &\text{s.t.} \begin{cases} q \propto \omega \\ q \geq \mathbf{0}_n \end{cases} \end{aligned} \tag{27}$$

By construction, the solution is independent from the value $\mathbb{R}$ of the redemption shock since we have:

$$\arg\max \mathrm{RCR}(\tau_h) := \arg\max \mathbb{A}(\tau_h) \tag{28}$$

We obtain a trivial combinatorial problem. Indeed, the solution must satisfy the following set of constraints:

$$\begin{cases} q \propto \omega \\ q_i \leq \min\left(\tau_h \cdot q_i^+, \omega_i\right) \end{cases} \tag{29}$$

We deduce that:

$$q^\star(\tau_h) = \varphi(\tau_h) \cdot \omega \tag{30}$$

where:

$$\varphi(\tau_h) = \inf_{i=1,\ldots,n} \min\left(\tau_h \cdot \frac{q_i^+}{\omega_i}, 1\right) \tag{31}$$

Moreover, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{A}(\tau_h) &= \sum_{i=1}^n \left(\sum_{k=1}^h q_i(k)\right) P_i \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^n q_i^\star(\tau_h) \cdot P_i \\ &= \varphi(\tau_h) \left(\sum_{i=1}^n \omega_i \cdot P_i\right) \\ &= \varphi(\tau_h) \cdot \mathrm{TNA} \end{aligned} \tag{32}$$

We conclude that the redemption coverage rate is equal to the ratio between $\varphi(\tau_h)$ and $\mathcal{R}$:

$$\mathrm{RCR}(\tau_h) = \frac{\varphi(\tau_h)}{\mathcal{R}} \tag{33}$$

Example 2 (optimal pro-rata liquidation) *We consider the optimal pro-rata liquidation when the redemption shock $\mathcal{R}$ is equal to 20% and the time horizon τ_h varies from one trading day to one trading week.*

In Table 3, we indicate the optimal value $\varphi(\tau_h)$ for each time horizon τ_h. We also report[4] $\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$, $\mathbb{A}(h)$, $\mathrm{RCR}(h)$ and $\mathrm{LS}(h)$ for $h \leq \tau_h$. When $\tau_h = 1$, the optimal liquidation portfolio is equal to $(20\,000, 13\,795, 2\,317, 9\,216, 3\,470, 804)$. The redemption coverage ratio is equal to 22.98%, implying a high liquidity shortfall representing 15.40% of the total net assets. When $\tau_h = 2$, the optimal portfolio $q^\star$ becomes $(40\,000, 27\,589, 4\,633, 18\,433, 6\,941, 1\,609)$. The redemption coverage ratio is then equal to 45.97% whereas the liquidity shortfall represents 10.81% of the total net assets. In Exercise 1, the liquidation period h^+ was equal to five trading days, and we obtained $\mathrm{RCR}(5) = 100\%$. We notice that we achieve a better redemption coverage ratio with the optimal pro-rata liquidation rule. Indeed, we have $\mathrm{RCR}(5) = 114.92\%$.

Remark 2 *Since the optimal portfolio $q^\star(\tau_h)$ does not depend on the redemption shock $\mathbb{R}$, $\mathbb{A}(\tau_h)$ indicates the maximum redemption shock that can be absorbed, implying that:*

$$\mathbb{R} \leq \mathbb{A}(\tau_h) \Rightarrow \mathrm{RCR}(\tau_h) \geq 1$$

[4] We don't need to report the statistics for $h \geq \tau_h$ because we have $\mathcal{LR}(q;h) = \mathcal{LR}(q;\tau_h)$, $\mathbb{A}(h) = \mathbb{A}(\tau_h)$, $\mathrm{RCR}(h) = \mathrm{RCR}(\tau_h)$ and $\mathrm{LS}(h) = \mathrm{LS}(\tau_h)$.

Table 3: Computation of the RCR (Example 2, optimal pro-rata liquidation)

τ_h	$\varphi(\tau_h)$ (in %)	h	$\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$ (in %)	$\mathbb{A}(h)$ (in \$ mn)	RCR (h) (in %)	LS (h) (in %)
1	4.60	1	100.00	6.515	22.98	15.40
2	9.19	1	79.18	10.317	36.39	12.72
		2	100.00	13.030	45.97	10.81
3	13.79	1	63.66	12.443	43.89	11.22
		2	90.02	17.595	62.07	7.59
		3	100.00	19.545	68.95	6.21
4	18.39	1	54.81	14.284	50.39	9.92
		2	79.18	20.633	72.79	5.44
		3	93.17	24.280	85.65	2.87
		4	100.00	26.060	91.93	1.61
5	22.98	1	47.13	15.353	54.16	9.17
		2	70.74	23.044	81.29	3.74
		3	85.68	27.911	98.46	0.31
		4	94.54	30.795	108.64	0.00
		5	100.00	32.575	114.92	0.00

By definition, the maximum admissible redemption shock is equal to $\mathbb{R}(\tau_h) = \mathbb{A}(\tau_h)$ *or* $\mathcal{R}(\tau_h) = \varphi(\tau_h)$*. For instance, the maximum admissible redemption shock is equal to* \$6.515 *mn (or* 4.60% *of the TNA) when the time horizon is set to one trading day. Figure 2 shows the evolution of* $\mathcal{R}(\tau_h)$ *with respect to* τ_h*.*

Figure 2: Maximum admissible redemption shock in % (Example 2, optimal pro-rata liquidation)



Example 3 (waterfall liquidation) *We now consider the waterfall liquidation. In this case, the fund manager liquidates assets in order of their liquidity starting from the most liquid ones. The redemption shock is still equal to* 20%.

Table 4: Computation of the RCR (Example 3, waterfall liquidation)

h	$\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$ (in %)	$\mathbb{A}(h)$ (in \$ mn)	RCR (h) (in %)	LS (h) (in %)
1	11.80	16.727	59.01	8.20
2	23.38	33.136	116.90	0.00
3	34.06	48.274	170.30	0.00
4	44.21	62.661	221.05	0.00
5	52.53	74.459	262.67	0.00
6	57.55	81.572	287.76	0.00

Figure 3: Maximum admissible redemption shock in % (pro-rata vs. waterfall liquidation)



In the waterfall approach, there are no constraints on the liquidation portfolio q, which is equal to the fund's portfolio ω. In this case, the redemption coverage ratio is entirely determined by the trading limits q^+ and the current portfolio ω. Every day, we sell q_i^+ shares of security i until there is nothing left – $q_i(h) = 0$. Results are given in Table 4. Since there are no constraints on the asset structure of the portfolio $\omega - q$, we obtain higher values of the redemption coverage ratio compared to the naive or optimal pro-rata liquidation approach. Indeed, we have RCR $(1) = 59.01\%$, but RCR $(2) = 116.90\%$. In this example, we have RCR $(\tau_h) > 1$ when $\tau_h \geq 2$. By construction, the waterfall approach will always give higher redemption coverage ratios than the pro-rata approach. To illustrate this property, we compare the maximum admissible redemption shock in Figure 3 for the two approaches.

2.1.2 High-quality liquid assets approach

Mathematical framework In the high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) method, the amount of liquid assets is estimated by splitting securities by HQLA classes and applying liquidity weights. We assume that we have m HQLA classes. Let ccf_k denote the liquidity weight or the cash conversion factor (CCF) of the k^{th} HQLA class. The ratio of liquid assets in the fund is defined by:

$$\mathcal{A} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i(\omega) \cdot \text{CCF}_{\ell(i)} \tag{34}$$

where $\ell(i)$ indicates the HQLA class k of security i. We have:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{A} &= \sum_{i=1}^{n} w_i(\omega) \cdot \left(\sum_{k=1}^{m} \mathbb{1}\{i \in k\} \cdot \text{CCF}_k \right) \\
&= \sum_{k=1}^{m} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathbb{1}\{i \in k\} \cdot w_i(\omega) \right) \cdot \text{CCF}_k \\
&= \sum_{k=1}^{m} w_k \cdot \text{CCF}_k
\end{aligned} \tag{35}$$

where w_k is the weight of the k^{th} HQLA class[5]. We deduce that:

$$\text{RCR} = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{m} w_k \cdot \text{CCF}_k}{\mathcal{R}} \tag{37}$$

and:

$$\text{LS} = \mathcal{R} \cdot \max\left(0, 1 - \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{m} w_k \cdot \text{CCF}_k}{\mathcal{R}}\right) \tag{38}$$

Definition of HQLA classes The term HQLA refers to the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) introduced in the Basel III framework (BCBS, 2010, 2013). An asset is considered to be a high-quality liquid asset if it can be easily converted into cash. Therefore, the concept of HQLA is related to asset quality and asset liquidity. The first property indicates if the asset can be sold without discount, while the second property indicates if the asset can be easily and quickly sold (Roncalli, 2020). Thus, the LCR ratio measures whether or not the bank has the necessary assets to face a one-month stressed period of outflows. The stock of HQLA is computed by defining eligible assets and applying haircut values. For instance, corporate debt securities rated above BBB− are eligible, implying that high yield bonds are not. Then, a haircut of 15% (resp. 50%) is applied to corporate bonds rated AA− or higher (resp. between A+ and BBB−). Since the time horizon of the LCR is one month, the underlying idea is that (1) high yield bonds can be illiquid for one month, (2) investment grade corporate bonds can be sold during the month but with a discount, (3) corporate

[5] We also have:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{A} &= \mathcal{A} \cdot \text{TNA} \\
&= \sum_{k=1}^{m} (w_k \cdot \text{TNA}) \cdot \text{CCF}_k \\
&= \sum_{k=1}^{m} \text{TNA}_k \cdot \text{CCF}_k
\end{aligned} \tag{36}$$

where TNA_k is the dollar amount of the k^{th} HQLA class.

bonds rated AA− or higher can lose 15% of their value in the month and (4) corporate bonds rated between A+ and BBB− can lose 50% of their value in the month.

In Table 5, we report the HQLA matrix given by Bouveret (2017) and IMF (2017), which corresponds to the HQLA matrix of the Basel III Accord using the following rule:

$$\text{CCF}_k = 1 - H_k \tag{39}$$

where H_k is the haircut value. By construction, the CCF value is equal to 100% for cash. For equities, it is equal to 50%. Although common equity shares are highly liquid, we can face a price drop before the liquidation. Therefore, this value of 50% mainly reflects a discount risk. Sovereign bonds are assumed to be a perfect substitute for the cash if the credit rating of the issuer is AA− or higher. Otherwise, the CCF is equal to 85% and 50% for other IG sovereign bonds and 0% for HY sovereign bonds. In the case of corporate bonds, securities rated below BBB− receive a CCF of 0%, while the CCF is respectively equal to 50% and 85% for BBB− to A+ and AA− to AAA. For securitization, the CCFs are the same as for corporate bonds, except the category BBB− to BBB+ for which the CCF is set to zero.

Table 5: Cash conversion factors

Credit Rating	Cash	Sovereign bonds	Corporate bonds	Securitization	Equities
AA− to AAA	100%	100%	85%	85%	50%
A− to A+		85%	50%	50%	
BBB− to BBB+		50%	50%	0%	
Below BBB−		0%	0%	0%	

Source: Bouveret (2017, Table 6, page 14) and IMF (2017, Box 2, page 56).

Remark 3 *ESMA (2019b, Exhibit 38, page 26) uses the same HQLA matrix, except for securitization products. In this case, the CCFs are between* 65% *and* 93% *if the credit rating of the structure is between AA- and AAA, and* 0% *otherwise.*

As noticed by ESMA (2019b), "*the HQLA approach is very attractive from an operational point of view since it is easy to compute and interpret*". However, this approach has three drawbacks. First, the HQLA matrix proposed by the IMF and ESMA is a copy/paste of the HQLA matrix proposed by the Basel Committee, suggesting that the implicit time horizon τ_h is one month or 21 trading days. However, the time horizon is never mentioned, implying that there is a doubt about the IMF and ESMA's true intentions. Second, the granularity of the HQLA matrix is quite coarse. For instance, there is no distinction between large cap and small cap stocks. In the case of sovereign bonds, the CCR only depends on the credit rating. However, we know that some bonds are more liquid than others even if they belong to the same category of credit rating. For example, sovereign bonds issued by France, Germany, the UK and the US are more liquid than sovereign bonds issued by Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands and Sweden[6]. We observe the same issue with peripheral debt securities (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) and EM bonds. In the case of corporate bonds, this problem is even more serious, because liquidity is not only an issuer-related question. For instance, the maturity impacts the liquidity of the bonds issued by the same company. The last drawback concerns the absence of the portfolio structure in the computation of the RCR. Indeed, the RCR depends neither on the portfolio holdings nor on the portfolio

[6]This can be measured by the turnover ratio.

concentration. Therefore, the HQLA method is a specific top-down approach, which only focuses on asset classes. Two equity funds will have the same redemption coverage ratio for the same redemption shock (top left-hand panel in Figure 4). For example, we have $\text{RCR} = 2.5$ if $\mathcal{R} = 20\%$. The RCR is below one if the redemption shock is greater than 50%. For a high yield fund, the RCR is equal to zero whatever the value of the redemption shock (bottom right-hand panel in Figure 4). For a balanced fund, comprised of 50% IG bonds and 50% public equities, we obtain the following bounds:

$$\frac{50\%}{\mathcal{R}} \leq \text{RCR} \leq \frac{75\%}{\mathcal{R}} \tag{40}$$

Therefore, it is obvious that the HQLA method is a macro-economic approach, that can make sense for regulators to monitor the liquidity risk at the industry level, but it is not adapted for comparing the liquidity risk of two funds.

Figure 4: Redemption coverage ratio in % with the HQLA approach



Implementation of the HQLA approach Because of the previous comments, asset managers that would like to implement the HQLA approach must take into account the following considerations:

- The HQLA matrix must be more granular.
- The asset manager must use different time horizons.
- The calibration of the cash conversion factor mixes two factors[7]:

$$\text{CCF}_k(\tau_h) = \text{LF}_k(\tau_h) \cdot \left(1 - \text{DF}_k\left(\frac{\tau_h}{2}\right)\right) \tag{41}$$

[7] See Appendix B.1 on page 268 for the derivation of this result. A more conservative formula is $\text{CCF}_k(\tau_h) = \text{LF}_k(\tau_h) \cdot (1 - \text{DF}_k(\tau_h))$.

where $\mathrm{LF}_k(\tau_h)$ is the (pure) liquidity factor and $\mathrm{DF}_k(\tau_h)$ is the discount (or drawdown) factor.

- The liquidity factor $\mathrm{LF}_k(\tau_h)$ is an increasing function of τ_h. It indicates the proportion of the HQLA bucket that can be sold in τ_h trading days. By definition, we have $\mathrm{LF}_k(0) = 0$ and $\mathrm{LF}_k(\infty) = 1$.
- The drawdown factor $\mathrm{DF}_k(\tau_h)$ is an increasing function of τ_h. It indicates the loss value of the HQLA bucket in a worst-case scenario of a price drop after τ_h trading days. By definition, we have $\mathrm{DF}_k(0) = 0$ and $\mathrm{DF}_k(\infty) \leq 1$.

Concerning the HQLA classes, we can consider more granularity concerning the asset class. For example, we can distinguish DM vs. EM equities, LC vs. SC equities, etc. Moreover, we can introduce the specific risk factor of the fund, which encompasses two main dimensions: the fund's size and its portfolio structure. For instance, liquidating a fund of \$100 mn is different to liquidating a fund of \$10 bn. Similarly, the liquidation of two funds with the same size can differ because of the weight concentration difference. Indeed, liquidating a S&P 500 index fund of \$1 bn is different to liquidating an active fund of \$1 bn that is concentrated on 10 American stocks. Therefore, the cash conversion factor becomes:

$$\mathrm{CCF}_{k,j}(\tau_h) = \mathrm{LF}_k(\tau_h) \cdot \left(1 - \mathrm{DF}_k\left(\frac{\tau_h}{2}\right)\right) \cdot \left(1 - \mathrm{SF}_k\left(\mathrm{TNA}_j, \mathcal{H}_j\right)\right) \tag{42}$$

where $\mathrm{SF}_k \in [0,1]$ is the specific risk factor associated to the fund j. This is a decreasing function of the fund size TNA_j and the Herfindahl index $\mathcal{H}_j$ of the portfolio. Concerning the time horizon, τ_h can be one day, two days, one week, two weeks or one month. Finally, the three functions $\mathrm{LF}_k(\tau_h)$, $\mathrm{DF}_k(\tau_h)$ and $\mathrm{SF}_k(\mathrm{TNA}_j, \mathcal{H}_j)$ can be calibrated using standard econometric procedures.

A basic specification of the liquidity factor is:

$$\mathrm{LF}_k(\tau_h) = \min\left(1.0, \lambda_k \cdot \tau_h\right) \tag{43}$$

where λ_k is the selling intensity. For the drawdown factor, it is better to use a square root function[8]:

$$\mathrm{DF}_k(\tau_h) = \min\left(\mathrm{MDD}_k, \eta_k \cdot \sqrt{\tau_h}\right) \tag{44}$$

where MDD_k is the maximum drawdown and η_k is the loss intensity of the HQLA class. Let us consider the example of a large cap equity fund, whose total net assets are equal to \$1 bn. The redemption shock is set to \$400 mn. We assume that $\lambda_k = 5\%$ per day, $\eta_k = 6.25\%$ and $\mathrm{MDD}_k = 50\%$. Results are reported in Figure 5. We notice that the RCR depends on the value of τ_h. For small values of τ_h (less than 10 days), the RCR is below 1. For large values of τ_h (greater than 10 days), the RCR is above 1 because the liquidation factor overtakes the drawdown factor. Finally, we observe that the CCF and RCR functions are increasing and then decreasing with respect to the time horizon[9]. We now consider a second fund with the same assets under management, which is invested in small cap stocks. In this case, we assume that λ_k is reduced by a factor of two and η_k is increased by 20%. Results are given in Figure 5. We verify that the small cap fund has a lower RCR than the large cap fund.

[8] This is what we observe when we compute the value-at-risk of equity indices. For instance, we have reported the historical value-at-risk of the S&P 500 index in Figure 20 on page 284 for different confidence levels α. We obtain a square-root shape. In risk management, the square-root-of-time rule is very popular and is widely used for modeling drawdown functions (Roncalli, 2020, page 46).

[9] This is normal since we combine an increasing linear function with a decreasing square-root function.

Figure 5: Specification of the cash conversion factor



Figure 6: Specification of the specific risk factor



As explained previously, we should consider the specific risk of the fund. We propose the following formula:

$$\mathrm{SF}_k(\mathrm{TNA}, \mathcal{H}) = \min\left(\xi_k^{\text{size}}\left(\frac{\mathrm{TNA}}{\mathrm{TNA}^\star} - 1\right)^+ + \xi_k^{\text{concentration}}\left(\sqrt{\frac{\mathcal{H}}{\mathcal{H}^\star}} - 1\right)^+, \mathrm{SF}^+\right) \tag{45}$$

where TNA and $\mathcal{H}$ are the total net assets and the Herfindahl index of the fund, which is computed as $\mathcal{H} = \sum_{i=1}^n w_i^2(\omega)$. By definition, we have $n^{-1} \leq \mathcal{H} \leq 1$. $\mathrm{TNA}^\star$ and $\mathcal{H}^\star$ are two thresholds. Below these two limits, $\mathrm{SF}_k(\mathrm{TNA}, \mathcal{H})$ is equal to zero. ξ_k^{size} and $\xi_k^{\text{concentration}}$ are two coefficients that control the importance of the size and concentration risks. Moreover, SF^+ indicates the maximum value that can be taken by the specific risk since we have the following inequalities:

$$\begin{cases} 0 \leq \mathrm{SF}^+ \leq 1 \\ 0 \leq \mathrm{SF}_k(\mathrm{TNA}, \mathcal{H}) \leq \mathrm{SF}^+ \end{cases} \tag{46}$$

Figure 6 illustrates the specific risk of the fund when $\mathrm{TNA}^\star = \$1$ bn, $\mathcal{H}^\star = 1/100$, $\xi_k^{\text{size}} = 10\%$, $\xi_k^{\text{concentration}} = 25\%$ and $\mathrm{SF}^+ = 0.80$. We have also reported the two components $\mathrm{SF}_k^{\text{size}}(\mathrm{TNA})$ and $\mathrm{SF}_k^{\text{concentration}}(\mathcal{H})$:

$$\mathrm{SF}_k(\mathrm{TNA}, \mathcal{H}) = \min\left(\mathrm{SF}_k^{\text{size}}(\mathrm{TNA}) + \mathrm{SF}_k^{\text{concentration}}(\mathcal{H}), \mathrm{SF}^+\right) \tag{47}$$

It is better to use additive components than multiplicative components, because the specific risk tends quickly to the cap value SF^+ in this last case.

Example 4 *We assume that $\lambda_k = 5\%$ per day, $\eta_k = 6.25\%$, $\mathrm{MDD}_k = 50\%$, $\mathrm{TNA}^\star = \$1$ bn, $\mathcal{H}^\star = 1/100$, $\xi_k^{\text{size}} = 10\%$, $\xi_k^{\text{concentration}} = 25\%$ and $\mathrm{SF}^+ = 0.80$. We consider four mutual funds, whose TNA are respectively equal to \$1, \$5, \$7 and \$10 bn. The redemption shock is equal to 40% of the total net assets.*

Results are given in Table 6 with respect to the horizon time τ_h and the fund size. We consider two concentration indices: $\mathcal{H} = 0.01$ and $\mathcal{H} = 0.04$. We notice the impact of the fund size on the RCR. For instance, when τ_h is set to 10 days and the concentration index is equal to 1%, RCR is respectively equal to 1.08, 0.65, 0.43 and 0.22 for a fund size of \$1 bn, \$5 bn, \$7 bn, and \$10 bn. Therefore, the RCR is above one only when the fund size is \$1 bn. If we increase the concentration index, the RCR can be below one even if the fund size is small. For instance, when τ_h is set to 10 days and $\mathcal{H}$ is equal to 4%, RCR is equal to 0.81 for a fund size of \$1 bn. To summarize, the redemption coverage ratio is an increasing function of the time to liquidation τ_h, but a decreasing function of the concentration index $\mathcal{H}$ and the fund size TNA.

Table 6: Computation of the RCR in the HQLA approach

τ_h	$\mathcal{H} = 0.01$				$\mathcal{H} = 0.04$			
	\$1 bn	\$5 bn	\$7 bn	\$10 bn	\$1 bn	\$5 bn	\$7 bn	\$10 bn
1	0.12	0.07	0.05	0.02	0.09	0.04	0.02	0.02
5	0.56	0.34	0.23	0.11	0.42	0.20	0.11	0.11
10	1.08	0.65	0.43	0.22	0.81	0.38	0.22	0.22
20	2.01	1.20	0.80	0.40	1.50	0.70	0.40	0.40
60	1.64	0.99	0.66	0.33	1.23	0.58	0.33	0.33

2.2 Redemption liquidation policy

The previous analysis demonstrates that the redemption coverage ratio is highly dependent on the redemption portfolio $q = (q_1, \ldots, q_n)$. Generally, the redemption shock is expressed as a percentage. $\mathcal{R}$ represents the proportion of the fund size that can be redeemed. Then, we can convert the redemption shock is nominal value by using the identity formula:

$$\mathbb{R} = \mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA} \tag{48}$$

For instance, if the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$ is set to 10% and the fund size TNA is equal to \$1 bn, the redemption shock $\mathbb{R}$ is \$100 mn. However, the computation of RCR requires defining the liquidation policy or the portfolio q. Two main approaches are generally considered: the pro-rata liquidation and the waterfall liquidation. The first one ensures that the asset structure of the fund is the same before and after the liquidation. The second one minimizes the time to liquidation. In practice, fund managers can mix the two schemes. In this case, it is important to define the objective function in order to understand the trade-off between portfolio distortion and liquidation time.

2.2.1 The standard approaches

Vertical slicing The pro-rata liquidation uses the proportional rule, implying that each asset is liquidated such that the structure of the asset portfolio is the same before and after the liquidation. This rule is also called the vertical slicing approach. From a mathematical point of view, we have:

$$q = \mathcal{R} \cdot \omega \tag{49}$$

where ω is the fund's asset portfolio (before the liquidation). In practice, q_i is not necessarily an integer and must be rounded[10]. For instance, if $\omega = (1000, 514, 17)$ and $\mathcal{R} = 10\%$, we obtain $q = (100, 51.4, 1.7)$. Since we cannot sell a fraction of an asset, we can choose $q = (100, 51, 2)$.

We recall that the tracking error due to the liquidation is equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma(\omega \mid q) &= \sqrt{(w(\omega - q) - w(\omega))^\top \Sigma (w(\omega - q) - w(\omega))} \\ &= \sqrt{\Delta w(\omega \mid q)^\top \Sigma \Delta w(\omega \mid q)} \end{aligned} \tag{50}$$

where Σ is the covariance matrix of asset returns, $w(\omega)$ is the weight vector of portfolio ω (before liquidation) and $w(\omega - q)$ is the weight vector of portfolio $\omega - q$ (after liquidation). The proportional rule ensures that the asset composition does not change because of the redemption. Since the weights are the same — $\Delta w(\omega \mid q) = \mathbf{0}_n$, the tracking error is equal to zero:

$$\sigma(\omega \mid q) = 0 \tag{51}$$

This property is important because there is no portfolio distortion with the pro-rata liquidation rule.

We have seen that the redemption coverage ratio is highly dependent on the time to liquidation τ_h. In Roncalli *et al.* (2021b, Section 3.2.2, page 18), we have defined the liquidation time as the inverse function of the liquidation ratio:

$$\mathcal{LT}(q, p) = \mathcal{LR}^{-1}(q; p) = \inf\{h : \mathcal{LR}(q; h) \geq p\} \tag{52}$$

[10] This is why the waterfall slicing approach is also called the near proportional rule.

We now define the liquidity time (or time to liquidity) as follows:

$$\mathrm{TTL}(p) = \mathrm{RCR}^{-1}(p) = \inf\{h : \mathrm{RCR}(h) \geq p\} \tag{53}$$

It measures the required number of days to have a redemption coverage ratio larger than p. As we have seen that $\mathrm{RCR}(h)$ and $\mathrm{LS}(h)$ are related to $\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$ and $\mathcal{LS}(q;h)$, $\mathrm{TTL}(p)$ is also related to $\mathcal{LT}(q,p)$. In the case where the redemption portfolio satisfies $\mathbb{R} = \mathbb{V}(q)$, we verify that $\mathrm{TTL}(p) = \mathcal{LT}(q,p)$ because we have $\mathrm{RCR}(h) = \mathcal{LR}(q;h)$ and $\mathrm{LS}(h) = \mathcal{LS}(q;h)$. In the general case, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathrm{TTL}(p) &= \inf\left\{h : \frac{\mathbb{V}(q)}{\mathbb{R}} \cdot \mathcal{LR}(q;h) \geq p\right\} \\
&= \begin{cases} \mathcal{LT}\left(q, \dfrac{\mathbb{R}}{\mathbb{V}(q)} \cdot p\right) & \text{if } p \leq \dfrac{\mathbb{V}(q)}{\mathbb{R}} \\ +\infty & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\end{aligned} \tag{54}$$

While vertical slicing is optimal to minimize the tracking risk, the liquidation of the redemption portfolio can however take a lot of time. Indeed, the maximum we can liquidate each day is bounded by the liquidation policy limit q_i^+. We have:

$$\sum_{h=1}^{\tau_h} q_i(h) \leq \tau_h \cdot q_i^+ \tag{55}$$

In the case of the pro-rata liquidation rule, we have $q_i = \mathcal{R} \cdot \omega_i$. We deduce that the redemption portfolio can be fully liquidated after $\mathrm{TTL}(1) = \lfloor \tau_h^+ \rfloor$ days where:

$$\tau_h^+ = \mathcal{R} \cdot \sup_{i=1,\ldots,n} \frac{\omega_i}{q_i^+} \tag{56}$$

It may be difficult to sell some assets, because the value of q_i^+ is low. Nevertheless, the remaining redemption value may be very small. This is why fund managers generally consider in practice that the portfolio is liquidated when the proportion p is set to 99%.

Horizontal slicing Horizontal slicing is the technical term to define waterfall liquidation. In this approach, the portfolio is liquidated by selling the most liquid assets first. Contrary to vertical slicing, the fund manager accepts that the portfolio composition will be disturbed and his investment strategy has te be modified, implying a tracking error risk:

$$\sigma(\omega \mid q) > 0 \tag{57}$$

It is obvious that the waterfall approach minimizes the liquidity risk when it is measured by the liquidity shortfall. Let us illustrate this property with the example described in Table 1 on page 215. If we consider the naive pro-rata liquidation rule, we obtain the liquidity times given in Figure 21 on page 285. We notice that they are very similar for $p = 95\%$, 99% and 100%. We now assume that $q_7^+ = 20$, meaning that the seventh asset is not very liquid. Therefore, we have a huge position on this asset ($\omega_7 = 1\,800$) compared to the daily liquidation limit. If we would like to liquidate the full exposure on this asset, it will take 90 trading days versus 2 trading days previously. The consequence of this illiquid exposure is that the liquidity times are very different for $p = 95\%$, 99% and 100% (see Figure 22 on page 285). For instance, the maximum liquidity time[11] is respectively equal to 20, 46

[11] It is obtained by considering the case $\mathcal{R} = 100\%$.

and 90 trading days for $p = 95\%$, 99% and 100%. Previously, the maximum liquidity time was equal to 18, 21 and 22 trading days when q_7^+ was equal to 1 000. Having some illiquid assets in the portfolio may then dramatically increase the liquidity time when we choose the pro-rata liquidation rule. We have also computed the liquidity time when we consider the waterfall liquidation rule. Results are reported in Figures 23 and 24 on page 286. We observe two phenomena. First, if we compare Figures 21 and 23, we notice the higher convexity of the waterfall approach when we increase the redemption shock. Second, we retrieve the similarity pattern for $p = 95\%$, 99% and 100% except for very large redemption shocks when we have illiquid assets. The reason is that the part of illiquid assets is much lower than the remaining value of the portfolio. Figure 7 summarizes the two phenomena by comparing the pro-rata and waterfall approaches when $q_7^+ = 20$.

Figure 7: Liquidity time in days (pro-rata versus waterfall liquidation, illiquid exposure, $p = 99\%$)



In order to determine the proportion of non-liquidated assets in the case of the waterfall approach, we consider an analysis in terms of weights. We recall that the portfolio weight of Asset i is given by:

$$w_i(\omega) = \frac{\omega_i \cdot P_i}{\text{TNA}} \tag{58}$$

Since the number of required trading days to liquidate the exposure to Asset i is equal to:

$$\tau_i(\omega) = \frac{\omega_i}{q_i^+} \tag{59}$$

the portfolio weight of Asset i that can be liquidated with a trading day is given by the following formula:

$$\psi_i(\omega) = \frac{w_i(\omega)}{\tau_i(\omega)} = \frac{q_i^+ \cdot P_i}{\text{TNA}} \tag{60}$$

Figure 8: Daily liquidation



Using Equation (9) on page 212, we deduce that the liquidity shortfall of a full redemption scenario under the waterfall approach is equal to[12]:

$$\mathrm{LS}(h) = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \min\left(h \cdot \psi_i(\omega), w_i(\omega)\right) \tag{61}$$

The relative weight of the portfolio that can be liquidated at time h is then equal to $W(h) = \mathrm{LS}(h-1) - \mathrm{LS}(h)$. $W(h)$ is the daily liquidation expressed in %. In Figure 8, we have reported the values taken by $W(h)$ for the previous example. We notice that significant liquidation occurs over the first 22 days. After this period, the amount liquidated decreases substantially because it concerns illiquid assets.

Remark 4 *We can use the previous analysis to determine the amount of "illiquid assets" in the portfolio. For that, we choose a threshold $w^\star$ below which the amount liquidated is too small*[13]*:*

$$h^\star = \inf\left\{h : W(h) \leq w^\star\right\} \tag{62}$$

Alternatively, we can directly set the value of $h^\star$ above which we assume it corresponds to an illiquid time. The amount of illiquid assets is then equal to $\sum_{k \geq h^\star} W(h)$ or equivalently $\mathrm{LS}(h^\star - 1) = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{n} \min\left((h^\star - 1) \cdot \psi_i(\omega), w_i(\omega)\right)$. In the previous example, it is equal to 2.50% if $w^\star = 1\%$ and 1.52% if $w^\star = 0.5\%$.

2.2.2 The mixing approach

So far, the analysis of the redemption coverage ratio and the redemption liquidation policy has been focused on the trading limits and the daily amounts that can be liquidated. This

[12] We have $\mathrm{LS}(0) = 100\%$.
[13] $w^\star$ is generally set to 0.5%.

volume-based approach is not enough and may lead to misleading conclusions. Indeed, the previous analysis completely omits the transaction costs. This is obviously the case of the vertical slicing approach, where the fund manager is forced to sell exposures that are not liquid. Therefore, no cost analysis is done in the pro-rata liquidation rule. This is also the case in the above presentation of the horizontal slicing approach, since the liquidation policy only considers the daily trading limits through the variable q^+. Nevertheless, the practice of the waterfall approach is a little bit different, because it is not limited to the liquidity depth. Indeed, the ultimate goal of this approach is to liquidate the exposures at the lowest cost. Therefore, it includes a cost analysis. However, as seen previously, the waterfall approach implies a tracking risk that is not controlled. This is not acceptable in practice.

The optimal liquidation approach consists in defining a maximum acceptable level $\mathcal{TR}^+$ of tracking risk and to minimize the transaction cost $\mathcal{TC}(q)$ of the liquidation portfolio:

$$q^\star = \arg\min_q \mathcal{TC}(q) \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \begin{cases} \mathcal{TR}(\omega \mid q) \leq \mathcal{TR}^+ \\ \mathcal{LS}(q;h) \leq \mathcal{LS}^+ \\ \mathbf{1}_n^\top w(\omega - q) = 0 \\ w(\omega - q) \geq \mathbf{0}_n \end{cases} \tag{63}$$

In the case of an equity portfolio, the tracking risk is equal to the tracking error volatility:

$$\mathcal{TR}(\omega \mid q) = \sigma(\omega \mid q) = \sqrt{\Delta w(\omega \mid q)^\top \Sigma \Delta w(\omega \mid q)} \tag{64}$$

In the case of a bond portfolio, it is more difficult to define the tracking risk because the volatility is not the right approach to measure the risk of fixed-income instruments (Roncalli, 2020). Moreover, there are several risk dimensions to take into account. For instance, Ben Slimane (2021) considers three dimensions[14]: sectorial risk, duration risk and credit risk. Following Ben Slimane (2021), we can define the tracking risk as the sum of three risk measures:

$$\mathcal{TR}(\omega \mid q) = \mathcal{R}_w(\omega \mid q) + \mathcal{R}_{\text{MD}}(\omega \mid q) + \mathcal{R}_{\text{DTS}}(\omega \mid q) \tag{65}$$

The weight risk measure $\mathcal{R}_w(\omega \mid q)$ is the weight difference between Portfolio $\omega - q$ and Portfolio ω within the sector s:

$$\mathcal{R}_w(\omega \mid q) = \sum_{s=1}^{n_{\mathcal{S}ector}} \left| \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}ector(s)} \Delta w_i(\omega \mid q) \right| \tag{66}$$

where $n_{\mathcal{S}ector}$ is the number of sectors and $\Delta w_i(\omega \mid q) = w_i(\omega - q) - w_i(\omega)$ is the weight distortion of Bond i because of the liquidation. We define $\mathcal{R}_{\text{MD}}(\omega \mid q)$ as the modified duration risk of $\omega - q$ with respect to ω within the sector s:

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{MD}}(\omega \mid q) = \sum_{s=1}^{n_{\mathcal{S}ector}} \sum_{j=1}^{n_{\mathcal{B}ucket}} \left| \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}ector(s)} \Delta w_i(\omega \mid q) \cdot \text{MD}_i(\mathcal{B}ucket_j) \right| \tag{67}$$

where $n_{\mathcal{B}ucket}$ is the number of maturity buckets and $\text{MD}_i(\mathcal{B}ucket_j)$ is the modified duration contribution of Bond i to the maturity bucket j. The rationale of this definition is to track

[14] In fact, Ben Slimane (2021) adds two liquidity components: the first one concerns the liquidity costs whereas the second one concerns the liquidity depth (or the axis component of market makers).

the difference in modified duration per bucket. Finally, we define the DTS risk measure $\mathcal{R}_{\mathrm{DTS}}(\omega \mid q)$ as the weighted DTS difference between $\omega - q$ and ω:

$$\mathcal{R}_{\mathrm{DTS}}(\omega \mid q) = \sum_{s=1}^{n_{\mathcal{S}ector}} \left| \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}ector(s)} \Delta w_i(\omega \mid q) \cdot \mathrm{DTS}_i \right| \tag{68}$$

where DTS_i is the duration-times-spread of Bond i. Regarding the transaction cost function, we recall that it is defined as follows (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021b, Equation (26), page 25):

$$\mathcal{TC}(q) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{h=1}^{h^+} \mathbb{1}\{q_i(h) > 0\} \cdot q_i(h) \cdot P_i \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_i\left(\frac{q_i(h)}{v_i}\right) \tag{69}$$

where $\boldsymbol{c}_i(x)$ is the unit transaction cost function associated with Asset i. In Roncalli *et al.* (2021b), $\boldsymbol{c}_i(x)$ follows a two-regime power-law model. We also notice that the optimization problem (63) includes a constraint related to the liquidation shortfall. Without this constraint, the solution consists in liquidating each day an amount $q_i(h)$ much smaller than the trading limit q_i^+ in order to minimize the transaction costs due to the market impact. Of course, the idea is not to indefinitely delay the liquidation. Therefore, this constraint is very important to ensure that a significant portion of the redemption portfolio has been sold before h. It follows that the optimization problem (63) can be tricky to solve from a numerical point of view, in particular for bond funds. Nevertheless, it perfectly illustrates the trade-off between the three risk dimensions: the transaction cost risk $\mathcal{TC}(q)$, the tracking risk $\mathcal{TR}(\omega \mid q)$ and the liquidation shortfall risk $\mathcal{LS}(q; h)$.

Once again, we consider the example described in Table 1 on page 215. We assume that the volatility of the assets is respectively equal to[15] 20%, 18%, 15%, 15%, 22%, 30% and 35% whereas the bid-ask spread is equal to 5, 3, 5, 8, 12, 15 and 15 bps. The transaction cost function corresponds to the SQRL model defined by Roncalli *et al.* (2021b) with $\varphi_1 = 0.4$, $\tilde{x} = 5\%$ and $x^+ = 10\%$. We deduce that the daily volume v_i of each asset is equal to $10 \times q_i^+$. In Table 7, we define five liquidation portfolios where the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$ is set to 10%. Portfolio #1 satisfies the pro-rata liquidation rule. We verify that the tracking risk (measured by the tracking error volatility) is equal to zero. The total transaction cost is equal to 22.4 bps with the following break-down: 6.1 bps for the bid-ask spread component and 16.2 bps for the market impact component. This is a low tracking error. However, if the fund manager's objective is to liquidate the redemption in one trading day, we notice that the liquidation shortfall is equal to 23.5%. In Portfolio #2, the liquidation is concentrated in the second and third assets. Because these assets are more liquid than the others, the transaction cost is lower and equal to 20.4 bps. Nevertheless, this portfolio leads to a high tracking error risk of 79.6 bps. Portfolio #3 is made up of the less liquid assets. Therefore, it is normal to obtain a high transaction cost of 42.5 bps. Again, this portfolio presents a high tracking risk since we have $\mathcal{TR}(\omega \mid q) \approx 2\%$! If the objective function is to fulfill the redemption in one day, Portfolio #4 is a good candidate since we have $\mathcal{LS}(q; 1) = 0$ and

[15] The correlation matrix of asset returns is given by:

$$\rho = \begin{pmatrix} 100\% & & & & & & \\ 10\% & 100\% & & & & & \\ 40\% & 70\% & 100\% & & & & \\ 50\% & 40\% & 80\% & 100\% & & & \\ 30\% & 30\% & 50\% & 50\% & 100\% & & \\ 30\% & 30\% & 50\% & 50\% & 70\% & 100\% & \\ 30\% & 30\% & 50\% & 50\% & 70\% & 70\% & 100\% \end{pmatrix}$$

the transaction cost is moderate[16] ($\mathcal{TC}(q) = 25.6$ bps). However, the tracking risk is high and is equal to 35.4%. Portfolio #5 is a compromise between tracking risk and liquidity shortfall[17], because we have $\mathcal{TR}(\omega \mid q) = 21.2$ bps, $\mathcal{TC}(q) = 22.6$ bps but $\mathcal{LS}(q;1) = 9.4\%$. If the objective is to find the optimal liquidation policy with the constraints $\mathcal{LS}(q;1) \leq 10\%$ and $\mathcal{TR}(\omega \mid q) = 20\%$, Portfolio #5 is a good starting point.

Table 7: Comparison of five redemption portfolios

Liquidation portfolio		#1	#2	#3	#4	#5
q_1		43 510	0	0	20 000	29 404
q_2		30 010	27 000	0	20 000	24 004
q_3		5 040	22 238	0	10 000	8 016
q_4		20 050	0	0	20 000	20 020
q_5		7 550	0	34 315	18 044	13 846
q_6		1 750	0	17 500	0	700
q_7		180	0	1 800	0	72
$\mathcal{TR}(\omega \mid q)$	(in bps)	0.0	79.6	201.0	35.4	21.2
$\mathcal{TC}(q)$	(in bps)	22.4	20.4	42.5	25.6	22.6
$\mathcal{TC}_s(q)$	(in bps)	6.1	4.5	13.8	6.6	6.4
$\mathcal{TC}_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(q)$	(in bps)	16.2	15.9	28.7	19.1	16.2
$\mathcal{LS}(q;1)$	(in %)	23.5	48.2	60.7	0.0	9.4

2.3 Reverse stress testing

Reverse stress testing is a "*fund-level stress test which starts from the identification of the pre-defined outcome with regards to fund liquidity (e.g. the point at which the fund would no longer be liquid enough to honor requests to redeem units) and then explores scenarios and circumstances that might cause this to occur*" (ESMA, 2020a, page 6). Following Roncalli (2020), reverse stress testing consists in identifying stress scenarios that could bankrupt the fund. Therefore, reverse stress testing can be viewed as an inverse problem. Indeed, liquidity stress testing starts with a liability liquidity scenario and an asset liquidity scenario in order to compute the redemption coverage ratio. The liability liquidity scenario is defined by the redemption shock $\mathbb{R}$ (or the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$), while the asset liquidity scenario is given by the stressed trading limits q^+ or the HQLA classification. Given a time horizon τ_h, the outcome is $\mathrm{RCR}(\tau_h)$. From a theoretical point of view, the bankruptcy of the fund depends on whether the condition $\mathrm{RCR}(\tau_h) \geq 1$ is satisfied or not. The underlying idea is that the fund is not viable if $\mathrm{RCR}(\tau_h) < 1$. In practice, the fund can continue to exist because it can use short-term borrowing or other liquidity management tools such as gates or side pockets[18]. In fact, the fund's survival depends on many parameters. However, we can consider that a too small value of $\mathrm{RCR}(\tau_h)$ is critical and can produce the collapse of the fund. Let RCR^- be the minimum acceptable level of the redemption coverage ratio. Then, reverse stress testing consists in finding the liability liquidity scenario and/or the asset liquidity scenario such that $\mathrm{RCR}(\tau_h) = \mathrm{RCR}^-$.

[16] It is a little bit higher than the transaction cost of the vertical slicing approach.
[17] Portfolio #5 is equal to 40% of Portfolio #1 and 60% of Portfolio #4.
[18] These different tools will be explored in the next section on page 234.

2.3.1 The liability RST scenario

From a liability perspective, reverse stress testing consists in finding the redemption shock above which the redemption coverage ratio is lower than the minimum acceptable level:

$$\mathrm{RCR}(\tau_h) \leq \mathrm{RCR}^- \Longrightarrow \begin{cases} \mathbb{R} \geq \mathbb{R}^{\mathrm{RST}}(\tau_h) = \dfrac{\mathbb{A}(\tau_h)}{\mathrm{RCR}^-} \\ \text{or} \\ \mathcal{R} \geq \mathcal{R}^{\mathrm{RST}}(\tau_h) = \dfrac{\mathcal{A}(\tau_h)}{\mathrm{RCR}^-} \end{cases} \tag{70}$$

$\mathbb{R}^{\mathrm{RST}}(\tau_h)$ (or $\mathcal{R}^{\mathrm{RST}}(\tau_h)$) is called the liability reverse stress testing scenario. At first sight, computing the liability RST scenario seems to be easy since the calculation of $\mathbb{A}(\tau_h)$ is straightforward. However, it is a little bit more complicated since $\mathbb{A}(\tau_h)$ depends on the liquidation portfolio q. Therefore, we have to define q. This is the hard task of reverse stress testing. Indeed, the underlying idea is to analyze each asset exposure individually and decide the quantity of each asset that can be sold in the market during a stress period.

The simplest way to define q is to use the multiplicative approach with respect to the portfolio ω:

$$q_i^{\mathrm{RST}} = \alpha_i \cdot \omega_i \tag{71}$$

where α_i represents the proportion of the asset i than can be sold during a liquidity stress event. In particular, $\alpha_i = 0$ indicates that the asset is illiquid during this period. α_i also depends on the size ω_i. For instance, a large exposure on an asset can lead to a small value of α_i because it can be difficult to liquidate such exposure.

Table 8: Computation of the liability RST scenario

	$\mathbb{R}^{\mathrm{RST}}(\tau_h)$ (in $ mn)				$\mathcal{R}^{\mathrm{RST}}(\tau_h)$ (in %)			
RCR^-	25%	75%	50%	100%	25%	75%	50%	100%
$\tau_h = 1$	25.1	12.6	8.4	6.3	17.7	8.9	5.9	4.4
$\tau_h = 2$	46.2	23.1	15.4	11.5	32.6	16.3	10.9	8.1
$\tau_h = 3$	63.2	31.6	21.1	15.8	44.6	22.3	14.9	11.1
$\tau_h = 4$	80.1	40.1	26.7	20.0	56.5	28.3	18.8	14.4
$\tau_h \geq 5$	87.5	43.8	29.2	21.9	61.8	30.9	20.6	15.4

Let us consider again the example described in Table 1 on page 215. We assume that the third, fifth, sixth and seventh assets are illiquid in a stress period. For the other assets, we set $\alpha_1 = 20\%$, $\alpha_2 = 30\%$ and $\alpha_4 = 15\%$. Results are given in Table 8. For instance, if the minimum acceptable level of the redemption coverage ratio is equal to 25%, we obtain $\mathcal{R}^{\mathrm{RST}}(1) = 17.7\%$. This means that the fund may support a redemption shock below 17.7%, whereas the RCR limit of 25% is broken if the fund experiences a redemption shock above 17.7%. If the minimum acceptable level is set to 100%, which is the regulatory requirement, the liability RST scenario corresponds to $\mathcal{R}^{\mathrm{RST}}(1) = 4.4\%$.

Remark 5 *We don't always have a solution to Problem (70). Nevertheless, we notice that:*

$$\mathrm{RCR}(\infty) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n q_i^{\mathrm{RST}} \cdot P_i}{\sum_{i=1}^n \omega_i \cdot P_i} = \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i \cdot w_i(\omega) \tag{72}$$

A condition to obtain a solution such that $\mathbb{R} \leq \mathrm{TNA}$ *and* $\mathcal{R} \leq 1$ *is to impose the constraint* $\mathrm{RCR}^- \geq \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i \cdot w_i(\omega)$.

2.3.2 The asset RST scenario

The asset RST scenario consists in finding the asset liquidity shock above which the redemption coverage ratio is lower than the minimum acceptable level. Contrary to the liability RST scenario, for which the liquidity shock is measured by the redemption rate, it is not easy to define what a liquidity shock is when we consider the asset side. For that, we recall that the stress testing of the assets consists in defining three multiplicative (or additive) shocks for the bid-ask spread, the volatility and the daily volume (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021b, Section 5.4, page 51). Let x_i be the participation rate. We have:

$$x_i = \frac{q_i}{v_i} \tag{73}$$

where v_i is the daily volume. The trading limit x_i^+ (expressed in participation rate) is supposed to be fixed, implying that it is the same in normal and stress periods. However, the stress period generally faces a reduction in the daily volume, meaning that the trading limit q_i^+ (expressed in number of shares) is not the same:

$$q_i^+ = \begin{cases} v_i \cdot x_i^+ & \text{in a normal period} \\ m_v \cdot v_i \cdot x_i^+ & \text{in a stressed period} \end{cases} \tag{74}$$

where $m_v < 1$ is the multiplicative shock of the daily volume. The underlying idea of the asset RST scenario is then to define the upper limit m_v^{RST} below which the redemption coverage ratio is lower than the minimum acceptable level:

$$\text{RCR}(\tau_h) \leq \text{RCR}^- \Longrightarrow m_v \leq m_v^{\text{RST}}(\tau_h) < 1 \tag{75}$$

Nevertheless, the computation of $m_v^{\text{RST}}(\tau_h)$ requires defining a liquidation portfolio. For that, we can use the vertical slicing approach where $q_i = \mathcal{R}^\star \cdot \omega_i$ and $\mathcal{R}^\star$ is a standard redemption rate[19]. As in the case of the liability RST problem, the solution may not exist if $\text{RCR}(\tau_h) \leq \text{RCR}^-$ when m_v is set to one.

Remark 6 *In the liability RST problem, a low value of $\mathcal{R}^{\text{RST}}$ indicates that the fund is highly vulnerable. Indeed, this means that a small redemption shock may produce a funding liquidity stress on the investment fund. In the asset RST problem, the fund is vulnerable if the value of m_v^{RST} is high. In this case, a slight deterioration of the market depth induces a market liquidity stress on the investment fund even if it faces a small redemption. To summarize, fund managers would prefer to have low values of $\mathcal{R}^{\text{RST}}$ and high values of m_v^{RST}.*

The computation of m_v^{RST} for the previous example is reported in Figure 9. We first notice that the solution cannot exist because there is no value of m_v such that $\text{RCR}(\tau_h) \leq \text{RCR}^-$. For instance, this is the case of $\tau_h \leq 6$ when $\mathcal{R}^\star$ is set to 30% (bottom right-hand panel). By construction, $m_v^{\text{RST}}(\tau_h)$ is a decreasing function of τ_h. Indeed, the reverse stress testing scenario is more severe for short time windows than for long time windows. We also verify that $m_v^{\text{RST}}(\tau_h)$ is an increasing function of RCR^-, because the constraint is tighter.

Remark 7 *Reverse stress testing does not reduce to the computation of $\mathcal{R}^{\text{RST}}(\tau_h)$ or $m_v^{\text{RST}}(\tau_h)$. This step must be completed by the economic analysis to understand what market or financial scenario can imply $\mathcal{R} \geq \mathcal{R}^{\text{RST}}(\tau_h)$ or $m_v \leq m_v^{\text{RST}}(\tau_h)$.*

[19] A typical value of $\mathcal{R}^\star$ is 10%. It is important to use a low value for $\mathcal{R}^\star$ because the asset RST scenario measures the liquidity stress from the asset perspective, not from the liability perspective.

Figure 9: Computation of the asset RST scenario



3 Liquidity management tools

Liquidity management tools are measures applied by fund managers in exceptional circumstances to control or limit dealing in fund units (ESMA, 2020a). According to Darpeix *et al.* (2020), the main LMTs are anti-dilution levies, gates, liquidity buffers, redemption fees, in-kind redemptions, redemption suspensions, short-term borrowing, side pockets and swing pricing. They can be grouped into three categories (Table 9). First, we have liquidity buffers that may or not be mandatory, and short-term borrowing. The underlying idea is to invest a portion of assets in cash and to use it in the case of a liquidity stress. As such, this category has an impact on the structure of the asset portfolio. Second, we have special arrangements that include gates, in-kind redemptions, redemption suspensions and side pockets. The objective of this second group is to limit or delay the redemptions. Finally, we have swing pricing mechanisms[20], the purpose of which is clearly to protect the remaining investors.

Table 9: LMTs available to European corporate debt funds (June 2020)

		AIF	UCITS
Short-term borrowing		78%	91%
Special arrangements	Gates	23%	73%
	Side pockets	10%	10%
	In-kind redemptions	34%	77%
Swing pricing		7%	57%
Anti-dilution levies		11%	17%

Source: ESMA (2020b, page 38).

[20] They include anti-dilution levies.

3.1 Liquidity buffer and cash holding

As noticed by Yan (2006), cash is a critical component of mutual funds' portfolios for three reasons. First, cash is generally used to manage the inflows and outflows of the fund. For instance, in the case of a subscription, the fund manager may decide to delay the investment in order to find better investment opportunities later. In the case of a redemption, cash can be used to liquidate a part of the portfolio without selling the risky assets. Second, cash is important for the day-to-day management of the fund for paying management fees, managing collateral risk, investing in derivatives, etc. Third, cash is a financial instrument of market timing (Simutin, 2010, 2014). This explains that cash holding is an old practice of mutual funds.

Since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the importance of cash management has increased due to liquidity policies of asset managers, and liquidity (or cash) buffers have become a central concept in liquidity risk management. Nevertheless, implementing a cash buffer has a cost in terms of expected return. Therefore, cash buffer policies are increasingly integrated into investment policies.

3.1.1 Definition

A liquidity buffer refers to the stock of cash instruments held by the fund manager in order to manage the future redemptions of investors. This suggests the intentionality of the fund manager to use the buffer only for liquidity purposes. Because it is difficult to know whether cash is used for other purposes (e.g. tactical allocation, supply/demand imbalance), the cash holding of the investment fund is considered as a measurement proxy of its liquidity buffer. Chernenko and Sunderam (2016) go further and suggest that cash holding is "*a good measure of a fund's liquidity transformation activities*".

Since we use a strict definition, we consider that a liquidity buffer corresponds to the following instruments:

- Cash
  - Cash at hand
  - Deposits
- Cash equivalents
  - Repurchase agreements (repo)
  - Money market funds
  - Short-term debt securities

Generally, we assume that short-term debt securities have a maturity less than one year. We notice that cash and cash equivalents do not exactly coincide with liquid assets. Indeed, liquid assets may include stocks and government bonds that can be liquidated the next day. Therefore, our definition of the liquidity buffer is in fact the definition of a cash buffer.

3.1.2 Cost-benefit analysis

Maintaining a cash buffer has the advantage of reducing the cost of redemption liquidation and mitigating funding risk. However, it also induces some costs in terms of return, tracking error, beta exposure, etc. Since a cash buffer corresponds to a deleverage of the risky assets, it may breach the fiduciary duties of the fund manager. Indeed, the investors pay management

and performance fees in order to be fully exposed to a given asset class. Therefore, all these dimensions make the cost-benefit analysis difficult and complex, and computing an "*optimal*" level of cash buffer is a difficult task from a professional point of view.

Cash buffer analytics In what follows, we define the different concepts that are necessary to conduct a cost-benefit analysis.

Cash-to-assets ratio We assume that a cash buffer is implemented in the fund, and we note w_{cash} as the cash-to-assets ratio:

$$w_{\text{cash}} = \frac{\text{cash}}{\text{TNA}} \tag{76}$$

w_{cash} indicates the proportion of cash held for liquidity purposes, whereas $w_{\text{asset}} = 1 - w_{\text{cash}}$ measures the risky exposure to the assets. Traditionally, the fund is fully exposed to the assets, meaning that $w_{\text{cash}} = 0\%$ and $w_{\text{asset}} = 100\%$. Implementing a cash buffer implies that $w_{\text{cash}} > 0$. Nevertheless, it is difficult to give an order of magnitude in terms of policies and practices by asset managers. Using a sample of US funds regulated by the SEC, Chernenko and Sunderam (2016) found that w_{cash} is equal to 7.5% and 7.9% for equity and bond funds on average. However, the dispersion is very high because $\sigma(w_{\text{cash}})$ is approximately equal to 8%. Moreover, this high dispersion is observed in both the cross section and the time series. Using the percentile statistics, we can estimate that the common practice is to have a cash buffer between 0% and 15%.

Mean-variance analysis In Appendix B.2 on page 269, we derive several statistics by comparing a fund that is fully exposed to the assets and a fund that implements a cash buffer. Let R be the random return of this latter. We have:

$$\mathbb{E}[R] = \mu_{\text{asset}} - w_{\text{cash}} \cdot (\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}) \tag{77}$$

and:

$$\sigma(R) = \sqrt{w_{\text{cash}}^2 \cdot \sigma_{\text{cash}}^2 + w_{\text{asset}}^2 \cdot \sigma_{\text{asset}}^2 + 2 w_{\text{cash}} \cdot w_{\text{asset}} \cdot \rho_{\text{cash,asset}} \cdot \sigma_{\text{cash}} \cdot \sigma_{\text{asset}}} \tag{78}$$

where μ_{cash} and μ_{asset} are the expected returns of the cash and asset components, σ_{cash} and σ_{asset} are the corresponding volatilities, and $\rho_{\text{cash,asset}}$ is the correlation between the cash and the assets. Since the volatility of the cash buffer is considerably lower than the volatility of the assets, we deduce that:

$$\sigma(R) \approx (1 - w_{\text{cash}}) \cdot \sigma_{\text{asset}} \tag{79}$$

We observe that both the expected return[21] and the volatility decrease with the introduction of the cash buffer. In conclusion, maintaining constant liquidity consists in taking less risk with little impact on the Sharpe ratio of the fund. Indeed, we obtain:

$$\text{SR}(R) \approx \text{SR}(R_{\text{asset}})$$

where $\text{SR}(R_{\text{asset}})$ is the Sharpe ratio of the assets. Therefore, the implementation of a cash buffer is equivalent to deleveraging the asset portfolio. This result is confirmed by the portfolio's beta, which is lower than one:

$$\beta(R \mid R_{\text{asset}}) \approx 1 - w_{\text{cash}} \leq 1 \tag{80}$$

[21] Because we generally have $\mu_{\text{asset}} > \mu_{\text{cash}}$.

Tracking error analysis In this analysis, we consider that the benchmark is the asset portfolio (or the index of the corresponding asset class). On page 269, we show that the expected excess return is equal to:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[R \mid R_{\text{asset}}\right] = -w_{\text{cash}} \cdot \left(\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}\right) \tag{81}$$

whereas the tracking error volatility $\sigma\left(R \mid R_{\text{asset}}\right)$ is equal to:

$$\sigma\left(R \mid R_{\text{asset}}\right) \approx w_{\text{cash}} \cdot \sigma_{\text{asset}} \tag{82}$$

In a normal situation where $\mu_{\text{asset}} > \mu_{\text{cash}}$, the expected excess return is negative whereas the tracking error volatility is proportional to the cash-to-assets ratio. An important result is that the information ratio is the opposite of the Sharpe ratio of the assets:

$$\operatorname{IR}\left(R \mid R_{\text{asset}}\right) \approx -\operatorname{SR}\left(R_{\text{asset}}\right) \tag{83}$$

Again, this implies that the information ratio is generally negative.

Liquidation gain The previous analysis shows that there is a cost associated to the cash buffer. Nevertheless, there are also some benefits. The most important is the liquidation gain, which is related to the difference of the transaction costs without and with the cash buffer:

$$\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right) = \mathcal{TC}_{\text{without}} - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{with}} \tag{84}$$

where $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{without}}$ is the transaction cost without the cash buffer and $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{with}}$ is the transaction cost with the cash buffer. In Appendix B.2.5 on page 271, we show that:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right) &= \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \cdot \mathbb{1}\left\{\mathcal{R} < w_{\text{cash}}\right\} - \\ &\quad \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\left(\mathcal{R} - w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right) \cdot \mathbb{1}\left\{\mathcal{R} \geq w_{\text{cash}}\right\}\end{aligned} \tag{85}$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right] &= \int_0^{w_{\text{cash}}} \left(\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right)\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) + \\ &\quad \int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^1 \left(\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R} - w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right)\end{aligned} \tag{86}$$

where $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right)$ and $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right)$ are the asset and cash transaction cost functions, and $\mathbf{F}\left(x\right)$ is the distribution function of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$. Implementing a cash buffer has two main effects on the liquidity gain:

- First, we sell cash instead of the assets if the redemption shock is lower than the cash buffer and we have:
$$\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \gg \mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \tag{87}$$
- Second, we sell a lower proportion of risky assets if the redemption rate is greater than the cash-to-assets ratio and we have:
$$\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \gg \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R} - w_{\text{cash}}\right) \tag{88}$$

The expected liquidation gain is then made up of two terms which are positive:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right] = \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right] + \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right] \tag{89}$$

with the following properties[22]:

[22] See Appendix B.2.6 on page 273.

- $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$ is an increasing function of w_{cash} with $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}\left(0\right)\right] = 0$ and a maximum reached at $w_{\text{cash}}^{\star} = 1$:

$$\begin{aligned}\sup \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right] &= \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}\left(1\right)\right] \\ &= \int_0^1 \left(\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right)\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \end{aligned} \tag{90}$$

- $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(0\right)\right] = 0$ and $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(1\right)\right] = 0$, implying that $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$ is not an increasing function of w_{cash}. In fact, we can show that it is a bell curve, which is first increasing and then decreasing.

If we combine the two effects, we can show that:

$$\frac{\partial\, \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]}{\partial\, w_{\text{cash}}} = -\mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right) \cdot f\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right) + \int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^1 \mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R} - w_{\text{cash}}\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \tag{91}$$

where $f\left(x\right)$ is the probability density function of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$ and $\mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}$ is the derivative of the transaction cost function. We deduce that $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$ is an increasing function almost everywhere, except when w_{cash} is close to one. Therefore, the function $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$ reaches its maximum at a point $w_{\text{cash}}^{\star}$, which is close to 1.

Under the assumption that liquidating cash has zero cost and the additive property of the transaction cost function is almost satisfied, we demonstrate that[23]:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right] = \int_0^{w_{\text{cash}}} \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) + \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right) \cdot \left(1 - \mathbf{F}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right) \tag{92}$$

The interpretation of this formula is very simple. The first term corresponds to the expected transaction cost of liquidating the risky assets when the redemption rate is lower than the cash-to-assets ratio, whereas the second term is the transaction cost of liquidating the asset amount equivalent to the cash buffer times the probability of observing a redemption shock greater than the cash buffer. In Appendix B.2.6 on page 273, we demonstrate that:

$$\frac{\partial\, \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]}{\partial\, w_{\text{cash}}} = \mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right) \cdot \left(1 - \mathbf{F}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right) \tag{93}$$

If we compare Equations (91) and (93), we observe that they are not the same. The first term has vanished because $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \approx 0$. The second term is obtained by assuming that $\mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}$ is relatively constant[24]:

$$\begin{aligned}\int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^1 \mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R} - w_{\text{cash}}\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) &\approx \mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right) \int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^1 \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \\ &= \mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right) \cdot \left(1 - \mathbf{F}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right) \end{aligned} \tag{94}$$

Since $\partial_{w_{\text{cash}}} \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right] \geq 0$, the main impact of the approximation is to eliminate the hill effect when $w_{\text{cash}} \to 1$.

Example 5 *Using a square-root model, we assume that the transaction cost of liquidating the risky assets is equal to:*

$$\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(x\right) = x \cdot \left(s + \beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}} \sigma \sqrt{x}\right) \tag{95}$$

[23] See Equation (161) on page 273.
[24] The choice of w_{cash} for the derivative function $\mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right)$ is explained later.

where s is the bid-ask spread, σ is the daily volatility and $\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}$ is the price impact coefficient. Concerning the cash, it may be liquidated at a fixed rate c:

$$\mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}(x) = x \cdot c$$

where $c \ll s$. We also consider that the redemption rate follows a power-law distribution:

$$\mathbf{F}(x) = x^{\eta} \tag{96}$$

where $\eta > 0$.

In the top left-hand panel in Figure 10, we have reported the transaction cost function $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R})$ for the following parameters: a bid-ask spread s of 20 bps, a price impact sensitivity $\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}$ of 0.4 and an annualized volatility of 20%. We notice that the transaction cost is between 0 and 70 bps. Whereas the unit transaction cost function is concave, the total transaction cost is convex. The first derivative $\mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R})$ is given in the top right-hand panel in Figure 10. We verify that $\mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R}) > 0$, but $\mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R})$ is far from constant. Therefore, the approximation of $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R} - w_{\text{cash}})$ by the function $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R}) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(w_{\text{cash}})$ is not accurate. This discrepancy is illustrated in the bottom panels in Figure 10 when w_{cash} is equal to 10% and 50%.

Figure 10: Transaction cost function (95) in bps



As such, this is not surprising if the exact formula of $\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{LG}(w_{\text{cash}})]$ is:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{LG}(w_{\text{cash}})] &= \frac{\eta(s-c)}{\eta+1} \cdot w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1} + \frac{2\eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma}{2\eta+3} + \\ &\quad \eta s \cdot w_{\text{cash}}(1 - w_{\text{cash}}) - \eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma \cdot I(w_{\text{cash}}; \eta)\end{aligned} \tag{97}$$

whereas the approximate formula is very different:

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{LG}(w_{\text{cash}})] \approx s \cdot w_{\text{cash}} + \beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma \cdot w_{\text{cash}}^{1.5} - \frac{s}{\eta+1} \cdot w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1} - \frac{3\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma}{2\eta+3} \cdot w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1.5} \tag{98}$$

We have reported these two functions in Figure 11. The liquidation gains are expressed in bps. We observe some differences between the exact formula (97) and the approximate formula (98), but these differences tend to diminish when w_{cash} tends to 1. Moreover, the differences increase with respect to the parameter η, which controls the shape of the redemption rate distribution function[25]. This is normal because the probability of observing a large redemption rate increases with the parameter η. In fact, the poor approximation of $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$ mainly comes from the solution of $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$ and not the solution of $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$ as illustrated in Figure 28 on page 288.

Figure 11: Exact vs. approximate solution of $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$ in bps (Example 5, page 238)



This example allows us to verify the properties that have been demonstrated previously. Indeed, Figure 11 confirms that the approximate function of $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$ is increasing and reaches its maximum at $w^{\star}_{\text{cash}} = 1$, whereas the exact function of $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$ increases almost everywhere and only decreases when w_{cash} is close to 1. This implies that the maximum of $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$ reaches its maximum at $w^{\star}_{\text{cash}} < 1$. In our example, $w^{\star}_{\text{cash}}$ is equal to 97.40%, 96.67%, 93.55% and 83.37% when η is respectively equal to 0.5, 1, 2 and 3.

Example 6 *We consider Example 5 on page 238, but we impose a daily trading limit* x^{+}. *This example is more realistic than the previous one, because selling* 100% *of the assets generally requires more than one day. This is especially true in a liquidity stress testing framework. For example,* $x^{+} = 10\%$ *imposes that we can sell* 10% *of the fund every trading day, implying that we need* 10 *trading days to liquidate the fund.*

[25] On page 288, Figure 27 shows the density and distribution functions of the redemption rate. If $\eta = 1$, we obtain the uniform probability distribution. If $\eta \to 0$, the redemption rate is located at $\mathcal{R} = 0$. If $\eta \to 1$, the redemption rate is located at $\mathcal{R} = 1$. If $\eta < 1$, the probability that the redemption rate is lower than 50% is greater than 50%. If $\eta > 1$, the probability that the redemption rate is lower than 50% is less than 50%. Therefore, η controls the location of the redemption rate. The greater the value of η, the greater the risk of observing a large redemption rate.

If $x \leq x^+$, we have:

$$\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(x) = x\left(s + \beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\sqrt{x}\right) \tag{99}$$

If $x^+ < x \leq 2x^+$, we need two trading days to liquidate x and we have:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(x) &= \underbrace{x^+\left(s + \beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\sqrt{x^+}\right)}_{\text{First trading day}} + \underbrace{\left(x - x^+\right)\left(s + \beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\sqrt{x - x^+}\right)}_{\text{Second trading day}} \\ &= x \cdot s + \beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma \cdot \left(x^+\sqrt{x^+} + \left(x - x^+\right)\sqrt{x - x^+}\right)\end{aligned} \tag{100}$$

More generally, if $\kappa x^+ < x \leq (\kappa + 1)\, x^+$, x is liquidated in $\kappa + 1$ trading days, and we obtain:

$$\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(x) = x \cdot s + \kappa\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma \cdot x^+\sqrt{x^+} + \beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma \cdot \left(x - \kappa x^+\right)\sqrt{x - \kappa x^+} \tag{101}$$

where:

$$\kappa := \kappa\left(x; x^+\right) = \left\lfloor \frac{x}{x^+} \right\rfloor \tag{102}$$

Figure 12 represents the transaction cost function $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R})$ for the following parameters: a bid-ask spread s of 20 bps, a price impact sensitivity $\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}$ of 0.4, an annualized volatility of 20% and a trading limit $x^+ = 10\%$. Compared to Figure 10, the transaction cost is reduced and is between 0 and 40 bps. This is normal because the daily price impact is bounded in this example, and we cannot sell more than 10%. The first derivative $\mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R})$ lies in the interval $[20, 43]$ bps and can be assumed to be constant. Therefore, the approximation of $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R} - w_{\text{cash}})$ by the function $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R}) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(w_{\text{cash}})$ is good as illustrated in the bottom panels in Figure 12 when w_{cash} is equal to 10% and 50%.

Figure 12: Transaction cost function (101) in bps with $x^+ = 10\%$



In Appendix C.2 on page 289, we report the transaction cost function when the trading limit is respectively equal to $x^+ = 30\%$ and $x^+ = 50\%$ (Figures 29 and 30). We observe

that the approximation is less and less accurate when the trading limit x^+ increases. Let us define the approximation error by:

$$\mathcal{E}_{\text{rror}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}; x^+\right) = \sup_{\mathcal{R}\in[0,1]} \left|\left(\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R} - w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right| \tag{103}$$

This function is represented in Figure 31 on page 290 for three values of x^+: 10%, 20% and 30%. We see that the approximation error is cyclical:

$$\mathcal{E}_{\text{rror}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}; x^+\right) = \mathcal{E}_{\text{rror}}\left(w_{\text{cash}} + k \cdot x^+; x^+\right) \qquad \text{for } k = 1, 2, \ldots \tag{104}$$

and we observe a modulo pattern because of the introduction of trading limits. In Figure 13, we have reported the maximum approximation error:

$$\mathcal{M}_{\text{ax}}\mathcal{E}_{\text{rror}}\left(x^+\right) = \sup_{w_{\text{cash}}\in[0,1]} \mathcal{E}\text{rror}\left(w_{\text{cash}}; x^+\right) \tag{105}$$

The maximum error is not acceptable when we would like to trade a large amount in the market, but it is relatively low for usual trading limits. In our example, imposing $\mathcal{M}_{\text{ax}}\mathcal{E}_{\text{rror}}\left(x^+\right) \leq 1$ bp is achieved when $x^+ \leq 16\%$.

Figure 13: Maximum approximation error function $\mathcal{M}_{\text{ax}}\mathcal{E}_{\text{rror}}\left(x^+\right)$ in bps



Remark 8 *In Appendix B.2.8 on page 275, we derive the approximation of* $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$. *Figure 14 shows the values of the liquidity gain when* $x^+ = 10\%$. *The two components are reported in Figure 32 on page 290. Moreover, the comparison between the exact formulas (computed with numerical integration) and the approximation formulas is given in Figure 33 on page 291. We verify that the approximation is very good.*

Figure 14: Approximation of the liquidity gain $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$ in bps when $x^+ = 10\%$ (Example 6, page 240)



Optimal cash buffer We can now formulate the fund manager's optimization program. Its objective is to minimize the expected cost of the buffer $\mathcal{BC}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)$ and maximize its expected gain $\mathcal{BG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)$:

$$w_{\text{cash}}^{\star} = \arg \min_{w \in [0,1]} \underbrace{\mathcal{BC}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right) - \mathcal{BG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)}_{\text{Net cost } \mathcal{NC}(w_{\text{cash}})} \tag{106}$$

Since the buffer cost and the buffer gain are two increasing functions, the minimum of $\mathcal{BC}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)$ is reached at $w_{\text{cash}}^{\star} = 0$ while the maximum of $\mathcal{BG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)$ is obtained for $w_{\text{cash}}^{\star} = 1$. Therefore, there is a trade-off between these two functions. For instance, if we consider that the expected cost of the cash buffer corresponds to the opposite of the expected excess return penalized by the tracking error variance, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{BC}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right) &= -\mathbb{E}\left[R \mid R_{\text{asset}}\right] + \frac{\lambda}{2}\sigma^2\left(R \mid R_{\text{asset}}\right) \\ &= w_{\text{cash}}\left(\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}\right) + \frac{\lambda}{2} w_{\text{cash}}^2 \left(\sigma_{\text{cash}}^2 + \sigma_{\text{asset}}^2 - 2\rho_{\text{cash,asset}}\sigma_{\text{cash}}\sigma_{\text{asset}}\right) \end{aligned} \tag{107}$$

where $\lambda \geq 0$ represents the aversion parameter to the tracking error risk. For the specification of the buffer gain, we can choose the expected liquidation gain:

$$\mathcal{BG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right) = \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right] \tag{108}$$

We deduce the expression of the net buffer cost $\mathcal{NBC}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)$:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{NBC}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right) &= w_{\text{cash}}\left(\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}\right) + \\ &\quad \frac{\lambda}{2} w_{\text{cash}}^2 \left(\sigma_{\text{cash}}^2 + \sigma_{\text{asset}}^2 - 2\rho_{\text{cash,asset}}\sigma_{\text{cash}}\sigma_{\text{asset}}\right) - \\ &\quad \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right] \end{aligned} \tag{109}$$

It is made up of three components:

1. the return component that compares the expected asset return and the cash return;
2. the tracking error risk that measures the discrepancy of the fund's behavior with respect to the expected behavior;
3. the liquidity gain.

In order to find the solution to the optimization problem, we compute the derivative of the net buffer cost:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \mathcal{NBC}(w_{\text{cash}})}{\partial w_{\text{cash}}} &= \mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}} + \\ &\quad \lambda w_{\text{cash}} \left(\sigma_{\text{cash}}^2 + \sigma_{\text{asset}}^2 - 2\rho_{\text{cash,asset}}\sigma_{\text{cash}}\sigma_{\text{asset}}\right) - \\ &\quad \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}(w_{\text{cash}})\right]}{\partial w_{\text{cash}}}\end{aligned} \tag{110}$$

Finally, we conclude that:

$$w_{\text{cash}}^{\star} \in \begin{cases} \{0\} & \text{if } \partial_{w_{\text{cash}}}\mathcal{NBC}(w_{\text{cash}}) \geq 0 \\ \{1\} & \text{if } \partial_{w_{\text{cash}}}\mathcal{NBC}(w_{\text{cash}}) \leq 0 \\ ]0,1[& \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \tag{111}$$

The optimal value is equal to $w_{\text{cash}}^{\star} = 0$ in particular when the expected return difference between the assets and the cash is greater than the marginal expected liquidation gain:

$$\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}} \geq \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}(w_{\text{cash}})\right]}{\partial w_{\text{cash}}} \Rightarrow \frac{\partial \mathcal{NBC}(w_{\text{cash}})}{\partial w_{\text{cash}}} \geq 0 \tag{112}$$

If the fund manager is not sensitive to the tracking error risk ($\lambda = 0$), we have:

$$\mu_{\text{asset}} \leq 0 \Longrightarrow w_{\text{cash}}^{\star} = 1 \tag{113}$$

The two extreme solutions are easy to interpret. The first extreme case $w_{\text{cash}}^{\star} = 0$ is obtained because the liquidation gain does not compensate the (large) risk premium $\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}$ of the assets, whereas the second extreme case $w_{\text{cash}}^{\star} = 100\%$ is achieved because the fund manager anticipates that the assets will generate a negative return. In the first case, it is inefficient to implement a cash buffer because we expect the assets to perform very well. Therefore, implementing a cash buffer will dramatically reduce the fund's return and the cost of the liquidity stress is not sufficient to offset this later. In the second case, it is better to implement a 100% cash buffer because we anticipate that the assets will face a drawdown. However, if the fund manager and the investors are sensitive to the tracking error risk, this result no longer holds. Indeed, if $\mu_{\text{asset}} \leq 0$, the sign of the derivative depends on the value of λ:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial \mathcal{NBC}(w_{\text{cash}})}{\partial w_{\text{cash}}} &\approx \underbrace{\mu_{\text{asset}} - \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}(w_{\text{cash}})\right]}{\partial w_{\text{cash}}}}_{\text{negative}} + \\ &\quad \lambda \cdot \underbrace{w_{\text{cash}} \left(\sigma_{\text{cash}}^2 + \sigma_{\text{asset}}^2 - 2\rho_{\text{cash,asset}}\sigma_{\text{cash}}\sigma_{\text{asset}}\right)}_{\text{positive}}\end{aligned} \tag{114}$$

For a large value of λ, $w_{\text{cash}}^{\star} = 100\%$ is not optimal because it induces a high tracking error risk. This is especially true if the asset volatility σ_{asset} is large. Nevertheless, the tracking

error risk vanishes if $\rho_{\text{cash,asset}} = 1$ and $\sigma_{\text{cash}} = \sigma_{\text{asset}}$, which corresponds to a pure cash fund, but this case is obvious. All these results indicate that the optimal cash buffer is generally equal to 0% or 100%, whereas the probability of obtaining an intermediate value is low.

Let us illustrate the previous analysis. For the transaction cost function, we consider the square-root model with several sets of parameters:

(a) $s = 20$ bps, $c = 1$ bps, $\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}} = 0.40$, $\sigma = 20\%$ and $x^+ = 10\%$

(b) $s = 20$ bps, $c = 1$ bps, $\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}} = 0.40$, $\sigma = 20\%$ and $x^+ = 100\%$

(c) $s = 50$ bps, $c = 1$ bps, $\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}} = 0.40$, $\sigma = 80\%$ and $x^+ = 10\%$

(d) $s = 50$ bps, $c = 1$ bps, $\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}} = 0.40$, $\sigma = 80\%$ and $x^+ = 100\%$

The only difference between cases (a) and (b) (resp. cases (c) and (d)) is the trading limit. There is no trading limit for cases (b) and (d), whereas we cannot sell more than 10% of total net assets in cases (a) and (c). Cases (a) and (b) correspond to a normal period, whereas cases (c) and (d) are more suitable for a liquidity stress period. Indeed, the bid-ask spread is larger (50 bps vs. 20 bps), and we observe a higher volatility (80% versus 20%). In Figure 15, we report the net buffer cost $\mathcal{NBC}(w_{\text{cash}})$ when $\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}$ is set to 1% and λ is equal to zero. Each plot corresponds to a different value of the parameter η. We notice that the function $\mathcal{NBC}(w_{\text{cash}})$ is strictly increasing in cases (a) and (b), implying that the optimal cash buffer is $w^\star_{\text{cash}} = 0$. If we consider a normal transaction cost function, there is no interest to implement a liquidity buffer. Cases (c) and (d) are more interesting, because the function $\mathcal{NBC}(w_{\text{cash}})$ may be decreasing and then increasing, meaning that $w^\star_{\text{cash}} > 0$. Therefore, it is more interesting to use a "*stressed*" transaction cost function when we would like to calculate cash buffer analytics. This is why we only focus on cases (c) and (d) in what follows. Figure 16 shows the optimal value $w^\star_{\text{cash}}$ of the cash buffer with respect to the expected redemption rate[26]. We verify that $w^\star_{\text{cash}}$ increases with the trading limit x^+ and the expected redemption rate. For instance, the optimal cash buffer is equal to 10% if $\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{R}] = 50\%$ and $x^+ = 10\%$. If there is no trading limit, $w^\star_{\text{cash}} = 10\%$ if $\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{R}] = 23\%$. Of course, these results are extremely sensitive to the values of $\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}$, λ and σ_{asset}. For example, we obtain Figure 34 on page 291 when $\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}$ is equal to 2.5%. $w^\star_{\text{cash}}$ is dramatically reduced, and there is no liquidity buffer when $x^+ = 10\%$. There is also no implementation when $x^+ = 100\%$ and $\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{R}] \leq 50\%$. Therefore, the value of $w^\star_{\text{cash}}$ is very sensitive to $\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}$. We observe the same phenomenon with the parameter λ. Indeed, when we take into account the tracking error risk, the optimal value $w^\star_{\text{cash}}$ is reduced[27].

Given w_{cash}, we define the break-even risk premium as the value of $\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}$ such that the net cost function is minimum. It is equal to:

$$\varrho(w_{\text{cash}}) = \frac{\partial\, \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{LG}(w_{\text{cash}})]}{\partial\, w_{\text{cash}}} - \lambda w_{\text{cash}} \left(\sigma^2_{\text{cash}} + \sigma^2_{\text{asset}} - 2\rho_{\text{cash,asset}}\sigma_{\text{cash}}\sigma_{\text{asset}}\right) \tag{115}$$

In Figures 37 and 38 on page 291, we have reported the value of $\varrho(w_{\text{cash}})$ for the previous example. Once $\varrho(w_{\text{cash}})$ is computed, we obtain the following rules[28]:

$$\begin{cases} \mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}} < \varrho(w_{\text{cash}}) \Rightarrow w^\star_{\text{cash}} > w_{\text{cash}} \\ \mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}} = \varrho(w_{\text{cash}}) \Rightarrow w^\star_{\text{cash}} = w_{\text{cash}} \\ \mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}} > \varrho(w_{\text{cash}}) \Rightarrow w^\star_{\text{cash}} < w_{\text{cash}} \end{cases} \tag{116}$$

[26] We have $\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{R}] = \frac{\eta}{\eta+1}$ when $\mathbf{F}(x) = x^\eta$.

[27] See Figures 35 and 36 on page 292.

[28] For instance, Figures 39 and 40 on page 294 illustrate this set of rules for a liquidity buffer of 10%.

Figure 15: Net buffer cost ($\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}} = 1\%$ and $\lambda = 0$)



Figure 16: Optimal cash buffer ($\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}} = 1\%$ and $\lambda = 0$)



In particular, a cash buffer must be implemented if the risk premium of the asset is below the threshold $\varrho(0)$:

$$w_{\text{cash}}^{\star} > 0 \Leftrightarrow \mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}} < \varrho(0) = \frac{\partial \mathbb{E}[\mathcal{LG}(0)]}{\partial w_{\text{cash}}} \tag{117}$$

We notice that $\varrho(0)$ does not depend on the tracking error risk. Figures 17 and 18 show when a liquidity buffer is implemented with respect to the risk premium $\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}$ and the expected redemption rate $\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{R}]$.

3.1.3 The debate on cash hoarding

We cannot finish this section without saying a few words about the debate on cash hoarding. Indeed, the underlying idea of the previous analysis is to implement a cash buffer before the redemption occurs, and to help the liquidation process during the liquidity stress period (Chernenko and Sunderam, 2016; Goldstein, 2017; Ma *et al.*, 2021). However, Morris *et al.* (2017) found that asset managers can hoard cash during redemption periods, because they anticipate worst days. Instead of liquidating the cash buffer to meet investor redemptions, asset managers can preserve the liquidity of their portfolios (Jiang *et al.*, 2021) or even increase the proportion of cash during the stress period (Schrimpf *et al.*, 2021). In this case, cash hoarding may amplify fire sales and seems to be contradictory with the implementation of a cash buffer. However, cash hoarding is easy to understand in our framework. Indeed, during a stress period, asset managers may anticipate a very pessimistic scenario, meaning that they dramatically reduce the expected risk premium $\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}$. This implies increasing the level of the optimal cash buffer $w_{\text{cash}}^{\star}$. Therefore, the previous framework explains that cash buffering and cash hoarding are compatible if we consider that asset managers have a dynamic view of the risk premium of assets.

3.2 Special arrangements

Special arrangements are used extensively by the hedge fund industry. In particular, gates and side pockets were extensively implemented during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis after the Lehman Brothers collapse (Aiken *et al.*, 2015; Teo, 2011). Nevertheless, mutual funds are increasingly familiar with these tools and are allowed in many European countries (Darpeix *et al.*, 2020, Table 4.3.A, page 33). For instance, gates, in-kind redemptions, side pockets and redemption suspensions are active in France, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. In Germany, gates and side pockets are not permitted whereas side pockets are prohibited in the United Kingdom.

3.2.1 Redemption suspension and gate

When implementing a gate, the fund manager temporarily limits the amount of redemptions from the fund. In this case, the gate forces the redeeming investors to wait until the next regular withdrawal dates to receive the balance of their withdrawal request. For instance, the fund manager can impose that the daily amount of withdrawals do not exceed 2% of the fund's net assets. Let us assume a redemption rate of 5% at time t (investors A) and 2% at time $t+1$ (investors B). Because we have a daily gate of 2%, only 40% of the withdrawal of investors A may be executed at time t. The next 60% are executed at time $t+1$ and $t+2$. Investors B who would like to redeem at time $t+1$ must wait until time $t+2$, because redeeming investors A take precedence. Finally, we obtain the redemption schedule reported in Table 10. We notice that the last redeeming investors may be greatly penalized because of the queuing system. If there are many redemptions, the remaining investors have

Figure 17: Implementation of a cash buffer when $x^+ = 10\%$



Figure 18: Implementation of a cash buffer when $x^+ = 100\%$



no incentive to redeem because they face two risks. The risk of time redemption depends on the frequency of withdrawal dates. In the case of monthly withdrawals, investors can wait several months before obtaining their cash. For instance, we observed this situation during the hedge fund crisis at the end of 2008. The second risk concerns the valuation. Indeed, the unit price can change dramatically during the redemption gate period. This is why regulators generally impose a maximum period for mutual funds that would like to impose a redemption gate.

Table 10: Stress scenarios of the participation rate

Redemption Gate	Redeeming Investors	Time t	$t+1$	$t+2$	$t+3$
No gate	A	5% (100%)			
	B		2% (100%)		
2%	A	2% (40%)	2% (40%)	1% (20%)	
	B			1% (50%)	1% (50%)

An extreme case of a redemption gate is when the manager completely suspends redemptions from his fund. A redemption suspension is rare and was originally used by hedge funds[29]. However, it is now part of the liquidity management tools that can be used by mutual funds. For instance, it is the only mechanism that is available in all European jurisdictions (ESRB, 2017; Darpeix *et al.*, 2020). It was used by at least 215 European investment funds (with net assets totaling €73.4 bn) during the coronavirus crisis in February and March 2020 (Grill *et al.*, 2021). The authors found that "*many of those funds had invested in illiquid assets, were leveraged or had lower cash holdings than funds that were not suspended*".

At first sight, a suspension of redemptions seems to be a tougher decision than a redemption gate. Indeed, in this last case, redemptions continue to be accepted, but they are delayed. However, it is not certain that a redemption gate will have less impact than a redemption suspension. In a period of fire sales, gates can also exacerbate the liquidity crisis because of the asset liquidation/market transmission channel of systemic risk (Roncalli and Weisang, 2015a). On the contrary, redemption suspensions do not directly contribute to the asset liquidation from a theoretical point of view. However, we generally observe higher redemptions when suspensions are stopped. This means that we can have an ex-post overreaction of investors. In fact, it seems that a suspension of redemptions is preferable when the fund manager faces a temporary liquidity crisis such that many securities can not be priced. In the absence of price valuation, it may be good to wait until normal conditions are restored. Of course, it is not always possible and depends on the nature of the liquidity crisis.

The impact of gates has received little attention from academics. Nevertheless, the theoretical study of Cipriani *et al.* (2014) showed that there can be preemptive runs when a fund manager is able to impose a gate, although it can be ex-post optimal for the fund's investors. This illustrates the issue of strategic interaction and payoff complementarities described by Chen *et al.* (2010). Moreover, imposing a gate generally leads to a reputational

[29] See for instance the famous suspension of redemptions decided by GAM after its top manager in charge of absolute return strategies was the subject of a disciplinary procedure (GAM, 2018).

risk for the fund and a negative externality for the corresponding asset class and the other similar investment funds. More generally, Voellmy (2021) showed that redemption gates are less efficient than redemption fees, which are described on page 258.

3.2.2 Side pocket

When a side pocket is created, the fund separates illiquid assets from liquid assets. Therefore, the fund is split into two funds: the mirror fund, which is made up of the liquid assets and the side pocket of illiquid assets. Each investor in the initial fund receives the same number of units of the mirror fund and the side pocket. The mirror fund inherits the properties of the original fund. Therefore, the mirror fund can continue to be subscribed or redeemed. On the contrary, the side pocket fund becomes a closed-end fund (Opromolla, 2009). The fund manager's objective is then to liquidate the assets of the side pocket fund. However, he is not forced to liquidate them immediately and can wait until market conditions improve. For instance,it took many months (and sometimes one or two years) for hedge fund to manage the side pockets created in October 2008 and for investors to retrieve their cash.

To the best of our knowledge, the only academic study on side pocketing is the research work conducted by Aiken *et al.* (2015), who analyzed the behavior of 740 hedge funds between 2006 and 2011. The authors found that side pockets and gates are positively correlated, meaning that hedge funds both gated investors and placed assets into a side pocket during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. This result suggests that gates and side pockets are not mutually exclusive. This explains the bad reputation of side pockets. Indeed, investors generally have the feeling of facing a double sentence. A part of their investment is segregated, and they don't know when and how much of their capital they will retrieve. And the remainder of their investment is gated. This is not the original objective of side pocketing, since the underlying idea is to separate the original fund into a healthy portfolio and a bad portfolio. But generally, the healthy fund is also gated.

Certainly, side pocketing is a last-resort discretionary liquidity restriction because of the reputational risk. First, the fund manager gives a strong signal to the market that the liquidity crisis is not temporary but will persist for a long time. Therefore, side pocketing indirectly contributes to strengthening the spillover effect of the liquidity crisis because market sentiment is getting worse. Second, if we restrict our analysis to the fund level, the effect of side pocketing is ambiguous. It is obvious that it eliminates the first-mover advantage, but it is also a sign that the liquidity calibration of the original fund was worse. Moreover, side pockets can be used to protect management fees on the more liquid assets or to hide a poor risk management process. This explains that side pocketing is generally followed by the collapse of the fund, which generally suffers from existing investors' withdrawing while it is not able to attract new investors.

3.2.3 In-kind redemptions

In-kind redemptions are non-monetary payments. In this case, the fund manager offers a basket of securities to the redeeming investor, generally the asset portfolio of the fund on a pro-rata basis. Since the beginning of the 2000s, in-kind redemptions have been used extensively in order to improve the tax efficiency of US exchange traded funds (Poterba and Shoven, 2002). Even though they are less common in the mutual fund industry, in-kind redemptions have become increasingly popular to manage liquidity runs. For instance, according to ESRB (2017), in-kind redemptions are the most common available tool in the European Union, just after the suspension of redemptions.

In-kind redemptions are generally considered as an efficient tool for managing liquidity runs since they transfer the liquidation issue to redeeming investors. As showed by Agarwal

et al. (2020), redemption-in-kind funds tend to deliver more illiquid securities. Moreover, these funds "*experience less flow subsequently because investors avoid such funds where they are unable to benefit from liquidity transformation function of funds*" (Agarwal *et al.*, 2020, page 30).

Normally, in-kind redemptions solve the valuation problem of the redemption portfolio when it corresponds to the pro-rata asset portfolio[30]. This property is appealing in a period of liquidity stress. However, the pro-rata rule only concerns large redemptions in order to be sure that the rounding effect and the decimalization impact are small. From a technical point of view, redemption-in-kind is certainly more difficult to manage than gating the fund. This certainly explains why there are few mutual funds that have applied in-kind redemptions in Europe.

3.3 Swing pricing

The objective of swing pricing is to protect existing investors from dilution[31] caused by large trading costs and market impacts due to subscriptions and/or redemptions. Since this mechanism is relatively new, there are few research studies on its benefit. From a theoretical and empirical point of view, it seems that swing pricing can eliminate the first-mover advantage (Jin *et al.*, 2019; Capponi *et al.*, 2020) and mitigate the systemic risk (Malik and Lindner, 2017; Jin *et al.*, 2019). Nevertheless, these results must be challenged as shown by the works of Lewrick and Schanz (2017a,b):

> [...] "*we show that, within our theoretical framework, swing pricing can prevent self-fulfilling runs on the fund. However, in practice, the scope for swing pricing to prevent self-fulfilling runs is more limited, primarily because the share of liquidity-constrained investors is difficult to assess*" (Lewrick and Schanz, 2017a).
>
> [...] "*we show that swing pricing dampens outflows in reaction to weak fund performance, but has a limited effect during stress episodes. Furthermore, swing pricing supports fund returns, while raising accounting volatility, and may lead to lower cash buffers*" (Lewrick and Schanz, 2017b).

3.3.1 Investor dilution

Following Roncalli *et al.* (2021a), the total net assets (TNA) equal the total value of assets $A(t)$ less the current or accrued liabilities $D(t)$:

$$\text{TNA}(t) = A(t) - D(t)$$

The net asset value (NAV) represents the share price or the unit price:

$$\text{NAV}(t) = \frac{\text{TNA}(t)}{N(t)}$$

where the total number $N(t)$ of shares or units in issue is the sum of all units owned by all unitholders. In the sequel, we assume that the debits are negligible: $D(t) \ll A(t)$. This implies that:

$$\text{NAV}(t+1) \approx \frac{A(t+1)}{N(t+1)}$$

$R_A(t+1)$ denotes the return of the assets. We can then face three situations:

[30] Indeed, the valuation problem is transferred to the redeeming investors.
[31] This means a reduction in the fund's value.

1. There is no net subscription or redemption flows, meaning that $N(t+1) = N(t)$ and $A(t+1) = (1 + R(t+1)) \cdot A(t)$. In this case, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{NAV}(t+1) &= (1 + R_A(t+1)) \frac{A(t)}{N(t)} \\ &= (1 + R_A(t+1)) \cdot \text{NAV}(t) \end{aligned} \tag{118}$$

The growth of the net asset value is exactly equal to the return of the assets:

$$R_{\text{NAV}}(t+1) = \frac{\text{NAV}(t+1)}{\text{NAV}(t)} - 1 = R_A(t+1)$$

2. If the investment fund experiences some net subscription flows, the number of units becomes:

$$N(t+1) = N(t) + \Delta N(t+1)$$

where $\Delta N(t+1) = N^+(t+1)$ is the number of units to be created. At time $t+1$, we have[32]:

$$\begin{aligned} A(t+1) &= (1 + R_A(t+1)) \cdot (A(t) + \Delta N(t+1) \cdot \text{NAV}(t)) \\ &= (1 + R_A(t+1)) \cdot (N(t) \cdot \text{NAV}(t) + \Delta N(t+1) \cdot \text{NAV}(t)) \\ &= (1 + R_A(t+1)) \cdot N(t+1) \cdot \text{NAV}(t) \end{aligned}$$

and:

$$\text{TNA}(t+1) = A(t+1) - \mathcal{TC}(t+1)$$

where $\mathcal{TC}(t+1)$ is the transaction cost of buying the new assets. We deduce that:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{NAV}(t+1) &= \frac{A(t+1) - \mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{N(t+1)} \\ &= (1 + R_A(t+1)) \cdot \text{NAV}(t) - \frac{\mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{N(t+1)} \end{aligned} \tag{119}$$

In this case, the growth of the net asset value is less than the return of the assets:

$$R_{\text{NAV}}(t+1) = R_A(t+1) - \frac{\mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{N(t+1) \cdot \text{NAV}(t)} \leq R_A(t+1)$$

3. If the investment fund experiences some net redemption flows, the number of units becomes:

$$N(t+1) = N(t) + \Delta N(t+1)$$

where $\Delta N(t+1) = -N^-(t+1)$ and $N^-(t+1)$ is the number of units to be redeemed. At time $t+1$, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{NAV}(t+1) &= \frac{(1 + R_A(t+1)) \cdot N(t) \cdot \text{NAV}(t) - \mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{N(t)} \\ &= (1 + R_A(t+1)) \cdot \text{NAV}(t) - \frac{\mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{N(t)} \end{aligned} \tag{120}$$

In this case, the growth of the net asset value is less than the return of the assets:

$$R_{\text{NAV}}(t+1) = R_A(t+1) - \frac{\mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{N(t) \cdot \text{NAV}(t)} \leq R_A(t+1)$$

[32] $\Delta N(t+1) \cdot \text{NAV}(t)$ is the amount invested in the new assets at time t.

When comparing Equations (118), (119) and (120), we notice that subscription/redemption flows may penalize existing/remaining investors, because the net asset value is reduced by the transaction costs that are borne by all investors in the fund:

$$\text{NAV}(t+1 \mid \Delta N(t+1)=0) - \text{NAV}(t+1 \mid \Delta N(t+1)\neq 0) = \frac{\mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{\max(N(t), N(t+1))}$$

The decline in the net asset value is referred to as "*investor dilution*".

In order to illustrate the dilution, we consider a fund with the following characteristics: $\text{NAV}(t) = \$100$, $N(t) = 10$ and $R_A(t+1) = 5\%$. In the absence of subscriptions/redemptions, we have:

$$\text{NAV}(t+1) = (1+5\%) \times 100 = 105$$

We assume that creating/redeeming 5 shares induces a transaction cost of \$30. In the case of a net subscription of \$500, we have $N(t+1) = 15$ and:

$$\text{NAV}(t+1) = (1+5\%) \times 100 - \frac{30}{15} = 103$$

In the case of a net redemption of \$500, we have $N(t+1) = 5$ and:

$$\text{NAV}(t+1) = (1+5\%) \times 100 - \frac{30}{10} = 102$$

The transaction cost therefore reduces the NAV and impacts all investors in the fund. Moreover, we notice that the dilution is greater for redemptions than subscriptions. The reason is that the number of shares increases in the case of a subscription, implying that the transaction cost by share is lower than in the case of a redemption.

This asymmetry property between subscriptions and redemptions is an important issue when considering a liquidity stress testing program. Another factor is that the unit transaction cost is an increasing function of the size of the subscription/redemption amount. This is particularly true in a stress market when it is difficult to sell assets because of the low demand. If we consider the previous example, we can assume that selling \$500 in a stress period may induce a transaction cost of \$50. In this case, we obtain:

$$\text{NAV}(t+1) = (1+5\%) \times 100 - \frac{50}{10} = 100$$

This example illustrates how investor dilution is an important issue when the fund faces redemptions in a stress period.

3.3.2 The swing pricing principle

The swing pricing principle means that the NAV is adjusted for net subscriptions/redemptions. Therefore, transaction costs are only borne by the subscribing/redeeming investors. In the case of a net redemption, the NAV must be reduced by the transaction costs divided by the number of net redeeming shares:

$$\text{NAV}_{\text{swing}}(t+1) = \text{NAV}_{\text{gross}}(t+1) - \frac{\mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{N^-(t+1) - N^+(t+1)}$$

where $\text{NAV}_{\text{gross}}$ is the "*gross*" net asset value calculated before swing pricing is applied (AFG, 2016). In the case of a net subscription, the NAV becomes:

$$\text{NAV}_{\text{swing}}(t+1) = \text{NAV}_{\text{gross}}(t+1) + \frac{\mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{N^+(t+1) - N^-(t+1)}$$

Therefore, the NAV is increased if $N^+ - N^- > 0$. Finally, we obtain the following compact formula:

$$\text{NAV}_{\text{swing}}(t+1) = \text{NAV}_{\text{gross}}(t+1) + \frac{\mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{\Delta N(t+1)}$$

The adjustment only impacts investors that trade on that day, since existing investors are not affected by this adjustment. Indeed, the total net asset is equal to:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{TNA}(t+1) &= A(t+1) - \mathcal{TC}(t+1) \\
&= N(t) \cdot \text{NAV}_{\text{gross}}(t+1) + \Delta N(t+1) \cdot \text{NAV}_{\text{swing}}(t+1) - \mathcal{TC}(t+1) \\
&= N(t) \cdot \text{NAV}_{\text{gross}}(t+1) + \Delta N(t+1) \cdot \text{NAV}_{\text{gross}}(t+1) \\
&= N(t+1) \cdot \text{NAV}_{\text{gross}}(t+1)
\end{aligned}$$

meaning that it is exactly equal to the gross net asset value. If there is no redemption/subscription at time $t+2$, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{NAV}(t+2) &= (1 + R_A(t+2)) \cdot \text{NAV}_{\text{gross}}(t+1) \\
&= (1 + R_A(t+2)) \cdot (1 + R_A(t+1)) \cdot \text{NAV}(t+1)
\end{aligned}$$

We notice that swing pricing has protected the fund's buy-and-hold investors.

If we consider the previous example, we have $\text{NAV}_{\text{gross}}(t+1) = 105$ and:

$$\text{NAV}_{\text{swing}}(t+1) = \begin{cases} 105 + \dfrac{30}{5} = 111 & \text{if subscription} \\ 105 - \dfrac{30}{5} = 99 & \text{if redemption} \end{cases}$$

We observe that swing pricing increases the fund's volatility since the NAV adjustment with swing pricing is greater than the NAV adjustment without swing pricing. Moreover, the adjustment is smaller for subscriptions because the number of shares increases[33]. Therefore, we notice an asymmetry between subscriptions and redemptions since the latter impact the unit price more than the former. In the case of a liquidity crisis where there is a substantial imbalance between demand and supply, the impact of redemptions is even stronger and the contagion risk of a spillover effect is increased.

3.3.3 Swing pricing in practice

Swing pricing is regulated in Europe and the U.S. and can be used under regulatory constraints (Malik and Lindner, 2017). For instance, in France, the asset manager should inform the AMF and the fund's auditor of the implementation of swing pricing (AFG, 2016). The use of swing pricing has also been encouraged during the Coronavirus crisis in order to manage the liquidity:

> "*The AMF also favors the use of swing pricing and anti-dilution levies mechanisms during the current crisis, given the low liquidity of certain underlying assets and the sometimes-high costs involved in restructuring portfolios*" (AMF, 2020, page 4).

According to ESMA (2020b), swing pricing was the most used LMT in Europe during the market stress in February and March 2020, far ahead of redemption suspension. This follows the recommendations provided by the ESRB. Similar rules have existed in the U.S. for some years (SEC, 2016), even though the use of swing pricing is less widespread than in E.U. jurisdictions.

[33] Indeed, we have $\max(N(t), N(t+1)) = N(t+1) > N(t)$ in the case of net subscriptions and $\max(N(t), N(t+1)) = N(t)$ in the case of net redemptions.

Full vs. partial vs. dual pricing According to Jin *et al.* (2019), asset managers use three alternative pricing mechanisms:

1. Partial swing pricing
   The NAV is adjusted only when the net fund flow is greater than a threshold.

2. Full swing pricing
   The NAV is adjusted every time there is a net inflow or outflow. Full swing pricing is a special case of partial swing pricing by considering that the threshold is equal to zero.

3. Dual pricing
   We distinguish bid and ask NAVs, meaning that the investment fund has two NAVs. Therefore, investors purchase the fund shares at the ask price and sell at the bid price.

Using a dataset of UK based asset managers, Jin *et al.* (2019) estimated that approximately a quarter of investment funds use traditional pricing mechanisms whereas the three remaining quarters consider alternative pricing mechanisms. Within this group, the break down is the following: 25% employ full swing pricing, 50% prefer partial swing pricing and 25% promote dual pricing.

Dual pricing is an extension of full swing pricing that distinguishes between subscriptions and redemptions. However, dual pricing is more complex to calibrate. Indeed, it is not obvious to allocate transaction costs to both redeeming and subscribing investors because of the netting process. We have:

$$\text{NAV}_{\text{ask}}(t+1) = \text{NAV}_{\text{gross}}(t+1) + \frac{\alpha \cdot \mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{N^+(t+1)}$$

and:

$$\text{NAV}_{\text{bid}}(t+1) = \text{NAV}_{\text{gross}}(t+1) - \frac{(1-\alpha) \cdot \mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{N^-(t+1)}$$

where α is the portion of the transaction costs allocated to gross subscriptions. For instance, we can use the pro-rata rule:

$$\alpha = \frac{N^+(t+1)}{N^+(t+1) + N^-(t+1)}$$

but we can also penalize redeeming investors:

$$\alpha = \frac{N^+(t+1)}{N^+(t+1) + \gamma \cdot N^-(t+1)}$$

where $\gamma \geq 1$ is the penalization factor. Let us consider the previous example with $N^+(t+1) = 10$, $N^-(t+1) = 5$ and $\mathcal{TC}(t+1) = 30$. We have $\text{NAV}_{\text{swing}}(t+1) = 111$. If we assume that $\gamma = 1$, we have $\text{NAV}_{\text{ask}}(t+1) = 107$ and $\text{NAV}_{\text{bid}}(t+1) = 103$. If γ is set to 2, the previous figures become $\text{NAV}_{\text{ask}}(t+1) = 106.5$ and $\text{NAV}_{\text{bid}}(t+1) = 102$.

Remark 9 *The previous example illustrates one of the drawbacks of swing pricing. Indeed, since there are* 10 *subscriptions and* 5 *redemptions, the swing NAV is greater than the gross NAV (*\$111 *vs.* \$105*). Redeeming investors benefit from the entry of new investors. In the case of dual pricing, the unit price of redeeming investors is equal to* \$103 *(if* γ *is set to* 1*), which is lower than* \$111*.*

Setting the swing threshold and the swing factor In most cases, swing pricing is applied only when the net amount of subscriptions and redemptions reaches a threshold[34]:

$$\left|\frac{\Delta N(t+1)}{\min\left(N(t), N(t+1)\right)}\right| \geq sw_{\text{threshold}}$$

where $sw_{\text{threshold}}$ is the swing threshold. For example, $sw_{\text{threshold}} = 5\%$ implies that the swing pricing mechanism is activated every time we observe at least 5% of inflows/outflows. A swing factor is then applied to the NAV:

$$\text{NAV}_{\text{swing}}(t+1) = \begin{cases} (1 + sw_{\text{factor}}) \cdot \text{NAV}(t+1) & \text{if net subscription} \geq sw_{\text{threshold}} \\ (1 - sw_{\text{factor}}) \cdot \text{NAV}(t+1) & \text{if net redemption} \geq sw_{\text{threshold}} \end{cases}$$

We can use different approaches to calibrate the parameters $sw_{\text{threshold}}$ and sw_{factor}. For instance, we can assume that $sw_{\text{threshold}}$ is constant for a family of funds (e.g. equity funds). In this case, $sw_{\text{threshold}}$ is estimated using a historical sample of flow rates and transaction costs. The underlying idea is to use a value of $sw_{\text{threshold}}$ such that transaction costs become significant. However, this approach may appear too simple in a liquidity stress testing framework. Indeed, transaction costs are larger in a stress period, meaning that $sw_{\text{threshold}}$ is a decreasing function of the stress intensity. For instance, the asset manager can calibrate two values of $sw_{\text{threshold}}$, a standard figure which is valid for normal periods and a lower figure which is valid for normal periods. Typical values are 5% and 2%. The parameter sw_{factor} must reflect the transaction costs. Again, two approaches are possible: ex-ante or ex-post transaction costs. In the first case, we consider the transaction cost function calibrated to measure the asset risk, whereas the effective cost is used in the second case.

By construction, the swing factor sw_{factor} varies over time while the swing threshold $sw_{\text{threshold}}$ is more static. When the swing pricing mechanism is applied, we can estimate the amount of transaction costs:

$$\mathcal{TC}(t+1) = sw_{\text{factor}} \cdot \text{NAV}(t+1) \cdot |\Delta N(t+1)|$$

We deduce that the transaction cost ratio is greater than the product of the swing threshold and the swing factor:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{\min\left(N(t), N(t+1)\right) \cdot \text{NAV}(t+1)} &= sw_{\text{factor}} \cdot \left|\frac{\Delta N(t+1)}{\min\left(N(t), N(t+1)\right)}\right| \\ &\geq sw_{\text{factor}} \cdot sw_{\text{threshold}} \end{aligned}$$

Another approach consists in fixing the value of the product:

$$sw_{\text{factor}} \cdot sw_{\text{threshold}} = sw_{\text{product}}$$

In this case, we are sure that the swing pricing is activated when the transaction cost ratio is greater than the swing product sw_{product}. In the previous approaches, the swing factor is calculated once we have verified that the fund flow is larger than $sw_{\text{threshold}}$. In this new approach, the swing factor is first calculated in order to determine the swing threshold:

$$sw_{\text{threshold}} = \frac{sw_{\text{product}}}{sw_{\text{factor}}}$$

Therefore, the swing threshold is dynamic and changes every day.

[34] An alternative approach is to replace $\min\left(N(t), N(t+1)\right)$ with $N(t)$.

Let us see an example to illustrate the difference between the static and dynamic approaches. We consider that $sw_{\text{threshold}} = 5\%$ and $sw_{\text{factor}} = 40$ bps. We deduce that $sw_{\text{product}} = 2$ bps. In the static approach, the swing pricing mechanism is not activated if we face a redemption rate of 4% whatever the value of the swing factor. We assume that we are in a period of stress and a redemption rate of 4% implies a swing factor of 60 bps. In the dynamic approach, the swing threshold is equal to 3.33%, implying the activation of the swing pricing mechanism. More generally, we have a hyperbolic relationship between sw_{factor} and $sw_{\text{threshold}}$ as illustrated in Figure 19.

Figure 19: Dynamic approach of swing pricing



3.3.4 Anti-dilution levies

Anti-dilution levies (ADL) are very close to swing pricing since the fund manager does not use the transaction costs to adjust the NAV, but to adjust entry and exit fees. According to AFG (2016), these fees are equal to:

	$N^+ > N^-$		$N^+ < N^-$		Pro-rata
ADL^+	$\dfrac{\mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{N^+(t+1)}$	$\dfrac{\mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{\Delta N(t+1)}$	0	0	$\dfrac{\mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{N^+(t+1)+N^-(t+1)}$
ADL^-	0	0	$\dfrac{\mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{N^-(t+1)}$	$-\dfrac{\mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{\Delta N(t+1)}$	$\dfrac{\mathcal{TC}(t+1)}{N^+(t+1)+N^-(t+1)}$

where ADL^+ is the entry fees and ADL^- is the exit fees. In the case of a pro-rata rule, the transaction costs are borne by subscribing and redeeming investors. In the other cases, the transaction costs are charged to subscribing investors if $N^+ > N^-$ or redeeming investors if $N^+ < N^-$. Moreover, anti-dilution levies may or may not recognize netting figures. This is why we have reported two columns for the cases $N^+ > N^-$ and $N^+ < N^-$.

The main advantage of anti-dilution levies is that the NAV is not noisy and reflects the fair value of the unit price. Remaining investors may be sensitive because the mark-to-market is smoother. However, subscribing/redeeming investors may prefer swing pricing, because they may pay more attention to additional costs than to an adjusted price. Indeed, they may have the feeling that swing pricing is fairer, because the published NAV applies to all investors, whereas entry/exit costs only concern them.

Remark 10 *Sometimes there is a confusion between redemption fees and exit fees*[35]*. Indeed, redemption fees are charged to investors in a systematic way whatever the market conditions. They are indicated in the prospectus and their level is disclosed. Therefore, they are not a liquidity management tool for liquidity stress testing. On the contrary, swing pricing and anti-dilution levies are only charged in stress markets. Their levels are not necessarily disclosed. Table 11 summarizes the differences between these three mechanisms.*

Table 11: Differences between redemption fees, anti-dilution levies and swing pricing

Characteristics	Redemption fees	Anti-dilution levies	Swing pricing
Justification	No obligation	Documented and general principles externalised to fundholders	
Requirements for activation	Any redemption	Based on the net S/R balance and an activation threshold	
Indication to the level	Level of fees defined in the prospectus	No detail concerning the parameters	

Source: Darpeix *et al.* (2020, page 15).

3.3.5 Effectiveness of swing pricing

Based on the empirical study of US funds and their Luxembourg counterparts, Lewrick and Schanz (2017b) noticed that negative returns imply larger outflows during normal market conditions for US funds. In stressed markets, in particular during the 2013 US taper tantrum, they found no difference. Since swing pricing is applied in Luxembourg and not in the US during the study period, they concluded that swing pricing failed to reduce the liquidity risk. For Capponi *et al.* (2020), the reason lies in the scale and application of swing pricing. These authors consider that swing factors are too small and must be larger to reduce the incentive to redeem immediately to capture the first-mover advantage premium.

We reiterate here that the purpose of swing pricing is to protect the remaining investors. In particular, during a period of market stress, they do not pay other investors' transaction costs. The objective of swing pricing is not to prevent a liquidity crisis, but it may help fund managers to better rebalance their portfolio and reduce the use of horizontal slicing.

Remark 11 *This section dedicated to liquidity management tools demonstrates that there is not one solution, but several approaches to managing the liquidity risk. Nevertheless, this section also shows that the perfect tool does not exist. In liquidity risk, the number of known and unknown unknowns is much greater than the number of known knowns. Therefore, the tools presented here give a partial answer to the problem, because the liquidity issue concerns the balance between buying and selling forces. Therefore, it makes sense to complement the liquidity framework by monitoring its level.*

[35] See for instance Greene *et al.* (2007) and Lenkey and Song (2016).

4 Liquidity monitoring tools

It is obvious that monitoring liquidity is an important stage of a liquidity stress testing program. For instance, the step is mandatory in banking regulations. In addition to the LCR and NSFR, BCBS (2013) defines a set of liquidity risk monitoring tools, in order to "*capture specific information related to a bank's cash flows, balance sheet structure, available unencumbered collateral and certain market indicators*". We can classify these tools[36] into two categories. The first category concerns the metrics that measure the liquidity at a global level. It corresponds to the macro-economic approach of liquidity monitoring, and it mainly uses market-wide information. The second category is specific to the managed portfolios. It corresponds to the micro-economic approach of liquidity monitoring, and it mainly uses security-based information.

4.1 Macro-economic approach to liquidity monitoring

The ESMA risk assessment uses several metrics (ESMA TRV Report, 2021, page 4) to monitor financial risks: (a) risk participants (market environment, securities markets, infrastructure and services, asset management and consumers), (b) risk categories (liquidity risk, market risk, contagion risk, credit risk, operational risk) and (c) risk drivers (macro-economic environment, interest-rate environment, sovereign and private debt markets, infrastructure disruption, political and event risks). Some of them are interesting when monitoring global liquidity from an asset management viewpoint. We notice that the starting point of ESMA for measuring financial risks is the market environment, more precisely the economic outlook (real output, inflation risk, etc.) and the policy responses. Therefore, central bank liquidity is an important monitoring metric. Besides money market conditions, monitoring the banking sector is also essential, because of its interconnectedness with asset managers and asset owners. Therefore, statistics on the repo market activity are important to track[37]. Of course, traditional market risk metrics can be used to assess global liquidity. These include market sentiment (for instance, the levels of the VIX index and flight to liquidity), the performance of asset classes, the average level of credit spreads (for both sovereign and corporate bonds), the high yield premium, etc. Finally, the analysis of inflows/outflows, the number of active LMTs, liquidity demand from investors, the dynamics of trading volumes and the average bid-ask spreads can complement the macro-economic approach to liquidity monitoring.

4.2 Micro-economic approach to liquidity monitoring

The micro-economic approach focuses on asset classes, security instruments and issuers. For instance, the global liquidity metric gives no information on the liquidity of US municipal bonds, the investment grade segment of the ETF market, Italian BTP bonds, etc. The underlying idea is to then use more specific measures, including the daily spread, the daily volume, the number of daily quotes, etc. These metrics can be computed by asset class, security or issuer. Other information may be useful, for instance market-making activity, issuance activity, ETF liquidity, etc. Other important information flows are the metrics that can be computed from order books or the activity of trading desks. A typical example is the order imbalance proposed by Easley *et al.* (2015).

[36] The exhaustive list of liquidity monitoring metrics in the case of the Basel III framework is available in BCBS (2019).

[37] Other statistics are easily available such as the one-month return of banks' stocks, CDS and credit spreads of banks, etc.

5 Conclusion

This article concludes a series of research studies dedicated to liquidity stress testing in asset management. As already said, academics and professionals have so far paid little attention when asset-liability management concerns the asset management industry. The goal of this research project was then to fill the gap to develop mathematical and statistical approaches and provide appropriate answers. The first part of this project was dedicated to the liability liquidity risk (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021a) and focused on the statistical modeling of redemption shocks. The second part concerned the asset liquidity risk (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021b) and dealt with the modeling of the transaction cost function. Finally, this article, which constitutes the third part of the project, establishes the ALM framework of the liquidity risk in asset management (Roncalli, 2021c). It is organized around the three Ms: measurement, management and monitoring.

The primary liquidity measurement tool is the redemption coverage ratio or RCR. Using a redemption scenario, the RCR measures the fund manager's ability to liquidate the redemption portfolio in a stress period. Two methods exist to calculate the RCR: the time to liquidation approach and the HQLA framework. The RCR depends on several assumptions about liability and asset risks, but also on the liquidity policy (trading limits and liquidation method[38]). We show that the latter has a big impact. Moreover, we show how reverse stress testing can be implemented, in particular how to define liability and asset RST scenarios.

Liquidity management tools are many and varied. However, we can classify them into three main categories. The first category concerns cash management and the implementation of liquidity buffers. For that, we propose an analytical framework that compares the costs and benefits of a cash buffer. Therefore, we are able to define the optimal value of the cash buffer, which depends on marginal transaction costs, the expected return of assets and the sensitivity to the tracking error risk. In particular, we illustrate the central role of the risk premium. This analysis enabled us to reconcile the paradox around cash buffering and cash hoarding. In particular, we explain cash hoarding by the dynamic implementation of a cash buffer when the asset manager formulates negative expectations on the risk premium. The second category of LMTs are special arrangements. It concerns redemption suspensions, gates, side pockets and in-kind redemptions. Finally, the last category revolves around swing pricing.

Liquidity monitoring tools are more classical since they are not specific to the asset management industry. Indeed, central and commercial banks, regulators, market makers, investors, hedge funds and asset managers use very similar approaches. This is especially true for global liquidity that is highly dependent on central bank liquidity, economic outlook and market sentiment. Monitoring liquidity at asset class, security or issuer level is more challenging, but this is mainly a data management project.

Once again, financial regulation has sped up the development of liquidity risk management with the publication of the ESMA guidelines on liquidity stress testing in UCITS and AIFs. Even though these guidelines are less specific than those applied in the banking sector, they give sufficient information about what is expected and the road that asset managers must take in the future in terms of liquidity management. This study has been completed with the sole aim of complying with ESMA guidelines and asset management practices. It can be viewed as a benchmark for asset managers and a guidebook for academics, who want to develop practical models in this research field.

[38] We compare vertical slicing (naive and optimal pro-rata liquidation) and horizontal slicing (waterfall liquidation).

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Appendix

A Glossary

ALMT

ALMT (or a-LMT) is the acronym of "*Additional Liquidity Management Tool*". They include the tools applied by asset managers in exceptional circumstances to control or limit dealing in fund units/shares in the interests of investors. Examples of ALMT are suspension of dealing in units, deferral of dealing, side-pocketing and special arrangements.

Anti-diluation levy

Anti-diluation levies correspond to entry and exit fees. Their levels are calculated with respect to the transaction costs induced by subscriptions and redemptions.

Cash buffer

A cash buffer is a special type of liquidity buffers that is exclusively composed of cash instruments and cash equivalents.

Cash conversion factor

A CCF is a multiplicative factor, which indicates how to convert \$1 of assets into a liquid cash exposure.

Cash hoarding

Cash hoarding corresponds to a situation where the asset manager increases its cash holding in a liquidity stress period.

Gate

When a gate is implemented, the fund manager temporarily limits the amount of redemptions.

Horizontal slicing

See waterfall liquidation.

HQLA class

The term HQLA refers to high quality liquid asset. An HQLA class groups all the securities that present the same ability to be converted into cash.

In-kind redemption

When in-kind redemptions are implemented, the fund manager offers a basket of securities to the redeeming investor. In-kind redemptions are also called physical redemptions as opposed to cash redemptions that imply a monetary payment.

Liquidation policy

See trading limit.

Liquidation time

See time to liquidation.

Liquidity buffer

A liquidity buffer refers to the stock of liquid instruments held by the fund manager in order to manage future redemptions.

Liquidity management tool

Liquidity management tools include liquidity buffers, special arrangements, swing pricing and anti-dilution levies. See also ALMT.

Liquidity shortfall

The liquidation shortfall is defined as the residual redemption that cannot be fulfilled after h trading days. It is expressed as a percentage of the redemption value. If it is equal to 0%, this means that we can liquidate the redemption in h trading days. More generally, its mathematical expression is:

$$\mathrm{LS}(h) = \mathcal{R} \cdot \max(0, 1 - \mathrm{RCR}(h))$$

Pro-rata liquidation

The pro-rata liquidation uses the proportional rule, implying that each asset is liquidated such that the structure of the portfolio is the same before and after the liquidation.

Redemption coverage ratio

The redemption coverage ratio $\mathrm{RCR}(h)$ is the proportion of the redemption that is liquidated after h trading days. We generally focus on daily and weekly liquidation ratios $\mathrm{RCR}(1)$ and $\mathrm{RCR}(5)$. The RCR is also used to define the liquidation time (or time to liquidation), which is an important measure for managing the liquidity risk.

Redemption scenario

A redemption scenario q is defined by the vector $(q_1, \ldots, q_n)$ where q_i is the number of shares of security i to sell. This scenario can be expressed in dollars:

$$Q := (Q_1, \ldots, Q_n) = (q_1 P_1, \ldots, q_n P_n)$$

where P_i is the price of security i. The redemption scenario may also be defined by its dollar value $\mathbb{R}$:

$$\mathbb{R} = \mathbb{V}(q) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i P_i$$

Redemption suspension

A redemption suspension is a temporary measure where the investors are unable to withdraw their capital in the fund.

Reverse stress testing

Side pocket

A side pocket is a segregated portfolio of illiquid assets.

Special arrangement

Special arrangements are specific types of LMT measures available to some AIFs and which impact investors' redemption rights, such as side pockets or gates.

Swing pricing

Swing pricing is a NAV adjustment process to incorporate redemption and subscription costs.

Time to liquidation

The time to liquidation is the inverse function of the liquidation ratio. It indicates the minimum number of days required to liquidate the proportion p of the redemption.

Trading limit

The trading limit q^+ is the maximum number of shares that can be sold in one trading day.

Vertical slicing

See pro-rata liquidation.

Waterfall liquidation

In this approach, the portfolio is liquidated by selling the most liquid assets first.

B Mathematical results

B.1 Computation of the cash conversion factor

We define $H(t)$ as the following integral function:

$$H(t) = \int_0^t f(u) \left(1 - \int_0^u g(s)\, \mathrm{d}s\right) \mathrm{d}u \tag{121}$$

where $f(u) \geq 0$ and $g(u) \geq 0$ are two positive functions. We note:

$$F(t) = \int_0^t f(u)\, \mathrm{d}u \tag{122}$$

and:

$$G(t) = \int_0^t g(u)\, \mathrm{d}u \tag{123}$$

We assume that:

- $F(t)$ is an increasing function with $F(0) = 0$ and $F(\infty) = 1$;
- $G(t)$ is an increasing function with $G(0) = 0$ and $G(\infty) \leq 1$.

We deduce that

$$0 \leq H(t) \leq 1 \tag{124}$$

In the case where $f(u) = \xi$ is constant, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} H(t) &= \xi \int_0^t \left(1 - \int_0^u g(s)\, \mathrm{d}s\right) \mathrm{d}u \\ &= \frac{F(t) \int_0^t (1 - G(u))\, \mathrm{d}u}{t} \end{aligned} \tag{125}$$

because we have $F(t) = \xi t$. Using the integral mean value theorem, we deduce that $\int_0^t G(u)\, \mathrm{d}u = t(1 - G(c))$ where $c \in [0, t]$. If $g(u)$ is relatively smooth, it follows that:

$$\begin{aligned} H(t) &= F(t)(1 - G(c)) \\ &\approx F(t)\left(1 - G\left(\frac{t}{2}\right)\right) \end{aligned} \tag{126}$$

This result has been obtained by considering that $f(u)$ is constant. Nevertheless, we assume that this result holds in the general case.

Let us apply the previous result to the computation of the cash conversion factor. $f(u)$ is the instantaneous amount of the liquidation portfolio that can be sold in the market at time u, whereas $F(t)$ is the cumulated amount of the liquidation portfolio that can be sold between 0 and t. $G(u) = \int_0^u g(s)\, \mathrm{d}s$ is the drawdown during the period $[0, t]$. Using the notations on page 221, Equation (126) becomes:

$$\mathrm{CCF}(t) = \mathrm{LF}(t)\left(1 - \mathrm{DF}\left(\frac{t}{2}\right)\right) \tag{127}$$

B.2 Analytics of the cash buffer

B.2.1 Mean-variance analysis of the portfolio

Let w_{cash} be the cash-to-assets ratio:

$$w_{\text{cash}} = \frac{\text{cash}}{\text{TNA}} \tag{128}$$

The random return of the portfolio that includes the cash buffer is equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} R &= w_{\text{cash}} \cdot R_{\text{cash}} + (1 - w_{\text{cash}}) \cdot R_{\text{asset}} \\ &= R_{\text{asset}} - w_{\text{cash}} \cdot (R_{\text{asset}} - R_{\text{cash}}) \end{aligned} \tag{129}$$

where R_{cash} and R_{asset} are the random returns of the cash and the assets. We deduce that:

$$\mathbb{E}[R] = \mu_{\text{asset}} - w_{\text{cash}} \cdot (\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}) \tag{130}$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma^2(R) &= w_{\text{cash}}^2 \cdot \sigma_{\text{cash}}^2 + (1 - w_{\text{cash}})^2 \cdot \sigma_{\text{asset}}^2 + \\ &\quad 2w_{\text{cash}} \cdot (1 - w_{\text{cash}}) \cdot \rho_{\text{cash,asset}} \cdot \sigma_{\text{cash}} \cdot \sigma_{\text{asset}} \end{aligned} \tag{131}$$

where μ_{cash} and μ_{asset} are the expected returns of the cash and asset components, σ_{cash} and σ_{asset} are the corresponding volatilities, and $\rho_{\text{cash,asset}}$ is the correlation between the cash and the assets. Generally, we assume that $\sigma_{\text{cash}} \approx 0$ (or $\sigma_{\text{cash}} \ll \sigma_{\text{asset}}$), implying that:

$$\sigma(R) \approx (1 - w_{\text{cash}}) \cdot \sigma_{\text{asset}} \tag{132}$$

B.2.2 Tracking error analysis of the portfolio

Since the tracking error due to the cash buffer is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} e &= R - R_{\text{asset}} \\ &= -w_{\text{cash}} \cdot (R_{\text{asset}} - R_{\text{cash}}) \end{aligned} \tag{133}$$

we obtain the following formula for the expected excess return:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[R \mid R_{\text{asset}}] &= \mathbb{E}[R - R_{\text{asset}}] \\ &= -w_{\text{cash}} \cdot (\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}) \end{aligned} \tag{134}$$

whereas the tracking error volatility $\sigma(R \mid R_{\text{asset}})$ is equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma^2(R \mid R_{\text{asset}}) &= \sigma^2(R - R_{\text{asset}}) \\ &= w_{\text{cash}}^2 \cdot \left(\sigma_{\text{cash}}^2 + \sigma_{\text{asset}}^2 - 2\rho_{\text{cash,asset}} \cdot \sigma_{\text{cash}} \cdot \sigma_{\text{asset}}\right) \end{aligned} \tag{135}$$

If we assume that $\sigma_{\text{cash}} \approx 0$, it follows that:

$$\sigma(R \mid R_{\text{asset}}) \approx w_{\text{cash}} \cdot \sigma_{\text{asset}} \tag{136}$$

B.2.3 Beta and correlation of the portfolio

The covariance between the portfolio return and the asset return is equal to:

$$\begin{aligned}
\operatorname{cov}(R, R_{\text{asset}}) &= \mathbb{E}[R \cdot R_{\text{asset}}] - \mathbb{E}[R] \cdot \mathbb{E}[R_{\text{asset}}] \\
&= \mathbb{E}\left[w_{\text{cash}} \cdot R_{\text{cash}} \cdot R_{\text{asset}} + (1 - w_{\text{cash}}) \cdot R_{\text{asset}}^2\right] - \\
&\quad (\mu_{\text{asset}} - w_{\text{cash}} \cdot (\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}})) \cdot \mu_{\text{asset}} \\
&= w_{\text{cash}} \cdot (\rho_{\text{cash,asset}} \cdot \sigma_{\text{cash}} \cdot \sigma_{\text{asset}} + \mu_{\text{cash}} \cdot \mu_{\text{asset}}) + \\
&\quad (1 - w_{\text{cash}}) \cdot \left(\sigma_{\text{asset}}^2 + \mu_{\text{asset}}^2\right) - \\
&\quad \left(\mu_{\text{asset}}^2 - w_{\text{cash}} \cdot \left(\mu_{\text{asset}}^2 - \mu_{\text{cash}} \cdot \mu_{\text{asset}}\right)\right) \\
&= w_{\text{cash}} \cdot \rho_{\text{cash,asset}} \cdot \sigma_{\text{cash}} \cdot \sigma_{\text{asset}} + \\
&\quad (1 - w_{\text{cash}}) \cdot \sigma_{\text{asset}}^2
\end{aligned} \tag{137}$$

We deduce that:

$$\begin{aligned}
\beta(R \mid R_{\text{asset}}) &= \frac{\operatorname{cov}(R, R_{\text{asset}})}{\sigma^2(R_{\text{asset}})} \\
&= 1 - \frac{w_{\text{cash}}}{\sigma_{\text{asset}}^2}\left(\sigma_{\text{asset}}^2 - \rho_{\text{cash,asset}} \cdot \sigma_{\text{cash}} \cdot \sigma_{\text{asset}}\right)
\end{aligned} \tag{138}$$

If $\sigma_{\text{cash}} \approx 0$, we obtain:

$$\beta(R \mid R_{\text{asset}}) \approx 1 - w_{\text{cash}} \tag{139}$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned}
\rho(R, R_{\text{asset}}) &= \frac{\operatorname{cov}(R, R_{\text{asset}})}{\sigma(R) \cdot \sigma(R_{\text{asset}})} \\
&\approx 1
\end{aligned} \tag{140}$$

B.2.4 Sharpe and information ratios

The Sharpe ratio is equal to:

$$\begin{aligned}
\operatorname{SR}(R) &= \frac{\mathbb{E}[R] - \mathbb{E}[R_{\text{cash}}]}{\sigma(R)} \\
&= \frac{(1 - w_{\text{cash}}) \cdot (\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}})}{\sigma(R)}
\end{aligned} \tag{141}$$

For the information ratio, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
\operatorname{IR}(R \mid R_{\text{asset}}) &= \frac{\mathbb{E}[R \mid R_{\text{asset}}]}{\sigma(R \mid R_{\text{asset}})} \\
&= -\frac{\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}}{\sqrt{\sigma_{\text{cash}}^2 + \sigma_{\text{asset}}^2 - 2\rho_{\text{cash,asset}} \cdot \sigma_{\text{cash}} \cdot \sigma_{\text{asset}}}}
\end{aligned} \tag{142}$$

If $\sigma_{\text{cash}} \approx 0$, we deduce that:

$$\operatorname{SR}(R) \approx \frac{\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}}{\sigma_{\text{asset}}} = \operatorname{SR}(R_{\text{asset}}) \tag{143}$$

and:

$$\operatorname{IR}(R \mid R_{\text{asset}}) \approx -\frac{\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}}}{\sigma_{\text{asset}}} = -\operatorname{SR}(R_{\text{asset}}) \tag{144}$$

B.2.5 Liquidation gain

Without the cash buffer, the transaction cost of the redemption shock $\mathbb{R} = \mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA}$ is equal to:

$$\mathcal{TC}_{\text{without}} = \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA}) \tag{145}$$

where $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(V)$ is the transaction cost[39] when liquidating the amount V of assets. With the cash buffer, the breakdown of redemption shock is:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{R} &= \mathbb{R}_{\text{cash}} + \mathbb{R}_{\text{asset}} \\ &= \underbrace{\min(w_{\text{cash}}, \mathcal{R}) \cdot \text{TNA}}_{\text{Cash liquidation}} + \underbrace{(\mathcal{R} - w_{\text{cash}})^+ \cdot \text{TNA}}_{\text{Asset liquidation}} \end{aligned} \tag{146}$$

Indeed, the fund manager first sells the cash until the redemption rate reaches the cash-to-assets ratio, and then liquidates the assets if necessary:

$$\mathbb{R} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \mathcal{R} = 0 \\ \mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA} & \text{if } 0 < \mathcal{R} \leq w_{\text{cash}} \\ w_{\text{cash}} \cdot \text{TNA} + (\mathcal{R} - w_{\text{cash}}) \cdot \text{TNA} & \text{if } \mathcal{R} > w_{\text{cash}} \end{cases} \tag{147}$$

We deduce that the transaction cost has two components:

$$\mathcal{TC}_{\text{with}} = \mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}(\min(w_{\text{cash}}, \mathcal{R}) \cdot \text{TNA}) + \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left((\mathcal{R} - w_{\text{cash}})^+ \cdot \text{TNA}\right) \tag{148}$$

where $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}(V)$ is the transaction cost when liquidating the amount V of cash. Another more tractable expression of $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{with}}$ is:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{TC}_{\text{with}} &= \mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}(\mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA}) \cdot \mathbb{1}\{\mathcal{R} \leq w_{\text{cash}}\} + \\ &\quad \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}((\mathcal{R} - w_{\text{cash}}) \cdot \text{TNA}) \cdot \mathbb{1}\{\mathcal{R} > w_{\text{cash}}\} \end{aligned} \tag{149}$$

It follows that the liquidation gain of implementing a cash buffer is:

$$\mathcal{LG} = \mathcal{TC}_{\text{without}} - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{with}} \tag{150}$$

We deduce that:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{LG} &= \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA}) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}(\mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA}) \cdot \mathbb{1}\{\mathcal{R} \leq w_{\text{cash}}\} - \\ &\quad \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}((\mathcal{R} - w_{\text{cash}}) \cdot \text{TNA}) \cdot \mathbb{1}\{\mathcal{R} > w_{\text{cash}}\} \\ &= \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA}) \cdot \mathbb{1}\{\mathcal{R} \leq w_{\text{cash}}\} + \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA}) \cdot \mathbb{1}\{\mathcal{R} > w_{\text{cash}}\} - \\ &\quad \mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}(\mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA}) \cdot \mathbb{1}\{\mathcal{R} \leq w_{\text{cash}}\} - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}((\mathcal{R} - w_{\text{cash}}) \cdot \text{TNA}) \cdot \mathbb{1}\{\mathcal{R} > w_{\text{cash}}\} \\ &= (\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA}) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}(\mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA})) \cdot \mathbb{1}\{\mathcal{R} \leq w_{\text{cash}}\} + \\ &\quad (\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA}) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}((\mathcal{R} - w_{\text{cash}}) \cdot \text{TNA})) \cdot \mathbb{1}\{\mathcal{R} > w_{\text{cash}}\} \\ &= \mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}} + \mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}} \end{aligned} \tag{151}$$

where:

$$\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}} = (\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA}) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}(\mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA})) \cdot \mathbb{1}\{\mathcal{R} \leq w_{\text{cash}}\} \tag{152}$$

and:

$$\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}} = (\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA}) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}((\mathcal{R} - w_{\text{cash}}) \cdot \text{TNA})) \cdot \mathbb{1}\{\mathcal{R} > w_{\text{cash}}\} \tag{153}$$

[39] The unit of the transaction cost function is expressed in % of the total net assets.

Finally, we conclude that:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\right] &= \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}\right] + \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\right] \\ &= \int_0^{w_{\text{cash}}} \left(\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\cdot\text{TNA}\right) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}\left(\mathcal{R}\cdot\text{TNA}\right)\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) + \\ &\quad \int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^1 \left(\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\cdot\text{TNA}\right) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\left(\mathcal{R}-w_{\text{cash}}\right)\cdot\text{TNA}\right)\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \quad (154)\end{aligned}$$

where $\mathbf{F}(x)$ is the distribution function of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$.

We can simplify the previous expressions in two different ways. If we assume that $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}(\mathbb{R}) \approx 0$, we have:

$$\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}} \approx \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\cdot\text{TNA}\right)\cdot\mathbb{1}\left\{\mathcal{R}\leq w_{\text{cash}}\right\} \quad (155)$$

and:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}\right] = \int_0^{w_{\text{cash}}} \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\cdot\text{TNA}\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \quad (156)$$

We can also simplify $\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}$ with the following approximation:

$$\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\left(\mathcal{R}-w_{\text{cash}}\right)\cdot\text{TNA}\right) \approx \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\cdot\text{TNA}\right) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\cdot\text{TNA}\right) \quad (157)$$

This approximation is valid if the transaction cost function is perfectly additive. This is not the case because of the price impact. However, the transaction cost function may be decomposed as a sum of daily transaction costs. Because of the liquidation policy limits, the daily transaction costs are almost the same for large redemptions and can justify the previous approximation. To better illustrate the underlying idea, let us assume that $\mathcal{R} = 30\%$ and $w_{\text{cash}} = 5\%$. Moreover, we suppose that we can liquidate 5% of the total net assets every day with a total cost of 7 bps in the stress regime[40]. Liquidating 30% is performed in 6 days: $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\cdot\text{TNA}\right) = 6\times 7 = 42$ bps. Liquidating $30\% - 5\%$ is performed in 5 days and we have:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\left(30\%-5\%\right)\cdot\text{TNA}\right) &= \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(25\%\cdot\text{TNA}\right) \\ &= 5\times 7 = 35 \text{ bps} \\ &= 42 - 7 \\ &= \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(30\%\cdot\text{TNA}\right) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(5\%\cdot\text{TNA}\right) \quad (158)\end{aligned}$$

In practice, we don't verify the strict equality because of many factors, but we can consider that the approximation is relatively valid compared to all uncertainties of a stress testing program. Therefore, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}} &\approx \left(\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\cdot\text{TNA}\right) - \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\cdot\text{TNA}\right) + \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\cdot\text{TNA}\right)\right)\cdot\mathbb{1}\left\{\mathcal{R}>w_{\text{cash}}\right\} \\ &= \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\cdot\text{TNA}\right)\cdot\mathbb{1}\left\{\mathcal{R}>w_{\text{cash}}\right\} \quad (159)\end{aligned}$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\right] &= \int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^1 \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\cdot\text{TNA}\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \\ &= \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\cdot\text{TNA}\right)\cdot\left(1-\mathbf{F}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right) \quad (160)\end{aligned}$$

[40] We recall that the transaction cost function is expressed in % of the total net assets, and not with respect to the liquidation amount. A total cost of 7 bps for the fund when the redemption rate is equal to 5% is then equivalent to a unit transaction cost of 140 bps

Finally, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\right] &= \int_0^{w_{\text{cash}}} \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\cdot \text{TNA}\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) + \\ &\quad \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\cdot \text{TNA}\right)\cdot\left(1-\mathbf{F}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right) \end{aligned} \tag{161}$$

Remark 12 *Since $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(\mathbb{R})$ is a function, we can replace it by the function $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(\mathcal{R})$ without any impact on the previous equations. This is equivalent to normalize the total net assets — $\text{TNA}=1$.*

B.2.6 First derivative of $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$

Exact formula The first derivative of $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$ satisfies:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial\,\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]}{\partial\, w_{\text{cash}}} &= \left(\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)-\mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right)\cdot f\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right) \\ &\geq 0 \end{aligned} \tag{162}$$

where $f(x)$ is the probability density function of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$. For $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$, we use the Leibniz integral rule:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial\,\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]}{\partial\, w_{\text{cash}}} &= -\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\cdot f\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right) + \\ &\quad \int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^1 \mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}-w_{\text{cash}}\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \end{aligned} \tag{163}$$

where $\mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}$ is the derivative of the transaction cost function, which is assumed to be positive. We have:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial\,\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(0\right)\right]}{\partial\, w_{\text{cash}}} &= \int_0^1 \mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \\ &\geq 0 \end{aligned} \tag{164}$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial\,\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(1\right)\right]}{\partial\, w_{\text{cash}}} &= -\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(1\right)\cdot f\left(1\right) \\ &< 0 \end{aligned} \tag{165}$$

Finally, we obtain:

$$\frac{\partial\,\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]}{\partial\, w_{\text{cash}}} = -\mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\cdot f\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right) + \int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^1 \mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}-w_{\text{cash}}\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \tag{166}$$

It follows that:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial\,\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(0\right)\right]}{\partial\, w_{\text{cash}}} &= \int_0^1 \mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}-w_{\text{cash}}\right) \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right) \\ &\geq 0 \end{aligned} \tag{167}$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial\,\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(1\right)\right]}{\partial\, w_{\text{cash}}} &= -\mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}\left(1\right)\cdot f\left(1\right) \\ &< 0 \end{aligned} \tag{168}$$

Approximate formula The first derivative of $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$ satisfies:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial\,\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]}{\partial\, w_{\text{cash}}} &= \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\cdot f\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\\ &\geq 0\end{aligned} \tag{169}$$

For $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$, we obtain:

$$\frac{\partial\,\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]}{\partial\, w_{\text{cash}}} = -\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\cdot f\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)+\mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\cdot\left(1-\mathbf{F}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right) \tag{170}$$

We have:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial\,\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(0\right)\right]}{\partial\, w_{\text{cash}}} &= \mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}\left(0\right)\cdot\left(1-\mathbf{F}\left(0\right)\right)\\ &\geq 0\end{aligned} \tag{171}$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial\,\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(1\right)\right]}{\partial\, w_{\text{cash}}} &= -\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(1\right)\cdot f\left(1\right)\\ &< 0\end{aligned} \tag{172}$$

Finally, we conclude that:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial\,\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]}{\partial\, w_{\text{cash}}} &= \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\cdot f\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)-\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)f\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)+\\ &\quad\ \mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\cdot\left(1-\mathbf{F}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right)\\ &= \mathcal{TC}'_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\cdot\left(1-\mathbf{F}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right)\\ &\geq 0\end{aligned} \tag{173}$$

B.2.7 Closed-form formula of Example 5 on page 238

Exact formula If $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(x\right)=x\cdot\left(s+\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\sqrt{x}\right)$, $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}\left(x\right)=x\cdot c$ and $\mathbf{F}\left(x\right)=x^{\eta}$, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right] &= \int_0^{w_{\text{cash}}}\left(\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right)-\mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right)\right)\mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right)\\ &= \eta\int_0^{w_{\text{cash}}}x\cdot\left(s-c+\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\sqrt{x}\right)\cdot x^{\eta-1}\,\mathrm{d}x\\ &= \eta\left(s-c\right)\int_0^{w_{\text{cash}}}x^{\eta}\,\mathrm{d}x+\eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\int_0^{w_{\text{cash}}}x^{\eta+0.5}\,\mathrm{d}x\\ &= \frac{\eta\left(s-c\right)}{\eta+1}\cdot w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1}+\frac{2\eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma}{2\eta+3}\cdot w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1.5}\end{aligned} \tag{174}$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right] &= \int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^1\left(\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\mathcal{R}\right)-\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(\left(\mathcal{R}-w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right)\right)\mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}\left(\mathcal{R}\right)\\ &= \eta\int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^1\left(sw_{\text{cash}}+\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\left(x\sqrt{x}-\left(x-w_{\text{cash}}\right)\sqrt{x-w_{\text{cash}}}\right)\right)\cdot x^{\eta-1}\,\mathrm{d}x\\ &= \eta s w_{\text{cash}}\int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^1\mathrm{d}x+\eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^1 x^{\eta+0.5}\,\mathrm{d}x-\\ &\quad\ \eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^1\left(x-w_{\text{cash}}\right)^{1.5}x^{\eta-1}\,\mathrm{d}x\end{aligned} \tag{175}$$

If we denote by $I(w_{\text{cash}};\eta)$ the integral $\int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^{1}(x-w_{\text{cash}})^{1.5}\,x^{\eta-1}\,\mathrm{d}x$, we obtain:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}(w_{\text{cash}})\right]=\eta s\cdot w_{\text{cash}}(1-w_{\text{cash}})+\frac{2\eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma}{2\eta+3}\cdot\left(1-w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1.5}\right)-\eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\cdot I(w_{\text{cash}};\eta) \tag{176}$$

where[41]:

$$I(w_{\text{cash}};\eta)=\frac{2}{5}(1-w_{\text{cash}})^{5/2}\,w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta-1}\,{}_2\mathfrak{F}_1\left(1-\eta,\frac{5}{2};\frac{7}{2};\frac{w_{\text{cash}}-1}{w_{\text{cash}}}\right) \tag{177}$$

We deduce that:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}(w_{\text{cash}})\right] &= \frac{\eta(s-c)}{\eta+1}\cdot w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1}+\frac{2\eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma}{2\eta+3}+\\ &\quad \eta s\cdot w_{\text{cash}}(1-w_{\text{cash}})-\eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\cdot I(w_{\text{cash}};\eta)\end{aligned} \tag{178}$$

Approximate formula We have:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}(w_{\text{cash}})\right] &= \int_0^{w_{\text{cash}}}\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(x)\,\mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}(x)\\ &= \eta\int_0^{w_{\text{cash}}}x\cdot\left(s+\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\sqrt{x}\right)\cdot x^{\eta-1}\,\mathrm{d}x\\ &= \eta s\int_0^{w_{\text{cash}}}x^{\eta}\,\mathrm{d}x+\eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\int_0^{w_{\text{cash}}}x^{\eta+0.5}\,\mathrm{d}x\\ &= \frac{\eta s}{\eta+1}\cdot w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1}+\frac{2\eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma}{2\eta+3}\cdot w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1.5}\end{aligned} \tag{179}$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}(w_{\text{cash}})\right] &= \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(w_{\text{cash}})\cdot(1-\mathbf{F}(w_{\text{cash}}))\\ &= w_{\text{cash}}\cdot(s+\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\sqrt{w_{\text{cash}}})\cdot(1-w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta})\\ &= s\cdot w_{\text{cash}}-s\cdot w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1}+\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\cdot w_{\text{cash}}^{1.5}-\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\cdot w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1.5}\end{aligned} \tag{180}$$

We deduce that:

$$\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}(w_{\text{cash}})\right]=s\cdot w_{\text{cash}}+\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\cdot w_{\text{cash}}^{1.5}-\frac{s}{\eta+1}\cdot w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1}-\frac{3\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma}{2\eta+3}\cdot w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1.5} \tag{181}$$

B.2.8 Closed-form formula of Example 6 on page 240

We have:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(x) &= \underbrace{x\cdot s}_{\text{linear}}+\underbrace{\kappa\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\cdot x^{+}\sqrt{x^{+}}}_{\text{constant}}+\underbrace{\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\cdot\left(x-\kappa x^{+}\right)\sqrt{x-\kappa x^{+}}}_{\text{nonlinear}}\\ &:= g\left(x;\kappa,x^{+}\right)\end{aligned} \tag{182}$$

where:

$$\kappa:=\kappa\left(x;x^{+}\right)=\left\lfloor\frac{x}{x^{+}}\right\rfloor \tag{183}$$

[41] See Equation (201) in Appendix B.3 on page 278.

We recall that $\mathcal{TC}_{\text{cash}}(x) = x \cdot \mathfrak{c}$ and $\mathbf{F}(x) = x^{\eta}$. By denoting $\kappa_{\text{cash}} = \kappa(w_{\text{cash}}; x^+)$, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}(w_{\text{cash}})\right] &= \int_0^{w_{\text{cash}}} \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(x)\, \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}(x) \\
&= \int_0^{x^+} \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(x)\, \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}(x) + \int_{x^+}^{2x^+} \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(x)\, \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}(x) + \ldots + \\
&\quad \int_{(\kappa_{\text{cash}}-1)x^+}^{\kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+} \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(x)\, \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}(x) + \int_{\kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+}^{w_{\text{cash}}} \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(x)\, \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}(x) \\
&= \sum_{k=1}^{\kappa_{\text{cash}}} \int_{(k-1)x^+}^{kx^+} \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(x)\, \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}(x) + \int_{\kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+}^{w_{\text{cash}}} \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(x)\, \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}(x)
\end{aligned} \tag{184}$$

We have the following cases:

$$\mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(x) = \begin{cases} g(x; k-1, x^+) & \text{if } x \in [(k-1)x^+, kx^+] \\ g(x; \kappa_{\text{cash}}, x^+) & x \in [\kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+, w_{\text{cash}}] \end{cases} \tag{185}$$

We deduce that:

$$\begin{aligned}
(*) &= \int_{(k-1)x^+}^{kx^+} \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(x)\, \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}(x) \\
&= \eta s \int_{(k-1)x^+}^{kx^+} x^{\eta}\, \mathrm{d}x + \\
&\quad \eta(k-1)\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma x^+\sqrt{x^+} \int_{(k-1)x^+}^{kx^+} x^{\eta-1}\, \mathrm{d}x + \\
&\quad \eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma \int_{(k-1)x^+}^{kx^+} \left(x - (k-1)x^+\right)\sqrt{x-(k-1)x^+}\, x^{\eta-1}\, \mathrm{d}x
\end{aligned} \tag{186}$$

and:

$$\begin{aligned}
(*) &= \int_{\kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+}^{w_{\text{cash}}} \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}(x)\, \mathrm{d}\mathbf{F}(x) \\
&= \eta s \int_{\kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+}^{w_{\text{cash}}} x^{\eta}\, \mathrm{d}x + \\
&\quad \eta\kappa_{\text{cash}}\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma x^+\sqrt{x^+} \int_{\kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+}^{w_{\text{cash}}} x^{\eta-1}\, \mathrm{d}x + \\
&\quad \eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma \int_{\kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+}^{w_{\text{cash}}} \left(x - \kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+\right)\sqrt{x-\kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+}\, x^{\eta-1}\, \mathrm{d}x
\end{aligned} \tag{187}$$

For the first and second terms, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
\int_a^b x^{\eta}\, \mathrm{d}x &= \left[\frac{x^{\eta+1}}{\eta+1}\right]_a^b \\
&= \frac{b^{\eta+1} - a^{\eta+1}}{\eta+1}
\end{aligned} \tag{188}$$

and:

$$\int_a^b x^{\eta-1}\,\mathrm{d}x = \frac{b^\eta - a^\eta}{\eta} \tag{189}$$

We also notice that:

$$\sum_{k=1}^{\kappa_{\text{cash}}} \frac{(kx^+)^{\eta+1} - ((k-1)\,x^+)^{\eta+1}}{\eta+1} + \frac{w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1} - (\kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+)^{\eta+1}}{\eta+1} = \frac{w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1}}{\eta+1} \tag{190}$$

We note:

$$\mathcal{H}\left(w_{\text{cash}}, \kappa_{\text{cash}}, x^+\right) = \sum_{k=1}^{\kappa_{\text{cash}}} (k-1)\left(kx^+\right)^\eta - \left((k-1)\,x^+\right)^\eta + \kappa_{\text{cash}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}^\eta - \left(\kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+\right)^\eta\right)$$

For the third term, we have:

$$\int_a^b (x-a)\sqrt{x-a}x^{\eta-1}\,\mathrm{d}x = I\left(a, b; \eta\right) \tag{191}$$

Except for some specific values[42] of η, this term has no closed-form formula and we use a numerical solution. We conclude that:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right] &= \eta s\frac{w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1}}{\eta+1} + \\
&\quad \beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma x^+\sqrt{x^+}\mathcal{H}\left(w_{\text{cash}}, \kappa_{\text{cash}}, x^+\right) + \qquad (192)\\
&\quad \eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\left(\sum_{k=1}^{\kappa_{\text{cash}}} I\left((k-1)\,x^+, kx^+; \eta\right) + I\left(\kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+, w_{\text{cash}}; \eta\right)\right) \qquad (193)
\end{aligned}$$

The computation of $\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right]$ gives:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right] &= \mathcal{TC}_{\text{asset}}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\cdot\left(1 - \mathbf{F}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right)\\
&= s\left(w_{\text{cash}} - w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1}\right) + \kappa_{\text{cash}}\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma x^+\sqrt{x^+}\left(1 - w_{\text{cash}}^\eta\right) +\\
&\quad \beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\cdot\left(w_{\text{cash}} - \kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+\right)\sqrt{w_{\text{cash}} - \kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+}\cdot\left(1 - w_{\text{cash}}^\eta\right) \qquad (194)
\end{aligned}$$

We conclude that:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}\left(w_{\text{cash}}\right)\right] &= \eta s\frac{w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1}}{\eta+1} + \beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma x^+\sqrt{x^+}\mathcal{H}\left(w_{\text{cash}}, \kappa_{\text{cash}}, x^+\right) +\\
&\quad \eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\left(\sum_{k=1}^{\kappa_{\text{cash}}} I\left((k-1)\,x^+, kx^+; \eta\right) + I\left(\kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+, w_{\text{cash}}; \eta\right)\right) +\\
&\quad s\left(w_{\text{cash}} - w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta+1}\right) + \kappa_{\text{cash}}\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma x^+\sqrt{x^+}\left(1 - w_{\text{cash}}^\eta\right) +\\
&\quad \beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\cdot\left(w_{\text{cash}} - \kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+\right)\sqrt{w_{\text{cash}} - \kappa_{\text{cash}}x^+}\cdot\left(1 - w_{\text{cash}}^\eta\right) \qquad (195)
\end{aligned}$$

B.3 Computation of the integral function $I\left(w_{\text{cash}}; \eta\right)$

We consider the following integral:

$$I\left(w_{\text{cash}}; \eta\right) = \int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^1 \left(x - w_{\text{cash}}\right)^{3/2} x^{\eta-1}\,\mathrm{d}x \tag{196}$$

where $\eta > 0$ and $w_{\text{cash}} \in [0, 1]$.

[42] See Appendix B.4 on page 280.

B.3.1 Preliminary result

Let $\mathfrak{B}(a,b) = \int_0^1 x^{a-1}(1-x)^{b-1}\,\mathrm{d}x$ and ${}_2\mathfrak{F}_1(a,b;c;z) = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{(a)_n (b)_n}{(c)_n} \frac{z^n}{n!}$ be the beta function and the ordinary hypergeometric function[43]. If $c > b > 0$, we know that:

$$\mathfrak{B}(b, c-b)\ {}_2\mathfrak{F}_1(a,b;c;z) = \int_0^1 x^{b-1}(1-x)^{c-b-1}(1-zx)^{-a}\,\mathrm{d}x \tag{197}$$

If $c = 1+b$, we deduce that:

$$\begin{aligned}\int_0^1 x^{b-1}(1-zx)^{-a}\,\mathrm{d}x &= \mathfrak{B}(b,1)\ {}_2\mathfrak{F}_1(a,b;c;z)\\ &= \frac{{}_2\mathfrak{F}_1(a,b;c;z)}{b}\end{aligned} \tag{198}$$

because:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathfrak{B}(b,1) &= \int_0^1 x^{b-1}\,\mathrm{d}x\\ &= \left[\frac{x^b}{b}\right]_0^1\\ &= \frac{1}{b}\end{aligned} \tag{199}$$

B.3.2 Main result

We consider the change of variable:

$$y = \frac{x - w_{\text{cash}}}{1 - w_{\text{cash}}} \tag{200}$$

We deduce that:

$$\begin{aligned}I(w_{\text{cash}};\eta) &= \int_0^1 \left((1-w_{\text{cash}})\,y\right)^{3/2} \left(w_{\text{cash}} + (1-w_{\text{cash}})\,y\right)^{\eta-1} (1-w_{\text{cash}})\,\mathrm{d}y\\ &= (1-w_{\text{cash}})^{5/2}\, w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta-1} \int_0^1 y^{3/2}\left(1 + \left(\frac{1-w_{\text{cash}}}{w_{\text{cash}}}\right) y\right)^{\eta-1}\mathrm{d}y\\ &= (1-w_{\text{cash}})^{5/2}\, w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta-1}\mathfrak{B}\left(\frac{5}{2},1\right)\ {}_2\mathfrak{F}_1\left(1-\eta,\frac{5}{2};\frac{7}{2};\frac{w_{\text{cash}}-1}{w_{\text{cash}}}\right)\\ &= \frac{2}{5}(1-w_{\text{cash}})^{5/2}\, w_{\text{cash}}^{\eta-1}\ {}_2\mathfrak{F}_1\left(1-\eta,\frac{5}{2};\frac{7}{2};\frac{w_{\text{cash}}-1}{w_{\text{cash}}}\right)\end{aligned} \tag{201}$$

Remark 13 *From a theoretical point of view, Equation (201) is only valid for* $0.5 < w_{\text{cash}} \leq 1$ *if we adopt the definition* ${}_2\mathfrak{F}_1(a,b;c;z) = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{(a)_n (b)_n}{(c)_n} \frac{z^n}{n!}$ *because we must have* $|z| < 1$. *Nevertheless, we can show that Equation (197) remains valid for* $|z| \geq 1$ *if we consider that the hypergeometric function is the solution of Euler's hypergeometric differential equation. In this case, we can use Equation (201) for* $0 \leq w_{\text{cash}} \leq 0.5$, *but we must be careful about the numerical implementation of the hypergeometric function* ${}_2\mathfrak{F}_1(a,b;c;z)$.

[43] $(a)_n$ is the rising Pochhammer symbol.

B.3.3 Special cases

Specific values of η If $\eta = 0.5$, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} I(w_{\text{cash}}; 0.5) &= \int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^{1} \frac{(x - w_{\text{cash}})^{3/2}}{\sqrt{x}} \, \mathrm{d}x \\ &= \frac{(4 - 10w_{\text{cash}})\sqrt{1 - w_{\text{cash}}} + 3w_{\text{cash}}^2 \left(2\ln\left(1 + \sqrt{1 - w_{\text{cash}}}\right) - \ln(w_{\text{cash}})\right)}{8} \end{aligned} \tag{202}$$

If $\eta = 1$, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} I(w_{\text{cash}}; 1) &= \int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^{1} (x - w_{\text{cash}})^{3/2} \, \mathrm{d}x \\ &= \left[\frac{(x - w_{\text{cash}})^{5/2}}{2.5}\right]_{w_{\text{cash}}}^{1} \\ &= \frac{2}{5}(1 - w_{\text{cash}})^{5/2} \end{aligned} \tag{203}$$

We verify that:

$$ {}_2\mathfrak{F}_1\left(1 - 1, \frac{5}{2}, \frac{7}{2}; z\right) = 1 \tag{204}$$

If $\eta = 2$, we have:

$$I(w_{\text{cash}}; 2) = \int_{w_{\text{cash}}}^{1} (x - w_{\text{cash}})^{3/2} \, x \, \mathrm{d}x \tag{205}$$

Let $y = (x - w_{\text{cash}})^{3/2}$, we have $x = y^{2/3} + w_{\text{cash}}$ and $\mathrm{d}x = \frac{2}{3} y^{-1/3} \, \mathrm{d}y$. It follows that:

$$\begin{aligned} I(w_{\text{cash}}; 2) &= \int_{0}^{(1 - w_{\text{cash}})^{3/2}} y \left(y^{2/3} + w_{\text{cash}}\right) \frac{2}{3} y^{-1/3} \, \mathrm{d}y \\ &= \frac{2}{3} \int_{0}^{(1 - w_{\text{cash}})^{3/2}} \left(y^{4/3} + w_{\text{cash}} y^{2/3}\right) \mathrm{d}y \\ &= \frac{2}{3} \left[\frac{3y^{7/3}}{7} + 3w_{\text{cash}} \frac{y^{5/3}}{5}\right]_{0}^{(1 - w_{\text{cash}})^{3/2}} \\ &= \frac{2(1 - w_{\text{cash}})^{7/2}}{7} + \frac{2w_{\text{cash}}(1 - w_{\text{cash}})^{5/2}}{5} \\ &= \frac{2}{5}(1 - w_{\text{cash}})^{5/2} w_{\text{cash}} \left(1 + \frac{5}{7}\left(\frac{1 - w_{\text{cash}}}{w_{\text{cash}}}\right)\right) \end{aligned} \tag{206}$$

We verify that:

$$ {}_2\mathfrak{F}_1\left(1 - 2, \frac{5}{2}, \frac{7}{2}; z\right) = 1 - \frac{5}{7} z \tag{207}$$

If η is integer, ${}_2\mathfrak{F}_1\left(1 - \eta, \frac{5}{2}, \frac{7}{2}; z\right)$ is a polynomial function. The analytical solution can be computed using the Wolfram's alpha platform[44] and the hypergeometric function

[44] https://www.wolframalpha.com

`Hypergeometric2F1[1-eta,5/2,7/2,z]` by replacing `eta` with the corresponding integer. For instance, we have:

$$ {}_2\mathfrak{F}_1\left(1-3,\frac{5}{2},\frac{7}{2};z\right)=\frac{35z^2-90z+63}{63} \tag{208} $$

and:

$$ {}_2\mathfrak{F}_1\left(1-3,\frac{5}{2},\frac{7}{2};z\right)=\frac{-105z^3+385z^2-495z+231}{231} \tag{209} $$

It is then straightforward to find the analytical solution of $I\left(w_{\text{cash}};\eta\right)$ by using Equation (201) and replacing z by $\dfrac{w_{\text{cash}}-1}{w_{\text{cash}}}$.

Specific values of w_{cash} If $w_{\text{cash}}=0$, we have:

$$ I\left(0;\eta\right)=\frac{2}{2\eta+3} \tag{210} $$

We deduce that:

$$ \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(0\right)\right]=0 \tag{211} $$

If $w_{\text{cash}}=0.5$, we have:

$$ {}_2\mathfrak{F}_1\left(1-\eta,\frac{5}{2},\frac{7}{2};1\right)=\frac{15\sqrt{\pi}\Gamma\left(\eta\right)}{8\Gamma\left(\eta+\frac{5}{2}\right)} \tag{212} $$

and:

$$ I\left(0.5;\eta\right)=\frac{3\sqrt{\pi}\Gamma\left(\eta\right)}{2^{\eta+7/2}\Gamma\left(\eta+\frac{5}{2}\right)} \tag{213} $$

We deduce that:

$$ \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(0.5\right)\right]=\frac{\eta s}{4}+\eta\beta_{\boldsymbol{\pi}}\sigma\left(\frac{2}{2\eta+3}\left(1-\frac{1}{2}^{\eta+1.5}\right)-\frac{3\sqrt{\pi}\Gamma\left(\eta\right)}{2^{\eta+7/2}\Gamma\left(\eta+\frac{5}{2}\right)}\right) \tag{214} $$

If $w_{\text{cash}}=1$, we have:

$$ {}_2\mathfrak{F}_1\left(1-\eta,\frac{5}{2},\frac{7}{2};0\right)=1 \tag{215} $$

and:

$$ I\left(1;\eta\right)=0 \tag{216} $$

We deduce that:

$$ \mathbb{E}\left[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}\left(1\right)\right]=0 \tag{217} $$

B.4 Computation of $I\left(a,b;\eta\right)$ in some special cases

Using the results derived previously, we deduce that:

$$ \begin{aligned} I\left(a,b;1\right) &= \frac{2}{5}\left(b-a\right)^{2.5} \\ I\left(a,b;2\right) &= \frac{2}{35}\left(b-a\right)^{2.5}\left(2a+5b\right) \\ I\left(a,b;3\right) &= \frac{2}{315}\left(b-a\right)^{2.5}\left(8a^2+20ab+35b^2\right) \end{aligned} \tag{218} $$

For $\eta = 0.5$, we have:

$$I(a,b;0.5) = \frac{1}{4}\sqrt{b-a}\left((2b-5a)\sqrt{b} - 3\psi(a,b)\right) \tag{219}$$

where:

$$\psi(a,b) = \begin{cases} \operatorname{Re}\left(a^2(a-b)^{-0.5}\sin^{-1}\sqrt{\frac{b}{a}}\right) & \text{if } a \neq 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } a = 0 \end{cases} \tag{220}$$

C Additional results

C.1 Tables

Table 12: Number of liquidated shares $q_i(h)$ (Example 1, naive pro-rata liquidation)

h	Asset						
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7
1	20 000	20 000	10 000	20 000	15 100	2 000	360
2	20 000	20 000	80	20 000	0	1 500	0
3	20 000	20 000	0	100	0	0	0
4	20 000	20	0	0	0	0	0
5	7 020	0	0	0	0	0	0
6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	87 020	60 020	10 080	40 100	15 100	3 500	360

Table 13: Weights $w_i(q;h)$ in % (Example 1, naive pro-rata liquidation)

h	Asset						
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7
1	11.95	16.52	32.77	13.70	16.93	4.28	3.84
2	16.41	22.68	22.68	18.81	11.63	5.15	2.64
3	20.59	28.45	18.96	15.77	9.72	4.30	2.21
4	25.68	26.63	17.74	14.75	9.10	4.03	2.06
5	27.32	26.04	17.35	14.43	8.90	3.94	2.02
6	27.32	26.04	17.35	14.43	8.90	3.94	2.02

Table 14: Weights $w_i(\omega - q;h)$ in % (Example 1, naive pro-rata liquidation)

h	Asset						
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7
0	27.32	26.04	17.35	14.43	8.90	3.94	2.02
1	29.13	27.16	15.54	14.51	7.95	3.90	1.80
2	29.29	26.65	16.39	13.64	8.40	3.72	1.91
3	28.83	25.50	16.99	14.13	8.71	3.86	1.98
4	27.72	25.90	17.26	14.35	8.85	3.92	2.01
5	27.32	26.04	17.35	14.43	8.90	3.94	2.02
6	27.32	26.04	17.35	14.43	8.90	3.94	2.02

Table 15: Number of liquidated shares $q_i(h)$ (Example 3, waterfall liquidation)

h	Asset						
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7
1	20 000	20 000	10 000	20 000	20 000	2 000	1 000
2	20 000	20 000	10 000	20 000	20 000	2 000	800
3	20 000	20 000	10 000	20 000	20 000	2 000	0
4	20 000	20 000	10 000	20 000	15 500	2 000	0
5	20 000	20 000	10 000	20 000	0	2 000	0
6	20 000	20 000	400	20 000	0	2 000	0
7	20 000	20 000	0	20 000	0	2 000	0
8	20 000	20 000	0	20 000	0	2 000	0
9	20 000	20 000	0	20 000	0	1 500	0
10	20 000	20 000	0	20 000	0	0	0
11	20 000	20 000	0	500	0	0	0
12	20 000	20 000	0	0	0	0	0
13	20 000	20 000	0	0	0	0	0
14	20 000	20 000	0	0	0	0	0
15	20 000	20 000	0	0	0	0	0
16	20 000	100	0	0	0	0	0
17	20 000	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	20 000	0	0	0	0	0	0
19	20 000	0	0	0	0	0	0
20	20 000	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	20 000	0	0	0	0	0	0
22	15 100	0	0	0	0	0	0
23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	435 100	300 100	50 400	200 500	75 500	17 500	1 800

Table 16: Weights $w_i(q;h)$ in % (Example 3, waterfall liquidation)

h	Asset						
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7
1	10.64	14.71	29.17	12.20	19.97	3.81	9.50
2	10.74	14.85	29.45	12.31	20.16	3.85	8.63
3	11.06	15.29	30.33	12.68	20.76	3.96	5.92
4	11.36	15.70	31.15	13.02	20.12	4.07	4.56
5	11.95	16.52	32.77	13.70	16.93	4.28	3.84
6	13.09	18.09	30.15	15.01	15.46	4.69	3.51

Table 17: Weights $w_i(\omega - q;h)$ in % (Example 3, waterfall liquidation)

h	Asset						
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7
0	27.32	26.04	17.35	14.43	8.90	3.94	2.02
1	29.55	27.56	15.77	14.73	7.41	3.96	1.02
2	32.38	29.46	13.66	15.07	5.46	3.97	0.00
3	35.72	31.60	10.65	15.33	2.77	3.93	0.00
4	39.97	34.24	6.42	15.54	0.00	3.83	0.00
5	44.33	36.58	0.29	15.24	0.00	3.56	0.00
6	46.61	36.82	0.00	13.65	0.00	2.92	0.00

C.2 Figures

Figure 20: Calibration of the drawdown function (S&P 500 index, 1990-2020, historical value-at-risk)



Figure 21: Liquidity time in days (naive pro-rata liquidation)



Figure 22: Liquidity time in days (naive pro-rata liquidation, illiquid exposure)



Figure 23: Liquidity time in days (waterfall liquidation)



Figure 24: Liquidity time in days (waterfall liquidation, illiquid exposure)



Figure 25: Impact of the cash buffer on the portfolio return ($\mu_{\text{asset}} = 10\%$, $\sigma_{\text{asset}} = 20\%$ and $\rho_{\text{cash,asset}} = 0\%$)



Figure 26: Impact of the cash buffer on the portfolio return ($\mu_{\text{asset}} = 3\%$, $\sigma_{\text{asset}} = 5\%$ and $\rho_{\text{cash,asset}} = 20\%$)



Figure 27: Probability distribution function of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$ (Example 5, page 238)



Figure 28: Exact vs. approximate solution of $\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}(w_{\text{cash}})]$ and $\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}(w_{\text{cash}})]$ in bps (Example 5, page 238)



Figure 29: Transaction cost function (101) in bps with $x^+ = 30\%$



Figure 30: Transaction cost function (101) in bps with $x^+ = 50\%$



Figure 31: Approximation error function $\mathcal{E}_{\text{rror}}(w_{\text{cash}}; x^+)$ in bps



Figure 32: Approximation of the liquidity gains $\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{cash}}(w_{\text{cash}})]$ and $\mathbb{E}[\mathcal{LG}_{\text{asset}}(w_{\text{cash}})]$ in bps (Example 6, page 240)



Figure 33: Comparison of exact and approximate formulas in bps when $x^+ = 10\%$ (Example 6, page 240)



Figure 34: Optimal cash buffer ($\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}} = 2.5\%$ and $\lambda = 0$)



Figure 35: Optimal cash buffer ($\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}} = 1\%$, $\lambda = 0.25$ and $\sigma_{\text{asset}} = 20\%$)



Figure 36: Optimal cash buffer ($\mu_{\text{asset}} - \mu_{\text{cash}} = 1\%$, $\lambda = 2$ and $\sigma_{\text{asset}} = 20\%$)



Figure 37: Break-even risk premium $\varrho(w_{\text{cash}})$ in % ($x^+ = 10\%$, $\lambda = 0$)



Figure 38: Break-even risk premium $\varrho(w_{\text{cash}})$ in % ($x^+ = 100\%$, $\lambda = 0$)



Figure 39: Decision rule for implementing a cash buffer of 10% ($x^+ = 10\%$, $\lambda = 0$)



Figure 40: Decision rule for implementing a cash buffer of 10% ($x^+ = 100\%$, $\lambda = 0$)



Part IV
A Step-by-step Practical Guide

Liquidity Stress Testing in Asset Management Part 4. A Step-by-step Practical Guide*

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Abstract

This article is part of a comprehensive research project on liquidity risk in asset management, which can be divided into three dimensions. The first dimension covers liability liquidity risk (or funding liquidity) modeling, the second dimension focuses on asset liquidity risk (or market liquidity) modeling, and the third dimension considers the asset-liability management of the liquidity gap risk (or asset-liability matching). The purpose of this research is to propose a methodological and practical framework in order to perform liquidity stress testing programs, which comply with regulatory guidelines (ESMA, 2019a, 2020a) and are useful for fund managers. The review of the academic literature and professional research studies shows that there is a lack of standardized and analytical models. The aim of this research project is then to fill the gap with the goal of developing mathematical and statistical approaches, and providing appropriate answers.

The three dimensions have been developed in the published working papers: (1) modeling the liability liquidity risk (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021a), (2) modeling the asset liquidity risk (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021b) and (3) managing the asset-liability liquidity risk (Roncalli, 2021c). This fourth working paper provides three examples and the comprehensive details to compute the redemption coverage ratio, implement reverse stress testing and estimate the liquidation cost of the redemption portfolio. The portfolios have been chosen in order to cover the main asset classes: large-cap stocks, small-cap stocks, sovereign bonds and corporate bonds. Since we provide the data in the appendix, these basic examples are easily reproducible and may help quantitative analysts to understand the different steps to implement liquidity stress testing in asset management.

Keywords: liquidity risk, stress testing, asset-liability management, redemption coverage ratio, reverse stress testing, transaction cost, reproducible research, knowledge transfer.

JEL classification: C02, G32.

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1 Introduction

Since September 2020, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has required asset managers to adopt a liquidity stress testing (LST) policy for their investment funds (ESMA, 2020a). More precisely, each asset manager must assess the liquidity risk factors across their funds in order to ensure that stress testing is tailored to the liquidity risk profile of each fund. The guidelines are described in two ESMA publications (ESMA, 2019a, 2020a). However, contrary to the banking regulation on liquidity risk, those regulatory texts do not contain any methodological aspects[1]. Even though they are complemented by two other ESMA publications (ESMA, 2019b, 2020b) and some IMF FSAP analysis (IMF, 2017, 2020), the absence of standardized models and parameter values can be a major hurdle for implementing LST policies, especially for small asset managers[2]. Certainly, this situation can be explained by the lack of maturity of this topic in the asset management industry.

In April 2020, we launched an ambitious research project in order to develop quantitative models and provide practical solutions for implementing LST programs. This research project has been built around three dimensions: liability liquidity risk, asset liquidity risk and asset-liability risk management. It resulted in three publications, each one considering a specific dimension: (1) modeling the liability liquidity risk (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021a), (2) modeling the asset liquidity risk (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021b) and (3) managing the asset-liability liquidity risk (Roncalli, 2021c). The discussions we had with the asset management industry show that these working papers may be viewed as too elaborate. Therefore, we have decided to complement them with a fourth working paper, which is a step-by-step practical guide. This working paper is equivalent to the publication of Bouveret (2017), but our research is reproducible since all the data are provided and described in the appendix.

In order to be concise and simple, we have only focused on three LST measures or tools. The first one is the redemption coverage ratio, which can be computed using a time to liquidation (TTL) approach or a high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) approach. The first approach requires us to define a redemption portfolio and a liquidation policy, whereas the second one is based on the concept of cash conversion factor. For the latter approach, we can use the figures provided by the Basel Committee or postulate a parametric function. The second tool or the reverse stress testing (RST) defines two measures: the liability RST scenario and the asset RST scenario. Finally, the third measure is the liquidity cost associated with the redemption scenario. For that, we need to specify the unit transaction cost function and combine it with the liquidation policy. Moreover, analyzing the redemption cost helps to determine the liquidity risk contribution of each asset.

This paper is organized as follows. Section Two deals with equity portfolios. Using a €1 bn investment in large-cap stocks, we show how to compute the redemption coverage ratio and implement reverse stress testing. Then, we conduct a transaction cost analysis in order to calculate the liquidation cost of the redemption portfolio. Using a second portfolio, we show how the transaction cost formulas are impacted by small-cap stocks. We also illustrate how several statistics change when we consider an asset-liability stress test scenario instead of a normal scenario. In Section Three, we do the same analysis with a bond portfolio. In particular, we highlight the differences between stock and bond portfolios. Finally, Section Four offers some concluding remarks.

[1] For instance, the redemption coverage ratio (RCR) is the main tool of LST programs. However, it is referred to only twice. First, ESMA defines it as: "*a measurement of the ability of a fund's assets to meet funding obligations arising from the liabilities side of the balance sheet, such as a redemption shock*" (ESMA-2020a, page 7). Second, ESMA states that "*an outcome of combined asset and liability LST may be a comparable metric or score, for example based on the RCR*" (ESMA-2020a, page 20).

[2] However, the research of Bouveret (2017) contains the basics of liquidity stress testing for investment funds and can be used as a beginner's guide.

2 The case of equity portfolios

We consider the equity portfolio described in Table 13 on page 322. This portfolio corresponds to a €1 bn investment[3] in the Eurostoxx 50 index at the end of October 2021. For each stock i, we have the number of shares ω_i held by the portfolio, the price P_i, the bid and ask quotes P_i^{bid} and P_i^{ask}, the annualized volatility σ_i and the current daily volume v_i.

2.1 Redemption coverage ratio

2.1.1 Liquidation ratio

Let q_i^+ be the maximum number of shares that can be sold during a trading day for the asset i. We note $q = (q_1, \ldots, q_n)$ the redemption portfolio and $q_i(h)$ the number of shares liquidated after h trading days. Following Roncalli *et al.* (2021b, Equation (22), page 14), we have:

$$q_i(h) = \min\left(\left(q_i - \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} q_i(k)\right)^+, q_i^+\right) \tag{1}$$

where $q_i(0) = 0$. The liquidation ratio $\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$ is then the proportion of the redemption scenario q that is liquidated after h trading days (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021b, Equation (23), page 14):

$$\mathcal{LR}(q;h) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{k=1}^h q_i(k) \cdot P_i}{\sum_{i=1}^n q_i \cdot P_i} \tag{2}$$

where P_i is the price of the asset i.

We consider the vertical slicing approach (or pro-rata liquidation). We deduce that the redemption portfolio is defined as (Roncalli, 2021c, page 9):

$$q_i = \mathcal{R} \cdot \omega_i \tag{3}$$

The liquidation policy is given by (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021b, Equation (9), page 4):

$$q_i^+ = x_i^+ \cdot v_i \tag{4}$$

where x_i^+ is the trading limit expressed in %. In the sequel, we assume that $x_i^+ = 10\%$, which is a standard figure. In Table 1, we report the values of q_i, v_i, q_i^+ and $q_i(h)$. We observe that we need three trading days to liquidate the redemption portfolio when the redemption shock $\mathcal{R}$ is set to 80%. In fact, most exposures are liquidated in two days, but two stocks require three trading days: Flutter Entertainment ($i = 24$) and Linde ($i = 35$). We verify that the mark-to-market value of the liquidated portfolio is equal to the nominal redemption shock $\mathbb{R} = \mathcal{R} \cdot \text{TNA}$:

$$\mathbb{V}(q) = \sum_{h=1}^{h^+} \sum_{i=1}^n q_i(h) \cdot P_i = \mathbb{R} \tag{5}$$

where h^+ is the liquidation period. In our case, we have $\mathbb{R} = €799\,999\,999.60$.

[3] The exact value of the total net assets is equal to:

$$\text{TNA} = \mathbb{V}(\omega) = \sum_{i=1}^n \omega_i \cdot P_i = 999\,999\,999.50\,€$$

Table 1: Liquidation of the redemption portfolio (TNA = €1 bn, $\mathcal{R} = 80\%$, vertical slicing)

i	ω_i	q_i	v_i	q_i^+	$q_i\,(1)$	$q_i\,(2)$	$q_i\,(3)$	$\sum_{h=1}^{3} q_i\,(h)$
1	59 106	47 284.8	514 842	51 484.2	47 284.8	0.0	0.0	47 284.8
2	8 883	7 106.4	56 255	5 625.5	5 625.5	1 480.9	0.0	7 106.4
3	150 027	120 021.6	629 509	62 950.9	62 950.9	57 070.7	0.0	120 021.6
4	184 310	147 448.0	1 316 600	131 660.0	131 660.0	15 788.0	0.0	147 448.0
5	130 520	104 416.0	750 684	75 068.4	75 068.4	29 347.6	0.0	104 416.0
6	268 123	214 498.4	1 736 372	173 637.2	173 637.2	40 861.2	0.0	214 498.4
7	131 520	105 216.0	754 901	75 490.1	75 490.1	29 725.9	0.0	105 216.0
8	651 421	521 136.8	4 358 304	435 830.4	435 830.4	85 306.4	0.0	521 136.8
9	3 192 430	2 553 944.0	54 130 721	5 413 072.1	2 553 944.0	0.0	0.0	2 553 944.0
10	5 544 072	4 435 257.6	72 371 040	7 237 104.0	4 435 257.6	0.0	0.0	4 435 257.6
11	242 317	193 853.6	2 473 040	247 304.0	193 853.6	0.0	0.0	193 853.6
12	181 800	145 440.0	2 444 130	244 413.0	145 440.0	0.0	0.0	145 440.0
13	136 334	109 067.2	1 183 053	118 305.3	109 067.2	0.0	0.0	109 067.2
14	365 067	292 053.6	2 390 614	239 061.4	239 061.4	52 992.2	0.0	292 053.6
15	251 719	201 375.2	1 434 050	143 405.0	143 405.0	57 970.2	0.0	201 375.2
16	265 762	212 609.6	2 672 846	267 284.6	212 609.6	0.0	0.0	212 609.6
17	206 041	164 832.8	1 579 517	157 951.7	157 951.7	6 881.1	0.0	164 832.8
18	60 148	48 118.4	339 768	33 976.8	33 976.8	14 141.6	0.0	48 118.4
19	311 879	249 503.2	2 536 147	253 614.7	249 503.2	0.0	0.0	249 503.2
20	1 026 503	821 202.4	9 225 311	922 531.1	821 202.4	0.0	0.0	821 202.4
21	2 459 244	1 967 395.2	30 518 046	3 051 804.6	1 967 395.2	0.0	0.0	1 967 395.2
22	795 234	636 187.2	19 419 467	1 941 946.7	636 187.2	0.0	0.0	636 187.2
23	95 262	76 209.6	491 647	49 164.7	49 164.7	27 044.9	0.0	76 209.6
24	55 520	44 416.0	212 501	21 250.1	21 250.1	21 250.1	1 915.8	44 416.0
25	1 840 196	1 472 156.8	14 316 692	1 431 669.2	1 431 669.2	40 487.6	0.0	1 472 156.8
26	351 837	281 469.6	7 543 014	754 301.4	281 469.6	0.0	0.0	281 469.6
27	413 417	330 733.6	3 643 730	364 373.0	330 733.6	0.0	0.0	330 733.6
28	1 235 905	988 724.0	15 954 487	1 595 448.7	988 724.0	0.0	0.0	988 724.0
29	5 774 696	4 619 756.8	106 942 206	10 694 220.6	4 619 756.8	0.0	0.0	4 619 756.8
30	23 113	18 490.4	204 628	20 462.8	18 490.4	0.0	0.0	18 490.4
31	161 807	129 445.6	786 412	78 641.2	78 641.2	50 804.4	0.0	129 445.6
32	261 645	209 316.0	2 285 287	228 528.7	209 316.0	0.0	0.0	209 316.0
33	290 422	232 337.6	2 489 971	248 997.1	232 337.6	0.0	0.0	232 337.6
34	76 637	61 309.6	372 415	37 241.5	37 241.5	24 068.1	0.0	61 309.6
35	162 956	130 364.8	578 973	57 897.3	57 897.3	57 897.3	14 570.2	130 364.8
36	83 427	66 741.6	364 566	36 456.6	36 456.6	30 285.0	0.0	66 741.6
37	44 351	35 480.8	256 421	25 642.1	25 642.1	9 838.7	0.0	35 480.8
38	64 954	51 963.2	363 103	36 310.3	36 310.3	15 652.9	0.0	51 963.2
39	282 801	226 240.8	2 135 693	213 569.3	213 569.3	12 671.5	0.0	226 240.8
40	120 062	96 049.6	794 444	79 444.4	79 444.4	16 605.2	0.0	96 049.6
41	362 506	290 004.8	1 551 395	155 139.5	155 139.5	34 865.3	0.0	290 004.8
42	345 779	276 623.2	1 859 400	185 940.0	185 940.0	90 683.2	0.0	276 623.2
43	180 140	144 112.0	818 822	81 882.2	81 882.2	62 229.8	0.0	144 112.0
44	237 952	190 361.6	1 136 151	113 615.1	113 615.1	76 746.5	0.0	190 361.6
45	660 350	528 280.0	10 497 975	1 049 797.5	528 280.0	0.0	0.0	528 280.0
46	835 885	668 708.0	6 596 020	659 602.0	659 602.0	9 106.0	0.0	668 708.0
47	247 964	198 371.2	1 943 066	194 306.6	194 306.6	4 064.6	0.0	198 371.2
48	189 196	151 356.8	912 539	91 253.9	91 253.9	60 102.9	0.0	151 356.8
49	57 954	46 363.2	1 071 749	107 174.9	46 363.2	0.0	0.0	46 363.2
50	163 680	130 944.0	976 446	97 644.6	97 644.6	33 299.4	0.0	130 944.0

The liquidation contribution of the trading day h is the proportion of the redemption portfolio liquidated on day h:

$$\mathcal{LC}(q;h) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i(h) \cdot P_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i \cdot P_i} \tag{6}$$

By construction, we verify that the sum of liquidation contributions is equal to the liquidation ratio:

$$\mathcal{LR}(q;h) = \sum_{k=1}^{h} \mathcal{LC}(q;k) \tag{7}$$

In Table 2, we report the liquidation contribution $\mathcal{LC}(q;h)$ and the liquidation ratio $\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$ for different values of the redemption rate. When $\mathcal{R}$ is equal to 90%, we liquidate 72.41% the first day, 26.06% the second day and 1.53% the third day.

Table 2: Liquidation ratio in % (TNA = €1 bn, vertical slicing)

$\mathcal{R}$	5%	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
$\mathcal{LC}(q;1)$	100.00	100.00	100.00	96.43	81.31	72.41
$\mathcal{LC}(q;2)$	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.57	18.46	26.06
$\mathcal{LC}(q;3)$	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.23	1.53
$\mathcal{LR}(q;1)$	100.00	100.00	100.00	96.43	81.31	72.41
$\mathcal{LR}(q;2)$	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	99.77	98.47
$\mathcal{LR}(q;3)$	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

The liquidity risk profile depends on the size of the redemption portfolio. For instance, we can consider individual investment funds, whose total net assets are lower than \$1 bn. On the contrary, if we consider the largest asset managers, their aggregate exposure to the stocks of the Eurostoxx 50 index is greater than \$1 bn. In Figure 13 on page 334, we report the liquidation ratio[4] when the total net assets are respectively equal to 1, 5, 10 and 20 bn. If we consider a redemption rate of 10%, we obtain the results given in Figure 1 for different time horizons (one day, two days and one week). For instance, we obtain $\mathcal{LR}(q;1) = 37.43\%$, $\mathcal{LR}(q;2) = 66.91\%$ and $\mathcal{LR}(q;1) = 99.47\%$ when the total net assets are equal to €20 bn.

From the liquidation ratio, we can compute the liquidation time (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021b, page 18):

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{LT}(q;p) &= \mathcal{LR}^{-1}(q;p) \\ &= \{\inf h : \mathcal{LR}(q;h) \geq p\} \end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

The liquidation period h^+ is equal to $\mathcal{LT}(q;1)$. It measures the number of days required to liquidate 100% of the redemption portfolio. In practice, the redemption portfolio can have some small illiquid exposures on small-cap stocks. Therefore, it is better to define h^+ as the 99% quantile of the liquidation ratio:

$$h^+ = \mathcal{LR}^{-1}(q;99\%) \tag{9}$$

In Figure 2, we report the computation of the liquidation ratio for the previous example.

[4] For that, we scale the original portfolio $(\omega_1, \ldots, \omega_n)$ by a factor of m where m is respectively equal to 1, 5, 10 and 20.

Figure 1: Liquidation ratio $\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$ in % when the redemption rate is equal to 10%



Figure 2: Liquidation time $h^+ = \mathcal{LR}^{-1}(q;99\%)$ in number of trading days



2.1.2 Time to liquidation approach

We now turn to the computation of the redemption coverage ratio. Following Roncalli (2021c, Equation (12), page 6), we have:

$$\mathrm{RCR}(h) = \frac{\mathcal{LR}(q;h) \cdot \mathbb{V}(q)}{\mathcal{R} \cdot \mathbb{V}(\omega)} \tag{10}$$

where $\mathbb{V}(q) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i \cdot P_i$ and $\mathbb{V}(\omega) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i \cdot P_i = \mathrm{TNA}$. The liquidity shortfall is the amount of additional assets to be sold to satisfy the redemption. Its relative value (with respect to the total net assets) is equal to (Roncalli, 2021c, Equation (9), page 6):

$$\mathrm{LS}(h) = \mathcal{R} \cdot \max(0, 1 - \mathrm{RCR}(h)) \tag{11}$$

As noticed by Roncalli (2021c), the redemption coverage ratio is exactly equal to the liquidation ratio when the redemption shock $\mathbb{R} = \mathcal{R} \cdot \mathrm{TNA}$ is equal to the mark-to-market $\mathbb{V}(q)$ of the redemption portfolio. The reason is that the redemption portfolio is defined using the vertical slicing and its value is exactly equal to the redemption portfolio (Roncalli, 2021c, page 9). Therefore, in the case of the naive vertical slicing approach, we always have:

$$q = \mathcal{R} \cdot \omega \Longrightarrow \mathrm{RCR}(h) \leq 1 \tag{12}$$

It is obvious that the RCR cannot be computed with the naive vertical slicing approach. It is better to consider the waterfall approach: $q = \omega$. In this case, we use the following formula (Roncalli, 2021c, Equations (7) and (8), page 6):

$$\mathrm{RCR}(h) = \sum_{k=1}^{h} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i(k) \cdot P_i}{\mathcal{R} \cdot \mathrm{TNA}} = \frac{1}{\mathcal{R}} \sum_{k=1}^{h} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i(k) \cdot P_i}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \omega_i \cdot P_i} \tag{13}$$

In Table 3, we report the redemption coverage ratio for different redemption rate values when the total net assets are equal to €1 bn. When the liquidation approach corresponds to the naive vertical slicing, we obtain the same figures as the liquidation ratio (see Table 2 on page 301). When we use the waterfall approach, the RCR is higher. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the RCR with respect to the TNA. In the case where the redemption rate is equal to 10%, the RCR is below one when the TNA is larger than 7.6 bn for the one-day time horizon, 15.1 bn for the two-day time horizon and 37.7 bn for the one-week time horizon.

Table 3: Redemption coverage ratio (TNA = €1 bn)

Redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$		5%	10%	25%	50%	75%	90%
Vertical slicing	RCR (1)	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.96	0.81	0.72
	RCR (2)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.98
	RCR (3)	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Waterfall liquidation	RCR (1)	13.38	6.69	2.68	1.34	0.89	0.74
	RCR (2)	19.29	9.64	3.86	1.93	1.29	1.07
	RCR (3)	20.00	10.00	4.00	2.00	1.33	1.11

2.1.3 Impact of the stress test scenario

To compute the redemption coverage ratio in a stress period, we can shock the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$ and the daily trading volume v_i. For the first parameter, we use a larger value

Figure 3: Redemption coverage ratio when the redemption rate is equal to 10% (waterfall liquidation)



$\mathcal{R}^{\text{stress}}$ for the redemption shock. For the second parameter, we recall that the liquidation policy is defined as $q_i^+ = x_i^+ \cdot v_i$. Following Roncalli *et al.* (2021b, page 56), we introduce a multiplicative parameter $m_v \leq 1$ so that the liquidation policy in a stress period becomes:

$$q_i^+ = m_v \cdot x_i^+ \cdot v_i \tag{14}$$

We consider the previous equity portfolio. We assume that the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}$ is equal to 5% in a normal period[5]. Results are given in Table 4. For the stress testing exercise, we consider a higher redemption rate value ($\mathcal{R}^{\text{stress}} = 20\%$) and different asset liquidity scenarios. Results are given in Table 5. For instance, if we assume that the asset liquidity is reduced by a factor of 2 ($m_v = 50\%$), the value of $\text{RCR}^{\text{stress}}(1)$ is equal to 0.38 for a one-day time horizon and a TNA of €5 bn, while it was equal to 3.02 in a normal period.

Table 4: Redemption coverage ratio in a normal period ($\mathcal{R} = 5\%$, waterfall liquidation)

TNA	€1 bn	€5 bn	€10 bn	€20 bn
$h = 1$	13.38	3.02	1.51	0.75
$h = 2$	19.29	6.04	3.02	1.51
$h = 5$	20.00	13.38	7.49	3.77

Remark 1 *We can break down the impact of the stress test scenario by distinguishing the effect of the redemption shock and the impact of the asset liquidity.*

[5]This figure is far overestimated when it concerns normal market periods.

Table 5: Stress testing of the redemption coverage ratio ($\mathcal{R}^{\text{stress}} = 20\%$, waterfall liquidation)

	$m_v = 1.00$				$m_v = 0.75$			
TNA	€1 bn	€5 bn	€10 bn	€20 bn	€1 bn	€5 bn	€10 bn	€20 bn
$h = 1$	3.35	0.75	0.38	0.19	2.67	0.57	0.28	0.14
$h = 2$	4.82	1.51	0.75	0.38	4.33	1.13	0.57	0.28
$h = 5$	5.00	3.35	1.87	0.94	5.00	2.67	1.41	0.71
	$m_v = 0.50$				$m_v = 0.10$			
TNA	€1 bn	€5 bn	€10 bn	€20 bn	€1 bn	€5 bn	€10 bn	€20 bn
$h = 1$	1.87	0.38	0.19	0.09	0.38	0.08	0.04	0.02
$h = 2$	3.35	0.75	0.38	0.19	0.75	0.15	0.08	0.04
$h = 5$	4.97	1.87	0.94	0.47	1.87	0.38	0.19	0.09

2.1.4 The case of small-cap portfolios

The previous example may be misleading because we obtain high redemption coverage ratio figures as we are considering large-cap liquid stocks. In fact, liquidity stress testing makes more sense when the portfolio contains small- and mid-cap stocks. In Table 14 on page 323, we consider a second portfolio, which is equally weighted on 20 stocks. Since some stocks present a low free-float market capitalization, liquidating this portfolio is more challenging. For instance, 144 trading days are required to liquidate 99% of a €1 bn exposure on this portfolio[6]. Therefore, it is unsurprising that we obtained the redemption coverage ratio values given in Tables 6 and 7. Using the waterfall approach, the redemption coverage ratio $\text{RCR}^{\text{stress}}$ (1) is below one for a €1 bn exposure even though the multiplicative factor m_v is equal to 1.

Table 6: Redemption coverage ratio in a normal period (small-cap portfolio, $\mathcal{R} = 5\%$, waterfall liquidation)

TNA	€1 bn	€2 bn	€3 bn	€4 bn
$h = 1$	1.28	0.64	0.43	0.32
$h = 2$	2.56	1.28	0.85	0.64
$h = 5$	5.89	3.20	2.13	1.60

Table 7: Stress testing of the redemption coverage ratio (small-cap portfolio, $\mathcal{R}^{\text{stress}} = 20\%$, waterfall liquidation)

	$m_v = 1.00$				$m_v = 0.75$			
TNA	€1 bn	€2 bn	€3 bn	€4 bn	€1 bn	€2 bn	€3 bn	€4 bn
$h = 1$	0.32	0.06	0.03	0.02	0.24	0.05	0.02	0.01
$h = 2$	0.64	0.13	0.06	0.03	0.48	0.10	0.05	0.02
$h = 5$	1.47	0.32	0.16	0.08	1.17	0.24	0.12	0.06
	$m_v = 0.50$				$m_v = 0.10$			
TNA	€1 bn	€2 bn	€3 bn	€4 bn	€1 bn	€2 bn	€3 bn	€4 bn
$h = 1$	0.16	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.00	0.00
$h = 2$	0.32	0.06	0.03	0.02	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.00
$h = 5$	0.80	0.16	0.08	0.04	0.16	0.03	0.02	0.01

[6] Figures 14 and 15 on page 334 show other liquidation statistics.

2.1.5 HQLA approach

The high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) method is explained in detail in Roncalli (2021c, Section 2.1.2, pages 13-18). Let CCF_k be the cash conversion factor (CCF) of the k^{th} HQLA class. The redemption coverage ratio is defined as:

$$\text{RCR}(h) = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{m} w_k \cdot \text{CCF}_k(h)}{\mathcal{R}} \tag{15}$$

where w_k is the weight of the k^{th} HQLA class. In the case of the Basel III framework, $\text{CCF}_k(h)$ is fixed and does not depend on the time horizon h. In the case of the risk sensitive framework, Roncalli (2021c) proposed the following formula:

$$\text{CCF}_{k,j}(h) = \text{LF}_k(h) \cdot \left(1 - \text{DF}_k\left(\frac{h}{2}\right)\right) \cdot (1 - \text{SF}_k(\text{TNA}_j, \mathcal{H}_j)) \tag{16}$$

where $\text{LF}_k(h) \in [0,1]$ is the liquidity factor, $\text{DF}_k(\tau_h) \in [0, \text{MDD}_k]$ is the drawdown factor and $\text{SF}_k \in [0,1]$ is the specific risk factor associated to the fund j. Following Roncalli (2021c), we specify these functions as follows:

$$\begin{cases} \text{LF}_k(h) = \min(1.0, \lambda_k \cdot h) \\ \text{DF}_k(h) = \min\left(\text{MDD}_k, \eta_k \cdot \sqrt{h}\right) \\ \text{SF}_k(\text{TNA}_j, \mathcal{H}_j) = \min\left(\xi_k^{\text{size}}\left(\dfrac{\text{TNA}_j}{\text{TNA}^\star} - 1\right)^+ + \xi_k^{\text{concentration}}\left(\sqrt{\dfrac{\mathcal{H}_j}{\mathcal{H}^\star}} - 1\right)^+, \text{SF}^+\right) \end{cases} \tag{17}$$

where λ_k is the selling intensity, MDD_k is the maximum drawdown, η_k is the loss intensity, TNA_j is the total net assets and $\mathcal{H}_j$ is the Herfindahl index of the fund.

In the Basel framework, the value of $\text{CCF}_k(h)$ is set to 50%. Concerning the risk sensitive framework, we assume that $\lambda_k = 2\%$, $\eta_k = 5\%$, $\text{MDD}_k = 50\%$, $\xi_k^{\text{size}} = 10\%$, $\xi_k^{\text{concentration}} = 25\%$, $\text{TNA}^\star = 1$ bn, $\mathcal{H}^\star = 2\%$ and $\text{SF}^+ = 0.80$. Results are given[7] in Figures 4 and 5 when the stressed redemption rate $\mathcal{R}^{\text{stress}}$ is equal to 20%. We also compare the HQLA approach with the time-to-liquidation (TTL) approach[8].

2.2 Reverse stress testing

According to Roncalli (2021c), reverse stress testing consists in finding the liquidity scenario such that $\text{RCR}(h) = \text{RCR}^-$ where RCR^- is the minimum acceptable level of the redemption coverage ratio[9].

2.2.1 Liability RST scenario

From a liability perspective, reverse stress testing consists in finding the redemption shock above which the redemption coverage ratio is lower than the minimum acceptable level:

$$\text{RCR}(h) \leq \text{RCR}^- \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{R} \geq \mathcal{R}^{\text{RST}} \tag{18}$$

$\mathcal{R}^{\text{RST}}$ is computed by solving the non-linear equation:

$$\mathcal{R}^{\text{RST}} = \left\{\mathcal{R} \in [0,1] : \text{RCR}(h) = \text{RCR}^-\right\} \tag{19}$$

[7] For the small-cap portfolio, we assume that the selling intensity λ_k is reduced by 25%, the loss intensity η_k is increased by 20% and the threshold $\text{TNA}^\star$ is divided by a factor of two.

[8] The stress multiplier m_v is set to 50%.

[9] A standard value of RCR^- is 50%.

Figure 4: Redemption coverage ratio of the large-cap portfolio (TNA = €1 bn, $\mathcal{R}^{\text{stress}} = 20\%$ and $m_v = 50\%$)



Figure 5: Redemption coverage ratio of the small-cap portfolio (TNA = €1 bn, $\mathcal{R}^{\text{stress}} = 20\%$ and $m_v = 50\%$)



In the case where the liquidation portfolio q does not depend on the redemption rate, we obtain an analytical expression:

$$\frac{\sum_{k=1}^{h}\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i(k)\cdot P_i}{\mathcal{R}^{\text{RST}}\cdot \text{TNA}} = \text{RCR}^- \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{R}^{\text{RST}} = \frac{\sum_{k=1}^{h}\sum_{i=1}^{n} q_i(k)\cdot P_i}{\text{RCR}^-\cdot \text{TNA}} \tag{20}$$

For instance, this solution is valid for the waterfall approach since we have $q = \omega$. However, the analytical solution cannot be used for the pro-rata liquidation: $q = \mathcal{R}\cdot\omega$. In this case, we must solve the non-linear equation (19).

Table 8 gives the liability RST scenario $\mathcal{R}^{\text{RST}}$ when the minimum acceptable redemption coverage ratio is set to 50% and we consider the pro-rata liquidation policy. We notice that $\mathcal{R}^{\text{RST}}$ may be greater than one, implying that the size of the fund is too small to experience a liquidity stress test scenario. In this case, we report the total net assets $\text{TNA}^{\text{RST}} = \mathcal{R}^{\text{RST}}\cdot\text{TNA}$ such that the non-linear equation $RCR(h) = \text{RCR}^-$ is satisfied for a 100% redemption rate. If we consider the large-cap portfolio with $m_v = 0.50$, the reverse stress testing scenario for the one-day time horizon is $\mathcal{R}^{\text{RST}} = 72.1\%$. If $m_v = 1.00$, the value of $\mathcal{R}$ is always greater than one. Therefore, the reverse stress testing scenario for the one-day time horizon is given by the variable TNA^{RST} instead of the metric $\mathcal{R}^{\text{RST}}$. In our case, we obtain $\text{TNA}^{\text{RST}} = €1.441$ bn. Therefore, by assuming a 100% redemption shock, the size of the fund must be greater than €1.441 bn to breach the stress test scenario. On the contrary, if we consider the small-cap portfolio, reverse stress testing implies low values of the redemption rate $\mathcal{R}^{\text{RST}}$. For example, if we observe a 50% reduction in the asset liquidity, a redemption scenario of 4.9% is sufficient to observe a redemption coverage ratio lower than 50% when the time horizon h is set to one trading day.

Table 8: Liability reverse stress testing scenario $\mathcal{R}^{\text{RST}}$ in % (TNA = €1 bn, pro-rata liquidation, $\text{RCR}^- = 50\%$)

	Large-cap portfolio				Small-cap portfolio			
m_v	1.00	0.75	0.50	0.10	1.00	0.75	0.50	0.10
$h = 1$	144.1	108.1	72.1	14.5	9.7	7.3	4.9	1.0
$h = 2$	288.2	216.2	144.1	28.9	19.3	14.5	9.7	2.0
$h = 3$	432.3	324.2	216.2	43.3	28.9	21.7	14.5	2.9
$h = 4$	576.3	432.3	288.2	57.7	38.5	28.9	19.3	3.9
$h = 5$	720.4	540.3	360.2	72.1	48.1	36.1	24.1	4.9

2.2.2 Asset RST scenario

From an asset perspective, reverse stress testing consists in finding the asset liquidity shock m_v below which the redemption coverage ratio is lower than the minimum acceptable level:

$$\text{RCR}(h) \leq \text{RCR}^- \Leftrightarrow m_v \leq m_v^{\text{RST}} \tag{21}$$

Since the liquidation policy $q_i^+ = m_v\cdot x_i^+\cdot v_i$ depends on the value m_v, there is no analytical solution. The numerical solution corresponds then to the root of the non-linear equation $\left\{m_v \in [0,1] : \text{RCR}(h) = \text{RCR}^-\right\}$.

For the large-cap portfolio, the values taken by m_v^{RST} are very small. This indicates that the asset liquidity must be dramatically reduced to observe a stress test scenario, which is not realistic. For instance, in the case where the redemption shock is equal to 10%, the current liquidity must be reduced by a factor greater than 10 (m_v^{RST} is equal to 0.07 for $h = 1$). In the case of the small-cap portfolio, the current liquidity is not enough to liquidate 10% of the total net assets in one day since we have $m_v^{\text{RST}} = 1.04$.

Table 9: Asset reverse stress testing scenario m_v^{RST} (TNA = €1 bn, pro-rata liquidation, $\text{RCR}^- = 50\%$)

	Large-cap portfolio				Small-cap portfolio			
$\mathcal{R}$	5%	10%	20%	50%	5%	10%	20%	50%
$h = 1$	0.04	0.07	0.14	0.35	0.52	1.04	2.08	5.20
$h = 2$	0.02	0.04	0.07	0.17	0.26	0.52	1.04	2.60
$h = 3$	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.12	0.17	0.35	0.69	1.73
$h = 4$	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.09	0.13	0.26	0.52	1.30
$h = 5$	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.07	0.11	0.21	0.42	1.04

2.3 Transaction cost analysis

2.3.1 Analytics of the transaction cost function

The cost function corresponds to the square-root-linear model described in Roncalli *et al.* (2021b, Section 2.4.2, page 11). Let $x_i(h)$ be the participation rate at the trading day h. It is equal to:

$$x_i(h) = \frac{q_i(h)}{v_i} \tag{22}$$

where v_i is the daily volume. The unit transaction cost function is equal to:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i(x_i(h)) = \begin{cases} 1.25\, s_i + 0.40\, \sigma_i \sqrt{x_i(h)} & \text{if } x_i(h) \leq \tilde{x}_i \\ 1.25\, s_i + \dfrac{0.40}{\sqrt{\tilde{x}_i}} \sigma_i x_i & \text{if } \tilde{x}_i \leq x_i(h) \leq x_i^+ \\ +\infty & \text{if } x_i(h) > x_i^+ \end{cases} \tag{23}$$

where s_i is the bid-ask spread, σ_i is the daily volatility, $x_i^+ = 10\%$ and $\tilde{x}_i = \dfrac{2}{3} x_i^+$. We can break down this unit transaction cost as follows:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i(x_i(h)) = \boldsymbol{c}_i^s + \boldsymbol{c}_i^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(x_i(h)) \tag{24}$$

where $\boldsymbol{c}_i^s$ is the spread component and $\boldsymbol{c}_i^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(x_i(h))$ is the price impact component. Let $Q_i = q_i \cdot P_i$ and $Q_i(h) = q_i(h) \cdot P_i$ be the nominal value of q_i and $q_i(h)$. The transaction cost of the trade associated to $q_i(h)$ is therefore equal to:

$$\mathcal{TC}_i(q_i(h)) = Q_i(h) \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_i(x_i(h)) \tag{25}$$

Again, we have the following decomposition:

$$\begin{cases} \mathcal{TC}_i(q_i(h)) = \mathcal{TC}_i^s(q_i(h)) + \mathcal{TC}_i^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(q_i(h)) \\ \mathcal{TC}_i^s(q_i(h)) = Q_i(h) \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_i^s \\ \mathcal{TC}_i^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(q_i(h)) = \mathcal{TC}_i(q_i(h)) - \mathcal{TC}_i^s \end{cases} \tag{26}$$

We can now compute the total and unit costs of the redemption portfolio:

$$\mathcal{TC}(q) = \sum_{h=1}^{h^+} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{TC}_i(q_i(h)) \tag{27}$$

and:

$$\boldsymbol{c}(q) = \frac{\mathcal{TC}(q)}{\sum_{i=1}^n q_i \cdot P_i} \tag{28}$$

If we are interested in the contribution of the stock i or the trading day h, we have[10]:

$$\mathcal{TC}(q;h) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathcal{TC}_i(q_i(h)) \tag{31}$$

and[11]:

$$\mathcal{TC}_i(q_i) = \sum_{h=1}^{h^+} \mathcal{TC}_i(q_i(h)) \tag{34}$$

We consider the redemption portfolio described in Table 1 on page 300. Using the daily volume, the annualized volatility and the bid-ask quotes given in Table 13 on page 322, we compute the daily participation rate[12] $x_i(h)$, the daily volatility[13] σ_i and the (half) bid-ask spread[14] s_i. Then, we define the spread and price impact component $\boldsymbol{c}_i^s$ and $\boldsymbol{c}_i^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(x_i(h))$ and we deduce the unit transaction cost $\boldsymbol{c}_i(x_i(h))$. Results are given in Table 16 on page 326. For example, if we consider the first stock ($i = 1$), we have $x_1(1) = 9.18\%$, $\sigma_1 = 1.59\%$, $s_1 = 0.89$ bps, $\boldsymbol{c}_1^s = 1.11$ bps, $\boldsymbol{c}_1^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(x_1(1)) = 22.67$ bps and $\boldsymbol{c}_1(x_1(1)) = 23.78$ bps. When h is equal to 2 or 3, we have $\boldsymbol{c}_1(x_1(h)) = 0$ bps because $x_1(h) = 0$. Then, we compute $Q_i(h) = q_i(h) \cdot P_i$ and deduce $\mathcal{TC}_i(q_i(h))$ and $\mathcal{TC}_i(q_i)$ using Equations (25) and (34). Results are reported in Table 17 on page 327. The transaction cost to liquidate q_1 is equal to €31 936. Finally, liquidating the redemption portfolio implies a total cost $\mathcal{TC}(q)$ of €1 738 156. This represents a unit transaction cost $\boldsymbol{c}(q)$ of 21.73 bps. Table 18 on page 328 also provides the break-down between the spread component $\mathcal{TC}_i^s(q_i)$ and the price impact component $\mathcal{TC}_i^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(q_i)$.

Remark 2 *From a trading viewpoint, computing the unit transaction cost $\boldsymbol{c}(q)$ makes a lot of sense because we compare the total transaction cost to the value of the redemption portfolio. From a liquidity stress testing viewpoint, it is better to normalize the total transaction cost by the total net assets:*

$$\tilde{\boldsymbol{c}}(q) = \frac{\mathcal{TC}(q)}{\text{TNA}} \tag{37}$$

[10] We have the following decomposition:

$$\mathcal{TC}^s(q;h) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} Q_i(h) \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_i^s \tag{29}$$

and:

$$\mathcal{TC}^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(q;h) = \mathcal{TC}(q;h) - \mathcal{TC}^s(q;h) \tag{30}$$

[11] We have the following decomposition:

$$\mathcal{TC}_i^s(q_i) = Q_i \cdot \boldsymbol{c}_i^s \tag{32}$$

and:

$$\mathcal{TC}_i^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(q_i) = \mathcal{TC}_i(q_i) - \mathcal{TC}_i^s(q_i) \tag{33}$$

[12] We use Equation (22).

[13] We have:

$$\sigma_i = \frac{\sigma_i^{\text{yearly}}}{\sqrt{260}} \tag{35}$$

[14] We have:

$$s_i = \frac{P_i^{\text{ask}} - P_i^{\text{bid}}}{P_i^{\text{ask}} + P_i^{\text{bid}}} \tag{36}$$

Indeed, the computation of $\boldsymbol{c}(q)$ *measures the real impact of the redemption portfolio by combining the redemption shock and the liquidation cost:*

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{\boldsymbol{c}}(q) &= \frac{\mathcal{TC}(q)}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\omega_i \cdot P_i} \\ &= \mathcal{R}\cdot\boldsymbol{c}(q)\end{aligned} \tag{38}$$

Moreover, without the implementation of swing pricing, this is the cost borne by the final investor. In the example above, we obtain $\tilde{\boldsymbol{c}}(q) = 17.38$ *bps and* $\boldsymbol{c}(q) = 21.73$ *bps.*

In Figure 6, we report the transaction cost functions $\mathcal{TC}(q)$, $\boldsymbol{c}(q)$ and $\tilde{\boldsymbol{c}}(q)$. For each cost function, we indicate the total value and also the breakdown between the spread and the price impact. In the last panel, we show the proportion of $\boldsymbol{c}(q)$ due to the price impact. In Figure 7, we illustrate the breakdown per asset when the redemption rate is equal to 5%.

Figure 6: Transaction cost of the large-cap portfolio (TNA = €1 bn)



2.3.2 The case of small-cap stocks

For small-cap stocks, the only difference concerns the sensitivity coefficients of the unit transaction cost function. Following Roncalli *et al.* (2021b, Equation (44), page 40), we have:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i(x_i(h)) = \begin{cases} 1.40\, s_i + 0.50\, \sigma_i \sqrt{x_i(h)} & \text{if } x_i(h) \leq \tilde{x}_i \\ 1.40\, s_i + \dfrac{0.50}{\sqrt{\tilde{x}_i}}\sigma_i x_i & \text{if } \tilde{x}_i \leq x_i(h) \leq x_i^+ \\ +\infty & \text{if } x_i(h) > x_i^+ \end{cases} \tag{39}$$

We consider the small-cap portfolio. Figure 8 shows the breakdown per trading day when we assume that the redemption rate is equal to 5%. Finally, we obtain $\mathcal{TC}(q) = €147\,560$.

Figure 7: Breakdown per asset in € (large-cap portfolio, TNA = €1 bn, $\mathcal{R} = 5\%$)



Figure 8: Breakdown per trading day in € (small-cap portfolio, TNA = €1 bn, $\mathcal{R} = 5\%$)



2.3.3 Stress testing

The transaction cost function remains the same for the stress period, but the three parameters s_i, σ_i and v_i change because we apply shocks to them. Since the stress test scenario is defined by the triplet $(\Delta_s, \Delta_\sigma, m_v)$, it follows that Equation (23) becomes:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i(x_i(h)) = \begin{cases} 1.25\ (s_i + \Delta_s) + 0.40 \left(\sigma_i + \dfrac{\Delta_\sigma}{\sqrt{260}}\right)\sqrt{x_i} & \text{if } x_i(h) \leq \tilde{x}_i \\ 1.25\ (s_i + \Delta_s) + \dfrac{0.40}{\sqrt{\tilde{x}_i}} \left(\sigma_i + \dfrac{\Delta_\sigma}{\sqrt{260}}\right) x_i & \text{if } \tilde{x}_i \leq x_i(h) \leq x_i^+ \\ +\infty & \text{if } x_i(h) > x_i^+ \end{cases} \tag{40}$$

where:

$$x_i(h) = \frac{q_i(h)}{m_v \cdot v_i} \tag{41}$$

Therefore, a stress test scenario has three impacts: (1) for a given value of $q_i(h)$, the participation rate $x_i(h)$ is larger; (2) the transaction cost $\boldsymbol{c}_i(x_i(h))$ is higher because the participation rate, the bid-ask spread and the volatility are higher; (3) moreover, it takes more time to liquidate the redemption portfolio since we have $q_i^+ = m_v \cdot x_i^+ \cdot v_i$, meaning that the daily trading limits expressed in number of shares are reduced.

Figure 9: Breakdown per trading day in € (large-cap portfolio, TNA = €1 bn, $\mathcal{R} = 80\%$)



We consider the example described in Section 2.3.1 on page 309. Previously, we found that the total transaction cost $\mathcal{TC}(q)$ was equal to 1 738 156 euros. representing a redemption transaction cost $\boldsymbol{c}(q)$ of 21.73 bps and a portfolio transaction cost $\tilde{\boldsymbol{c}}(q)$ of 17.38 bps. Let us assume the following stress test scenario: $\Delta_s = 8$ bps, $\Delta_\sigma = 20\%$ and $m_v = 0.50$. We now obtain[15] $\mathcal{TC}^{\text{stress}}(q) = 4\,124\,811$ euros, $\boldsymbol{c}(q) = 51.56$ bps and $\tilde{\boldsymbol{c}}(q) = 41.25$ bps. In Figure 9, we compare the breakdown per trading day for the normal and stress cases.

[15] See Tables 19, 20 and 21 on page 329 for computational details.

3 The case of bond portfolios

The case of bond portfolios is similar to the case of equity portfolios. This is why we only focus on the most important differences when doing a liquidity stress testing exercise with bond portfolios.

3.1 Computing the liquidation portfolio

We define the redemption portfolio by the vector of liquidated bonds $q = (q_1, \ldots, q_n)$. Nevertheless, in the fixed-income universe, we may prefer to consider nominal values $Q_i = q_i \cdot P_i$ instead of real values q_i. Therefore, the redemption portfolio is also defined by $Q = (Q_1, \ldots, Q_n)$. Let $Q_i(h)$ be the exposure in the i^{th} bond liquidated after h trading days. We have:

$$Q_i(h) = \min\left(\left(Q_i - \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} Q_i(k)\right)^+, Q_i^+\right) \tag{42}$$

where $Q_i(0) = 0$ and Q_i^+ is the maximum trading limit that can be sold during a trading day for the bond i. Equation (42) is equivalent to Equation (1) on page 299 because we have:

$$q_i(h) = \frac{Q_i(h)}{P_i} \tag{43}$$

The formulas for $\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$, $\text{RCR}(h)$ and $\text{LS}(h)$ remain the same as previously.

We consider the portfolio described on page 324. It is made up of 11 sovereign bonds and 36 corporate bonds. In Table 15, we report the values of Q_i^+. We assume that Q_i^+ is equal to \$50 mn for US sovereign bonds, \$6 mn for senior corporate bonds and \$3 mn for non-senior corporate bonds (e.g. subordinated debt). If we consider a redemption rate equal to 30%, we obtain the liquidation values $Q_i(h)$ given in Table 10. We have $\mathcal{LR}(q;1) = 0.9566$, $\mathcal{LR}(q;2) = 0.9958$ and $\mathcal{LR}(q;3) = 1$. The redemption portfolio can almost be liquidated during the first day, since only the exposures on the four subordinated bonds require more than one day to be sold.

3.2 Computing the redemption coverage ratio

We scale up the portfolio in order to obtain TNA = \$10 bn or TNA = \$20 bn. Results are given in Table 11. When the total net assets are equal to \$10 bn and the redemption rate is set to 30%, the redemption coverage ratio $\text{RCR}(1)$ is equal to 0.251 if we consider a pro-rata liquidation or a waterfall liquidation. Therefore, we notice that the liquidation policy may have no impact on the RCR. The reason lies in the fact that $Q_i(h)$ is equal to Q_i^+ when the time horizon h is low. This means that the trading limits are reached for all the bonds. In this case, we cannot use a bond i to liquidate the exposure on the bond j.

Stress testing is implemented by considering a shock on the trading limits:

$$Q_i(h) = \min\left(\left(Q_i - \sum_{k=0}^{h-1} Q_i(k)\right)^+, m_{Q^+} \cdot Q_i^+\right) \tag{44}$$

where $m_{Q^+} \leq 1$ is the stress parameter of the trading limit Q_i^+. For instance, if m_v is equal to 50%, we obtain the right panel in Table 11. We notice the high impact of the stress parameter m_{Q^+} on the redemption coverage ratio[16].

[16] See Figures 17 and 18 on page 336 for a more visual illustration.

Table 10: Liquidation of the redemption portfolio (bond portfolio, TNA = \$1 bn, $\mathcal{R} = 30\%$, vertical slicing)

i	Q_i	Q_i^+	$Q_i\,(1)$	$Q_i\,(2)$	$Q_i\,(3)$	$\sum_{h=1}^{3} Q_i\,(h)$
1	16 255 353	50 000 000	16 255 353	0	0	16 255 353
2	12 718 447	50 000 000	12 718 447	0	0	12 718 447
3	12 017 318	50 000 000	12 017 318	0	0	12 017 318
4	13 233 346	50 000 000	13 233 346	0	0	13 233 346
5	12 063 483	50 000 000	12 063 483	0	0	12 063 483
6	11 544 025	50 000 000	11 544 025	0	0	11 544 025
7	21 235 655	50 000 000	21 235 655	0	0	21 235 655
8	20 407 521	50 000 000	20 407 521	0	0	20 407 521
9	20 072 491	50 000 000	20 072 491	0	0	20 072 491
10	13 683 284	50 000 000	13 683 284	0	0	13 683 284
11	26 768 829	50 000 000	26 768 829	0	0	26 768 829
12	3 802 896	6 000 000	3 802 896	0	0	3 802 896
13	3 282 954	6 000 000	3 282 954	0	0	3 282 954
14	1 476 301	6 000 000	1 476 301	0	0	1 476 301
15	2 064 731	6 000 000	2 064 731	0	0	2 064 731
16	2 954 414	6 000 000	2 954 414	0	0	2 954 414
17	2 359 638	6 000 000	2 359 638	0	0	2 359 638
18	1 887 457	6 000 000	1 887 457	0	0	1 887 457
19	3 538 056	6 000 000	3 538 056	0	0	3 538 056
20	6 906 942	3 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000	906 942	6 906 942
21	6 153 350	3 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000	153 350	6 153 350
22	2 639 184	6 000 000	2 639 184	0	0	2 639 184
23	4 773 841	6 000 000	4 773 841	0	0	4 773 841
24	3 007 583	6 000 000	3 007 583	0	0	3 007 583
25	5 735 256	3 000 000	3 000 000	2 735 256	0	5 735 256
26	6 210 205	3 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000	210 205	6 210 205
27	3 561 300	6 000 000	3 561 300	0	0	3 561 300
28	2 978 950	6 000 000	2 978 950	0	0	2 978 950
29	4 166 994	6 000 000	4 166 994	0	0	4 166 994
30	2 979 133	6 000 000	2 979 133	0	0	2 979 133
31	2 920 499	6 000 000	2 920 499	0	0	2 920 499
32	2 358 223	6 000 000	2 358 223	0	0	2 358 223
33	2 652 842	6 000 000	2 652 842	0	0	2 652 842
34	4 958 507	6 000 000	4 958 507	0	0	4 958 507
35	3 535 819	6 000 000	3 535 819	0	0	3 535 819
36	2 650 657	6 000 000	2 650 657	0	0	2 650 657
37	2 662 310	6 000 000	2 662 310	0	0	2 662 310
38	3 140 845	6 000 000	3 140 845	0	0	3 140 845
39	4 155 263	6 000 000	4 155 263	0	0	4 155 263
40	2 803 320	6 000 000	2 803 320	0	0	2 803 320
41	2 293 116	6 000 000	2 293 116	0	0	2 293 116
42	1 946 863	6 000 000	1 946 863	0	0	1 946 863
43	2 656 800	6 000 000	2 656 800	0	0	2 656 800
44	2 295 612	6 000 000	2 295 612	0	0	2 295 612
45	3 267 302	6 000 000	3 267 302	0	0	3 267 302
46	2 270 545	6 000 000	2 270 545	0	0	2 270 545
47	2 952 538	6 000 000	2 952 538	0	0	2 952 538

Table 11: Redemption coverage ratio RCR (h) (bond portfolio, $\mathcal{R} = 30\%$)

		Normal period				Stress period			
		Pro-rata		Waterfall		Pro-rata		Waterfall	
	TNA	10	20	10	20	10	20	10	20
h	1	0.251	0.126	0.251	0.126	0.126	0.063	0.126	0.063
	2	0.503	0.251	0.503	0.251	0.251	0.126	0.251	0.126
	3	0.704	0.377	0.754	0.377	0.377	0.188	0.377	0.188
	4	0.835	0.503	1.005	0.503	0.503	0.251	0.503	0.251
	5	0.900	0.622	1.257	0.628	0.622	0.314	0.628	0.314
	6	0.928	0.704	1.508	0.754	0.704	0.377	0.754	0.377
	7	0.940	0.773	1.759	0.880	0.773	0.440	0.880	0.440
	8	0.948	0.835	2.006	1.005	0.835	0.503	1.005	0.503
	9	0.953	0.873	2.195	1.131	0.873	0.565	1.131	0.565
	10	0.957	0.900	2.346	1.257	0.900	0.622	1.257	0.628

Figure 10: Multiplier stress factor $m_{\text{RCR}}(h)$ ($m_{Q^+} = 50\%$)



Remark 3 *The stress parameter m_{Q^+} is exactly equal to the previous stress parameter m_v. Indeed, we have $q_i^+ = x_i^+ \cdot v_i$ and $Q_i^+ = q_i^+ \cdot P_i$. The stressed values are defined as $q_i^{+,\text{stress}} = m_v \cdot q_i^+$ and $Q_i^{+,\text{stress}} = m_{Q^+} \cdot Q_i^+$. We deduce that $Q_i^{+,\text{stress}} = q_i^+ \cdot P_i = m_v \cdot q_i^+ \cdot P_i = m_v \cdot Q_i^+$ and $m_{Q^+} = m_v$.*

We note $\text{RCR}^{\text{normal}}(h)$ the redemption coverage ratio when m_{Q^+} (or m_v) is equal to one. The stressed value $\text{RCR}^{\text{stress}}(h)$ is computed with $m_{Q^+} < 1$. We define the multiplier stress factor of the redemption coverage ratio as:

$$m_{\text{RCR}}(h) = \frac{\text{RCR}^{\text{stress}}(h)}{\text{RCR}^{\text{normal}}(h)} \tag{45}$$

By construction, we have $\text{RCR}^{\text{stress}}(\infty) = \text{RCR}^{\text{normal}}(\infty)$, implying that:

$$m_{Q^+} \leq m_{\text{RCR}}(h) \leq 1 \tag{46}$$

In Figure 10, we report $m_{\text{RCR}}(h)$ when we consider the pro-rata liquidation and the waterfall liquidation. We notice that the stress test scenario has a bigger impact on the pro-rata liquidation than on the waterfall liquidation. In particular, in this example, $m_{\text{RCR}}(h)$ does not depend on the redemption shock when we use the waterfall liquidation.

3.3 Computing the transaction cost

In the case of bonds, the participation rate is defined with respect to the outstanding amount $\mathcal{M}_i$ and not the daily volume v_i:

$$y_i(h) = \frac{Q_i(h)}{\mathcal{M}_i} \tag{47}$$

Following Roncalli *et al.* (2021b), we use the following unit transaction cost for the sovereign bonds:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i(y_i(h)) = 1.25\, s_i + 3.00\, \sigma_i y_i(h)^{0.25} \qquad \text{if } y_i(h) \leq y_i^+ \tag{48}$$

where:

$$y_i^+ = \frac{Q_i^+}{\mathcal{M}_i} \tag{49}$$

In the case of corporate bonds, the formula becomes:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i(y_i(h)) = 1.50\, s_i + 0.125\ \text{DTS}_i\, y_i(h)^{0.25} \qquad \text{if } y_i(h) \leq y_i^+ \tag{50}$$

where DTS_i is the duration-times-spread measure of the bond i. Again, we can introduce a second transaction cost regime, where the price impact is linear. In this case, we have:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i(y_i(h)) = \begin{cases} 1.25\, s_i + 3.00\, \sigma_i y_i(h)^{0.25} & \text{if } y_i(h) \leq \tilde{y}_i \\ 1.25\, s_i + \dfrac{3.00}{\tilde{y}_i^{0.75}}\, \sigma_i y_i(h) & \text{if } \tilde{y}_i \leq y_i(h) \leq y_i^+ \end{cases} \tag{51}$$

and:

$$\boldsymbol{c}_i(y_i(h)) = \begin{cases} 1.50\, s_i + 0.125\ \text{DTS}_i\, y_i(h)^{0.25} & \text{if } y_i(h) \leq \tilde{y}_i \\ 1.50\, s_i + \dfrac{0.125}{\tilde{y}_i^{0.75}}\ \text{DTS}_i\, y_i(h) & \text{if } \tilde{y}_i \leq y_i(h) \leq y_i^+ \end{cases} \tag{52}$$

where $\tilde{y}_i = \dfrac{2}{3} y_i^+$.

Using the data given in Table 15 on page 324, we compute the unit transaction cost with respect to $Q_i(h)$ in Figure 11. The first panel uses the formula of sovereign bonds while the three other panels use the formula of corporate bonds. $i = 1$ corresponds to the UST bond. The spread s_i is equal to 1.33 bps and the yearly volatility is equal to 16 bps. This explains the low transaction cost. $i = 45$ corresponds to the Petronas bond. The transaction cost is very high because the bid-ask spread s_i is equal to 57.15 bps and the DTS is equal to 2635 bps.

Figure 11: Unit transaction cost function



We consider the bond portfolio, whose total net assets are equal to \$10 bn. By assuming a 30% redemption rate and a vertical slicing approach, we obtain $\mathcal{TC}(q) = 10.68$ million dollars. This implies a liquidation cost $\boldsymbol{c}(q)$ of 35.60 bps and an investment cost $\tilde{\boldsymbol{c}}(q)$ of 10.68 bps. The price impact cost represents 68.90% of the total cost[17].

Let us consider the following stress test scenario: $\Delta_s = 3$ bps, $\Delta_{\sigma^{\text{yearly}}} = 2\%$, $\Delta_{\text{DTS}} = 100$ bps and $m_{Q^+} = 0.50$. We now obtain $\mathcal{TC}^{\text{stress}}(q) = 12.29$ million dollars. In Table 12, we compare the breakdown between the spread and price impact components. We notice that the ratio of the transaction cost that is explained by the price impact is greater for the normal scenario than for the stress test scenario. At first sight, this result may be curious, because we expect that price impacts increase when we stress the liquidity condition. The issue comes from the definition of the participation rate. In the case of stocks, we have $x_i(h) = \dfrac{q_i(h)}{v_i}$. When we stress the volume v_i by applying the stress factor m_v, we have two effects: an impact on $q_i(h)$ and an impact on v_i. Finally, the stressed value of $x_i(h)$ is greater or equal to the normal value of $x_i(h)$. This is not the case for bonds. Indeed, we have:

$$y_i(h) = \frac{Q_i(h)}{\mathcal{M}_i} \tag{53}$$

[17] More figures are given in Tables 22 and 23 on page 332.

Figure 12: Ratio of transaction cost explained by the price impact (bond portfolio, TNA = \$10 bn, $\mathcal{R} = 30\%$, vertical slicing)



When we stress the liquidity policy by applying the multiplicative factor m_{Q^+}, we have an impact on the liquidation shares $Q_i(h)$, but no effect on the outstanding amount $\mathcal{M}_i$. Therefore, the stressed value of $y_i(h)$ is less than the normal value of $y_i(h)$. Finally, the part of the transaction cost due to the price impact is reduced when we decrease m_{Q^+} (see Figure 12). In order to be consistent with the equity framework, we propose to scale the participation rate:

$$y_i^{\text{stress}^*}(h) = \frac{1}{m_{Q^+}} \left(\frac{Q_i(h)}{\mathcal{M}_i} \right) \tag{54}$$

This approach is called "*stress**" in order to distinguish it from the previous one. In Table 12 we report the transaction cost of the redemption portfolio when we assume that $\mathcal{R} = 30\%$ and the fund size is equal to \$10 bn. In the normal case, the investment cost is equal to 10.68 bps. However, this figure is not representative of a normal cost. Indeed, we use a too high redemption value ($\mathcal{R} = 30\%$). If we assume that $\mathcal{R} = 30\%$, we obtain $\tilde{\boldsymbol{c}}(q) = 1.53$ bps. This investment cost becomes 12.29 bps when we consider the stress test scenario. If we implement the correction given by Equation (54), we finally obtain $\tilde{\boldsymbol{c}}(q) = 13.75$ bps.

Table 12: Spread and price impact components in bps (bond portfolio, TNA = \$10 bn, $\mathcal{R} = 30\%$, vertical slicing)

Scenario	$\boldsymbol{c}^s(q)$	$\boldsymbol{c}^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(q)$	$\boldsymbol{c}(q)$	$\tilde{\boldsymbol{c}}^s(q)$	$\tilde{\boldsymbol{c}}^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(q)$	$\tilde{\boldsymbol{c}}(q)$
Normal ($\mathcal{R} = 5\%$)	11.07	19.51	30.58	0.55	0.98	1.53
Normal	11.07	24.53	35.60	3.32	7.36	10.68
Stress	15.12	25.84	40.96	4.54	7.75	12.29
Stress*	15.12	30.73	45.85	4.54	9.22	13.75

4 Conclusion

This working paper complements the publication of the three previous research papers dedicated to the liquidity stress testing in asset management (Roncalli *et al.*, 2021a,b; Roncalli, 2021c). Using three portfolios, we have explained how to compute the redemption coverage ratio, implement reverse stress testing and estimate the liquidation cost of the redemption portfolio. The first portfolio is an index portfolio corresponding to the Eurostoxx 50 index. The second portfolio is an active equity portfolio, which is made up of 20 small- and mid-cap stocks. Finally, the third portfolio corresponds to 47 sovereign and corporate bonds. These examples illustrate the main asset classes that are concerned by liquidity stress testing: large-cap stocks, small-cap stocks, sovereign bonds, corporate bonds. We have excluded derivatives from this research project because of the lack of research on this topic. Nevertheless, these examples must enable asset managers to understand the common basics of liquidity stress testing in asset management.

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Appendix

A Data

We use three portfolios[18]:

1. Table 13 presents a first equity portfolio based on the Eurostoxx 50 index. It is made up of 50 stocks with the following correspondence: (1) Adidas, (2) Adyen, (3) Air Liquide, (4) Airbus, (5) Allianz, (6) Anheuser-Busch, (7) ASML, (8) AXA, (9) Banco Santander, (10) BASF, (11) Bayer, (12) BMW, (13) BBVA, (14) BNP Paribas, (15) CRH, (16) Daimler, (17) Danone, (18) Deutsche Boerse, (19) Deutsche Post, (20) Deutsche Telekom, (21) Enel, (22) Eni, (23) EssilorLuxottica, (24) Flutter Entertainment, (25) Iberdrola, (26) Inditex, (27) Infineon Technolog, (28) ING, (29) Intesa Sanpaolo, (30) Kering, (31) Kon Ahold Delhaize, (32) Kone, (33) Koninklijke Philips, (34) L'Oreal, (35) Linde, (36) LVMH, (37) Muenchener Rueckve, (38) Pernod Ricard, (39) Prosus, (40) Safran, (41) Sanofi, (42) SAP, (43) Schneider Electric, (44) Siemens, (45) Stellantis, (46) TotalEnergies, (47) Universal Music, (48) Vinci, (49) Volkswagen, (50) Vonovia.

2. In Table 14, we consider a second equity portfolio with more small and mid-cap stocks. We have the following correspondence: (1) Heineken, (2) Zalando, (3) ArcelorMittal, (4) Kerry Group, (5) Porsche, (6) Puma, (7) Hannover Rueck, (8) Solvay, (9) Euronext, (10) Sodexo, (11) Gecina, (12) Ubisoft Entertainment, (13) Rational, (14) Deutsche Lufthansa, (15) Ackermans & van Haaren, (16) Aeroports de Paris, (17) Telecom Italia, (18) Christian Dior, (19) Sopra Steria Group, (20) Dassault Aviation.

3. The last portfolio is made up of 11 US bonds and 36 USD-denominated corporate bonds. Table 15 gives the different characteristics for the different bonds: (1) UST (T 1 5/8 11/15/22), (2) UST (T 0 1/4 05/15/24), (3) UST (T 0 3/8 08/15/24), (4) UST (T 1 5/8 08/15/29), (5) UST (T 2 3/8 05/15/29), (6) UST (T 3 1/8 11/15/28), (7) UST (T 1 5/8 05/15/31), (8) UST (T 1 1/4 08/15/31), (9) UST (T 1 1/8 02/15/31), (10) UST (T 2 3/8 05/15/51), (11) UST (T 2 08/15/51), (12) Apple (AAPL 3 02/09/24), (13) DNB Bank (DNBNO 0.856 09/30/25), (14) Equinor (EQNR 2 7/8 04/06/25), (15) Bank of America (BAC 3.093 10/01/25), (16) Comcast (CMCSA 3.7 04/15/24), (17) Cnooc Finance (CNOOC 3 05/09/23), (18) EMD Finance (MRKGR 3 1/4 03/19/25), (19) Boeing (BA 4.508 05/01/23), (20) Bank of America (BCHINA 5 11/13/24), (21) BP Capital Markets (BPLN 4 3/8 PERP), (22) Apple (AAPL 3.35 02/09/27), (23) Nestle (NESNVX 3 5/8 09/24/28), (24) Alibaba (BABA 3.4 12/06/27), (25) Bank of America (BAC 4.183 11/25/27), (26) Dai-Ichi Life Insurance (DAIL 4 PERP), (27) NTT Finance (NTT 1.162 04/03/26), (28) Anheuser-Busch (ABIBB 4 04/13/28), (29) Bat Capital (BATSLN 3.557 08/15/27), (30) Bayer (BAYNGR 4 1/4 12/15/25), (31) Nissan (NSANY 4.345 09/17/27), (32) Amazon (AMZN 1 1/2 06/03/30), (33) Alphabet (GOOGL 1.1 08/15/30), (34) Shell (RDSALN 2 3/4 04/06/30), (35) Bank of America (BAC 2.592 04/29/31), (36) BNP Paribas (BNP 2.871 04/19/32), (37) Petronas (PETMK 3 1/2 04/21/30), (38) British Telecom (BRITEL 9 5/8 12/15/30), (39) Deutsche Telekom (DT 8 1/4 06/15/30), (40) Orange (ORAFP 8 1/2 03/01/31), (41) Shell (RDSALN 3 1/4 04/06/50), (42) Abbott Laboratories (ABT 4 3/4 11/30/36), (43) Saudi Arabian Oil (ARAMCO 3 1/4 11/24/50), (44) Bank of America (BAC 4.443 01/20/48), (45) Petronas (PETMK 4.55 04/21/50), (46) Credit Suisse (CS 4 7/8 05/15/45) and (47) Telefonica (TELEFO 5.213 03/08/47).

[18]The raw data are available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356849853.

Table 13: Large-cap equity portfolio (Eurostoxx 50 index), TNA = €1 bn)

i	ω_i	P_i	P_i^{bid}	P_i^{ask}	σ_i^{yearly}	v_i
1	59 106	284.050	281.750	281.800	25.69	514 842
2	8 883	2630.500	2567.500	2568.500	31.14	56 255
3	150 027	143.600	142.880	142.920	13.75	629 509
4	184 310	112.000	111.640	111.660	26.42	1 316 600
5	130 520	200.950	200.150	200.200	21.75	750 684
6	268 123	54.460	53.280	53.290	27.08	1 736 372
7	131 520	698.400	690.100	690.300	31.82	754 901
8	651 421	24.415	24.760	24.765	18.72	4 358 304
9	3 192 430	5.641	5.988	5.990	33.74	54 130 721
10	5 544 072	3.2805	3.2465	3.2480	29.85	72 371 040
11	242 317	62.550	62.190	62.200	20.69	2 473 040
12	181 800	48.735	48.805	48.820	21.39	2 444 130
13	136 334	87.340	86.610	86.630	26.13	1 183 053
14	365 067	57.460	58.250	58.260	26.61	2 390 614
15	251 719	41.360	41.060	41.070	20.83	1 434 050
16	265 762	83.850	84.870	84.900	26.15	2 672 846
17	206 041	56.040	55.810	55.830	18.72	1 579 517
18	60 148	144.200	142.700	142.750	17.01	339 768
19	311 879	54.040	53.160	53.170	19.38	2 536 147
20	1 026 503	16.032	15.942	15.944	19.77	9 225 311
21	2 459 244	7.270	7.213	7.215	23.17	30 518 046
22	795 234	12.164	12.408	12.412	21.32	19 419 467
23	95 262	172.860	177.120	177.160	20.43	491 647
24	55 520	165.600	163.600	163.650	33.71	212 501
25	1 840 196	10.250	10.225	10.230	24.90	14 316 692
26	351 837	31.050	30.910	30.930	25.62	7 543 014
27	413 417	40.100	39.700	39.710	29.69	3 643 730
28	1 235 905	13.082	13.122	13.126	25.02	15 954 487
29	5 774 696	2.438	2.441	2.442	22.67	106 942 206
30	23 113	650.900	646.100	646.200	31.69	204 628
31	161 807	57.460	57.960	57.980	19.61	786 412
32	261 645	28.085	27.965	27.970	15.39	2 285 287
33	290 422	40.665	40.250	40.260	21.56	2 489 971
34	76 637	393.450	388.850	388.950	20.44	372 415
35	162 956	271.800	271.300	271.400	17.81	578 973
36	83 427	671.700	666.100	666.200	28.37	364 566
37	44 351	254.400	255.300	255.400	21.80	256 421
38	64 954	201.100	197.000	197.050	17.37	363 103
39	282 801	76.530	75.000	75.020	46.16	2 135 693
40	120 062	114.080	116.920	116.940	30.87	794 444
41	362 506	85.990	85.770	85.780	14.72	1 551 395
42	345 779	126.300	123.060	123.080	21.01	1 859 400
43	180 140	148.900	145.600	145.620	22.27	818 822
44	237 952	139.840	136.940	136.980	25.33	1 136 151
45	660 350	17.286	17.078	17.084	28.79	10 497 975
46	835 885	43.295	43.610	43.620	21.90	6 596 020
47	247 964	25.120	24.970	24.980	12.73	1 943 066
48	189 196	91.670	91.590	91.620	20.21	912 539
49	57 954	194.780	193.200	193.260	29.39	1 071 749
50	163 680	54.060	52.680	52.700	19.20	976 446

The portfolio holding ω_i and the daily volume v_i are measured in number of shares, the yearly volatility σ_i^{yearly} is expressed in %, whereas the prices (P_i, P_i^{bid} and P_i^{ask}) are in euros.

Table 14: Small-cap equity portfolio (Eurostoxx index), TNA = €1 bn)

i	ω_i	P_i	P_i^{bid}	P_i^{ask}	σ_i^{yearly}	v_i
1	505 766	98.860	98.840	98.860	17.68	432 593
2	645 495	77.460	77.460	77.480	34.36	725 019
3	1 830 496	27.315	27.310	27.320	41.55	5 513 446
4	436 110	114.650	114.650	114.750	16.88	221 468
5	592 839	84.340	84.300	84.320	27.48	535 423
6	447 628	111.700	111.650	111.750	21.57	291 008
7	309 311	161.650	161.600	161.700	20.60	92 108
8	473 261	105.650	105.600	105.700	17.23	134 879
9	531 915	94.000	93.950	94.050	21.40	201 095
10	597 944	83.620	83.600	83.660	26.02	298 374
11	407 997	122.550	122.500	122.550	17.73	90 460
12	1 066 100	46.900	46.890	46.910	30.24	566 323
13	56 883	879.000	878.400	879.400	34.17	8 328
14	7 423 908	6.735	6.734	6.738	38.20	12 831 900
15	324 464	154.100	154.000	154.200	14.60	22 415
16	413 908	120.800	120.600	120.750	30.83	90 763
17	153 940 887	0.325	0.324	0.325	25.92	179 923 300
18	70 521	709.000	709.000	709.500	28.73	4 061
19	289 687	172.600	172.500	172.700	26.86	19 850
20	537 923	92.950	92.850	93.000	24.35	41 414

The portfolio holding ω_i and the daily volume v_i are measured in number of shares, the yearly volatility σ_i^{yearly} is expressed in %, whereas the prices (P_i, P_i^{bid} and P_i^{ask}) are in euros.

Table 15: Bond portfolio (USD-denominated, TNA = $1 bn)

i	Isin	ω_i	P_i	s_i	σ_i^{yearly}	DTS_i	$\mathcal{M}_i$	Q_i^+
1	US912828TY62	529 725	102.288	1.33	0.16		121 993	50
2	US91282CCC38	427 182	99.243	1.56	0.99		88 769	50
3	US91282CCT62	403 263	99.334	1.21	1.46		83 876	50
4	US912828YB05	432 386	102.018	2.31	4.65		92 619	50
5	US9128286T26	372 123	108.060	1.46	4.31		84 427	50
6	US9128285M81	339 801	113.243	2.10	3.91		80 506	50
7	US91282CCB54	695 025	101.846	1.55	5.90		148 501	50
8	US91282CCS89	695 930	97.747	1.60	6.25		142 197	50
9	US91282CBL46	689 215	97.079	1.61	5.88		140 063	50
10	US912810SX72	412 836	110.482	2.86	15.15		95 481	50
11	US912810SZ21	880 939	101.289	3.10	17.88		91 407	50
12	US037833CG39	120 000	105.636	3.43	0.92	43	1 750	6
13	US25601B2A27	110 140	99.357	6.52	2.44	78	1 250	6
14	US29446MAD48	46 500	105.828	9.09	2.38	101	1 250	6
15	US06051GGT04	65 100	105.721	9.87	1.19	137	1 750	6
16	US20030NCR08	92 000	107.044	4.07	1.06	53	2 500	6
17	US12625GAC87	75 300	104.455	6.65	0.88	119	2 000	6
18	US26867LAL45	59 000	106.636	6.17	1.57	124	1 600	6
19	US097023CS21	112 300	105.018	2.19	1.30	101	3 000	6
20	US061202AA55	205 000	112.308	9.37	2.08	265	3 000	3
21	US05565QDU94	192 000	106.829	3.56	4.29	559	2 500	3
22	US037833CJ77	80 000	109.966	7.56	2.44	137	2 250	6
23	US641062AF17	142 000	112.062	13.08	3.94	243	1 250	6
24	US01609WAT99	92 800	108.031	10.18	3.74	518	2 550	6
25	US06051GGC78	170 000	112.456	10.85	2.74	392	2 000	3
26	US23380YAD94	190 500	108.665	26.74	2.10	555	2 500	3
27	US62954WAC91	120 000	98.925	7.94	2.20	168	3 000	6
28	US035240AL43	88 000	112.839	13.64	3.54	300	2 500	6
29	US05526DBB01	130 000	106.846	15.23	2.79	566	3 500	6
30	US07274NAJ28	89 000	111.578	11.56	2.04	257	2 500	6
31	US654744AC50	89 000	109.382	7.22	3.08	753	2 500	6
32	US023135BS49	80 500	97.649	14.43	4.97	296	2 000	6
33	US02079KAD90	93 800	94.273	12.76	5.05	425	2 250	6
34	US822582CG52	156 000	105.951	11.78	5.83	413	1 750	6
35	US06051GJB68	116 000	101.604	13.98	5.32	729	3 000	6
36	US09659W2P81	86 400	102.263	15.38	5.57	926	2 250	6
37	US716743AP46	82 000	108.224	23.37	10.20	763	2 250	6
38	US111021AE12	68 000	153.963	16.15	4.43	1193	2 670	6
39	US25156PAC77	92 000	150.553	14.01	3.75	839	3 500	6
40	US35177PAL13	60 000	155.740	17.46	4.65	763	2 460	6
41	US822582CH36	70 000	109.196	26.31	15.97	1619	2 000	6
42	US002824BG43	49 900	130.051	37.90	7.36	817	1 650	6
43	US80414L2L80	90 000	98.400	59.02	11.07	2872	2 250	6
44	US06051GGG82	60 000	127.534	56.44	12.08	1560	2 000	6
45	US716743AR02	87 000	125.184	57.14	12.43	2336	2 750	6
46	US225433AF86	58 600	129.155	29.29	10.24	1962	1 925	6
47	US87938WAU71	77 700	126.664	27.90	10.78	2635	2 500	6

The portfolio holding ω_i is measured in number of shares, the price P_i is in US dollars, the yearly volatility σ_i^{yearly} is expressed in %, the (half) bid-ask spread s_i and the duration-times-spread DTS_i are in bps, whereas the outstanding amount $\mathcal{M}_i$ and the daily trading limit Q_i^+ are expressed in $ mn.

B Additional results

This appendix contains additional tables and figures.

Table 16: Computation of the unit transaction cost $\boldsymbol{c}_i(x_i(h))$ (large-cap portfolio, TNA = €1 bn, $\mathcal{R} = 80\%$, vertical slicing)

i	s_i	$\boldsymbol{c}_i^s$	σ_i	$x_i(h)$			$\boldsymbol{c}_i^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(x_i(h))$			$\boldsymbol{c}_i(x_i(h))$		
1	0.89	1.11	1.59	9.18	0.00	0.00	22.67	0.00	0.00	23.78	0.00	0.00
2	1.95	2.43	1.93	10.00	2.63	0.00	29.92	12.53	0.00	32.35	14.97	0.00
3	1.40	1.75	0.85	10.00	9.07	0.00	13.21	11.98	0.00	14.96	13.73	0.00
4	0.90	1.12	1.64	10.00	1.20	0.00	25.38	7.18	0.00	26.50	8.30	0.00
5	1.25	1.56	1.35	10.00	3.91	0.00	20.90	10.67	0.00	22.46	12.23	0.00
6	0.94	1.17	1.68	10.00	2.35	0.00	26.02	10.31	0.00	27.19	11.48	0.00
7	1.45	1.81	1.97	10.00	3.94	0.00	30.57	15.66	0.00	32.38	17.47	0.00
8	1.01	1.26	1.16	10.00	1.96	0.00	17.99	6.50	0.00	19.25	7.76	0.00
9	1.67	2.09	2.09	4.72	0.00	0.00	18.18	0.00	0.00	20.27	0.00	0.00
10	2.31	2.89	1.85	6.13	0.00	0.00	18.33	0.00	0.00	21.22	0.00	0.00
11	0.80	1.00	1.28	7.84	0.00	0.00	15.58	0.00	0.00	16.59	0.00	0.00
12	1.54	1.92	1.33	5.95	0.00	0.00	12.94	0.00	0.00	14.86	0.00	0.00
13	1.15	1.44	1.62	9.22	0.00	0.00	23.14	0.00	0.00	24.59	0.00	0.00
14	0.86	1.07	1.65	10.00	2.22	0.00	25.57	9.83	0.00	26.64	10.90	0.00
15	1.22	1.52	1.29	10.00	4.04	0.00	20.01	10.39	0.00	21.53	11.91	0.00
16	1.77	2.21	1.62	7.95	0.00	0.00	19.98	0.00	0.00	22.19	0.00	0.00
17	1.79	2.24	1.16	10.00	0.44	0.00	17.99	3.07	0.00	20.22	5.30	0.00
18	1.75	2.19	1.05	10.00	4.16	0.00	16.34	8.61	0.00	18.53	10.80	0.00
19	0.94	1.18	1.20	9.84	0.00	0.00	18.32	0.00	0.00	19.49	0.00	0.00
20	0.63	0.78	1.23	8.90	0.00	0.00	16.91	0.00	0.00	17.69	0.00	0.00
21	1.39	1.73	1.44	6.45	0.00	0.00	14.59	0.00	0.00	16.33	0.00	0.00
22	1.61	2.01	1.32	3.28	0.00	0.00	9.57	0.00	0.00	11.59	0.00	0.00
23	1.13	1.41	1.27	10.00	5.50	0.00	19.63	11.89	0.00	21.04	13.30	0.00
24	1.53	1.91	2.09	10.00	10.00	0.90	32.39	32.39	7.94	34.30	34.30	9.85
25	2.44	3.06	1.54	10.00	0.28	0.00	23.92	3.28	0.00	26.98	6.34	0.00
26	3.23	4.04	1.59	3.73	0.00	0.00	12.28	0.00	0.00	16.32	0.00	0.00
27	1.26	1.57	1.84	9.08	0.00	0.00	25.89	0.00	0.00	27.47	0.00	0.00
28	1.52	1.90	1.55	6.20	0.00	0.00	15.45	0.00	0.00	17.36	0.00	0.00
29	2.05	2.56	1.41	4.32	0.00	0.00	11.69	0.00	0.00	14.25	0.00	0.00
30	0.77	0.97	1.97	9.04	0.00	0.00	27.51	0.00	0.00	28.48	0.00	0.00
31	1.73	2.16	1.22	10.00	6.46	0.00	18.84	12.36	0.00	21.00	14.52	0.00
32	0.89	1.12	0.95	9.16	0.00	0.00	13.54	0.00	0.00	14.66	0.00	0.00
33	1.24	1.55	1.34	9.33	0.00	0.00	19.33	0.00	0.00	20.88	0.00	0.00
34	1.29	1.61	1.27	10.00	6.46	0.00	19.64	12.89	0.00	21.25	14.50	0.00
35	1.84	2.30	1.10	10.00	10.00	2.52	17.11	17.11	7.01	19.41	19.41	9.31
36	0.75	0.94	1.76	10.00	8.31	0.00	27.26	22.64	0.00	28.20	23.58	0.00
37	1.96	2.45	1.35	10.00	3.84	0.00	20.94	10.59	0.00	23.39	13.04	0.00
38	1.27	1.59	1.08	10.00	4.31	0.00	16.69	8.95	0.00	18.27	10.53	0.00
39	1.33	1.67	2.86	10.00	0.59	0.00	44.35	8.82	0.00	46.02	10.49	0.00
40	0.86	1.07	1.91	10.00	2.09	0.00	29.66	11.07	0.00	30.73	12.14	0.00
41	0.58	0.73	0.91	10.00	8.69	0.00	14.14	12.29	0.00	14.87	13.02	0.00
42	0.81	1.02	1.30	10.00	4.88	0.00	20.19	11.51	0.00	21.20	12.53	0.00
43	0.69	0.86	1.38	10.00	7.60	0.00	21.40	16.26	0.00	22.25	17.12	0.00
44	1.46	1.83	1.57	10.00	6.75	0.00	24.34	16.44	0.00	26.16	18.26	0.00
45	1.76	2.20	1.79	5.03	0.00	0.00	16.02	0.00	0.00	18.22	0.00	0.00
46	1.15	1.43	1.36	10.00	0.14	0.00	21.04	2.02	0.00	22.47	3.45	0.00
47	2.00	2.50	0.79	10.00	0.21	0.00	12.23	1.44	0.00	14.73	3.95	0.00
48	1.64	2.05	1.25	10.00	6.59	0.00	19.42	12.87	0.00	21.46	14.91	0.00
49	1.55	1.94	1.82	4.33	0.00	0.00	15.16	0.00	0.00	17.10	0.00	0.00
50	1.90	2.37	1.19	10.00	3.41	0.00	18.45	8.80	0.00	20.82	11.17	0.00

The daily volatility σ_i and the daily participation rate $x_i(h)$ are expressed in %, whereas the bid-ask spread s_i and the unit transaction costs $\boldsymbol{c}_i^s$, $\boldsymbol{c}_i^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(x_i(h))$ and $\boldsymbol{c}_i(x_i(h))$ are measured in bps.

Table 17: Computation of the total transaction cost $\mathcal{TC}_i(q_i(h))$ (large-cap portfolio, TNA = €1 bn, $\mathcal{R} = 80\%$, vertical slicing)

i	$Q_i(h)$			$\mathcal{TC}_i(q_i(h))$			$\mathcal{TC}_i(q_i)$
1	13 431 247.44	0.00	0.00	31 936.75	0.00	0.00	31 936.75
2	14 797 877.75	3 895 507.45	0.00	47 874.31	5 830.54	0.00	53 704.85
3	9 039 749.24	8 195 352.52	0.00	13 523.51	11 248.99	0.00	24 772.50
4	14 745 920.00	1 768 256.00	0.00	39 081.24	1 467.05	0.00	40 548.28
5	15 084 994.98	5 897 400.22	0.00	33 877.67	7 212.12	0.00	41 089.78
6	9 456 281.91	2 225 300.95	0.00	25 712.16	2 554.23	0.00	28 266.39
7	52 722 285.84	20 760 568.56	0.00	170 729.19	36 278.74	0.00	207 007.93
8	10 640 799.22	2 082 755.76	0.00	20 480.97	1 616.00	0.00	22 096.97
9	14 406 798.10	0.00	0.00	29 198.99	0.00	0.00	29 198.99
10	14 549 862.56	0.00	0.00	30 872.51	0.00	0.00	30 872.51
11	12 125 542.68	0.00	0.00	20 112.48	0.00	0.00	20 112.48
12	7 088 018.40	0.00	0.00	10 535.97	0.00	0.00	10 535.97
13	9 525 929.25	0.00	0.00	23 421.99	0.00	0.00	23 421.99
14	13 736 468.04	3 044 931.81	0.00	36 592.48	3 319.27	0.00	39 911.75
15	5 931 230.80	2 397 647.47	0.00	12 772.78	2 855.88	0.00	15 628.67
16	17 827 314.96	0.00	0.00	39 565.34	0.00	0.00	39 565.34
17	8 851 613.27	385 616.84	0.00	17 902.33	204.55	0.00	18 106.88
18	4 899 454.56	2 039 218.72	0.00	9 079.77	2 201.99	0.00	11 281.76
19	13 483 152.93	0.00	0.00	26 283.29	0.00	0.00	26 283.29
20	13 165 516.88	0.00	0.00	23 292.62	0.00	0.00	23 292.62
21	14 302 963.10	0.00	0.00	23 351.72	0.00	0.00	23 351.72
22	7 738 581.10	0.00	0.00	8 966.85	0.00	0.00	8 966.85
23	8 498 610.04	4 674 981.41	0.00	17 880.92	6 216.75	0.00	24 097.67
24	3 519 016.56	3 519 016.56	317 256.48	12 069.30	12 069.30	312.50	24 451.10
25	14 674 609.30	414 997.90	0.00	39 590.09	263.12	0.00	39 853.21
26	8 739 631.08	0.00	0.00	14 262.89	0.00	0.00	14 262.89
27	13 262 417.36	0.00	0.00	36 426.36	0.00	0.00	36 426.36
28	12 934 487.37	0.00	0.00	22 448.98	0.00	0.00	22 448.98
29	11 262 967.08	0.00	0.00	16 047.96	0.00	0.00	16 047.96
30	12 035 401.36	0.00	0.00	34 275.96	0.00	0.00	34 275.96
31	4 518 723.35	2 919 220.82	0.00	9 487.95	4 238.94	0.00	13 726.89
32	5 878 639.86	0.00	0.00	8 618.38	0.00	0.00	8 618.38
33	9 448 008.50	0.00	0.00	19 728.26	0.00	0.00	19 728.26
34	14 652 668.17	9 469 593.95	0.00	31 129.91	13 728.40	0.00	44 858.31
35	15 736 486.14	15 736 486.14	3 960 180.36	30 551.75	30 551.75	3 687.74	64 791.24
36	24 487 898.22	20 342 434.50	0.00	69 044.22	47 969.50	0.00	117 013.72
37	6 523 350.24	2 502 965.28	0.00	15 259.67	3 264.04	0.00	18 523.71
38	7 302 001.33	3 147 798.19	0.00	13 344.15	3 315.46	0.00	16 659.62
39	16 344 458.53	969 749.90	0.00	75 209.91	1 016.95	0.00	76 226.86
40	9 063 017.15	1 894 321.22	0.00	27 848.80	2 299.77	0.00	30 148.57
41	13 340 445.60	11 597 067.15	0.00	19 838.80	15 102.83	0.00	34 941.63
42	23 484 222.00	11 453 288.16	0.00	49 789.93	14 346.06	0.00	64 135.98
43	12 192 259.58	9 266 017.22	0.00	27 133.61	15 862.95	0.00	42 996.55
44	15 887 935.58	10 732 230.56	0.00	41 565.42	19 601.77	0.00	61 167.20
45	9 131 848.08	0.00	0.00	16 635.12	0.00	0.00	16 635.12
46	28 557 468.59	394 244.27	0.00	64 179.58	136.08	0.00	64 315.65
47	4 880 981.79	102 102.75	0.00	7 191.19	40.30	0.00	7 231.49
48	8 365 245.01	5 509 632.84	0.00	17 955.14	8 216.72	0.00	26 171.86
49	9 030 624.10	0.00	0.00	15 446.58	0.00	0.00	15 446.58
50	5 278 667.08	1 800 165.56	0.00	10 989.73	2 010.43	0.00	13 000.16
Total	626 583 692.07	169 138 870.69	4 277 436.84	1 459 115.46	275 040.48	4 000.24	1 738 156.17

All the metrics are expressed in €.

Table 18: Break-down of the total transaction cost $\mathcal{TC}(q)$ (large-cap portfolio, TNA = €1 bn, $\mathcal{R} = 80\%$, vertical slicing)

i	$\mathcal{TC}_i(q_i)$	$\mathcal{TC}_i^s(q_i)$	$\mathcal{TC}_i^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(q_i)$
1	31 936.75	1 489.58	30 447.17
2	53 704.85	4 549.60	49 155.26
3	24 772.50	3 015.24	21 757.26
4	40 548.28	1 848.88	38 699.40
5	41 089.78	3 275.63	37 814.15
6	28 266.39	1 370.18	26 896.21
7	207 007.93	13 308.25	193 699.67
8	22 096.97	1 605.70	20 491.27
9	29 198.99	3 006.93	26 192.06
10	30 872.51	4 200.63	26 671.88
11	20 112.48	1 218.50	18 893.98
12	10 535.97	1 361.34	9 174.63
13	23 421.99	1 374.67	22 047.31
14	39 911.75	1 800.42	38 111.33
15	15 628.67	1 267.64	14 361.03
16	39 565.34	3 937.82	35 627.51
17	18 106.88	2 068.53	16 038.35
18	11 281.76	1 519.24	9 762.52
19	26 283.29	1 585.06	24 698.23
20	23 292.62	1 032.23	22 260.39
21	23 351.72	2 478.33	20 873.38
22	8 966.85	1 558.94	7 407.91
23	24 097.67	1 859.21	22 238.47
24	24 451.10	1 404.75	23 046.35
25	39 853.21	4 610.61	35 242.60
26	14 262.89	3 533.16	10 729.73
27	36 426.36	2 087.65	34 338.71
28	22 448.98	2 463.90	19 985.08
29	16 047.96	2 883.21	13 164.75
30	34 275.96	1 164.15	33 111.82
31	13 726.89	1 603.83	12 123.05
32	8 618.38	656.86	7 961.52
33	19 728.26	1 466.90	18 261.36
34	44 858.31	3 876.68	40 981.63
35	64 791.24	8 161.31	56 629.92
36	117 013.72	4 206.10	112 807.62
37	18 523.71	2 209.30	16 314.41
38	16 659.62	1 657.44	15 002.18
39	76 226.86	2 885.32	73 341.54
40	30 148.57	1 171.36	28 977.21
41	34 941.63	1 817.07	33 124.56
42	64 135.98	3 548.54	60 587.44
43	42 996.55	1 842.10	41 154.45
44	61 167.20	4 859.11	56 308.09
45	16 635.12	2 004.83	14 630.29
46	64 315.65	4 148.76	60 166.89
47	7 231.49	1 247.02	5 984.47
48	26 171.86	2 839.95	23 331.90
49	15 446.58	1 752.57	13 694.02
50	13 000.16	1 679.36	11 320.80
Total	1 738 156.17	132 514.40	1 605 641.78

All the metrics are expressed in €.

Table 19: Stress testing — Liquidation portfolio $q_i\,(h)$ (large-cap portfolio, TNA = €1 bn, $\mathcal{R} = 80\%$, vertical slicing)

i	q_i	q_i^+	$q_i\,(1)$	$q_i\,(2)$	$q_i\,(3)$	$q_i\,(4)$	$q_i\,(5)$
1	47 284.80	25 742.10	25 742.10	21 542.70	0.00	0.00	0.00
2	7 106.40	2 812.75	2 812.75	2 812.75	1 480.90	0.00	0.00
3	120 021.60	31 475.45	31 475.45	31 475.45	31 475.45	25 595.25	0.00
4	147 448.00	65 830.00	65 830.00	65 830.00	15 788.00	0.00	0.00
5	104 416.00	37 534.20	37 534.20	37 534.20	29 347.60	0.00	0.00
6	214 498.40	86 818.60	86 818.60	86 818.60	40 861.20	0.00	0.00
7	105 216.00	37 745.05	37 745.05	37 745.05	29 725.90	0.00	0.00
8	521 136.80	217 915.20	217 915.20	217 915.20	85 306.40	0.00	0.00
9	2 553 944.00	2 706 536.05	2 553 944.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
10	4 435 257.60	3 618 552.00	3 618 552.00	816 705.60	0.00	0.00	0.00
11	193 853.60	123 652.00	123 652.00	70 201.60	0.00	0.00	0.00
12	145 440.00	122 206.50	122 206.50	23 233.50	0.00	0.00	0.00
13	109 067.20	59 152.65	59 152.65	49 914.55	0.00	0.00	0.00
14	292 053.60	119 530.70	119 530.70	119 530.70	52 992.20	0.00	0.00
15	201 375.20	71 702.50	71 702.50	71 702.50	57 970.20	0.00	0.00
16	212 609.60	133 642.30	133 642.30	78 967.30	0.00	0.00	0.00
17	164 832.80	78 975.85	78 975.85	78 975.85	6 881.10	0.00	0.00
18	48 118.40	16 988.40	16 988.40	16 988.40	14 141.60	0.00	0.00
19	249 503.20	126 807.35	126 807.35	122 695.85	0.00	0.00	0.00
20	821 202.40	461 265.55	461 265.55	359 936.85	0.00	0.00	0.00
21	1 967 395.20	1 525 902.30	1 525 902.30	441 492.90	0.00	0.00	0.00
22	636 187.20	970 973.35	636 187.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
23	76 209.60	24 582.35	24 582.35	24 582.35	24 582.35	2 462.55	0.00
24	44 416.00	10 625.05	10 625.05	10 625.05	10 625.05	10 625.05	1 915.80
25	1 472 156.80	715 834.60	715 834.60	715 834.60	40 487.60	0.00	0.00
26	281 469.60	377 150.70	281 469.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
27	330 733.60	182 186.50	182 186.50	148 547.10	0.00	0.00	0.00
28	988 724.00	797 724.35	797 724.35	190 999.65	0.00	0.00	0.00
29	4 619 756.80	5 347 110.30	4 619 756.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
30	18 490.40	10 231.40	10 231.40	8 259.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
31	129 445.60	39 320.60	39 320.60	39 320.60	39 320.60	11 483.80	0.00
32	209 316.00	114 264.35	114 264.35	95 051.65	0.00	0.00	0.00
33	232 337.60	124 498.55	124 498.55	107 839.05	0.00	0.00	0.00
34	61 309.60	18 620.75	18 620.75	18 620.75	18 620.75	5 447.35	0.00
35	130 364.80	28 948.65	28 948.65	28 948.65	28 948.65	28 948.65	14 570.20
36	66 741.60	18 228.30	18 228.30	18 228.30	18 228.30	12 056.70	0.00
37	35 480.80	12 821.05	12 821.05	12 821.05	9 838.70	0.00	0.00
38	51 963.20	18 155.15	18 155.15	18 155.15	15 652.90	0.00	0.00
39	226 240.80	106 784.65	106 784.65	106 784.65	12 671.50	0.00	0.00
40	96 049.60	39 722.20	39 722.20	39 722.20	16 605.20	0.00	0.00
41	290 004.80	77 569.75	77 569.75	77 569.75	77 569.75	57 295.55	0.00
42	276 623.20	92 970.00	92 970.00	92 970.00	90 683.20	0.00	0.00
43	144 112.00	40 941.10	40 941.10	40 941.10	40 941.10	21 288.70	0.00
44	190 361.60	56 807.55	56 807.55	56 807.55	56 807.55	19 938.95	0.00
45	528 280.00	524 898.75	524 898.75	3 381.25	0.00	0.00	0.00
46	668 708.00	329 801.00	329 801.00	329 801.00	9 106.00	0.00	0.00
47	198 371.20	97 153.30	97 153.30	97 153.30	4 064.60	0.00	0.00
48	151 356.80	45 626.95	45 626.95	45 626.95	45 626.95	14 475.95	0.00
49	46 363.20	53 587.45	46 363.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
50	130 944.00	48 822.30	48 822.30	48 822.30	33 299.40	0.00	0.00

Table 20: Stress testing — Participation rate $x_i(h)$ and unit transaction cost $\boldsymbol{c}_i(x_i(h))$ (large-cap portfolio, TNA = €1 bn, $\mathcal{R} = 80\%$, vertical slicing)

i	s_i	σ_i	$x_i(h)$					$\boldsymbol{c}_i(x_i(h))$				
1	8.89	2.83	10.00	8.37	0.00	0.00	0.00	55.01	47.85	0.00	0.00	0.00
2	9.95	3.17	10.00	10.00	5.26	0.00	0.00	61.57	61.57	41.54	0.00	0.00
3	9.40	2.09	10.00	10.00	10.00	8.13	0.00	44.18	44.18	44.18	38.12	0.00
4	8.90	2.88	10.00	10.00	2.40	0.00	0.00	55.72	55.72	28.95	0.00	0.00
5	9.25	2.59	10.00	10.00	7.82	0.00	0.00	51.67	51.67	42.92	0.00	0.00
6	8.94	2.92	10.00	10.00	4.71	0.00	0.00	56.41	56.41	36.51	0.00	0.00
7	9.45	3.21	10.00	10.00	7.88	0.00	0.00	61.60	61.60	51.02	0.00	0.00
8	9.01	2.40	10.00	10.00	3.91	0.00	0.00	48.46	48.46	30.27	0.00	0.00
9	9.67	3.33	9.44	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	60.81	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
10	10.31	3.09	10.00	2.26	0.00	0.00	0.00	60.78	31.47	0.00	0.00	0.00
11	8.80	2.52	10.00	5.68	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.10	35.06	0.00	0.00	0.00
12	9.54	2.57	10.00	1.90	0.00	0.00	0.00	51.69	26.08	0.00	0.00	0.00
13	9.15	2.86	10.00	8.44	0.00	0.00	0.00	55.76	48.84	0.00	0.00	0.00
14	8.86	2.89	10.00	10.00	4.43	0.00	0.00	55.85	55.85	35.42	0.00	0.00
15	9.22	2.53	10.00	10.00	8.08	0.00	0.00	50.75	50.75	43.24	0.00	0.00
16	9.77	2.86	10.00	5.91	0.00	0.00	0.00	56.55	40.04	0.00	0.00	0.00
17	9.79	2.40	10.00	10.00	0.87	0.00	0.00	49.44	49.44	21.21	0.00	0.00
18	9.75	2.30	10.00	10.00	8.32	0.00	0.00	47.75	47.75	41.79	0.00	0.00
19	8.94	2.44	10.00	9.68	0.00	0.00	0.00	49.01	47.78	0.00	0.00	0.00
20	8.63	2.47	10.00	7.80	0.00	0.00	0.00	48.99	40.60	0.00	0.00	0.00
21	9.39	2.68	10.00	2.89	0.00	0.00	0.00	53.21	29.95	0.00	0.00	0.00
22	9.61	2.56	6.55	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	38.25	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
23	9.13	2.51	10.00	10.00	10.00	1.00	0.00	50.26	50.26	50.26	21.45	0.00
24	9.53	3.33	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	1.80	63.51	63.51	63.51	63.51	29.80
25	10.44	2.78	10.00	10.00	0.57	0.00	0.00	56.19	56.19	21.43	0.00	0.00
26	11.23	2.83	7.46	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	46.75	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
27	9.26	3.08	10.00	8.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	59.31	50.50	0.00	0.00	0.00
28	9.52	2.79	10.00	2.39	0.00	0.00	0.00	55.16	29.19	0.00	0.00	0.00
29	10.05	2.65	8.64	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	47.98	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
30	8.77	3.21	10.00	8.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	60.63	51.06	0.00	0.00	0.00
31	9.73	2.46	10.00	10.00	10.00	2.92	0.00	50.21	50.21	50.21	28.95	0.00
32	8.89	2.19	10.00	8.32	0.00	0.00	0.00	45.12	39.40	0.00	0.00	0.00
33	9.24	2.58	10.00	8.66	0.00	0.00	0.00	51.48	46.14	0.00	0.00	0.00
34	9.29	2.51	10.00	10.00	10.00	2.93	0.00	50.46	50.46	50.46	28.77	0.00
35	9.84	2.34	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	5.03	48.63	48.63	48.63	48.63	33.35
36	8.75	3.00	10.00	10.00	10.00	6.61	0.00	57.41	57.41	57.41	41.80	0.00
37	9.96	2.59	10.00	10.00	7.67	0.00	0.00	52.61	52.61	43.27	0.00	0.00
38	9.27	2.32	10.00	10.00	8.62	0.00	0.00	47.49	47.49	42.54	0.00	0.00
39	9.33	4.10	10.00	10.00	1.19	0.00	0.00	75.23	75.23	29.54	0.00	0.00
40	8.86	3.15	10.00	10.00	4.18	0.00	0.00	59.94	59.94	36.87	0.00	0.00
41	8.58	2.15	10.00	10.00	10.00	7.39	0.00	44.09	44.09	44.09	35.37	0.00
42	8.81	2.54	10.00	10.00	9.75	0.00	0.00	50.42	50.42	49.45	0.00	0.00
43	8.69	2.62	10.00	10.00	10.00	5.20	0.00	51.47	51.47	51.47	34.77	0.00
44	9.46	2.81	10.00	10.00	10.00	3.51	0.00	55.38	55.38	55.38	32.89	0.00
45	9.76	3.03	10.00	0.06	0.00	0.00	0.00	59.07	15.27	0.00	0.00	0.00
46	9.15	2.60	10.00	10.00	0.28	0.00	0.00	51.69	51.69	16.89	0.00	0.00
47	10.00	2.03	10.00	10.00	0.42	0.00	0.00	43.95	43.95	17.75	0.00	0.00
48	9.64	2.49	10.00	10.00	10.00	3.17	0.00	50.68	50.68	50.68	29.81	0.00
49	9.55	3.06	8.65	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	53.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
50	9.90	2.43	10.00	10.00	6.82	0.00	0.00	50.03	50.03	38.06	0.00	0.00

The daily volatility σ_i and the daily participation rate $x_i(h)$ are expressed in %, whereas the bid-ask spread s_i and the unit transaction costs $\boldsymbol{c}_i(x_i(h))$ are measured in bps.

Table 21: Stress testing — Break-down of the total transaction cost $\mathcal{TC}(q)$ (large-cap portfolio, TNA = €1 bn, $\mathcal{R} = 80\%$, vertical slicing)

i	$\mathcal{TC}_i(q_i)$	$\mathcal{TC}_i^s(q_i)$	$\mathcal{TC}_i^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(q_i)$
1	69 498.63	14 920.83	54 577.80
2	107 290.00	23 242.98	84 047.02
3	73 910.28	20 250.34	53 659.94
4	87 281.60	18 363.05	68 918.54
5	103 263.27	24 258.03	79 005.24
6	61 463.65	13 051.76	48 411.89
7	430 680.96	86 791.11	343 889.85
8	57 872.23	14 329.25	43 542.97
9	87 604.76	17 413.73	70 191.03
10	80 581.70	18 750.49	61 831.21
11	54 141.87	13 344.04	40 797.83
12	33 736.06	8 449.35	25 286.71
13	50 102.25	10 900.60	39 201.65
14	87 508.74	18 581.82	68 926.92
15	40 467.87	9 596.51	30 871.36
16	89 878.23	21 765.14	68 113.09
17	44 580.36	11 305.76	33 274.60
18	31 915.40	8 457.91	23 457.49
19	65 268.45	15 068.21	50 200.23
20	59 659.28	14 197.75	45 461.53
21	68 639.06	16 781.30	51 857.76
22	29 601.62	9 297.52	20 304.10
23	64 977.96	15 032.80	49 945.16
24	45 645.94	8 760.04	36 885.90
25	83 351.95	19 700.22	63 651.73
26	40 860.80	12 272.79	28 588.01
27	73 414.82	15 350.07	58 064.75
28	64 855.26	15 398.39	49 456.88
29	54 038.96	14 146.18	39 892.79
30	67 823.25	13 199.55	54 623.71
31	35 944.56	9 041.78	26 902.78
32	24 997.62	6 535.50	18 462.12
33	46 297.30	10 914.91	35 382.39
34	117 072.56	27 998.94	89 073.61
35	166 258.54	43 594.46	122 664.07
36	244 729.74	49 036.44	195 693.30
37	45 147.21	11 235.62	33 911.59
38	48 068.44	12 107.24	35 961.21
39	125 825.97	20 199.53	105 626.44
40	61 311.15	12 128.69	49 182.46
41	105 645.33	26 754.59	78 890.75
42	175 033.80	38 486.05	136 547.75
43	105 152.21	23 300.38	81 851.83
44	141 145.26	31 479.28	109 665.98
45	53 687.02	11 136.67	42 550.35
46	148 277.36	33 100.47	115 176.89
47	21 632.44	6 230.10	15 402.34
48	67 548.14	16 714.83	50 833.30
49	47 858.61	10 783.19	37 075.42
50	33 262.97	8 758.19	24 504.78
Total	4 124 811.45	932 514.40	3 192 297.05

All the metrics are expressed in €.

Table 22: Break-down of the total transaction cost $\mathcal{TC}(q)$ (bond portfolio, TNA = \$10 bn, $\mathcal{R} = 30\%$, vertical slicing)

i	$\mathcal{TC}_i(q_i)$	$\mathcal{TC}_i^s(q_i)$	$\mathcal{TC}_i^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(q_i)$
1	36 012.29	27 024.52	8 987.77
2	69 885.29	24 800.97	45 084.32
3	82 529.58	18 176.19	64 353.39
4	255 188.46	38 211.29	216 977.17
5	212 256.83	22 015.86	190 240.97
6	199 177.04	30 303.07	168 873.97
7	457 182.39	41 144.08	416 038.31
8	475 933.42	40 815.04	435 118.38
9	448 409.64	40 395.89	408 013.75
10	783 664.66	48 917.74	734 746.92
11	1 897 014.61	103 729.21	1 793 285.40
12	26 113.54	19 565.90	6 547.64
13	43 144.34	32 107.29	11 037.05
14	26 290.67	20 129.36	6 161.31
15	41 572.40	30 568.34	11 004.05
16	23 824.88	18 036.70	5 788.18
17	34 493.76	23 537.39	10 956.36
18	27 033.64	17 468.42	9 565.22
19	24 224.80	11 622.52	12 602.29
20	152 183.10	97 077.07	55 106.03
21	140 308.97	32 858.89	107 450.08
22	43 327.04	29 928.35	13 398.69
23	145 124.09	93 662.76	51 461.33
24	103 949.26	45 925.79	58 023.47
25	168 041.37	93 341.29	74 700.07
26	356 675.94	249 091.31	107 584.63
27	63 633.66	42 415.08	21 218.57
28	94 233.98	60 949.31	33 284.67
29	175 895.36	95 194.98	80 700.38
30	80 175.43	51 658.16	28 517.28
31	112 149.16	31 629.01	80 520.15
32	78 265.60	51 043.74	27 221.86
33	92 505.62	50 775.40	41 730.22
34	170 309.73	87 616.82	82 692.91
35	165 002.62	74 146.13	90 856.49
36	152 015.61	61 150.66	90 864.95
37	168 452.93	93 327.29	75 125.64
38	211 293.24	76 086.97	135 206.27
39	206 312.96	87 322.85	118 990.11
40	150 154.94	73 418.95	76 735.99
41	232 066.72	90 497.82	141 568.90
42	174 454.08	110 679.19	63 774.90
43	517 530.40	235 206.50	282 323.90
44	331 010.74	194 346.51	136 664.23
45	550 434.34	280 040.49	270 393.85
46	270 117.83	99 756.39	170 361.44
47	410 992.48	123 563.71	287 428.78
Total	10 680 569.46	3 321 281.21	7 359 288.25

All the metrics are expressed in \$.

Table 23: Break-down of the total transaction cost $\mathcal{TC}(q)$ (bond portfolio, TNA = \$10 bn, $\mathcal{R} = 30\%$, vertical slicing)

h	$\mathcal{TC}_i(q;h)$	$\mathcal{TC}_i^s(q;h)$	$\mathcal{TC}_i^{\boldsymbol{\pi}}(q;h)$
1	2 474 425.38	662 994.50	1 811 430.88
2	2 474 425.38	662 994.50	1 811 430.88
3	2 088 332.97	625 380.98	1 462 951.99
4	1 671 552.80	521 194.84	1 150 357.97
5	961 444.93	309 791.04	651 653.89
6	298 303.99	130 259.49	168 044.50
7	129 808.94	70 773.73	59 035.21
8	77 556.19	44 594.76	32 961.43
9	43 809.26	25 534.82	18 274.44
10	39 588.86	22 734.00	16 854.86
11	39 588.86	22 734.00	16 854.86
12	39 588.86	22 734.00	16 854.86
13	39 588.86	22 734.00	16 854.86
14	39 588.86	22 734.00	16 854.86
15	39 588.86	22 734.00	16 854.86
16	39 588.86	22 734.00	16 854.86
17	39 588.86	22 734.00	16 854.86
18	39 588.86	22 734.00	16 854.86
19	39 588.86	22 734.00	16 854.86
20	31 558.10	18 425.29	13 132.81
21	20 125.95	13 466.70	6 659.24
22	6 611.72	4 216.50	2 395.22
23	6 611.72	4 216.50	2 395.22
24	113.52	97.57	15.95
25	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total	10 680 569.46	3 321 281.21	7 359 288.25

All the metrics are expressed in \$.

Figure 13: Liquidation ratio $\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$ in % (equity portfolio, vertical slicing)



Figure 14: Liquidation ratio $\mathcal{LR}(q;h)$ in % (small-cap portfolio, vertical slicing)



Figure 15: Liquidation time $h^+ = \mathcal{LR}^{-1}(q; 99\%)$ in number of trading days (small-cap portfolio, vertical slicing)



Figure 16: Transaction cost of the large-cap portfolio (TNA = €5 bn)



Figure 17: Normal redemption coverage ratio (bond portfolio, $\mathcal{R} = 30\%$, $m_{Q^+} = 1.0$)



Figure 18: Stressed redemption coverage ratio (bond portfolio, $\mathcal{R} = 30\%$, $m_{Q^+} = 0.5$)